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Abstract 
 
This thesis provides empirical evidence on the degree of banking sector competition in the 
Central and East European (CEE) countries and the impact of competition on banks’ risk-
taking and interest margins. The thesis uses data on around 300 banks from 17 CEE countries 
for the period 1999-2009, and employs a variety of estimation methodologies. The first 
objective of the thesis is to measure the degree of banking sector competition in CEE 
countries. Using the Panzar-Rosse approach, we found that the banking sectors of the CEE 
countries have been characterized by monopoly behaviour. By distinguishing between the 
non-EU and EU countries of the region, we found that banks operating in the non-EU 
countries faced a lower degree of competition compared to banks operating in the EU 
members of the region. The separate estimation for Kosovo indicated that the competitive 
behaviour of banks operating in this country was consistent with monopolistic competition. 
The second objective of the thesis is to estimate the impact of banking sector competition on 
the degree of banks’ risk-taking. Using country-level Panzar-Rosse H-statistic estimates as a 
measure of competition, for the overall sample, we found that competition enhances the 
quality of the loan portfolio, thus providing evidence against the mainstream view on the 
trade-off between competition and stability. However, for the non-EU countries of our 
sample the impact of competition on banks’ risk-taking appeared positive, which implies that 
more effective authorities are needed in these countries to oversee the banks’ behaviour when 
competitive pressures increase. The third objective of the thesis is to estimate the impact of 
banking sector competition on banks’ interest margins. The results suggest that competition 
had a negative impact on net interest margins. The impact of competition in reducing the net 
interest margins was stronger in the non-EU countries compared to the EU countries of the 
sample. Overall, the results suggest that the banking sectors of the CEE countries are 
characterized by low levels of competition, implying higher risk and larger interest margin. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis aims at exploring the degree of banking sector competition in the Central and East 
European (CEE) countries, and the economic effects that have been associated with banking 
sector competition. More specifically, the main objectives of the thesis are: a) to estimate the 
degree of banking sector competition in the CEE countries; b) to estimate the relationship 
between banking sector competition and banks’ loan portfolio quality as a proxy of banks’ 
risk-taking; and c) to estimate the relationship between banking sector competition and net 
interest margin which is a measure of financial intermediation cost and efficiency. A more 
extensive elaboration and justification of the objectives of this thesis is provided in the rest of 
this chapter. 
The primary role of a banking system is to “bridge” the resources from savers to borrowers, 
i.e. to transform savers’ deposits into loans for the investors. This role makes the banking 
system to be considered among the most important sectors that determine the performance of 
a country’s economy. In the empirical literature there is a broad consensus that well-
functioning financial intermediaries lead to higher economic growth (Bonin and Wachtel, 
2002). However, the credit allocation role does not necessarily lead to higher economic 
growth if it is not based on prudential lending principles that secure an efficient allocation of 
resources (Wachtel, 2001). Such banking systems - able to provide efficient financial 
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intermediation - have been operating in the modern economies for quite a long time; whereas 
in the transition economies of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) they are relatively new.
1
 
The creation of modern commercial banking sectors in the CEE countries started to take 
place mainly after the beginning of the transition process in the early 1990s, when the 
monobank systems were broken up and two-tier banking systems were established. However, 
the creation of the two-tier banking systems, composed of a central bank and commercial 
banks, was not sufficient to build stable banking systems that could efficiently exercise their 
financial intermediation role. The new banking systems mainly consisted of state-owned 
banks that inherited large stocks of bad loans from the previous monobank system, while 
continued to base their new activity on the “old” practices by lending to inefficient state-
owned enterprises and without following adequate risk-management procedures. The 
imprudent behaviour of banks, associated also with macroeconomic instability and weak 
institutions, led to banking crises in almost all the CEE countries. The situation was 
normalized after a decade of costly restructuring programmes by the governments, and deep 
reforms which eventually led to a large-scale privatization of state-owned banks to foreign 
banks. Progress was recorded also in restoring macroeconomic stability and in developing the 
legal and regulatory institutions which, nevertheless, might be considered to have recorded a 
rather slow progress. As a result, during the second decade of transition, the banking sectors 
of the CEE countries became both more stable and more efficient, which was reflected in a 
continuous decline of non-performing loans and interest rate spreads. The banking sectors in 
the CEE countries have become a driving force of economic activity, especially given the 
underdeveloped equity markets, which makes the economy much more dependent on 
                                                          
1
 Central and Eastern Europe in this study is referred to the following European transition economies: Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.  
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financial intermediation from the banking sector. However, in spite of the progress, the 
banking sectors of the CEE countries (especially those of the non-EU countries) continue to 
lag behind the banking sectors of the Euro Area both in terms of the depth of financial 
intermediation and the financial intermediation efficiency. 
One of the factors that are considered to be highly relevant for the development and 
efficiency of the banking sector is the degree of banking sector competition. Competition is 
generally viewed as the driving force of efficiency and a promoter of wider financial 
inclusion. However, the relevance of competition is attributed also to its potential role in the 
stability of the banking system, with the mainstream view claiming that competition leads 
banks to higher risk-taking. The interest of both academics and policy makers in banking 
sector competition has been reignited by the recent global financial crisis, with many 
believing that competition has contributed to the incidence of the crisis. The increased 
attention on banking sector competition can be noticed also by the changing mandate of the 
central banks which, apart from their traditional mandate to maintain price and financial 
stability, are increasingly broadening their agenda on areas dealing with other effects of 
banking activity that, in a way or the other, are related to competition. For example, the 
World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, updated in 2011, reports that 71 
percent of the central banks claim that financial inclusion and economic development are 
included in their mandate (World Bank, 2013). In addition, 65 percent of the central banks 
report dealing with market conduct issues, and 25 percent report that competition policy is 
included in their agenda.  
Before the transition process began, competition in the banking sectors of the CEE countries 
may be considered to have been non-existent or very limited, and the break-up of the 
monobank systems in the beginning of transition mainly resulted in the creation of 
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oligopolistic market structures (Papi and Revloltella, 1999). The entry of private banks and 
the eventual privatization of the state-owned banks to foreign banks led to a substantial 
increase in the number of banks, while the degree of market concentration started to decline, 
which might potentially be interpreted as an increase of competition. However, these 
structural features of the banking market may not adequately indicate whether the banking 
sectors of the CEE countries became competitive, given that they do not represent a direct 
measure of competitive behaviour. 
The rapid changes that took place in the banking sectors of the CEE countries after the break-
up of the centrally-planned monobank systems, which were associated with deep reforms that 
led to substantial changes in bank behaviour and the market structure of the banking sectors, 
as well as the pivotal role of the banking sector as an important driver of economic activity in 
these countries, make the banking sectors of the CEE countries an interesting area of 
research. One of the least explored dimensions of the banking sectors of the CEE countries, 
but which is viewed as a highly important determinant for the way in which a banking sector 
serves the economy, is banking sector competition. Therefore, as presented at the beginning 
of this chapter, this thesis aims at estimating the degree of banking sector competition in the 
CEE countries, and the impact of competition on the degree of banks’ risk-taking and interest 
margins. Apart from contributing to the broadly inconclusive literature on the economic 
effects of competition, the findings of this thesis may also be important for shaping the 
attitude of the regulatory authorities towards the banking sector competition. 
Before starting to explore banking sector competition and its effects in the CEE countries, the 
thesis initially addresses the issues related to the measurement of competition. The literature 
on the measurement of competition is divided into two streams, consisting of the structural 
approach for the measurement of competition and the non-structural approach. The structural 
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approach is mainly based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm, which uses 
the degree of market concentration as a measure of market power. According to this 
approach, firms operating in more concentrated markets are more likely to exert market 
power and to collude with each other, thus charging higher prices and generating higher 
profits. However, this approach has been seriously challenged by different theories. For 
example, the efficient-structure hypothesis argues that higher profits in more concentrated 
markets are a result of the superior efficiency of larger firms rather than a result of market 
power. Another example is the contestability theory, according to which highly concentrated 
markets can behave competitively if the markets are contestable.  
The critiques directed at the SCP paradigm led to the development of the non-structural 
approaches for the measurement of competition, which directly quantify the competitive 
behaviour of the banks and do not appeal to structural features of the market to infer the 
competitive behaviour. The most widely used non-structural approach is the method of 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) which measures competition by estimating the elasticity of bank 
revenues with respect to changes of input prices. The sum of elasticities of the bank revenues 
to a range of input prices produces the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic which indicates whether 
banks’ behaviour is consistent with monopoly, monopolistic competition, or perfect 
competition. The value of the Panzar-Rosse approach is that it directly quantifies the 
competitive behaviour of the banks. Taking into account the critiques directed at the SCP 
paradigm on the one hand and, on the other hand, the advantages of the Panzar-Rosse method 
which produces a direct measure of the competitive behaviour, and in line with the recent 
literature that uses the Panzar-Rosse method to assess banking sector competition, we treat 
the Panzar-Rosse approach as the main method for measuring banking sector competition in 
this thesis. 
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In line with the main objectives of the thesis, in chapter 4 we apply the Panzar-Rosse method 
to estimate the extent of banking sector competition in 16 CEE countries for the period 1999-
2009. As emphasized above, banking sector competition in the CEE countries represents a 
relatively recent phenomenon that was introduced after the transition process began and, as 
such, has not extensively been addressed in the banking sector literature. Despite the 
liberalization of entry criteria and the subsequent increase in the number of banks operating 
in the CEE countries, which might be an indication of the increase of competition, still these 
countries countinue to be characterized by a lower depth of financial intermediation and 
higher interest margins than the more advanced EU countries, which may signal the presence 
of market power in the banking market. Therefore, in this chapter, our objective is to shed 
more light on the competitive behaviour of banks operating in the CEE countries. 
Competition is a highly important factor for determining the beneficial role of banks to the 
economy with respect to both financial intermediation efficiency and financial stability. 
These are important factors for the economic development and macroeconomic stability of 
every country.  Given that the sample of countries consists both of countries that have joined 
the EU and of countries that are still in the EU integration process, we expect that potential 
differences with regard to the banks’ operating environment between these two categories of 
countries may affect the competitive behaviour of the banks. Therefore, apart from estimating 
the average degree of competition for the overall sample, we also include interaction terms in 
the regression in order to test whether the competitive behaviour of banks in the non-EU 
countries is significantly different from the competitive behaviour of banks in the EU 
countries of the region.  
In addition, this is the first study to conduct a separate estimation for measuring the degree of 
competition in the banking sector of Kosovo, which is the youngest country in the region and 
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has the most-recently developed banking sector. The separate estimation of banking sector 
competition for Kosovo is undertaken, because no previous study has explicitly dealt with 
this dimension of banking activity in Kosovo, and also because of data limitations that 
imposed a slight modification to the original Panzar-Rosse approach. The estimation of 
banking sector competition for Kosovo is particularly important given that it represents the 
country with the smallest number of banks in the region, the highest degree of concentration 
in the banking market, and the highest level of interest margins, all of which have induced a 
wide public debate on whether the market is sufficiently competitive and whether measures 
that intensify banking sector competition are needed to be undertaken by the central bank.   
In both estimations, we follow Bikker et al. (2007, 2009), who make two related suggestions: 
not to scale the dependent variable to total assets; and not to include total assets as an 
explanatory variable in a Panzar-Rosse model. By doing so, we aim at eliminating the 
misspecification bias that is present in most of the studies that have applied the Panzar-Rosse 
approach to the banking sector, which are thus considered to have inadequately estimated the 
degree of competition. Both estimations will be conducted using panel data and dynamic 
models. The estimation for the CEE countries uses annual bank-level data and will be 
conducted using General Method of Moments (GMM) estimation, whereas the estimation for 
Kosovo is based on quarterly bank-level data and uses the Unobserved Components model.  
The second objective of this thesis, which is to estimate the relationship between banking 
sector competition and risk-taking, is addressed in chapter 5. The issue of bank risks is 
considered as highly important both in the literature and among the regulators primarily 
because banks’ bankruptcies are expected to be associated with much larger negative 
consequences for the economy compared to the bankruptcy of other types of firms. As a 
consequence, the economic literature has dealt extensively with the determinants of banks’ 
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risk-taking. In this context, considerable attention has been paid to the relationship between 
banking sector competition and the risk-taking behaviour of banks, with the mainstream view 
arguing that competition pushes banks to undertake higher risks (Keeley, 1990; Hellman et 
al., 2000; Marques, 2002; Repullo, 2003). Based on this view, regulators, especially in the 
past, have often undertaken measures to restrict banking sector competition, aiming at 
safeguarding banking system stability. However, the other strand of the literature argues that 
competition has a negative impact on risk, suggesting that banks operating in more 
competitive markets tend to undertake lower levels of risk (Boyd and de Nicolό, 2005; Chen, 
2007).  
The high ratios of non-performing loans in all the CEE countries, which reflected the high 
degree of risk-taking by banks, represented the main challenge during the transition process 
of the banking sector in these countries. The reasons for the high non-performing loans were 
multiple, starting from the legacies inherited from the centrally-planned economies, to the 
poor corporate management of the newly created banks and the weak institutions. In such an 
environment, where banks lacked the capacities to perform adequate risk-management and 
the institutions lacked the capacities to provide adequate regulation and supervision, the 
increase of competition might have further exacerbated the risks taken by the banks. Given 
that banking sector competition in these countries is expected to increase further as the non-
EU countries of the CEE move towards EU membership and the quality of institutions in 
many of the CEE countries is still considered to be weak,  the investigation of the relationship 
between competition and risk-taking in the banking sector is very important for a better 
understanding of the impact of competition in these countries in the past and for a better 
tailoring of banking sector competition policies in the future. 
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We investigate the relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking in the 
CEE countries by following an estimation strategy that consists of two stages. The first stage 
consists of the estimation of the degree of competition (i.e. H-statistic) for each country/year 
using the Panzar-Rosse approach. In the second stage, we use the H-statistics that were 
produced in the first stage to estimate the impact of competition on banks’ risk taking in the 
CEE countries. To our knowledge, this is the first study to use the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic in 
estimating the impact of banking sector competition on risk-taking for the CEE countries, 
while the previous studies have mostly used market concentration indices, which might not 
represent adequate measures of competition. For comparison, we use also the Lerner Index as 
a measure of market power and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a measure of market 
concentration. The degree of banks’ risk (i.e. the dependent variable) in this study is proxied 
by the loan-loss provisions to total loans ratio, which reflects the quality of the bank’s loan 
portfolio. The estimation will be conducted using the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition 
method, which is a recently introduced extension of traditional fixed effects estimation. 
The third objective of the thesis is addressed in chapter 6 and investigates the relationship 
between banking sector competition and financial intermediation costs. Financial 
intermediation costs play a highly important role for the overall economic activity of a 
country, since they directly affect the cost of capital formation and, hence, the level of 
investments. This is particularly important for the CEE and other countries that lack well-
functioning equity markets. In the absence of developed equity markets, financing options for 
enterprises are much more limited, so the economy is more dependent on financing from the 
banking sector and thus more sensitive to banks’ interest margins. In the CEE countries, 
interest margins continue to be higher than in the more advanced EU countries, thus 
negatively affecting the efficiency of financial intermediation. The theoretical and empirical 
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literature emphasizes a number of factors that are considered to have an important role in 
determining the level of interest margins. One of the most important factors is the degree of 
market competition, with most of the literature arguing that higher competition leads to lower 
interest margins (Ho and Saunders, 1981; Berger and Hannan, 1998). A few studies have 
investigated this relationship for the CEE region and have similarly found that competition 
reduces interest margins. However, the majority of empirical studies that have investigated 
the determinants of interest margins did not use a direct measure of competition but, instead, 
have relied on the market concentration indices, which have been largely criticised for not 
representing adequate measures of competition.  
Therefore, for estimating the relationship between banking sector competition and interest 
margins in the CEE countries, as a measure of competition we use the Panzar-Rosse H-
statistic for each country/year that we estimated in chapter 5. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first study to use the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic in estimating the relationship 
between banking sector competition and interest margins for the CEE countries and will 
enable a better understanding of the role of banking sector competition in the determination 
of financial intermediation efficiency in the CEE countries. For comparison, we use also the 
Lerner Index, which is a measure of market power, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a 
market concentration index that enables our results to be comparable with the results obtained 
from other studies. The regression controls also for the impact of other variables, including 
bank-specific variables, macroeconomic variables, and institutional variables. For the 
dependent variable, we follow the majority of the studies in this field that use the net interest 
margin, which is considered to be a measure of financial intermediation cost. The estimation 
will be conducted on panel data, using the General Method of Moments approach to dynamic 
panel modelling. 
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The thesis uses the data on around 300 banks from 17 CEE countries for the period 1999-
2009. The bank-specific data in this thesis are sourced from the Fitch-IBCA Bankscope 
database, which provides annual data on banks operating all around the globe. For Kosovo, 
the data are obtained from the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo, given that the 
Bankscope database includes few Kosovo banks. The data on the macroeconomic and 
institutional indicators are obtained from different sources, including the International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Commission, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and the Heritage Foundation. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the evolution of the 
banking sector in the CEE countries, including the pre-transition period and the transition 
process. Special attention is paid to the evolution of competitive conditions, risk-taking, and 
intermediation costs, which are the key areas covered by this thesis. Chapter 3 presents a 
critical review of the approaches for the measurement of competition, focusing on the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm and the Panzar-Rosse approach. In chapter 4, we 
apply the Panzar-Rosse approach to estimate the degree of banking sector competition in the 
CEE countries, and separately measure the degree of banking sector competition for Kosovo. 
In chapter 5 we estimate the relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking 
in the CEE countries. Chapter 6 presents the estimation of the relationship between banking 
sector competition and financial intermediation costs in the CEE countries. Finally, chapter 7 
presents the main findings of the thesis and presents corresponding policy implications that 
may help policymakers to better shape their policies with regard to banking sector 
competition and, in turn, with regard to the general improvement of banking sector stability 
and efficiency. This chapter also summarizes the main contributions to knowledge provided 
by the thesis as well as some potential topics for further research in this field. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Until the beginning of the 1990s, when the process of transition from the centrally planned to 
market oriented economies started, the banking systems of the CEE countries (except the 
former Yugoslavia) consisted of monobanks which collected deposits that were renumerated 
at regulated interest rates, and extended loans based on the Government’s central plan. The 
banking system in its present form did not exist, with the monobanks having a rather 
administrative role, serving as record-keepers for the implementation of the payments plan 
between the state entities. Unlike that in other CEE countries, the banking system in former 
Yugoslavia since the 1950s consisted of the central bank and the commercial banks but, 
given that commercial banks were not privately-owned, there were no big differences 
compared to the banking sectors of other CEE countries. 
When the transition from to the market system started, the monobanks were broken up in 
order to form a two-tier banking system, consisting of the central bank and the commercial 
banks. However, for most of the countries the transition process entailed difficulties that 
resulted in banking crises in these countries. It took a decade of restructuring and reforms to 
stabilise the banking systems of these countries and make them capable of converging 
towards the banking systems of Western economies. During the second decade of the 
transition process, the privatization of state-owned banks led to a dominant presence of 
foreign banks in almost all the CEE countries which brought the modern commercial banking 
experiences and boosted the banking sector development in these countries. Meanwhile, 
macroeconomic stability was restored in most countries and progress was recorded with 
regard to the development of legal and regulatory institutions. These developments created 
the conditions for the development of banking sector competition, while banking stability and 
financial intermediation efficiency improved, albeit lagging behind the Euro Area countries. 
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This chapter aims at presenting an overview of the evolution of the banking sector in the CEE 
countries and the developments during the transition process. The chapter is organized as 
follows. The next section presents an overview of the banking systems of CEE countries in 
the pre-transition period and the transition from the monobank system to a two-tier banking 
system. Section 2.2 presents the banking sector developments, especially the restructuring 
process, during the transition. Section 2.3 analyses the developments of the banking system in 
the second decade of transition by focusing on the banking reforms and the evolution of 
banking system competition, loan-portfolio quality, and interest rate spreads. Section 2.4 
concludes.     
 
2.2 The Transition process and the banking system in the CEE 
countries 
The banking systems of the CEE countries have passed through a long process of transition 
from the monobank system into a well-functioning two-tier banking system. In the CEE 
region (except in former Yugoslavia), each country had a monobank which exercised the 
functions of the Central Bank and also some of the functions of commercial bank such as the 
settlement of payments, the collection of deposits, and the allocation of credit. However, 
these functions were not related to market-based financial intermediation. Deposits were 
remunerated at regulated interest rates, whereas loans were disbursed to State Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) based on the central plan (Caviglia et al., 2002). In other words, the 
financial intermediation was not market-based, but deposits were used to produce directed 
loans to SOEs. Loans to the SOEs were allocated to finance investment projects as well as in 
the form of budget allocations to fulfil working capital requirements necessary for meeting 
the output plan (Bonin and Wachtel, 2002).  
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In some of the countries, the banking activity was organized in separate segments operated by 
specialist banks. The specialist banks had a subservient role to central planning and carried 
specific functions without interfering with each other, meaning that there was no competition 
between them. For example, a state saving bank was responsible only for the collection of 
deposits; a trade bank was responsible for handling foreign trade transactions; an agricultural 
bank allocated loans to the agriculture sector; and a construction bank allocated loans for 
infrastructure development. All these banks were part of a single state banking apparatus and 
served the fulfilment of the output plan.     
In the former Yugoslavia, the situation was somewhat different. The two-tier banking system 
existed since the 1950s, consisting of the National Bank of Yugoslavia that had the role of the 
central bank, and the republic-level commercial banks (Bonin, 2001). Most of the republics 
had a main commercial bank which controlled the majority of the banking sector assets. 
These commercial banks had a collective ownership, similar to all enterprises in Yugoslavia.  
With the transition from centrally planned economies to free market economies, which 
started in the beginning of the 1990s, the banking sector , like other sectors, had to embark on 
the reform process. For most of the CEE countries, the first step of the reform was to break 
up the monobank system and establish a two-tier banking system which included the Central 
Bank and commercial banks. Under the new system, the central banks were responsible for 
the monetary policy and for regulating and supervising the commercial banks. The newly 
created commercial banks were mostly state-owned. In some countries, the entire commercial 
portfolio of the monobank was transformed into a single state-owned commercial bank. Also 
the previous specialist banks were transformed into state-owned commercial banks. Hence, 
even though the first step of reform was undertaken, the state retained its influence on the 
banks’ decisions. A similar situation was created also in the republics of the former 
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Yugoslavia, where the problems with capitalization and bad loans had led governments to 
nationalize many of the commercial banks, creating state-owned banks.  
A common feature of all the CEE countries at the beginning of the transition was the high 
presence of the state-ownership in the banking system and the high degree of the market 
concentration. In order to induce domestic competition, almost all countries applied lax 
licensing criteria which enabled private banks to enter the market, thus leading to a rapid 
increase in the overall number of commercial banks. In Yugoslavia, the number of banks 
started to increase in the 1970s upon the establishment of many domestic company-banks 
which led to an excessive number of small and unhealthy banks (Sevic, 2000).   
However, the transition to a two-tier system and the increase of the number of banks was not 
sufficient to ensure well-functioning banking systems in the CEE countries. The substantial 
deterioration of the loan quality and the subsequent problems with the degree of banks’ 
capitalization made the banking systems of these countries far from efficient and sustainable. 
These problems derived from the legacies of the pre-transition period as well as the flaws that 
occurred during the transition process.  
Before the transition process began, bank loans were issued to the SOEs as directed credits 
based on central planning. The bank credit policy was just another government instrument to 
fulfil the needs of the centrally planned economy, while the evaluation of the credit risk was 
not relevant (Stubos and Tsikripis, 2004). Hence, many of these loans were of dubious 
quality from the moment they were issued (i.e. before the transition). When the break-up of 
the monobank system took place, these loans were inherited by the newly created state-
owned commercial banks (SOCB) - thus, SOCBs started their operation with a stock of bad 
loans in their portfolios. However, the problem was not limited to the existing stock of bad 
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loans and was exacerbated by the inflow of new dubious-quality loans in the banks’ 
portfolios.  
Most of these dubious quality loans were the result of lending to SOEs which was either 
motivated politically, given that both banks and enterprises were state-owned, or because 
banks wanted to maintain their lending relationships with their clients (Bonin et al., 2008). At 
this stage, banks lacked adequate capacities in terms of technology and human resources to 
assess the viability of projects. Risk assessment techniques were relatively new to banks 
because they became relevant only after the break-up of the monobank system. Hence, the 
initial lending by the SOCBs mainly consisted of loans issued to borrowers whose quality 
was unknown to the banks. These loans, in fact, carried a high level of risk due to the 
increased fragility of SOEs at the outset of transition. 
The transition process in CEE countries was characterized by a sharp decline of output of 
SOEs (Blanchard, 1996), largely due to the elimination of government subsidies to the state 
enterprises and the market liberalization that subjected SOEs to domestic and foreign 
competition. As a consequence, the profitability of many SOEs declined and so did their 
ability to repay bank loans. According to Gorton and Winston (1998), when the market-
oriented reforms began, many enterprises had sufficient funds to cover their operating 
expenses but not enough to cover their interest payments. As a consequence, most loans 
issued by SOCBs to SOEs were translated into non-performing loans. Another 
macroeconomic problem impeding the efficient functioning of the banking system in the 
beginning of the transition process was the high inflation rates which in many countries had 
turned into hyperinflation. In some countries, such as Estonia (1992), Macedonia (1992), 
Latvia (1993), and Czech Republic (1996), the monetary policy element of the 
macroeconomic stabilization programs aimed at reducing inflation led to higher nominal 
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interest rates which, in turn, led to an increase in real interest rates. This had a negative 
impact on the loan repayment capacity of the borrowers and led to a further increase in non-
performing loans (Tang et al., 2000). 
In order for the banking system to operate prudently, adequate regulation and supervision 
capacities are required. When the transition process started, prudential regulation and 
supervision in CEE countries was extremely poor (Tang et al., 2000). The banking laws had 
many deficiencies with regard to the regulation of loan collection and the rules on collateral, 
and the conflict of interest between the bank and the bank’s shareholders was not properly 
defined. In addition, the central banks lacked trained personnel and the supporting 
infrastructure to perform adequate banking supervision. This mainly reflected the lack of 
experience in dealing with commercial banking in the previous system. The weak 
institutional environment left room for the installation of poor internal governance practices 
in banks which represented a serious impediment to the development of the banking systems 
of these economies (Tang et al., 2000). Fraud, corruption and insider lending became 
common in banks. Some of the new banks were used to lend improperly to their owners; 
indeed, this might have been the reason why some of these banks were created (Bonin et al., 
2008).   
Another institutional obstacle for banks in the transition economies was the legal framework 
for the protection of creditor rights. In the previous regime, lending meant the channelling of 
investment funds or subsidies to the state-owned enterprises, while there was no bankruptcy 
law and no legal framework for the protection of creditor rights and, as such, the repayment 
of loans was often based on bargaining between enterprises and state-owned banks (Fries and 
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Taci, 2002). As such, the protection of creditor rights was not considered to be relevant.
2
 
However, with the separation from the centrally-planned system and their subsequent 
privatization, banks and enterprises no longer belonged to the same owner, so banks needed 
assurance that they would be able to enforce loan repayments; i.e. the protection of creditor 
rights became a necessity. 
These institutional deficiencies, coupled with the policy of lax licensing criteria for new 
banks, led to a rapid increase in the number of banks, most of which were undercapitalized. 
The entry of new banks, instead of increasing competition and being beneficial for the 
efficiency of  the banking system and the pool of bank services, only exacerbated the fragility 
of the banking system. Lacking commercial banking experience and operating in a poorly 
regulated and supervised banking environment, these banks engaged in excessive risk-taking 
(Bonin and Wachtel, 2002). As a consequence, there was a dramatic increase in the volume 
of non-performing loans which threatened the stability of the banking system. As shown in 
Table 2.1, non-performing loans reached two-digit figures in most of these countries, and in 
many of them a substantial part of the banking system faced solvency problems. In order to 
address the systemic risk, the authorities encouraged state-owned banks to take over the 
smaller private banks that were likely to fail. However, this did not result to be an adequate 
solution, because these acquisitions further worsened the already weak balance sheets of the 
state-owned banks. 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Creditor rights include the ability of the banks to hold and seize collateral, and the ability to recover loans fully 
or partially through the bankruptcy procedures when the loans are not repaid by the borrowers (Riess et al., 
2002). 
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Table 2.1 Summary of non-performing loans in selected CEE countries 
      
Country Period Scope of crisis 
   
Albania 1992- 
31% of loans granted after the cleanup of 1992 were 
nonperforming. 
   Bosnia and H. 1992- Loans issued in late 1980s and early 1990s were in default. 
   Bulgaria 1991- In 1995, 75% of non-government loans were non-performing. 
   Croatia 1995 Banks accounting for 47% of bank credits were insolvent. 
   
Czech Rep. 
1994-
1995 38% of loans were non-performing; many banks were closed 
down after year 1993. 
  
   
Estonia 
1992-
1995 
Insolvent banks held 41% of banking system assets; licenses of 
5 banks were revoked; 2 banks were nationalized and merged; 2 
banks were merged and converted to a loan recovery agency.   
  
   Hungary 1987- 8 banks accounting for 25% of financial system assets became 
insolvent. 
  
   Latvia 1995- 2/3 of the banks recorded losses in 1994; 23 licenses were 
revoked in 1994-1995; 3 major banks were closed down in 
1995; 10 banks accounting for 40% of banking system assets 
were in crisis. 
  
  
   Lithuania 1995 12 small banks were liquidated; 4 larger ones did not meet 
capital adequacy requirements; the fourth largest bank was 
closed down. 
  
   
Macedonia 
1993-
1994 
70% of loans were non-performing; the second largest bank was 
closed down.     
   Source: Tang et al. (2000). 
The discussion above shows that the transformation of the monobank system to a two-tier 
system was not sufficient to ensure efficient financial intermediation in transition economies 
of the CEE.  The problem was not only prevalent in the initial stages transition but continued 
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due to the ongoing improper behaviour of the banks as well as the absence of strong 
regulatory and supervisory institutions. This situation called for deep restructuring with 
regard to both the commercial banks and the relevant institutions. 
 
2.2.1 Restructuring of the banking system    
The newly created SOCBs inherited poor-quality loans from the previous centrally-planned 
system while the continued state ownership of banks allowed them to continue to apply poor 
banking practices. This was also a consequence of the lack of personnel with the knowledge 
and experience of market-oriented banking and the weak regulatory and supervisory 
institutions. Therefore, the restructuring of the banking system implied a complex process 
which had to tackle both the problems inherited from the past as well as the current behaviour 
of the banks. In addition, the institutional restructuring was another important task that had to 
be done in parallel with bank restructuring.  
However, the approach of authorities in most CEE countries was not so comprehensive. The 
initial focus was on cleaning the balance sheets from the existing bad loans, but not 
addressing the current improper behaviour of banks which was generating new non-
performing loans in the banks’ balance sheets. After the elimination of fiscal subsidies to 
SOEs, the SOCBs were viewed as an alternative source of financial support to SOEs (Bonin 
and Wachtel, 2004). The SOCBs continued to lend to the still-not-restructured SOEs which 
had also been hit by the decline of output since the beginning of transition. The stock of bad 
loans was not static but kept increasing partly due to the gradual recognition of the quality of 
the previously issued loans and partly due to the continuation of bad lending practices by the 
banks (Bonin and Wachtel, 2002). The lending process was not based on the modern banking 
techniques which include the screening of borrowers and the evaluation of project risks. 
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In order to preserve the banks from failing, many governments intervened by recapitalizing 
the problematic banks or by removing the bad loans from their portfolios (Bonin, 2001; 
Bonin and Wachtel, 2004). For example, Hungary and Bulgaria embarked on waves of 
recapitalization. The Czech Republic, Croatia, and Slovenia created state-owned hospital 
banks or other asset management companies that took over the bad loans from the ailing 
banks. Poland adopted a programme in which the restructuring of the SOEs and banks were 
tackled at the same time. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania followed a combined approach that 
consisted of bank restructuring when the problems were not very deep and bank liquidation 
for the more problematic banks. 
However, these methods of intervention proved to be insufficient because they targeted only 
the existing stock of the bad loans while not addressing the flow of new bad loans (Bonin et 
al., 2008). In fact, these forms of intervention might have even contributed to a larger flow of 
new bad loans because of their impact in inducing moral hazard in the behaviour of banks. 
The subsequent waves of recapitalizations and the creation of “hospital” banks and other 
government agencies for bad loans collection led to the expectation that the government 
would continue to do so in future too. In the case of Poland, banks did not prove to have the 
necessary expertise to restructure enterprises and ended up extending continuous credit to 
weak SOEs (Gray and Holle, 1996; Bonin and Leven, 1996).  
The normalization of the situation in the banking systems called for a more complex 
approach which, in addition to addressing the existing stock of the bad loans, also helped 
eliminate the banks’incentive to lend to weak clients. As Bonin and Wachtel (2004) 
emphasize, freeing banks from the inherited bad clients was more important than cleaning the 
banks’ balance sheets from the inherited bad loans. This primarily implied the need for the 
SOCBs to quit lending to weak SOEs. As Bonin and Wachtel (2002) point out, one of the key 
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pillars of an efficient banking sector is to have financially strong banks which are 
independent of the state (through privatization) and independent of the legacies of the past 
(i.e. from the inherited bad loans and bad clients). 
Therefore, the way ahead for all CEE countries was to proceed towards the privatization of 
their state-owned banks. The benefits from privatization were expected to be 
multidimensional, including the creation of better incentives for bank managers to change to 
a more disciplined risk-taking behaviour, the reduction of the government’s influence on 
lending decisions of commercial banks, and the improvement of incentives for the acquisition 
of better screening and monitoring technologies by banks (Reininger et al., 2002). Although 
most countries embarked on the privatization process, the expectations were not met 
immediately. In many countries privatization resulted in the bank ownership being dispersed 
among many small owners or in cross-ownership between enterprises and the government 
(Tang et al., 2000). This obviously did not lead banks away from their previous lending 
relationships and did not improve their corporate governance. In addition, in sosme countries, 
the owners of many banks were their main clients and possessed no banking experience or 
know-how to run banks (Kraft, 2004). Therefore, the best way for privatization to produce 
the desired results was their privatization to reputable foreign banks, given the lack of 
domestic commercial banking experience and the lack of sufficient capital in CEE countries 
(Bonin et al., 1999).   
The governments of transition countries initially hesitated to allow foreign banks enter their 
markets, claiming that the foreign direct investments in the banking sector were less desirable 
than in other sectors of the economy (Bonin et al., 2008). The concerns were mainly related 
to the possibility that the foreign-owned banks would facilitate capital flight from transition 
economies and whether they would be committed to provide loans for the local economic 
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development. An exception was Hungary which sold the SOCBs to the foreign banks in early 
transition. Other countries did eventually open up to the foreign investors, but only after their 
initial costly bank restructuring programs failed. Afterwards, foreign ownership dominated 
the banking systems in most of CEE countries while state ownership gradually disappeared in 
most of them. The entry of foreign banks helped the modernization of the banking systems in 
these countries by bringing modern practices of commercial banking. Foreign banks may also 
be considered to have introduced competition in the banking sector which led to more 
prudent and efficient financial intermediation (Tang et al., 2000). 
During the transition process, most countries recorded progress in institution building which 
included the introduction of prudential regulations (e.g. capital adequacy requirements, loan 
classification and provisioning), upgrading the local accounting standards in line with the 
international standards, strengthening banking supervision, tightening the licensing criteria, 
and strengthening the legal framework (e.g. bankruptcy and collateral laws) (Tang et al., 
2000). However, the creation of the legal framework was not complete without effective 
implementation. Despite the significant progress in the early stage, most countries lagged 
behind with respect to the implementation of the legal framework. Hence, more effort was 
needed in closing the gap between the extensiveness and the effectiveness of the legal 
framework (EBRD, 2001).   
 
2.3 The banking systems of CEE countries in the later stage of 
transition (1999-2009) 
A decade after the transition began, the CEE countries successfully established market-
oriented banking systems and overcame the banking crises that occurred during the early 
transition process. This was achieved by successful restructuring of the banks which was 
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mainly achieved after their privatization to foreign banks, and the establishment of a more 
favourable operating environment.  
In the next section we focus on the second decade of the transition, i.e. the period 1999-2009 
(to which we refer as the post-transition period). This section initially elaborates the operating 
environment for the banks in CEE countries. The section then elaborates the banking sector 
reform and development during the post-transition period, focusing on three specific aspects 
of the banking sector in the region which include banking system competition, risk-taking, 
and interest rate spreads. 
 
2.3.1 Operating environment 
The poor macroeconomic environment at the beginning of the transition process that was 
characterized by a sharp decline of output and excessively high inflation rates represented a 
serious impediment to the efficient functioning of the banking system. However, the 
stabilization programmes during the first decade of transition, which included sound 
monetary and fiscal policies, resulted in macroeconomic stability. The economic activity in 
the old unproductive sectors gradually declined while the new sectors that were able to 
compete in an open market economy started to grow (Fischer and Sahay, 2000). As a result, 
by 1999 almost all CEE countries recorded positive real GDP growth rates which generally 
remained quite steady until 2009 when the global crisis resulted in most CEE countries 
recording negative growth rates (Table 2.2). Despite the similarities in growth rates, a wide 
gap remains when GDP per capita of CEE countries are compared with each other. The more 
advanced CEE countries, namely the EU member countries, have considerably higher GDP 
per capita compared to other countries of the region, thus reflecting substantial divergences in 
terms of the degree of economic development. The country with the lowest GDP per capita is 
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Kosovo (1,814 US dollars), while the country with the highest GDP per capita is Slovenia 
(16,486 US dollars). 
The CEE countries were successful also in bringing down their inflation rates which had 
represented a serious macroeconomic problem at the beginning of the transition. All countries 
except Serbia and Romania were successful in reducing the inflation to one-digit rates by 
1999. By 2007, inflation rates had dropped to one-digit rates in Serbia and Romania, too. 
 
Table 2.2 Selected macroeconomic indicators, average values for 1999-2009 
     
Albania 6.5 2,367                               2.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4.7 2,960                               1.7
Bulgaria 4.7 3,581                               6.2
Croatia 2.8 9,266                               3.3
Czech Republic 3.4 11,705                             3.3
Estonia 4.5 9,404                               4.2
Hungary 2.4 9,430                               6.5
Kosovo 4.5 1,814                               1.6
Latvia 4.6 7,191                               5.7
Lithuania 4.3 7,197                               2.8
Macedonia 2.9 2,830                               2.4
Montenegro 3.8 3,736                               21.2
Poland 4.0 7,683                               3.9
Romania 4.1 4,441                               19.1
Serbia 4.0 3,438                               27.3
Slovakia 4.2 10,389                             5.9
Slovenia 3.3 16,486                             5.0
Real GDP growth rates 
(in % )
GDP per capita (in US 
dollars)
Annual average 
inflation rates ( in % )
 
       Source: EU Commission, IMF, EBRD 
       Note: See Appendix 1.1 for the time series of each indicator for the period 1999-2009. 
 
The progress has been slower with regard to the effectiveness of the legal framework which 
created uncertainties regarding the ability of banks to enforce their creditor rights (Kraft, 
2004; Hasselmann and Wachtel, 2007). Taking into account the fact that the design of the 
legal framework in all CEE countries was based on the contemporary practices of the free-
27 
 
market economies, the lack of effectiveness might mostly be attributed to the inefficiency of 
the court system in enforcing the legal framework. The Heritage Foundation produces the 
Property Rights Index which measures the degree to which laws in a country protect private 
property and the extent to which these laws are implemented. The index pays special 
attention to the presence of corruption within the judicial system, and the ability of businesses 
and individuals to enforce contracts. Table 2.3 shows that most CEE countries have a low 
index of property rights protection and the progress, if any, has been very slow. As expected, 
the countries that were more advanced in terms of the EU integration such as the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia had higher indices, suggesting that the 
degree of property rights protection in these countries was higher than in the other countries 
of the region.    
Table 2.3 Protection of property rights index 
                        
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Albania 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Bosnia and H. 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Bulgaria 50 50 50 50 50 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Croatia 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Czech Rep. 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Estonia 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 90 90 90 
Hungary 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Kosovo - - - - - - - - - - - 
Latvia 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 55 55 
Lithuania 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Macedonia 
   
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Montenegro - - - 30 30 - - - - - 40 
Poland 70 70 70 70 70 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Romania 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 35 
Serbia - - - 30 30 - - - - - 40 
Slovakia 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Slovenia 70 70 70 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 60 
            Source: Heritage Foundation. 
Note: The index takes values from 0-100. Higher values indicate a higher level of property rights protection. 
  
28 
 
2.3.2 Banking sector reform and development 
The second decade of the transition process was mainly characterized by the reduced role of 
the state in the banking system, their privatisation and the rapid increase in foreign ownership 
of banks. This is the period when the banking system stability, in the sense of the banking 
sector being capable of withstanding the shocks and allocating the savings into profitable 
investment projects (ECB’s definition of financial stability), was more clearly achieved. 
As shown in Table 2.4, by 2009 state ownership of the banks in CEE countries was almost 
entirely replaced by foreign ownership as the privatization process, together with low barriers 
to entry for the foreign investors, led to a massive influx of foreign banks. The significant 
presence of foreign banks started to occur from 2000 onwards, and by 2009 foreign 
ownership heavily dominated the banking sectors in all the CEE countries (except Slovenia). 
For example, in Estonia foreign-owned banks controlled 98.3% of total banking system 
assets, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina where the market share of foreign-owned banks 
was 94.5% in 2009.  
The entry of foreign banks may be considered to have contributed most to the development of 
functional market-based banking systems in CEE countries; directly, as providers of the 
banking services, and indirectly through competition and other positive spill-over effects 
(Litan et al., 2001). The expertise and the information technology brought by foreign banks 
enhanced the efficiency of the banking system and provided better risk-management 
techniques, thus contributing to the stability of the banking system too. In addition, the entry 
of foreign banks benefited domestic banks especially in terms of improvements in human 
capital (Papi and Revoltella, 1999). The entry of foreign banks was beneficial also for the 
development of banking regulations and supervision, because the authorities needed to adjust 
to the more advanced level of foreign bank operations (Hermes and Lensink, 2004).  
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Table 2.4 Banking system ownership and reform indicators, 2009 
        
  
Asset share of state 
banks (in %) 
Asset share of foreign 
banks (in %) 
EBRD index of 
banking reform 
Albania 0.0 92.4 3.0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.8 94.5 3.0 
Bulgaria 2.4 84.0 3.7 
Croatia 4.1 91.0 4.0 
Czech Republic - - 4.0 
Estonia 0.0 98.3 4.0 
Hungary 3.9 81.3 4.0 
Kosovo 0.0 90.0 - 
Latvia 17.1 69.3 3.7 
Lithuania 0.0 91.5 3.7 
Macedonia 1.4 93.3 3.0 
Montenegro 0.0 87.1 3.0 
Poland 22.1 72.3 3.7 
Romania 7.9 84.3 3.3 
Serbia - - 3.0 
Slovakia 0.9 91.6 3.7 
Slovenia 16.7 29.5 3.3 
    Source: EBRD Transition Reports; World Bank 
Note a): See Appendix 1.2 for the times series of each indicator for the period 1999-2009. 
Note b): The EBRD index of banking reform takes values from 1 to 4+. A score of 1 means little progress 
compared to the previous centrally-planned banking system, apart from the creation of the two-tier banking 
system. A score of 2 means significant progress with regard to the interest rate liberalization and credit 
allocation, suggesting that there is only a limited presence of directed credits and interest rate ceilings. Score 3 
implies that significant progress was achieved in terms of the development of regulatory and supervisory 
capacities; almost full liberalization of the interest rates; significant lending to the private enterprises and a 
substantial presence of the private banks. Score 4 implies significant progress towards the harmonization of the 
banking laws and regulation with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) standards; effective banking 
regulation and supervision; and substantial financial deepening. Score 4+ means that the banking system has 
reached a maturity level similar to the standards of advanced industrial economies. 
 
Apart from the privatization of state-owned banks, transition countries also needed to develop 
adequate regulatory and supervisory institutions to regulate and supervise the commercial 
banks effectively. In this respect, most CEE countries have recorded substantial progress, 
although there are still divergences between these countries. The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) produces the Banking Reform and Interest Rate 
Liberalization index which covers many aspects of banking reform, including the 
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liberalization of banking operations (e.g. interest rates, credit allocation, etc.) and the 
development of banking regulations and supervision. Table 2.4 shows that by 2009 all CEE 
countries had reached a banking sector reform index of 3 or higher, implying that all of them 
countries had achieved significant progress in the development of regulatory and supervisory 
capacities; the commercial banking activity was substantially liberalized; and lending to the 
private sector had increased significantly. In some countries, such as Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, and Hungary, the banking sector reform index reached the value of 4, 
suggesting that the banking systems of these countries are almost as developed as the banking 
systems of the developed countries. The highest banking reform indices are observed in the 
EU member countries, suggesting that the EU integration process might have had an 
important role in inducing the banking reform process.
3
  
The banking reform process in CEE countries was associated with a rapid increase in lending, 
as measured by the ratio of ‘domestic credit to private sector to GDP’. From an average of 
27.3% in 1999, the ratio reached an average of 63.5% in 2009, though there was wide 
variations in different countries, with the more advanced reformers having also higher credit 
to GDP ratios, while the non-EU countries generally having lower ratios. The country with 
the highest ratio is Estonia at 108% in 2009, whereas the lowest ratio of 35.7% was recorded 
by Kosovo which is the country with the youngest banking system in the region (Box 2.1). 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Croatia was always like the more developed transition economies, similar to those that were in the EU, even 
before it formally joined the EU on July 2013. 
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           Figure 2.1 Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP), 2009 
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Note: see Appendix 1.3 for the times series of this indicator for the period 1999-2009. 
 
 
Box 2.1 The creation of the Kosovo’s banking system and its challenges 
At the end of the war in 1999, when the Yugoslav banks left Kosovo, the old banking sector 
in Kosovo ceased to exist. In fact, even before the war, the utilization of banking services had 
been at a very low level and the banking system was mainly focused on the administration of 
the payment system rather than providing financial intermediation services. This was a 
consequence of the financial and political developments that took place in the former 
Yugoslavia, and especially Kosovo, during the 1990s. The freezing (i.e. confiscation) of the 
foreign currency deposits of the citizens by the Yugoslav National Bank in the beginning of 
the 1990s led to a substantial loss of confidence in the banking system. This loss of 
confidence, together with the excessively high inflation rates and the general mistrust of the 
Serbian regime, led Kosovo’s citizens away from depositing their money in banks. At the 
same time, the possibility of obtaining bank credit from the banks was almost non-existent. 
Hence, after the end of the war, Kosovo had to establish its banking system from the scratch. 
The first step was to establish a regulatory and supervisory authority which would create the 
preconditions for the forthcoming entry of commercial banks. The Banking and Payments 
Authority of Kosovo (which in 2008 became the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo) 
was established in 1999 and was responsible for licensing, regulation, and supervision of all 
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the financial institutions in Kosovo. The first commercial bank entered the market in 
December 1999, and by 2009 the number of banks operating in Kosovo reached eight, with 
most of them being foreign-owned. 
Despite the loss of confidence in the banking system during the 1990s, the new banking 
system of Kosovo showed an impressive performance in gaining the public’s trust. However, 
banks still faced many challenges which, among others, included the insufficient protection 
of creditor rights by the newly-created judicial system, inadequate financial reporting and 
poor business planning capacities by the firms. In spite of these challenges, the banking 
system of Kosovo has become a modern system, providing contemporary financial services 
and maintaining a high level of sustainability.  
 
In spite of remarkable progress, the degree of banking sector development in CEE countries 
is far below that of the Euro area, where the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to 
GDP averaged 133.8% in 2009 (Figure 2.1). The relatively low degree of financial 
intermediation in the CEE region compared to the Euro area is mainly attributed to the 
“stagnation” of lending to enterprises, while most of the credit growth consisted of lending to 
households (EBRD, 2006). The reluctance of banks to expand lending to enterprises is 
primarily related to uncertainties arising from the institutional fragility and, especially, to the 
need for the better protection of creditor rights. According to Haselmann and Wachtel (2007), 
in an uncertain legal environment banks tend to be more conservative in terms of accepting 
different types of assets as collateral and are less likely to lend to information-opaque 
borrowers. Hence, banks in the CEE region have focused more on lending to households 
which is a form of lending that does not require investments in information gathering and is 
viewed as less risky compared to lending to enterprises. Apart from the weak legal 
environment, other factors that have precluded a more rapid expansion of lending to 
enterprises may include the weak corporate governance within the enterprises, poor 
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implementation of accounting standards, and the poor financial disclosure by the firms which 
increase the level of risk perceived by banks (World Bank, 2003). 
In order to shed more light on the development of the banking sector in CEE countries, in the 
next sections, we focus on three specific aspects of banking sector activity, including: 
banking sector competition, loan-portfolio quality, and intermediation efficiency (more 
specifically interest rate spreads). These three aspects represent the main focus of this thesis 
and will be investigated empirically in the chapters 4, 5 and 6 respectively. 
 
2.3.3 Competitive conditions in the banking sectors of the CEE countries 
Competition in the banking system is highly important in all countries because of its impact 
on several dimensions of banking system activities. Competition is considered to be a driving 
force of the banking system efficiency and a promoter of innovations in financial products. 
Increased competition is also considered to be beneficial in terms of financial inclusion by 
increasing the access of firms and individuals to financial services. Another dimension of the 
impact of competition is financial stability, with the traditional view claiming that 
competition is detrimental to the stability of the banking system - but there are also opposing 
views claiming that competition enhances stability.    
At the beginning of transition i.e. the creation of the two-tier banking system, the banking 
system experienced the creation of oligopolistic market structures in most of transition 
economies (Papi and Revloltella, 1999). In some countries, the asset portfolio of the 
monobank was inherited by a single state-owned commercial bank, whereas in other 
countries the previous specialist banks were transformed into state-owned commercial banks, 
implying that in general the banking systems were dominated by a small number of large 
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banks (Bonin, 2001). Considering that all these banks were state-owned, large in size, 
segmented in different sectors of the economy (e.g. trade, agriculture, and infrastructure) and 
that the market was still not open to foreign-owned banks, it may be taken that they possessed 
substantial market power and the likelihood of competition taking place between those banks 
was non-existent or very low. The possibility of these banks competing with each other was 
limited, particularly due to the lack of commercial banking experience which prohibited them 
from differentiating their products or introducing new financial products in the market. 
The privatization process and the entry of new banks in the market created conditions for the 
evolution of banking system competition. This especially happened after the foreign banks 
started to enter the banking markets of the transition economies which reduced the market 
power of the domestic banks and introduced modern commercial banking practices. The new 
banking technologies and products that are usually introduced by the foreign banks are 
expected to induce local banks to engage in more competition (World Bank, 2013). By the 
end of the first decade of transition, the number of banks in all CEE countries had 
substantially increased and foreign banks were present in all the countries (Table 2.5).  
However, from 2000, a wave of banking consolidation engulfed the region, thus leading to a 
decline in the number of banks in most countries. The consolidation trend was driven by the 
stronger banks being encouraged to take over the weaker banks in order to preserve financial 
stability, bank shareholders that decided to exit the market, and the mergers of the parent 
banks of some of the foreign banks operating in the region (Gelos and Roldos, 2004).  
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Table 2.5 Number of domestic and foreign banks 
 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Albania 13 (11) 13 (12) 13 (12) 13 (12) 15 (13) 16 (14) 16 (14) 17 (14) 17 (15) 16 (14) 16 (14)
Bosnia and H. 61 (9) 56 (14) 49 (20) 40 (21) 37 (19) 33 (17) 33 (20) 32 (22) 32 (21) 30 (21) 30 (21)
Bulgaria 34(22) 35(25) 35(26) 34(26) 35(25) 35 (24) 34 (23) 32 (23) 29 (21) 30 (22) 30 (22)
Croatia 53(13) 43(21) 43(24) 46(23) 41(19) 37 (15) 34 (13) 33 (15) 33 (16) 33 (16) 32 (15)
Czech Rep. 42(27) 40(26) 38(26) 37(26) 35(26) 35(26) 36(27) 37(28) - - -
Estonia 7 (3) 7 (4) 7 (4) 7 (4) 7 (4) 9 (6) 13 (10) 14 (12) 15 (13) 17 (15) 17 (14)
Hungary 43(29) 42(33) 41(31) 37(27) 36(29) 38 (27) 38 (27) 40 (28) 40 (27) 39 (25) 38 (23)
Kosovo 1(1) 2(2) 5(2) 6(2) 6(2) 6(2) 6(2) 6(2) 9(5) 8(6) 8(6)
Latvia 23 (12) 21 (12) 23 (10) 23 (9) 23 (10) 23 (9) 23 (9) 24 (12) 25 (14) 27 (16) 27 (18)
Lithuania 13 (4) 13 (6) 13 (6) 14 (7) 13 (7) 12 (6) 12 (6) 11 (6) 14 (6) 17 (5) 17 (5)
Macedonia 23 (5) 22 (7) 21 (8) 20 (7) 21 (8) 21 (8) 20 (8) 19 (8) 18 (11) 18 (14) 18 (14)
Montenegro - - - - - 10 (3) 10 (7) 10 (8) 11 (8) 11 (9) 11 (9)
Poland 77(39) 73(46) 69(46) 59(45) 58(46) 57 (44) 61 (50) 63 (52) 64 (54) 70 (60) 67 (57)
Romania 41(26) 41(29) 41(32) 39(32) 38(29) 32 (23) 33 (24) 31 (26) 31 (26) 32 (27) 31 (25)
Serbia 75(3) 81(3) 54(8) 50(12) 47(16) 43 (11) 40 (17) 37 (22) 35 (21) 34 (20) -
Slovakia 25(11) 23(14) 21(13) 20(15) 21(16) 21 (16) 23 (16) 24 (16) 26 (15) 26 (16) 26 (13)
Slovenia 31 (5) 28 (6) 24 (5) 22 (6) 22 (6) 22 (7) 25 (9) 25 (10) 27 (11) 24 (11) 25 (11)
 
Source: EBRD transition reports; CBK statistics. 
Note: Numbers in bracktes represent foreign banks. 
 
The consolidation process created concerns about a potential increase of the degree of market 
concentration which, according to the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm, 
would imply a decline in the banking system competition, assuming that a market with fewer 
and larger banks is more likely to be characterized by uncompetitive behaviour.
4
 However, 
the degree of market concentration does not appear to have increased after the consolidation 
process. Market concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, appears to 
have followed a gradually declining trend after 2000 (see Table 2.6). The reason why the 
consolidation process has not led to increased market concentration may be due to the fact 
that the taken-over banks or the banks that exited the market were mostly small banks. 
Estonia is the country which recorded an increasing trend of market concentration index, but 
the increase does not appear to have been related to the decline in the number of banks in this 
country. 
                                                          
4
 The Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm and the market concentration indices will be explained in more 
detail in Chapter 3. 
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Table 2.6 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (deposits market) 
                        
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Albania 
  
8,859  
  
6,978  
  
7,672  
  
4,696  
  
4,019  
  
3,618  
  
2,957  
  
2,631  
  
2,342  
  
2,311  
  
2,358  
Bosnia and H. 
  
3,069  
  
3,273  
  
2,005  
  
1,254  
  
1,165  
  
1,264  
  
1,252  
  
1,327  
  
1,162  
  
1,302  
  
1,527  
Bulgaria 
  
2,305  
  
1,947  
  
1,482  
      
980  
      
968  
      
990  
      
858  
      
865  
  
1,077  
  
1,084  
  
1,210  
Croatia 
  
1,457  
  
1,440  
  
1,873  
  
1,143  
  
1,258  
  
1,206  
  
1,204  
  
1,158  
  
1,034  
  
1,233  
  
1,269  
Czech Rep. 
  
4,213  
  
1,559  
  
1,707  
  
1,725  
  
1,690  
  
1,570  
  
1,626  
  
1,657  
  
1,669  
  
1,701  
  
1,844  
Estonia  -   -  
  
4,926  
  
3,773  
  
3,743  
  
5,092  
  
5,483  
  
5,948  
  
5,791  
  
6,500  
  
7,751  
Hungary 
  
2,103  
  
1,732  
  
2,078  
  
1,416  
  
1,361  
  
1,250  
  
1,169  
  
1,186  
  
1,206  
  
1,154  
  
1,311  
Kosovo  -   -  
  
5,388  
  
4,239  
  
3,005  
  
2,639  
  
2,642  
  
3,043  
  
3,121  
  
2,933  
  
2,545  
Latvia  -   -   -  
  
1,101  
  
1,033  
      
998  
  
1,178  
  
1,083  
      
978  
  
1,099  
  
1,228  
Lithuania  -   -   -  
  
2,625  
  
2,582  
  
2,338  
  
2,050  
  
2,109  
  
2,115  
  
2,031  
  
1,950  
Macedonia 
  
3,892  
  
3,781  
  
3,722  
  
2,614  
  
2,601  
  
2,397  
  
2,403  
  
2,225  
  
2,145  
  
2,023  
  
2,218  
Montenegro  -   -   -  
  
3,705  
  
3,141  
  
2,597  
  
3,924  
  
3,616  
  
3,079  
  
2,785  
  
2,390  
Poland 
  
1,568  
  
1,311  
  
1,262  
  
1,198  
  
1,007  
      
915  
      
885  
      
886  
      
950  
      
781  
      
831  
Romania 
  
1,830  
  
2,169  
  
2,624  
  
1,432  
  
1,513  
  
1,283  
  
1,122  
  
1,210  
  
1,192  
  
1,098  
  
1,051  
Serbia 
  
5,236  
  
5,813  
  
2,749  
  
1,238  
  
1,115  
      
832  
      
854  
      
835  
      
793  
      
821  
      
811  
Slovakia 
  
1,701  
  
1,445  
  
1,609  
  
1,767  
  
1,680  
  
1,616  
  
1,355  
  
1,546  
  
1,370  
  
1,447  
  
1,496  
Slovenia 
  
1,964  
  
1,990   -  
  
2,289  
  
1,767  
  
1,727  
  
1,579  
  
1,533  
  
1,548  
  
1,354  
  
1,421  
            Source: Bankscope database and own calculations. 
 
Even though market concentration is largely regarded as a measure of competition, this view 
has increasingly been criticized. For example, the contestability theory maintains that a 
concentrated market will be characterized by competitive behaviour if there is a credible 
threat of entry by new entrants (i.e. if there are no or low barriers to entry for potential new 
entrants). Another argument as to why market concentration may not be an adequate measure 
of competition is related to the fact that it does not take into account the potential competition 
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from other non-bank financial institutions, such as the micro-finance institutions which, in 
CEE countries, compete with banks especially in the credit market (Riess et al., 2002). In 
addition, banks operating in a country face competition also from banks operating in other 
countries. For example, in 2005, the cross-border loans to firms in CEE countries averaged at 
7.6% of GDP (Herzberg and Watson, 2007).
5
 However, access to cross-border loans is more 
likely to be available for large multi-national companies, while small and medium sized 
enterprises are not likely to have easy access to cross-border financing since they are more 
prone to asymmetric information problems that stem from the lack of credit record and the 
lack of adequate collateral (Caviglia et al., 2002). Based on this, it may be assumed that 
banks operating in larger economies, which have a larger pool of foreign companies, are 
likely to face more competition than banks operating in smaller economies where competition 
is more likely to be limited within the country boundaries. 
The observable factors such as the number of banks, degree of market concentration and the 
cross-border lending discussed above may, to some extent, serve as indicators of banking 
system competition, but these do not necessarily measure the degree of competition. In spite 
of the fact that foreign banks are considered to have induced competition in the banking 
systems, it should not be taken for granted that a high level of competition will persist in 
these markets. According to Kraft (2004), foreign banks are becoming increasingly 
accommodated to high profits, especially in South-Eastern Europe countries which may make 
them unwilling to engage in aggressive competition that could eventually undermine their 
profits.   
                                                          
5
 This figure does not include the data on Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, 
and Serbia. 
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Therefore, in chapter 3 of this thesis we present an overview of the main measures of banking 
system competition; and in chapter 4 we estimate the degree of competition in the banking 
systems of CEE countries using the Panzar-Rosse approach which directly quantifies the 
competitive behaviour of banks. In addition, in chapter 5 we estimate the banking system 
competition for each country and each year to show the evolution of competition over the 
1999-2009 period, which is later used to estimate the impact of competition on banks’ risk-
taking and financial intermediation cost.     
Regulatory issues with regard to banking sector competition 
The creation of the conditions for banking sector competition in the transition economies was 
largely effected by the regulatory policies. Up to the beginning of the transition process, the 
banking systems of the transition economies were mainly in the form of monobank systems, 
where banking sector competition may be considered to have been inexistent. The first 
preconditions for the introduction of competition in the banking sector were created with the 
breaking-up of the monobank systems, which led to an increase of the number of banks. 
However, most of these banks remained state-owned and large in size due to the inheritance 
of large portfolios from the previous monobanks which, accompanied with a lack of 
commercial banking expertise, could not engage in proper competition in the sense of being 
able to compete through prices and product innovations. 
As discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, the state ownership of the commercial 
banks was associated with many difficulties that hampered the efficient and stable 
functioning of the banking sectors in the transition economies. As a means to avoid these 
problems was considered the privatization of the commercial banks. However, due to the 
restrictions on foreign ownership, most of the banks were sold domestically. In addition, in 
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order to induce competition, regulators applied lax licensing criteria, which led to a large 
inflow of new banks that were mostly undercapitalized and lacked commercial banking 
experience. These developments further worsened the deficiencies inherited from the 
previous monobank system and failed to establish competitive and sustainable banking 
systems that could provide efficient financial intermediation to the economy. 
Despite the initial hesitation to allow the entry of foreign banks, eventually all the CEE 
countries opened-up to foreign investors, which helped the modernization of the banking 
systems in these countries by bringing modern commercial banking practices. According to 
Tang et al. (2000), the entry of the foreign banks may also be considered to have introduced 
banking sector competition in the CEE countries. The entry of foreign banks represents the 
beginning of a new era for the development of the banking sector, which was marked also by 
strengthening of the prudential regulation including the tightening of the licensing criteria for 
the new banks. 
As was shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, during the second decade of transition the banking 
sectors of the CEE countries were dominated by foreign ownership and substantial progress 
was recorded in banking reform. Regulators acknowledged the importance of creating the 
regulatory preconditions for the development of competition through the entry of foreign 
banks and also acknowledged the importance of prudent licensing criteria in order to ensure a 
healthy development of competition. Based on the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey, it appears that all the CEE countries have broadly eliminated the 
limitations on the foreign bank entry or ownership and have also established prudent entry 
requirements for the licensing process (Table 2.7). 
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Table 2.7 Limitations on foreign bank entry and entry requirements, 2006/2007 
      
  
Limitations on Foreign Bank 
Entry/Ownership 
Entry into Banking 
Requirements 
   Albania n.a n.a 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 8 
Bulgaria 3 8 
Croatia 3 8 
Czech Republic 3 8 
Estonia 3 8 
Kosovo 3 8 
Hungary 3 8 
Latvia 3 8 
Lithuania 3 8 
Macedonia 2 8 
Montenegro n.a n.a 
Poland 3 8 
Romania 3 7 
Serbia n.a n.a 
Slovakia 3 8 
Slovenia 3 8 
   Source: World Bank (2007) 
The first column in Table 2.7 shows the respective countries’ bank regulator responses to the 
question as to whether foreign banks may own domestic banks and whether foreign banks 
may enter a country's banking industry in the form of acquisition, subsidiary or branch. As 
shown in the table, almost all countries have a score of 3, which implies that none of the 
above mentioned forms of foreign bank entry is prohibited. The second column presents the 
responses to the question on whether various types of legal submissions are required to obtain 
a banking  license.
6
 The responses presented in Table 2.7 show that almost all the countries 
have a score of 8, suggesting that they have established all the listed prudential criteria for the 
licensing process.  
                                                          
6
 The question includes a list of potential requirements that regulators may request to be submitted before the 
issuance of a banking licence, including: draft by-laws; intended organization chart; financial projections for the 
first three years; financial information on the main potential shareholders; background/experience of future 
directors; background/experience of future managers; sources of funds to be disbursed in the capitalization of 
new bank; and market differentiation intended for the new bank. 
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The results presented in Table 2.7 show a highly homogenous picture for the CEE countries 
regarding the limitations on foreign bank entry and the entry requirement during the licensing 
process. Nevertheless, regarding the entry requirements, the survey results present the 
extensiveness of the regulations rather than their effectiveness, meaning that still there might 
be substantial differences between the EU countries and the non-EU countries with regard to 
the degree of the implementation of regulations, which largely depends on the overall quality 
of institutions in these countries. 
The CEE countries have recorded progress also in the establishment of competition 
legislation and institutions, but the progress may be considered to have been rather slow and 
there are differences between the EU and non-EU countries of the sample. The Competition 
Policy Index produced by the EBRD suggests that, by 2009, competition policy legislation 
and institutions had been set up in all CEE countries and that there has been progress in 
reducing the entry restrictions and in undertaking enforcement actions against dominant firms 
(Table 2.8). However, as shown in the table, the progress of reforms appears to have been 
quite slow during the 1999-2009 period. The competition policy indices in Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia appear to be lower compared to other 
CEE countries, which are either EU members or more advanced in the EU integration 
process. However, in none of the more advanced reformers of the CEE region has the 
competition policy index reached the value of 4 or 4+, implying that the competitive 
conditions in the whole region remain below the level of advanced industrial economies. 
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Table 2.8 Competition Policy Index 
                        
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Albania 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Bosnia and H. 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Bulgaria 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 
Croatia 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 3.0 
Czech Rep. - - - - - - - - - - - 
Estonia 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Hungary 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Kosovo - - - - - - - - - - - 
Latvia 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 
Lithuania 2.3 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Macedonia 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Montenegro 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.7 2.0 
Poland 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Romania 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Serbia 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.7 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Slovakia 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Slovenia 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
            Source: EBRD Transition Report (various issues). 
Note: The competition policy index ranges from 1 to 4+. The value of 1 implies that no competition policy and 
legislation is in place. The value of 2 implies that competition policy legislation and institutions are set up, and 
some reduction of entry restrictions or enforcement action on dominant firms has taken place. The value of 3 
implies that some enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a competitive 
environment, including break-ups of dominant conglomerates, and a substantial reduction of entry restrictions 
have taken place. The value of 4 implies significant enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to 
promote a competitive environment. The value of 4+ implies standards and performance typical of advanced 
industrial economies: effective enforcement of competition policy; and unrestricted entry to most markets. 
 
An implication of tables 2.7 and 2.8 taken together is that the CEE countries are quite 
homogenous with respect to the regulatory framework, but there may be differences with 
respect to the implementation of the regulatory framework. For this reason, in all our 
empirical chapters we control for the potential impact of the quality of institutions, which 
embraces implementation, and which serves as a proxy for the extent to which regulations are 
implemented. 
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2.3.4 Non-performing loans during the 1999-2009 period 
Despite the improvements, in 1999, most the CEE countries still had two-digit non-
performing loans to total loans ratios (Table 2.9). This was a period when state-ownership 
still represented a considerable share of the banking system, and in some countries it even 
dominated the ownership structure of the banking system (Appendix 1.2). In addition, even 
though the privatization to foreign banks had begun, some domestically-owned weak banks 
were still in operation - those licensed in the beginning of transition when lax licensing 
criteria were applied in order to induce the domestic competition in the banking system.  
 
Table 2.9 Non-performing loans (as % of total loans) 
                        
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Albania 32.7 42.6 6.9 5.6 4.6 4.2 2.3 3.1 3.4 6.6 10.5 
Bosnia and H. 58.7 15.8 20.7 11.4 8.3 6.1 5.4 4.1 3.0 3.1 6.0 
Bulgaria 17.5 10.9 7.9 10.4 4.4 3.7 3.8 3.2 2.5 3.2 6.7 
Croatia 20.6 19.8 15 11.6 9.4 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.8 4.8 7.8 
Czech Rep. 24.5 20.4 14.1 8.5 5.0 4.1 4.0 3.8 2.8 2.8 4.6 
Estonia 2.9 1.3 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.9 5.3 
Hungary 4.4 3.1 3 4.9 3.8 3.6 3.1 2.9 2.8 3.3 6.7 
Kosovo - - - 1.2 1.1 2.4 3.5 4.1 4.1 3.3 4.3 
Latvia 6.8 5 3.1 2.1 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.4 2.4 16.4 
Lithuania 11.9 10.8 7.4 5.8 2.6 2.4 3.4 3.1 2.7 4.6 20.8 
Macedonia 62.6 46.5 44.4 35.7 34.9 27.5 22.2 15.1 10.9 10.1 12.6 
Montenegro - - - - - 5.7 5.2 2.8 3.2 6.0 13.5 
Poland 14.9 16.8 20.5 24.7 25.1 17.4 11.6 7.7 5.4 4.7 8.0 
Romania 35.4 3.8 3.4 2.3 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 3.0 4.5 8.5 
Serbia - - - - 9.1 7.2 5.5 7.1 2.6 3.5 8.5 
Slovakia 32.9 26.2 24.3 11.2 9.1 7.2 5.5 7.1 2.6 3.5 5.2 
Slovenia 9.3 9.3 10 10 9.4 7.5 6.4 5.5 3.9 3.6 6.0 
Euro Area - - - - 3.0 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.3 3.0 4.7 
            Source: EBRD Transition Reports (various issues); World Bank development indicators, CBK statistics. 
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However, after 2001, when the state-ownership of the banks recorded a massive decline in all 
CEE countries and foreign-ownership started to dominate the banking systems, the quality of 
loan portfolio improved substantially in all CEE countries except Macedonia, where the high 
level of non-performing loans persisted during the whole decade.  
The improvement of the loan portfolio quality is considered to have primarily reflected the 
improved management practices brought in by foreign banks which relied on more advanced 
risk-management techniques. The improvement of the loan quality may also reflect the more 
conservative lending approach in all CEE countries, where the lending activity was mainly 
focused on household loans that are considered to be less risky compared to the loans issued 
to enterprises (see Section 2.3.2). In addition, the bank consolidation process that took place 
after the year 2000, consisting of stronger banks taking-over weaker banks and some of the 
weak banks leaving the market, further contributed to the decline of non-performing loans. 
Also, the strengthening of the regulatory framework and the bank supervision authorities 
played a key role in disciplining the risk-taking behaviour of the banks. Furthermore, the 
steady economic growth and the low inflation rate, alongside a better protection of creditor 
rights, enhanced the overall operating environment for banks by increasing loan repayment 
capacities and borrowers’ discipline. 
However, the rapid credit growth that was taking place in most CEE countries started to be 
viewed with concern for the potential deterioration of the loan-portfolio quality (Barisitz, 
2005). The concerns were related to the fact that, under high credit growth rates, the 
screening of individuals is likely to deteriorate, hence increasing the likelihood of ‘bad’ 
borrowers being granted access to bank loans. The credit expansion might partly be attributed 
to the supposedly increased banking system competition after the entry of the foreign banks 
which might have led to a more aggressive behaviour by banks in the credit market. In 
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addition, credit growth was also fuelled by the macroeconomic stability in CEE countries 
which increased the demand for loans and enhanced the banks’ confidence in the domestic 
markets. 
The rapid growth of credit was initially seen by the authorities as satisfactory in terms of 
catching-up with the more developed countries, given the low degree of financial 
intermediation during the first decade of transition. Hence, the implementation of supervisory 
actions was delayed, thus allowing excessive credit growth to take place (Barisitz, 2009). 
Even though the non-performing loans ratio in most countries remained relatively stable for 
most years under consideration, the main concern was that some of these loans could become 
non-performing in the next economic downturn (Barisitz, 2005). 
The favourable macroeconomic conditions that persisted for most of the second-decade of 
transition started to deteriorate by mid-2007, when the global financial crisis started to erupt. 
The financial and macroeconomic environment in all CEE countries started to worsen, thus 
threatening the stability of the financial sector (EBRD, 2008). In most CEE countries the 
GDP growth slowed-down in 2008, and by 2009 all countries except Albania, Kosovo and 
Poland experienced negative growth rates (see Appendix 1.1). As a consequence, the loan 
repayment capacity of the borrowers was negatively affected, leading to a substantial increase 
of non-performing loans in all CEE countries. The highest increase of the non-performing 
loans ratio was recorded in Latvia and Lithuania which were also the countries with the 
highest rate of real GDP decline. In Latvia, the share of non-performing loans to total loans 
reached 16.4% in 2009 (2.4% in 2008), whereas in Lithuania it reached 20.8% (4.6% in 
2008). In spite of the fact that there was no deep recession in CEE countries in 2009, the NPL 
ratio in all the countries, except Kosovo and the Czech Republic, has reached a higher level 
compared to the Euro Area average. 
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Chapter 5 of this thesis investigates empirically the determinants of the quality of loan-
portfolio (measured by the ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans) in CEE countries 
during the 1999-2009 period, taking into account especially the impact of banking system 
competition. 
 
2.3.5 Interest rate spreads during the period 1999-2009   
The intermediation cost, measured by interest margin, had remained high during the first 
decade of transition but this started to decline as competition began to develop and the overall 
environment improved. The interest rate spread, apart from indicating the intermediation cost, 
is considered also as an important indicator of the efficiency of intermediation and as a 
potential signal of market power. 
The interest rate spread, which measures the difference between lending interest rate and 
deposit interest rate, followed a declining trend in all CEE countries (see Table 2.10). The 
decline is consistent with the increasing presence of foreign banks in the region which seems 
to have increased the degree of banking efficiency by increasing the number of banks, 
especially foreign-owned banks, and increasing the degree of banking system competition, 
thus leading to lower interest rate spreads. Moreover, this period was also characterized by a 
more favourable macroeconomic performance, steady economic growth and low inflation and 
improvements in property rights protection, albeit at a slow pace. These improvements in the 
banks’ operating environment led to a reduction of the risk perceived by banks, based also on 
the decline of non-performing loans during this period, thus leading to lower risk premiums 
in the interest rates. 
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Table 2.10 Interest rate spread (lending rate minus deposit rate, in percentage points) 
                        
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Albania 8.7 13.8 11.9 6.8 5.9 5.2 8.0 7.7 8.4 6.2 5.9 
Bosnia and H. 15.2 15.8 - 8.2 6.8 6.6 6.0 4.3 3.6 3.5 4.3 
Bulgaria 10.3 8.2 8.2 6.4 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.7 6.3 6.4 5.2 
Croatia 10.6 8.3 6.3 11.0 10.1 9.9 9.5 8.2 7.0 7.2 8.4 
Czech Rep. 4.2 3.7 4.3 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 
Estonia 6.9 3.7 3.7 4.0 3.1 3.5 2.8 2.2 2.1 2.8 4.6 
Hungary 4.4 3.1 3.7 2.8 -1.4 3.7 3.4 0.6 2.3 0.3 5.2 
Kosovo - - - - - 12.4 11.4 11.6 10.1 9.4 10.1 
Latvia 9.2 7.5 5.9 4.7 2.4 4.2 3.3 3.8 4.8 5.5 8.2 
Lithuania 8.1 8.3 6.6 5.1 4.6 4.5 2.9 2.1 1.5 0.8 3.6 
Macedonia 9.1 7.7 9.4 8.8 8.0 5.9 6.9 6.6 5.4 3.8 3.0 
Montenegro - - - - - - - 6.1 4.1 5.4 5.5 
Poland 5.7 5.8 6.6 5.8 3.6 3.8 4.0 3.3 - - 3.9 
Romania 19.8 20.7 18.5 16.2 14.4 14.1 13.2 9.2 6.6 5.5 5.3 
Serbia 42.7 -72.4 30.4 17.1 12.7 11.9 13.1 11.5 7.1 8.8 6.7 
Slovakia 6.7 6.4 4.8 3.6 3.1 4.9 4.2 4.1 4.3 2.0 - 
Slovenia 5.1 5.7 5.2 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.6 2.3 2.6 4.5 
Euro Area -  -  -  -  3.2 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.3 3.5 
            Source: World Bank; European Central Bank, CBK statistics. 
However, with the beginning of the global crisis in mid-2007, the environment for banks 
started to become more uncertain. The declining growth rates in most CEE countries 
substantially increased concerns regarding the capability of borrowers to repay their loans. 
Hence, by 2009, the interest rates spreads had increased in most countries, reflecting the 
increase in risk premiums. 
As Table 2.10 shows, there are significant differences between the spreads in EU member 
states and other countries, with the latter having higher interest rate spreads during the whole 
period. An exception is Romania which, until lately, had quite high interest rate spreads 
which might reflect the persistingly high inflation in this country until 2006. The differences 
in the interest rate spreads between the EU and non-EU countries appear to have narrowed in 
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2009 when the spreads increased in most EU members. However, despite the continuously 
declining trend of the interest rate spreads in all CEE countries, they remained above the Euro 
Area average, thus suggesting that, in erms of financial intermediation efficiency, CEE 
countries continue to lag behind the more advanced financial sectors of the Euro Area. 
In order to clarify the factors that have contributed to the financial intermediation costs in 
CEE countries during the 1999-2009 period, chapter 6 of this thesis presents the results of the 
empirical estimation of the determinants of net interest margins. The main focus of this 
exercise will be on estimating the impact of banking system competition on the net interest 
margins using bank-level data. 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
The transition from the monobank system, which was an integral component of the centrally-
planned economies, to the market-based banking system was the initial stage of the creation 
of a modern banking system in CEE countries. However, it took almost a decade for the new 
banking system to be adequately operational in the sense of providing efficient financial 
intermediation and being stable. Bad loans inherited from the previous system, together with 
imprudent banking practices, weak institutions, and macroeconomic instability led most CEE 
countries into banking crises which required long and costly restructuring programs. The 
most substantial improvement occurred after the beginning of the privatization of state-
owned banks to foreign banks which introduced modern commercial banking know-how and 
technology, thus improving the risk management procedures and renhancing the efficienc of 
the banking systems in these countries. However, the development of an efficient and stable 
banking system also requires effective regulatory, supervisory and judiciary institutions  able 
to enforce prudent behaviour by banks and to protect their creditor rights. The quality of the 
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institutions in the beginning of the transition process was generally poor in all CEE countries, 
partly reflecting the lack of commercial banking experience and the continuing legacy of the 
previous sytem. 
During the second decade of transition, state-ownership of banks gradually diminished and 
was replaced by dominant foreign-ownership in all CEE countries. At the same time, 
substantial reforms were implemented in order to develop the regulatory and supervisory 
institutions, and improve the protection of creditor rights (the last one progressed at a slower 
pace). The EU members of the CEE region recorded a faster progress in the banking and 
institutional reforms than the non-EU countries. This has been reflected in the development 
of their banking systems. Despite this progress, the degree of banking development in CEE 
countries remains well below the average of the Euro Area. 
The transition process created the conditions for the evolution of banking system competition 
that were lacking in the centrally-planned economic system. Initially, the regulators took 
measures to induce banking competition by applying lax licensing criteria for the domestic 
banks, which led to a rapid increase in the number of undercapitalized banks that also lacked 
commercial banking experience. This policy proved inadequate and failed to introduce proper 
competition that would be beneficial for the development of the banking sector in these 
countries. The next steps of the regulators that took place during the second decade of the 
transition process, most importantly the liberalization of the foreign bank entry and the 
introduction of the prudential licensing criteria, were fundamental for the evolution of the 
banking sector competition in the CEE countries.  
During the second decade of transition, the quality of the loan-portfolio in all CEE countries 
improved substantially, reflecting a more prudent behaviour by the banks, stronger 
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institutions, and a more favourable macroeconomic environment. Substantial progress was 
achieved also with regard to the reduction of the intermediation cost, with the interest rate 
spreads following a declining trend in most countries. However, the interest rate spreads 
remain higher in CEE countries than the average of the Euro Area, potentially suggesting that 
the financial intermediation process in the transition economies continues to be characterized 
by a lower degree of efficiency. 
The favourable developments in the banking systems of CEE countries during the second 
decade of transition was seriously threatened in 2009, when the global crisis led to a 
deterioration of the operating environment. As a consequence, the non-performing loans 
increased considerably in all countries and the interest rate spreads responded positively to 
the increased risks.  
The developments regarding competition, loan portfolio quality, and interest rate spreads will 
be investigated empirically in greater detail in chapters 4, 5, and 6 respectively. Special 
attention will be paid to the estimation of the banking sector competition in the CEE 
countries, and its impact on the loan portfolio quality and interest margins. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Although competition has been given enormous attention in the economic literature, there is 
no general agreement on the best approach to be used for measuring the degree of 
competition. The literature on the measures of competition is divided into two major streams, 
the structural and non-structural approaches.  
In the structural approach, the level of competition is indicated by the degree of market 
concentration, measured by various concentration indices (e.g. Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 
and n-firm concentration ratio). The structural approach is mainly represented by the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm which, in its original form, maintains that an 
exogenously given market structure influences the conduct of banks and their performance. 
According to the SCP paradigm, banks operating in more concentrated markets generate 
higher profits, because concentration enables them to exert market power and collude with 
each other. Hence, based on the SCP paradigm, competition is measured by the degree of 
market concentration, with higher values of market concentration indicating a lower degree 
of competition. However, the view that market concentration implies lower competition is 
widely criticised in the literature, what has led to the development of the non-structural 
approaches which do not take into account the structural features of the market when 
measuring competition. 
The most commonly used non-structural approach is represented by the method of Panzar 
and Rosse (1987) which measures the competition by estimating a reduced-form revenue 
equation that measures the elasticity of bank revenues with respect to changes in input prices. 
The sum of elasticities of bank revenues with respect to the input prices produces the Panzar-
Rosse H-statistic which indicates whether banks behaviour is consistent to the notion of 
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monopoly, monopolistic competition, or perfect competition. The value of the Panzar-Rosse 
approach is that it directly quantifies the competitive behaviour of the banks. 
The Panzar-Rosse approach has been applied extensively in the banking literature which 
includes studies that have estimated banking sector competition for different countries and 
regions. The empirical studies that have applied the Panzar-Rosse approach to the banking 
industry have followed a quite homogenous methodology and have mostly found that the 
investigated banking sectors have been operating under monopolistic competition. However, 
the view of Bikker et al. (2007, 2009) that a Panzar-Rosse model should not include the total 
assets variable to control for bank’s size in the regression raises questions regarding the 
validity of the results generated by most of the empirical studies in this field. According to 
Bikker et al. (2007, 2009), controlling for total assets transforms the reduced-form revenue 
equation into a price equation, and thus produces a higher H-statistic which does not properly 
measure the degree of competition. 
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to provide a critical review of the approaches used to 
measure competition from both the theoretical and empirical point of view. The chapter is 
organized as follows. The next section presents the structural approach for the measurement 
of competition, focusing on the SCP paradigm and the theories that oppose the SCP 
paradigm. Section 3.3 presents the theoretical background of the Panzar-Rosse approach. 
Section 3.4 presents a critical review of studies that have applied the Panzar-Rosse approach 
to measure competition in the banking sector. Section 3.5 concludes.  
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3.2 Structural approach 
The structural approach for the measurement of competition mainly relies on the Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm which relates competition to the degree of market 
concentration. The SCP paradigm originates from the work of Bain (1951), where he 
analysed firms’ performance in 42 industries in the US during the 1930s. The results of this 
study suggested that firms operating in more concentrated industries and markets with higher 
entry barriers generated higher rates of return compared to firms operating in less 
concentrated industries and those with lower entry barriers. These findings were interpreted 
as evidence for the SCP paradigm. In its original form, the SCP paradigm maintains that an 
exogenously given market structure influences the conduct of banks and their performance. 
More specifically, the SCP paradigm claims that a higher degree of concentration grants 
market power to incumbent firms and enables them to behave in particular ways, such as 
colluding with each other, which results in higher profits. However, in most of the studies 
dealing with the SCP paradigm, firms’ conduct is not explicitly taken into account; therefore, 
it is rather the structure-performance relationship which is explored and a particular type of 
conduct or behaviour is only assumed.  
In line with the SCP hypothesis, Philips (1962) and Scherer and Ross (1990) claim that 
collusion is more likely to appear when the market is operated by fewer firms. In highly 
concentrated markets, where the industry output is produced by few firms, the actions of one 
firm tend to affect the actions of other rival firms, thus causing interdependence among firms 
which induces collusion as a possible way of easing competitive pressures and charging 
higher prices. According to the authors, an increase in the number of firms reduces the 
market share of each individual firm, so firms are more likely to ignore the interdependence 
among them and less likely to engage in colluding arrangements. Hay and Kelley (1974) 
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studied the price-fixing cases handled by the Department of Justice in US and found that 76 
percent of collusion cases occurred in markets where the four-firm concentration ratio was 
over 50 percent, providing support to the view that collusion is more likely to appear in 
industries that have higher degrees of market concentration. 
Van Hoose (2010) applies the SCP hypothesis to the bank loan market in a dominant-bank 
framework and claims that the dominant bank maintains a higher loan interest rate but which 
declines to a lower level when the number of banks increases. This market consists of a 
dominant incumbent bank i and a number of smaller banks indexed j= 1,…,m. Van Hoose 
assumes that the dominant incumbent bank possesses cost advantages deriving from 
economies of scale which serve as a barrier to entry to new banks. As a result, the market is 
operated by the dominant incumbent bank and few smaller banks. Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
profit maximising equilibrium of the dominant bank as well as the group of smaller banks.  
Figure 3.1 The SCP hypothesis in banking: a loan market with an incumbent bank and few 
small banks 
      
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) (b) 
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If the dominant incumbent bank i operates alone in the market, i.e. if it is a monopoly bank, it 
would face the loan market demand curve L
d
 which represents the total demand for loans. 
MC
i
L would be its marginal cost and MR
i
M would be its marginal revenue curve. Looking for 
profit maximization, bank i would provide the economy with loans equivalent to L
i
M, 
charging a monopoly loan rate r
i,M
L. The profit that bank i would be realizing at this points 
would be equivalent to the quantity of loans multiplied by the difference between the loan 
rate r
i,M
L and the average cost corresponding with this amount of lending which is depicted by 
AC
i
L (panel a). 
In panel (b), it is shown that smaller banks, depicted by j, have a higher marginal cost (MC
j
L) 
and average cost (AC
j
L) for every given level of lending compared to the dominant 
incumbent bank i, deriving from cost disadvantages that they have. Smaller banks have an 
upward sloping loan supply curve (L
s
F), meaning that they are willing to lend as long as loan 
interest rates are above the reservation loan rate Lr . The amount of loans issued by each of 
these banks is small in relation to total lending, so all of them take the market loan interest 
rate, i.e. the interest rate of the dominant incumbent bank, as given. The total supply of loans 
by these banks is shown by the supply curve L
s
F. 
Because of the competition from the smaller banks, the dominant incumbent bank does not 
face the entire market demand L
d
 (panel a), but instead the residual demand curve L
i,d
D = L
d
 - 
L
s
F. This means that the dominant incumbent bank faces a lower demand for loans which is 
equivalent to the difference between the total loan demand and the amount of loans supplied 
by small banks. The new marginal revenue curve which corresponds to the new demand 
curve (L
i,d
D) is depicted by MR
i
D. In these circumstances, the incumbent bank maximizes its 
profit by issuing a lower amount of loans (LD), while the loan interest rate declines to r
D
L, 
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with a negative impact on the incumbent bank’s profit. Nevertheless, the dominant incumbent 
bank still earns positive profits since the price charged is higher than its average cost. Smaller 
banks take the dominant incumbent bank’s loan rate as given and extend loans equivalent to 
LF (panel b) which represents the difference between the total loans demanded in the market 
and the amount of loans supplied by the dominant incumbent bank. At this point, each small 
bank earns a zero profit since price is equal to their average cost, so there is no incentive for 
smaller banks either to enter or exit the market.  
This example elaborates that the increase in the number of firms, i.e. greater competition, 
reduces the market price and leads to a reduction in the dominant incumbent bank’s profits. 
The assumption that the dominant incumbent firm faces lower average costs, due to 
economies of scale, may provide support to the efficiency hypothesis (discussed later) which 
argues that the profits of dominant incumbent firms are higher because of their superior 
efficiency. Nonetheless, the illustration supports the SCP paradigm by showing that the 
dominant incumbent firm does not behave like a competitive firm but instead charges prices 
that exceed its average costs. Despite being more efficient, the dominant incumbent firm does 
not adjust the price to its costs which would also lower prices for the consumers but instead 
charges monopoly prices. Whereas in competitive markets, more efficient firms are 
characterized by lower prices which enable them to be more competitive and increase their 
market share. 
A dominant bank may also engage in different types of strategic behaviour that disadvantage 
the smaller banks and enable the dominant bank to increase its market share and maintain a 
higher market price. According to Salop and Scheffman (1987), firms may engage in 
strategies that raise rivals’ costs (i.e. input prices), thus pushing them to increase the price and 
reduce their level of output. Possible forms of cost-raising strategies may include the abuse of 
58 
 
the regulatory process by lobbying for regulations that disadvantage the rivals and 
commencement of advertising wars. In a market dominated by a dominant firm and few 
smaller firms, as in the illustration elaborated above, it is more likely that the cost-raising 
strategies would be initiated by the dominant firm. Since the dominant firm possesses 
economies of scale, an increase of input prices would increase the average cost of the 
dominant firm by a lower amount compared to the smaller firms, thus pushing smaller firms 
to charge higher prices that reduce the demand for their products. In addition, the stronger 
financial position gives the dominant firm a greater lobbying power which may lead to 
regulations that disadvantage the smaller firms.      
Despite its extensive use in the literature as a mainstream framework for assessing the 
competition, the SCP paradigm has been subject to criticisms that contest its ability to explain 
the competitive conditions in a market. The criticisms are mostly directed to the assumed 
one-way causality from market structure to conduct and then to performance. According to 
Vesala (1995), market structure and conduct are endogenously determined as it is 
unreasonable to exclude the feedback effects from potential strategic behaviour of firms, i.e. 
the conduct of firms, to the market structure. For example, entry decisions in an industry may 
well depend on the conduct of the existing participants in the market, i.e. the actual degree of 
competition, the price they charge and the non-price aspects of competition. The SCP 
paradigm is criticised also because of its incompatibility with some of the existing theories, 
since not all the theories (still within mainstream economics) predict a positive relationship 
between market power and concentration (Vesala, 1995). For instance, the Cournot 
equilibrium is consistent with the SCP paradigm by predicting a positive relationship between 
market concentration and performance, claiming that a smaller number of firms is associated 
with lower industry output and higher prices. On the other hand, under the Bertrand 
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equilibrium price competition may be efficient even in a duopoly, suggesting that as long as 
there are at least two firms in the market, the equilibrium price will be the competitive price. 
According to this theory, each firm will tend to set prices below the prices charged by its 
rivals, aiming at gaining rivals’ customers. The sequence of price undercutting will continue 
until price declines to the level of the marginal cost, where firms do not have any incentive to 
undertake further price reductions (Lipczynski et al., 2005). 
One of the most widely reported critiques to the SCP approach is represented by the 
Efficiency Structure hypothesis (ES) which was developed by Demsetz (1973). Similar to the 
SCP, the ES hypothesis is a structural approach but often referred as the alternative of the 
SCP paradigm. The main objection of the ES to the SCP paradigm is related to the 
assumption that the higher profits in concentrated industries are attributed to the collusive 
behaviour or exertion of market power by the firms operating in those markets. According to 
the ES hypothesis, apart from market concentration, the market shares of individual firms 
must be included in the analysis to explain the industry profitability. This theory claims that 
higher profits realized by firms operating in concentrated markets are a result of the superior 
efficiency of larger firms which derives from economies of scale. According to this view, 
more efficient firms have the option of either keeping prices at the same level with other 
participants and earn higher profits, due to their cost advantages, or reducing prices and 
increase their market share which again leads to higher profits. In other words, this approach 
claims that higher profits in concentrated markets are not the result of the market power but 
rather the superior efficiency of dominant firms. While the SCP paradigm argues for a one-
way causality from market structure to firms’ conduct, the ES hypothesis suggests that it is 
firms’ conduct that affects market structure but it also allows for feedback effects from 
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structure to firms’ conduct which are transmitted through the impact of market structure on 
firms’ efficiency, i.e. from economies of scale.  
The Relative Market Power (RMP) hypothesis, developed by Shepherd (1982), also 
acknowledges the inclusion of market shares of individual firms into the analysis to explain 
the performance of an industry. However, this view relates the higher profits of larger firms 
to the market power and product differentiation of individual firms rather than to the superior 
efficiency of dominant firms as argued by the ES hypothesis. This may be considered as an 
argument in support of the SCP paradigm but the difference between the two is that RMP 
does not consider the higher profits in concentrated markets as originating from the collusion 
between firms but rather from the market power of individual firms (Shepherd, 1986). 
Another critique to the SCP paradigm is related to the fact that this approach regards higher 
profits as an indicator of the presence of market power. According to Vesala (1995), profits 
represent only a poor measure of market power as these two variables are not necessarily 
positively correlated. The author claims that firms may charge higher prices due to their 
market power, but may still realize low profits because of their cost inefficiencies. This view 
is in line with the quiet life hypothesis which claims that the managers of firms that have 
monopoly power are less induced to pursue policies aimed at the enhancement of efficiency 
since revenues can be increased by charging higher prices. But, because of the inefficiencies 
associated with the market power, the increase in revenues does not necessarily lead to higher 
profitability (Punt and van Rooij, 1999). However, despite the fact that firms with high 
monopoly power are considered to be less efficient than firms operating in competitive 
markets, still monopoly firms are generally expected to generate higher profits than the 
competitive firms. In this context, this might imply that higher profits might signal the 
presence of market power. 
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The SCP approach to competition is at odds with an important view on the concept of 
competition – the view associated with Schumpeter. According to Schumpeter, competition 
should be viewed less in terms of the effect on prices but more in terms of its impact on new 
technology, new sources of supply and new types of organizational development which 
provide enterprises with quality and cost advantages (Cook, 2002). Schumpeter argues that 
the quality and cost advantages originating from the innovation process may temporarily alter 
the market structure to a monopoly, rewarding the innovating firm with higher profits, but the 
monopoly power of this firm will be eroded by the innovations of other firms which are 
attracted by the high profits in the industry. The innovative activity, according to this view, 
mainly comes from outsiders (Bloch, 2000). In this respect, market concentration is not 
viewed as the opposite of the competition, but rather as an integral part of a dynamic 
competing process. Schumpeter’s approach amounts to an endogenous relationship between 
the actions of the entrepreneur and the market structure, while the SCP hypothesis argues for 
a one-way impact from market structure to the entrepreneur’s actions. In addition, the SCP 
approach does not take into account potential cost differences among firms which represent a 
key feature of Schumpeter’s argument. Cost advantages might be better taken into account by 
the Efficiency Structure hypothesis because the use of market shares of individual firms to 
explain profitability may, to some extent, address the cost differences among firms. However, 
this approach assumes that cost differences arise from the differences in the market shares, 
i.e. from economies of scale, rather than from innovations as argued by Schumpeter. 
Another related approach that criticizes the SCP paradigm is the Contestability Theory, 
developed by Baumol (1982) and Baumol et al. (1982). According to this theory, firms 
behave competitively also in a concentrated industry or even in a monopoly if the market is 
contestable. Perfectly contestable markets are those that are characterized by free entry and 
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costless exit. The contestability theory claims that firms operating in a contestable market 
behave competitively even if the market is highly concentrated, because charging prices that 
exceed the average cost would make the industry attractive to the new entrants which would 
then reduce the profits of existing firms. However, at least one of the key assumptions of the 
contestability theory, that the market is characterized by free entry, may not be much realistic 
in banking markets, bearing in mind the specifics of the sector that require potential entrants 
to meet specific criteria which, depending on how they are interpreted by the licensing 
authorities, might sometimes serve as barriers to entry. 
The contestability theory shares a key feature with the SCP paradigm in acknowledging the 
positive impact of the higher number of firms on the level of competition. However, there is 
an important difference between these two theories: the SCP paradigm takes into account 
only the actual number of firms operating in the market whereas the contestability theory 
refers to the potential number of firms. The contestability theory is in line with Schumpeter’s 
view regarding the role of new entrants for the enhancement of competition but it is not based 
on the innovative activity of the new entrants which represents the core of Schumpeter’s 
argument.    
Another critique to the SCP paradigm that applies particularly to the banking sector comes 
from the perspective of asymmetric information theories put forward by Shaffer (2002). 
According to his view, the SCP hypothesis assumes that an increase in the number of banks 
reduces the market power of banks who would then charge lower loan interest rates. On the 
other hand, screening theories generally suggest that as the number of banks increases, banks 
are less incentivised to screen the potential borrowers. With a higher number of banks 
operating in the market, the market share of each bank tends to shrink. So, in order to 
maintain or eventually increase their market share, banks may reduce their screening 
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procedures and offer easier access to credit to their clients. As a consequence, the probability 
of granting credit to lower quality borrowers will increase, implying a higher credit risk for 
the banking sector. The higher credit risk, in turn, leads to upward adjustment of interest rates 
charged by banks. A more detailed discussion of asymmetric theories in the context of the 
relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking will be provided in chapter 
5. 
Another view on the relationship between concentration and market power suggests that these 
two variables are positively related, but their relationship is not monotonic. In this context, it 
may be expected that the conduct of firms operating in markets with a low degree of 
concentration can be close to competitive, and an increase of concentration from this low 
level will generate an increase in the market power (Cetorelli, 1999). However, at high levels 
of concentration, conduct is considered to be already far from the competitive behaviour, so 
an additional increase of concentration is not expected to be associated with a further increase 
of market power (Figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2 Non-linear relationship between concentration and market power 
           
Another view with regard to the use of market concentration to infer the competitive 
conditions is presented by Carlton and Perloff (2000). According to these authors, even if 
Market power 
Concentration 
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market concentration explains the competitive conditions, concentration indices may not 
properly indicate market competition in an industry whose products compete closely with the 
products of another industry. For example, the concentration index for the banking loans 
market may underestimate competition in the lending market if a substantial amount of loans 
are extended by microfinance institutions. In addition, nowadays banks are increasingly 
facing cross-border competition from banks operating in other countries which also cannot be 
captured by the concentration indices. 
To summarise, the SCP paradigm claims that firms’ performance is explained by the degree 
of market concentration, arguing that a higher degree of concentration provides the dominant 
firms with the possibility to exert market power and engage in collusive behaviour which 
enables them to charge higher prices and generate higher profits. In other words, it is argued 
that higher concentration indicates a lower level of competition. The main theoretical 
challenge to the SCP hypothesis is based on the assumed one-way relationship from 
concentration to firms’ conduct and their performance. This challenge focuses on the core 
argument of this paradigm that higher profit rates in concentrated industries derive from the 
market power. Another important challenge is based on the contestability theory, according to 
which concentrated markets and even monopolies can behave competitively if the markets 
are contestable. Despite the shortcomings argued by different views, the SCP paradigm 
continues to be broadly used as a foundation for measuring competition by many empirical 
studies, including studies of banking industry.  
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3.3. Non-structural approaches  
The non-structural approaches for the measurement of competition were developed as a 
response to the deficiencies of the structural approach. The non-structural approaches 
measure competition or the market power by directly quantifying the competitive behaviour 
of the bank, rather than inferring it from the analysis of the degree of market concentration.  
The most-widely used non-structural approach for the measurement of banking sector 
competition is the Panzar and Rosse (1987) model which will be explained in more details in 
Section 3.3.1. Given its wide acceptance as an appropriate method for measuring the degree 
of competition, and its ability to directly quantify the competitive behaviour of the banks and 
indicate whether it is consistent with monopoly, monopolistic competition, or perfect 
competition, we treat this method as our main approach for measuring the degree of banking 
sector competition in this thesis.
 7
 
Another widely used approach that does not take into account the structural features of the 
market when measuring the degree of market power is the Lerner Index (Lerner, 1934). The 
Lerner Index measures the mark-up of price over the marginal costs for each bank. Higher 
values of the index indicate a higher degree of market power being exerted by the 
investigated banks. The Lerner Index will be used as an alternative measure to the Panzar-
Rosse measure of competition in chapters 5 and 6 where we estimate the impact of banking 
sector competition on the degree of risk-taking and financial intermediation costs, 
respectively. The estimates of the Lerner Index are obtained from the study of Efthyvoulou 
and Yildirim (2013).  
                                                          
7
 Other non-structural approaches for the measurement of competition include the model of Iwata (1974), 
Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982), but the empirical applications of these models are rather scarce. 
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A recently developed non-structural method for the measurement of competition is the Boone 
Indicator, introduced by Boone (2000, 2004), Boone et al. (2004) and CPB (2000). The 
Boone Indicator estimates the degree of competition based on the idea that competition 
increases the market shares of more efficient firms and reduces the market shares of 
inefficient firms. In this context, the larger the impact of efficiency on the increase of firms’ 
market shares, the higher is considered to be the degree of competition in that market and 
vice versa. The first study to apply the Boone Indicator to measure the competition in the 
banking sector is Leuvensteijn et al. (2007), which uses the Boone Indicator to estimate the 
degree of banking sector competition in a sample of EU countries. One advantage of the 
Boone Indicator compared to the Panzar-Rosse method is that it enables the estimation of the 
degree of competition not only for the entire market but also for separate product markets. On 
the other hand, the Boone Indicator may serve as a measure of the intensity of competition 
but it is not able to distinguish whether the competitive behaviour of banks is consistent with 
monopoly, monopolistic competition, or perfect competition. The Boone Indicator is not 
applied in this thesis.  
3.3.1 Panzar-Rosse method 
The Panzar and Rosse (1987) model, hereafter referred as the P-R model, is a non-structural 
approach, grounded in the microeconomic theory which measures competition by directly 
quantifying the conduct of firms and not taking into account the market structure. In 
assessing competition, the focus of the P-R model is on the competitive behaviour of firms 
rather than on market structure, implying some similarity between this approach and 
contestability theory. Some studies, such as, Bandt and Davis (2000), Nathan and Neave 
(2001) and Yildirim and Philippatos (2003) use the P-R approach to test the contestability 
theory by measuring the competitive behaviour of banks in markets characterized by a high 
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degree of concentration. The non-monopoly behaviour of banks found in these markets 
supports the predictions of the contestability theory.  
The P-R model produces the so-called H-statistic which measures the sum of elasticities of 
bank’s revenues with respect to input prices (Panzar and Rosse, 1987). In other words, the H-
statistic indicates how a bank’s revenues respond to an increase of input prices. The value of 
the H-statistic indicates whether the conduct of banks is in accordance with the notion of 
monopoly, monopolistic competition, or perfect competition (Table 3.1).  
Table 3.1 The range of values of H-statistic of the Panzar-Rosse model 
    
H-statistic values Competitive behaviour 
  
H ≤ 0 Monopoly 
0 < H < 1 Monopolistic Competition 
H = 1 Perfect competition 
   
As shown in Table 3.1, a negative value of the H-statistic which implies that an increase of 
input prices leads to a decline of firm’s revenues, is consistent with monopoly. Under a 
monopoly, an increase of input prices increases firm’s marginal costs, reduces the 
equilibrium output and subsequently reduces the revenues, giving an H-statistic of less than 
zero. Figure 3.3 illustrates the adjustment from an increase of input prices under monopoly. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that long-run average costs (LRAC) and long-run marginal costs 
(LRMC) are horizontal (and hence equal). The monopoly firm operates in the price-elastic 
range of the demand function. 
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Figure 3.3 The adjustment of monopoly to the increase of input prices 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 shows that, as input prices increase (from LRAC1 to LRAC2), the monopolist’s 
profit-maximizing price and output adjust from (P1, Q1) to (P2, Q2). More specifically, as a 
consequence of the increase of input prices, monopolist maximizes the profit at a higher price 
which, due to the price-elastic demand, leads to a decrease of output and, hence, to a decrease 
of monopolist’s revenues. 
Under perfect competition, the H-statistic takes the value of unity (H=1) which implies that 
an increase in input prices leads to an equiproportionate increase in firms’ revenues. Since in 
a perfectly competitive market price always equals marginal cost, and in the long run firms 
always operate at the minimum efficient scale, an increase of marginal costs will be followed 
by a proportionate increase of prices. The increase of prices will result in a reduction of 
market demand which will push some firms to exit the market. As a result, the surviving 
firms will face their original demand at the new level of prices which, as shown by Panzar 
and Rosse (1987), implies that, in the long run, their revenues will increase by as much as the 
increase of the input prices.  
 Price, Cost 
Marginal
revenue 
Market demand 
P1 
P2 
Q1 Q2 Quantity 
LRAC1=LRMC1 
LRAC2=LRMC2 
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In monopolistic competition (long-run equilibrium), the H-statistic takes a value ranging 
between zero and one (0<H<1) which implies that the increase of input prices will be 
associated with a less than proportional increase of revenues. Similar to the case of perfect 
competition, the increase of prices resulting from the increase in marginal costs will reduce 
the market demand and push some of the firms to exit the market. However, unlike in the 
case of perfect competition, the surviving firms will not face their original demand because 
their products are not perfect substitutes to the products of the firms that have left the market. 
In addition, under monopolistic competition, the perceived number of competitor firms 
changes the elasticity of the perceived demand function. Hence, the surviving firms will not 
increase their prices by as much as the increase of marginal costs in order not to attract the 
entry of new firms in the market. As a result, bank revenues will respond positively to the 
increase in input prices, but the increase in revenues will be proportionately smaller than the 
increase in input prices. As Goodard and Wilson (2009) put it, under monopolistic 
competition, an increase in average costs leads to an adjustment of both output and the 
number of perceived competitors as to achieve the monopolistic equilibrium condition 
MR=MC and AR=AC.  
For countries whose banking sectors have a limited exposure to the external markets, the H-
statistic explains the competitive structure prevailing in the domestic market (Bikker and 
Groenveld, 1998). This is arguably the case with the South-Eastern Europe economies which 
are characterized by small banking sectors, whose activity is mainly focused on lending to the 
domestic economy, financed by domestically collected deposits. For countries whose banking 
sectors are engaged in sizable foreign activities, the H-statistic explains the average 
competitive conduct of the banks, exercised both in the domestic and external markets. 
Shaffer (2004a) considers as a great advantage the fact that no specific market definition 
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appears in the Panzar-Rosse revenue equation which enables the measurement of competitive 
behaviour no matter the characteristics of the market in which banks operate. This feature of 
the P-R approach is important also for countries where banks face competitive pressures from 
other financial institutions (e.g. microfinance institutions) since the estimated H-statistic 
measures the competitive conduct of the banks in general, without distinguishing between 
market participants. In addition, the fact that the P-R approach measures the overall 
competitive behaviour of the banks is highly important for the countries where banks face 
cross-border competition from banks operating in other countries.   
A standard regression, known as the Panzar-Rosse model, used for calculating the H-statistic 
is a reduced-form revenue equation that takes the following form: 
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where, i is the index for the bank, TR represents the bank’s revenues, w represents a vector of 
bank’s input prices, z represents a vector of control variables that affect bank’s revenues and ε 
represents the error term.  
The literature is not unanimous on the appropriate measures of inputs and outputs for 
financial intermediaries (Nathan and Neave, 1989). The studies applying the P-R approach to 
the banking sector have used the “intermediation approach” to notions of ‘input’ and ‘output’ 
(Sealey and Lindley, 1977), treating banks as firms that produce loans by using labour, 
capital, deposits and other loanable funds as inputs.
8
 As for the control variables, studies 
                                                          
8
 The other stream of literature on the definition of financial intermediaries’ inputs and outputs is called the 
“production approach” and considers both loans and deposits as bank outputs, while the only inputs of banks are 
considered to be labour and physical capital (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). 
71 
 
applying the P-R approach to the banking sector have included variables that explain bank-
specific features, such as those reflecting the risk profile and the structure of assets.        
The log-log form specification of the revenue equation (Equation 3.1) is considered to be 
appropriate since coefficients can be interpreted as constant elasticities. The H-statistic is the 
sum of revenue elasticities with respect to input prices, i.e.: 



n
i
iH
1
                (3.2) 
The P-R model is based on several assumptions, including the assumption that banks are 
operating in long-run equilibrium, the performance of a bank is influenced by the actions of 
other participants in the market, the cost structure of banks is homogenous and the price 
elasticity of demand is greater than unity (Bikker and Haaf, 2002).  
To test whether banks are operating in a long-run equilibrium, previous studies have usually 
estimated the H-statistic from a reduced-form profit equation which uses the same 
explanatory variables as the reduced-form revenue equation (Equation 3.1), but instead of 
bank’s revenues these studies use profitability measures (e.g. return on assets) as the 
dependent variable. The models produce an HROA which represents the sum of elasticities of 
bank profitability with respect to input prices. The market is considered to be operating in 
long-run equilibrium when the HROA equals zero which implies that, in long-run equilibrium, 
bank profitability is not statistically correlated with factor input prices (de Rozas, 2007). The 
market is considered to be in disequilibrium when the HROA value is negative. However, 
Bikker et al. (2009) claim that HROA must not necessarily equal zero if the market is in 
structural equilibrium, but under imperfect competition. In this view, when the market 
demand is characterized by some degree of elasticity, the monopolist may not be able to pass 
the entire increase of costs to the clients which will result in a HROA<0.  
72 
 
Some of the assumptions of the P-R model put this approach at odds with the Schumpeterian 
notion of competition. The assumption that the banking sector operates in long-run 
equilibrium gives the P-R model a static nature which is contrary to Schumpeter’s argument 
that views competition as a dynamic process. According to the Schumpeter’s 1954 work, the 
static theory operates at a higher degree of abstraction compared to the dynamic theory since 
it ignores past and future values of variables, such as lags, sequences and rates of change 
(Goddard and Wilson, 2009). As Goddard and Wilson put it “… in practice adjustment 
towards equilibrium might be less than instantaneous, and markets might be out of 
equilibrium either occasionally, or frequently, or always” (p. 2282). However, the results 
from a Monte Caro simulations exercise conducted by Goddard and Wilson (2006) suggest 
that the view that markets are characterized by partial adjustment is valid for developed 
countries, whereas the group of developing and transition countries included in the exercise 
appeared to be characterized with instantaneous adjustment.    
Despite representing two distinctive approaches, some studies suggest that P-R model and 
SCP paradigm may have a common ground in explaining competition in the banking sector 
(Bikker and Groeneveld, 1998; Bikker and Haaf, 2002b). In these studies, the relationship 
between the H-statistic and market concentration resulted negative, suggesting that higher 
concentration is associated with less competition. Bikker and Haaf (2002b) estimated the 
impact of market concentration, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), on the 
H-statistic for a sample of European Union (EU) countries. The results suggested a negative 
and significant coefficient for the HHI which implies that a higher degree of concentration 
corresponds to a lower level of competition (i.e. lower H-statistic). These results might serve 
as evidence supporting the use of the HHI to explain competition. A similar study was 
conducted by Bikker and Groeneveld (1998) who investigated the relationship between the 
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H-statistic and the share of five largest banks’ assets in total banking sector assets (CR5) for a 
sample of EU countries. The results suggested a negative relationship between CR5 and the 
H-statistic, but the relationship appeared to be weak.  
However, some authors, such as Casu and Girardone (2006), have found the impact of market 
concentration on the H-statistic for a sample of EU-15 countries, to be statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that market concentration does not explain market competition. 
Claessens and Laeven (2004) had earlier investigated this relationship for a sample of banks 
in 50 countries. They did not find a negative relationship between these variables but instead 
a positive and statistically significant relationship. They attributed these findings to the 
inclusion of some large countries, such as US, France, Germany and Italy which had low 
values of H-statistic and also low degrees of market concentration due to the large number of 
banks operating in these markets. Excluding these countries from the sample resulted in an 
insignificant relationship between competition and market concentration.  
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3.4 Estimating the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic: a review of the 
literature  
Table 3.2 summarises some of the most important studies that have applied the P-R approach 
to the banking industry. As this table shows, most of these studies have used panel data and 
have mostly found that competition in these markets can best be described as monopolistic 
competition. However, earlier studies such as Nathan and Neave (1989), Molyneux et al. 
(1994) and Vesala (1995) applied the P-R approach to cross-section data, but found that the 
competitive behaviour of the banking system (i.e. H-statistic) was quite volatile from year to 
year. For example, in the study of Molyneux et al., the behaviour of banks operating in the 
UK shifted from monopoly in one year to almost perfect competition in the following year. A 
considerable year-to-year volatility of the H-statistic is observed also in our estimation of the 
H-statistic for each country/year for the CEE countries which is presented in chapter 5. On 
this issue, Bikker and Groenveld (1998) suggested that it is unlikely that competitive 
conditions change so drastically from year to year. Bikker and Groenveld attribute these 
changes to the fact the gradual market dynamics were not accounted for in the model, 
suggesting that market structure shifts gradually over time. In their study of banking sector 
competition in the EU-15 countries for the period 1989-1996, these authors introduced a 
logistic time curve in the P-R model to explicitly account for possible time variations in the 
H-statistic. The findings suggested that banks were operating under monopolistic 
competition, while the constitutive terms of the H-statistic slightly decreased over time. 
However, the results indicated monopolistic competition also when the logistic time curve 
was excluded from the model. 
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Table 3.2 A summary of studies applying the P-R approach to the banking industry 
Authors Period Countries 
examined 
Dependent variable Results 
Ahi (2002) 1995-2001 Estonia Interest revenues;  
Total revenues 
Monopolistic 
competition 
Bikker and 
Groenveld (1998) 
1989-1996 EU 15 Interest income/total 
assets; 
Total revenues/total assets 
Monopolistic 
competition 
Bikker and Haaf 
(2002b) 
1988-1998 23 European 
and non-
European 
countries 
Interest revenues/total 
assets 
Monopolistic 
competition 
Bikker et al. (2007) 1986-2005 101 countries 
world-wide 
Interest income; 
Total revenues 
Monopolistic 
competition 
Casu and Girardone 
(2006) 
1997-2003 EU-15 Total income/total assets Overall: 
monopolistic 
competition 
Finland: perfect 
competition 
Greece: monopoly 
Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) 
1994-2001 50 countries Interest revenues/total 
assets; 
Total revenues/total assets 
Monopolistic 
competition 
De Bandt and Davis 
(2000) 
1992-1996 Germany, 
France, Italy, 
United States 
Interest income; Total 
revenues 
Overall: 
monopolistic 
competition 
Lower H-statistic for 
smaller banks. 
Hahn, (2008) 1995-2002 Austria Total income/total assets Monopolistic 
competition 
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Dynamics were incorporated also by Bikker and Haaf (2002b), who multiplied the elasticities 
that constitute the H-statistic by a continuous time-curve model. The coefficient accounting 
for time was zero in 53% of all cases, indicating no significant changes in competitive 
Hempell (2002) 1993-1998 Germany Total income/total assets Monopolistic 
competition 
Mamatzakis et al. 
(2005) 
1998-2002 SEE 
countries 
Interest income/total 
assets; 
Total revenues/total assets 
Monopolistic 
competition 
Mkrtchyan (2005) 1998-2002 Armenia Interest income/total 
assets 
Monopolistic 
competition 
Manthos (2008) 1999-2006 Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
Total revenues; Gross 
interest income; Total 
revenues/Total assets 
Overall: 
Monopolistic 
competition 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 
Kazakhstan: 
Monopoly 
Molyneux et al. 
(1994) 
1986-1989 UK, 
Germany, 
France, Italy, 
Spain 
Interest revenues to total 
assets 
UK, Germany, 
France, Spain: 
Monopolistic 
competition 
Italy: Monopoly 
Nathan and Neave 
(1989) 
1982-1984 Canada Total revenue less 
provisions for loan losses 
1982: perfect 
competition 
1983,1984: 
monopolistic 
competition 
Staikouras and 
Fillipaki (2006) 
1998-2002 EU Interest income/total 
assets 
Monopolistic 
competition 
Vesala (1995) 1985-1992 Finland Total interest revenues;  
Total interest revenues 
from outstanding loans 
Overall: 
Monopolistic 
competition 
1989, 1990: perfect 
competition 
Yildirim and 
Philippatos (2003) 
1993-2000 Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
countries 
Interest income/total 
assets; 
Total revenues/total assets 
Monopolistic 
competition 
77 
 
conditions over time, whereas the positive values of this coefficient found in some of the 
cases suggest that competition increased over time. Similar to Vesala (1995), Bikker and 
Haaf interpreted the H-statistic as a continuous variable, meaning that for an H-statistic 
ranging between 0 and 1, a higher value indicates a more competitive behaviour.
9
  
Claiming that the adjustment towards market equilibrium is partial rather than instantaneous, 
Goddard and Wilson (2009) suggest that static revenue equations estimated through the Fixed 
Effects (FE) or Random Effects (RE) method are misspecified. In cases when the dependent 
variable (i.e. bank’s revenues) depends on its previous values, the static model will suffer 
from autocorrelation in the disturbance term. As a consequence the constitutive elasticities of 
the H-statistic will be biased towards zero. Hence, the authors suggest that the P-R revenue 
equation should be estimated using the General Method of Moments (GMM) in a dynamic 
formulation, including the lagged dependent variable among the explanatory variables. In a 
sample composed of developed countries, the GMM estimator yielded higher estimates than 
the FE estimator, providing evidence in favour of their view that FE estimates, based on static 
formulation, are biased towards zero. However, the introduction of dynamics to the P-R 
model is at odds with one of the key assumptions of the P-R approach which assumes that 
markets operate in long-run equilibrium continuously, i.e. in each period. However, 
according to Goddard and Wilson (2009), the estimation of the P-R revenue equation using 
dynamic panel data eliminates the need for the continuous market equilibrium assumption. 
Employing dynamic panel data enables the movement towards equilibrium to be achieved 
over time. 
                                                          
9
 According to Vesala (1995), the H-statistic is an increasing function of demand elasticity, implying that the 
less market power is exercised, the higher will be the value of the H-statistic. According to this view, the H-
statistic serves not only to depict a type of market structure, but also to measure the magnitude of competition. 
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Within the studies that have applied the P-R approach to the banking industry, there are 
differences also with regard to the dependent variable used in the model. Some studies have 
used interest revenues as the dependent variable which is based on the fact that the core 
activity of most banks is financial intermediation (Molyneux et al., 1994; Bikker and Haaf, 
2002b). However, since the non-interest income generating activities undertaken by banks are 
continuously increasing in modern banking, some authors have used total revenues as the 
dependent variable, in order to capture banks’ conduct over their entire range of activities 
(Nathan and Neave, 1989; Hempell, 2002; Hahn, 2008). Other studies, including Vesala 
(1995) and Claessens and Laeven (2004), for comparison have used both measures of income 
as the dependent variable and the values of the H-statistic have been similar, suggesting that 
the choice between interest revenues and total revenues for the dependent variable does not 
affect the measurement of competition in the banking sector. However, Bikker and Haaf 
(2002b) did the same comparison and found that the choice of these two variables had an 
impact on the results. The study referred to the banking sector in the Netherlands for the 
period 1991-1998, where the share of non-interest revenues to total revenues was 16%. 
Because of the small share of non-interest revenues, they used interest revenues as the 
dependent variable which provided a higher explanatory power for the model. The fit of the 
P-R model, as measured by R
2
, was 0.90 when interest revenues were used as the dependent 
variable, whereas it declined to 0.60 when the dependent variable consisted of total revenues. 
In addition, the value of the H-statistic obtained by using total revenues as the dependent 
variable was substantially lower than with interest revenues as the dependent variable. 
According to the authors, this is attributed to the fact that funding costs which in most studies 
represent the main component of the H-statistic, are not relevant for the non-interest revenue 
generating activities. 
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In order to put aside the effect of the bank’s size, the dependent variable in most of the 
studies shown in Table 3.2 have used income (either total or interest income) scaled to total 
assets (e.g. Hempell, 2002; Claessens and Leaven, 2003; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2003; 
Casu and Girardone, 2006). However, Bikker et al. (2007) criticise using revenues to total 
assets, claiming that it transforms the reduced-form revenue equation into a price equation. 
The ratio between revenues and total assets produces the income generated by a unit of assets 
which, in a simplified example where banks’ assets are entirely composed of loans and its 
revenues consist of interest income, would represent the loan interest rate, i.e. the price of a 
unit of assets. According to Bikker et al. (2007), employing the P-R approach to estimate the 
level of competition through a price equation instead of a reduced-form revenue equation 
impairs the estimation of the H-statistic by producing a higher value, thus leading to wrong 
conclusions on the degree of competition. The wrong conclusions can be inferred when 
market structure is characterized by monopoly, since the monopoly price is an increasing 
function of the marginal cost. More specifically, using a price variable instead of revenues as 
the dependent variable produces an H-statistic that measures the elasticity of prices (more 
specifically price of loans) with respect to input prices instead of the elasticity of revenues 
with respect to input prices. In this context, under monopoly conditions, an increase in input 
prices would have a positive impact on the price level, i.e. would produce a positive H-
statistic (H>0), given that the monopolist always increases the price when marginal costs 
increase (no matter the consequences for the revenues). Conversely, using revenues as a 
dependent variable, the H-statistic for the monopoly firm would be negative (H<0), reflecting 
the negative impact of the increase of input prices on the revenues. This takes place due to the 
profit maximizing objective of the monopolist which implies that, faced with increasing 
marginal costs, the monopolist increases the price that, because of operating in the elastic 
range of the demand curve, leads to a more than proportionate decline in the demand for a 
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monopolist’s products. As a consequence, the monopolist ends up charging higher prices, but 
producing proportionately less output which implies a lower level of revenues. In a study 
covering 18,000 banks from 101 countries throughout the world, Bikker et al. (2007) found 
that using the income to total assets ratio as the dependent variable tends to overestimate 
competition by producing a higher H-statistic. Using the absolute value of income as the 
dependent variable, the authors found that monopoly cannot be rejected in 28% of the 
investigated cases against 0% under the previous model. They also found that perfect 
competition cannot be rejected in 38% of cases compared to 20-30% when the dependent 
variable has been scaled.  
Another form of the same issue regarding the specification of the P-R revenue equation is 
related to the inclusion of total assets (TA) as a control variable in the regression. Many 
studies (e.g. Nathan and Neave, 1989 and Shaffer, 2004b) include TA as a bank-specific 
control variable and the main rational for doing so is that the size of a bank may affect its 
revenues, i.e. larger banks generate higher revenues, ceteris paribus, in ways unrelated to 
variations of input prices. On the other hand, Bikker et al. (2009) claim that the inclusion of 
TA as a control variable produces a positive H-statistic (H>0) even when the market is 
operating under a monopoly structure which is in contradiction with the basic principles upon 
which the P-R framework is built that predict a negative H-statistic (H<0) for monopoly 
markets. The inclusion of TA as a control variable implies that output is held constant, 
meaning that it does not allow for output adjustment by the monopolist as a response to the 
increase in input prices.
10
 Consequently, since the profit-maximization objective always 
requires the monopolist to increase the price when its marginal costs increase, the response of 
                                                          
10
 Total assets consist of the firm’s output and other asset categories (e.g. cash and fixed assets). In our case, it is 
important to note that controlling for total assets holds the bank’s total assets constant, meaning that also the 
total output of the bank (e.g. loans) which is a subcategory of total assets will be held constant, i.e. will not be 
allowed to adjust to the change of input prices. 
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the monopolist to the increase in input prices would be only the increase of the price level, 
while the demand for products would remain constant and not adjust to the new level of 
price. Hence, the increase in the price level with the output held constant would imply that 
the change in monopolist’s revenues as a consequence of the increase in input prices would 
be positive which, in a P-R model, would produce a positive H-statistic. The view that 
controlling for total assets produces a higher H-statistic is supported also by Goddard and 
Wilson (2009) which through a Monte Carlo simulation exercise found that the inclusion of 
total assets as a control variable causes an upward shift to the H-statistic. 
As explained above, both using revenues to total assets as the dependent variable and/or 
including total assets as an explanatory variable in a P-R model transforms the reduced-form 
revenue equation into a price equation, meaning that the H-statistic would represent the sum 
of the price elasticities with respect to the input prices instead of the sum of revenue 
elasticities. As a consequence, the H-statistic estimated by using a price equation will always 
be positive even for monopoly markets. This is confirmed also by our estimation results in 
chapter 4 where we apply the Panzar-Rosse approach to estimate competition in the banking 
sectors of CEE countries altogether and separately estimate competition in the banking sector 
of Kosovo. In the case of CEE countries, using the absolute value of revenues as the 
dependent variable (i.e. using a reduced-form revenue equation) produces a negative H-
statistic which suggests that the competitive behaviour of banks operating in the CEE region 
is consistent with monopoly. However, by using the revenue to total assets ratio as the 
dependent variable or including total assets as explanatory variable (i.e. using a price 
equation) produces a positive H-statistic which rejects the monopoly structure. In the case of 
Kosovo, the H-statistic produced by the reduced-form revenue equation is positive, but its 
value increases when the model is transformed into a price equation. Box 3.1 presents an 
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arithmetic illustration which shows that using revenues to total assets as the dependent 
variable and including total assets as an explanatory variable are expected to produce similar 
results. 
The studies that estimate the P-R model using a price equation suffer from another deficiency 
since they generally do not take into account the theoretical predictions on the potential 
endogeneity between the interest rates (i.e. revenues/total assets) and some of the control 
variables (e.g. loans to total assets ratio and equity to total assets ratio).  
 
Box 3.1 Review of Panzar-Rosse model specifications 
As explained in this section, Bikker et al. (2007, 2009) argue that scaling the dependent 
variable to total assets and/or including total assets as a control variable produce similar 
results. In this box, we provide an arithmetic illustration to explain why these two model 
specifications are expected to produce similar results. 
According to Bikker et al. (2007), a P-R regression suffers from misspecification if the 
dependent variable (total or interest revenues) is scaled to total assets and/or if total assets are 
included as a control variable. According to these authors, the P-R model should take the 
following form: 
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where, the dependent variable (TR) is the absolute value of revenues, wi represents a vector 
of input prices, zi represents a vector of control variables (excluding total assets) and ε 
represents the error term. 
However, the majority of studies applying the P-R approach to the banking sector have 
estimated the P-R model by either revenues to total assets as the dependent variable or by 
including total assets among the control variables, or both. Equation (2) shows a P-R 
specification form where the dependent variable consists of total revenues to total assets. This 
form of specification has been used in many studies, including Bikker and Groenveld (1998), 
Hempell (2002) and Mamatzakis et al. (2005). 
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                   (2) 
 
Another stream of studies applying the P-R method to assess competition in the banking 
sector estimate the regression by using the absolute value of revenues as the dependent 
variable, but including total assets among the control variables in order to control for bank’s 
size. Equation (3) represents an equation of this form which has been applied in some studies, 
including Shaffer (2004) and Manthos (2008). 
      
                                             
                 (3)  
 
However, despite representing two different models, equation (2) and equation (3) have the 
same properties, if it is assumed that the coefficient on total assets ( ) is equal to unity. 
Assuming 1 , equation (3) may also be expressed as: 
      
                                              
                         (4) 
 
where, )/log(loglog TATRTATR  . Hence, equation (4) is a restricted version of equation 
(3). 
Bikker et al. (2009) claim that the restriction of assumption that 1  often holds in 
empirical studies, relating it to the law of one price which postulates that firms operating in 
the same market and selling homogeneous products apply the same output prices. As a result, 
the revenues of these firms are proportional to their size as measured by total assets. 
 
Using a price rather than a revenue equation appears not to be an issue for markets operating 
under perfect competition, since under such conditions there is no price mark-up based on 
market power, but prices are fully determined by input prices, including a charge for invested 
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equity (Bikker et al., 2007). Under perfect competition, firms’ prices are equal to the 
minimum average costs, implying that any increase of costs must be associated with a 
proportionate increase of prices, otherwise firms would be operating with losses. The increase 
of prices reduces the aggregate demand, pushing some firms to exit the market. The exit of 
these firms compensates the declining demand for the surviving firms which enables them to 
produce their original level of output at the increased price level, thus increasing their 
revenues by as much as the increase of prices which is proportional to the increase of input 
prices. Therefore, the sum of the elasticities of input prices under a perfectly competitive 
equilibrium will be unity whether the dependent variable in the P-R model is a price variable 
or a revenue variable.  
Similarly, the H-statistic is not expected to be affected by controlling or not for total assets 
when the market is operating under a long-run perfectly competitive equilibrium. In such 
conditions, firms’ prices equal minimum average costs, which are U-shaped, and an increase 
of input prices will be associated with an increase of output prices, while the output scale at 
which average costs are minimized is not affected by changes in input prices. In other words, 
under perfect competition, an increase of input prices leads to an increase of output prices, 
while there is no adjustment in the volume of the output in the market.
11
  
However, Bikker at al. (2009) raise another issue that contests the interpretation of the 
Panzar-Rosse H-statistic when the market is operating in competitive equilibrium even in 
cases when the equation is estimated using an unscaled dependent variable. Their critique is 
based on a review of literature, including Johnston (1960), who report evidence that many 
industries have constant average costs over a range of scales, which contradicts the 
                                                          
11
 Due to the price-elastic demand, the increase of prices reduces the aggregate demand, pushing some of the 
firms to exit the market. The remaining firms will take over the demand of the exiting firms and will be able to 
produce the same level of output as before the increase of input prices. 
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mainstream microeconomic theory that assumes firms to have U-shaped average costs in 
equilibrium. According to the issue raised by Bikker et al., in a perfectly competitive 
environment, considering that banks are price-takers and cannot unilaterally affect the market 
price, an increase of input prices should not necessarily lead to the increase of output price, 
which is contrary to what the original Panzar-Rosse method assumes. Therefore, an increase 
of input prices would make banks operate with a price that is lower than the marginal cost, 
which would cause losses to the banks operating in the market. However, under the 
assumptions that banks operate with constant average costs, they might reduce their level of 
output in order to mitigate their losses. The reduction of the level of output would lead to a 
decline of revenues, implying that the increase of input prices would lead to a decline of 
banks’ revenues even if the market is perfectly competitive. In other words, the H-statistic 
would take a negative value also under perfect competition. This would cause problems for 
the original interpretation of the Panzar-Rosse model, since the negative values of the H-
statistic would no longer be able to rule out that the banking sector is operating in a 
competitive environment. However, in the absence of more direct and especially more recent 
empirical evidence, this issue may be considered to be a theoretical possibility rather than as 
the norm. At present, there is not a sufficiently strong case for researchers to assume constant 
costs and so abandon the Panzar-Rosse approach. However, this represents an important issue 
for further research, which may produce important inferences on the appropriateness of the 
Panzar-Rosse method for measuring banking sector competition. On the basis of this 
judgement, we pursue our research using the Panzar-Rosse approach. Yet, partly reflecting 
this reservation, we use other measures/indicators of banking sector competition (i.e. the 
Lerner Index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) to check our findings for robustness.  
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Another potential complication to the interpretation of the H-statistic may be related to the 
fact that a negative H-statistic may be consistent also to oligopoly instead of monopoly 
(Panzar and Rosse, 1977). According to Bikker et al. (2009), this may be the case both when 
average costs are U-shaped and when they are constant. However, this might not represent a 
serious concern regarding the interpretation of the H-statistic given that both monopoly and 
oligopoly are characterized by a high degree of market power. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
Despite the great attention that the banking sector competition has attracted in the economic 
literature, still there is no general agreement on which is the most appropriate approach to 
measure the competition. This chapter has presented a critical review of the most widely used 
methods for the measurement of competition. The methods for the measurement of 
competition are classified in two main categories, consisting of the structural approach and 
the non-structural approach. 
The structural approach for the measurement of competition is mostly based on the Structure-
Conduct-Performance paradigm which uses the degree of market concentration as a measure 
of competition and claims that a higher degree of market concentration corresponds to a 
lower degree of competition. According to this approach, in more concentrated markets banks 
are able to exert market power and the collusion between banks is more likely to happen, thus 
leading to higher interest rates charged by the banks and, hence, higher profits generated. 
However, the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm has been largely criticised in the 
literature which has questioned its appropriateness as a reliable framework for inferring the 
degree of competition. The criticisms are mostly directed to the assumed one-way causality 
from structure to conduct, and the exclusion of the possibility that the conduct of the bank 
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may also affect its market share and the market structure in general. In addition, the 
contestability theory claims that highly concentrated markets or even monopolies can be 
competitive if they are fully contestable. 
The criticisms directed to the structural approach for the measurement of competition have 
led to the development of the non-structural approaches which quantify the competitive 
behaviour of the bank without taking into consideration the structural features of the market. 
The most widely used non-structural method for the measurement of competition is 
represented by the Panzar-Rosse method which measures competition by estimating the 
elasticity of bank revenues to the changes of input prices, i.e. by estimating the Panzar-Rosse 
H-statistic. Depending on the response of bank revenues to the changes of input prices, it can 
be inferred whether banks behaviour is in line with monopoly, monopolistic competition, or 
perfect competition. In addition, since the H-statistic is an increasing function of the demand 
elasticity, the value of the H-statistic can also be used to assess the magnitude of the 
competition.  
The Panzar-Rosse method has been largely used in the empirical literature to measure 
competition in the banking sector in different countries and regions. The most common 
finding for the investigated banking sectors was monopolistic competition. However, the 
validity of these findings may be questioned considering that most of these studies either 
scale the dependent variable (interest or total income) to total assets or include the total assets 
as an explanatory variable in order to control for bank size. According to Bikker et al. (2007, 
2009), controlling for total assets transforms the Panzar-Rosse reduced-form revenue 
equation into a price equation and causes an upwards shift to the H-statistic. As a 
consequence, the H-statistic will always be positive, implying that monopoly will always be 
rejected. 
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Another issue related to the specification of the Panzar-Rosse model includes the choice 
between the bank’s total income and interest income for the dependent variable. Most of the 
empirical studies have used the interest income based on the fact that banks’ activity mostly 
relies on the financial intermediation, while there are also arguments in favour of using the 
total income, given that non-interest generating activity is continuously gaining more ground 
within the banks. The Panzar-Rosse method has mainly been applied using static models, 
while there are arguments in favour of using dynamic models in order to allow for a gradual 
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. 
Despite the fact that Panzar-Rosse approach has been widely used and accepted as an 
appropriate method for measuring the degree of competition, possible caveats on its 
interpretation were discussed in section 3.4. However, given the absence of direct recent 
evidence on the relevance of these caveats in practice, it was argued it was appropriate to 
continue investigating using the Panzar-Rosse statistic. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Before the transition process began, the banking systems in most CEE countries were 
characterized by monobank systems. In the former Yugoslavia, each republic had a 
dominating bank and few other banks that operated in different segments of the economy. 
Overall, banking system competition in the CEE countries may be considered to have been 
inexistent or highly limited. The transition from the monobank system into the two-tier 
banking system produced oligopolistic market structures in most countries. The asset 
portfolios of the monobanks were inherited by a single bank, or a few banks, which led to the 
banking markets being highly concentrated. The degree of financial intermediation was very 
low, while the interest rate spreads were high. These factors may suggest that banks operating 
in the CEE countries continued to exert market power in the initial stage of the transition 
process. However, the banking reforms that included the privatization of the state-owned 
banks and the elimination of entry barriers for foreign banks resulted in a large number of 
foreign banks entering the banking systems of the CEE countries. The entry of foreign banks 
is considered to have substantially induced banking system competition, especially given the 
commercial banking experience that was brought by them. In the meantime, the CEE 
countries recorded progress also with regard to the development of competition policy and 
institutions, but the progress was slow and most of the CEE countries lag behind the more 
advanced countries of the Euro Area. Hence, the aim of this chapter is to estimate the degree 
of banking system competition in the CEE countries, in order to be able to assess whether, 
after the changes that took place, their banking sectors were transformed into competitive 
markets. Given that Kosovo’s banking system was newly developed, and the fact that no 
previous study has addressed banking sector competition in this country, we address this 
issue by conducting a separate estimation within this chapter.  
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Although the measurement of competition has been given enormous attention in the 
economic literature, there is no general agreement on which is the most appropriate method 
to measure banking sector competition. However, as elaborated in chapter 3, the approach of 
Panzar and Rosse (1987), which directly quantifies competitive behaviour, is largely being 
recognized as an appropriate approach to measure competition. Based on this approach, 
competition is measured by the elasticity of bank revenues to the change of input prices, 
which indicates whether the competitive behaviour of banks is consistent with monopoly, 
monopolistic competition, or perfect competition. This method has previously been applied in 
a number of studies that have investigated banking sector competition in the CEE countries, 
such as Yildirim and Philippatos (2003) for the period 1993-2000, Mamatzakis et al. (2005) 
for the period 1998-2002, and Manthos (2008) for the period 1999-2006. These previous 
have generally found monopolistic competition. 
In this chapter, we contribute to the existing literature by applying the Panzar-Rosse method 
to estimate competition in the banking systems of 16 CEE countries for the period 1999-
2009, and by separately estimating - for the first time - competition for the banking sector of 
Kosovo for the period 2001-2010. In addition, unlike the other studies that have estimated 
banking sector competition for the CEE countries, we follow Bikker et al. (2007, 2009), who 
suggest not to scale the dependent variable to total assets and not to include total assets as an 
explanatory variable in a Panzar-Rosse model. By doing so, we aim at eliminating the 
misspecification bias that is present in most of the studies that have applied the Panzar-Rosse 
approach to measure banking sector competition (see discussion in chapter 3, page 73-78). 
Moreover, we also test whether banking sector competition in the non-EU countries of the 
CEE region differs from the competition in the EU members of this region. The application 
of the Panzar-Rosse approach in both the sample of CEE countries and for Kosovo is 
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conducted using dynamic panel data. The estimation for the CEE countries uses annual bank-
level data and is conducted using the General Method of Moments (GMM) as estimator. The 
estimation for Kosovo is based on quarterly bank-level data and uses the Unobserved 
Components Method, which is more suitable than GMM given the small sample of data.   
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a brief recapitulation of 
the Panzar-Rosse approach for the measurement of competition. Section 4.3 presents the 
estimation of banking sector competition for the CEE countries which includes the model 
description, the explanation of the estimation methodology (General Method of Moments), 
and the estimation results. Section 4.4 presents the estimation of competition for the banking 
sector of Kosovo, including the model description, the estimation methodology (Unobserved 
Components Method), and the estimation results. Section 4.5 presents the main conclusions 
from this study.   
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 4.2 The Panzar-Rosse method for the measurement of 
competition 
 
The Panzar –Rosse method is a non-structural approach for the measurement of competition. 
This approach quantifies the competitive behaviour of the bank by estimating the elasticity of 
bank revenues to the changes of bank’s input prices (Equation 4.1).  
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4.1. 
where, i indexes the banks; rev represents the bank revenues; funding costs, labour costs and 
physical capital costs represent the input prices; and z is a vector of control variables.   
The sum of the elasticity coefficients of the bank revenues with respect to the changes of 
input prices (β1+ β2+β3) produces the H-statistic that explains whether banks’ competitive 
behaviour is in line with monopoly (H≤0) , monopolistic competition (0<H<1), or perfect 
competition (H=1).  
A smaller or equal to zero H-statistic (H≤0) implies that the increase of input prices leads to a 
decline of bank revenues which, based on the principles upon which the Panzar-Rosse 
method is built, implies that the competitive behaviour of the banking system is in line with 
monopoly (see chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of the Panzar-Rosse method). An H-
statistic of between zero and one (0<H<1) corresponds to monopolistic competition, implying 
that an increase of input prices leads to a less than proportional increase of the bank revenues. 
The banking system is considered to be operating in perfect competition when the H-statistic 
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equals one (H=1), implying that an increase of input prices leads to a proportional increase of 
bank revenues. 
One of the key assumptions upon which the Panzar-Rosse approach is built is the assumption 
that banks are operating in long-run equilibrium. To test whether the banking market is 
operating in long run equilibrium, previous studies using this approach have estimated a 
regression similar to equation 4.2, but using Return on Assets (ROA) as the dependent 
variable. The model produces an HROA that is the sum of β1+ β2+ β3, which represents the 
sum of the elasticities of bank profitability with respect to the input prices. The market is 
considered to be operating in long-run equilibrium when HROA=0, thus implying that in the 
long-run equilibrium bank profitability is not statistically correlated with input prices (de 
Rozas, 2007). However, Bikker et al. (2009) claim that HROA must not necessarily equal zero 
if the market is in structural equilibrium but under imperfect competition. In this view, when 
the market demand is characterized by some degree of elasticity, the monopolist will not be 
able to pass the entire increase of costs to the customers; hence, HROA will be smaller than 
zero (i.e. negative).  
 
4.3 Estimation of Banking Sector Competition in the CEE 
countries 
In this section, we estimate the banking system competition in the CEE countries using the 
Panzar-Rosse approach. The estimation is done for a sample of 16 CEE countries for the 
period 1999-2009, including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, 
Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
12
 The regression uses bank-level data obtained from the 
                                                          
12
 Kosovo is not included in this sample because the data on personnel expenses, which is a key variable in this 
model, are reported as a separate category only as of the year 2008. The estimation of banking sector 
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BankScope database, and macroeconomic and institutional variables obtained from different 
sources. The estimation is done on a pooled and unbalanced panel of data.  
 
4.3.1 Model description 
This section describes the model that is used to estimate the banking sector competition for 
our sample of countries. Our model is in line with most of the studies that have used the 
Panzar-Rosse approach to measure banking sector competition, with some modifications 
related to the control for bank’s size. In addition, among the control variables we include also 
macroeconomic and institutional variables, in order to control for country-level factors that 
might have an impact on bank revenues. The model used for this estimation has the following 
form: 
   
 
4.2 
where, i = 1 … 294 indexes the banks; and t = 1999 … 2009 indexes the years. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
competition for Kosovo is conducted separately, in Section 4.4 of this chapter, with a small modification to the 
original Panzar-Rosse model. 
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Table 4.1 Description of variables 
 
Variable Description 
int_inc_real interest income adjusted to inflation 
p_funds interest expenses / total funding 
p_labour  personnel expenses / total assets 
p_physcapital other operating expenses / fixed assets 
loans_ta total loans / total assets 
prov_loans  loan-loss provisions/total loans 
equity_ta  equity / total assets 
rgdpgrowth real GDP growth rate 
ebrd_bankref EBRD index of banking reform 
dv_foreign dummy variable for foreign ownership 
dv_origin dummy variable for the country-of-origin of 
the bank (1 for EU-12 or US) 
dv_year  dummy variables for years 
dv_country dummy variables for country 
 
One of the issues that must be considered when specifying a model like this is the choice of 
the dependent variable to represent bank revenues. As discussed in chapter 3, most studies 
have used the interest income as the dependent variable given that the lending activity was 
the dominant activity in the banking sectors that were analysed. Some other studies have used 
the total income as the dependent variable considering that the non-interest income was 
continuously increasing its share in the total income, so having the total income as a 
dependent variable would capture the overall competitive behaviour. Given that the banking 
sectors of the CEE countries are mainly concentrated in the traditional banking activities, 
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where interest income largely dominates the overall structure of bank revenues (on average 
73% of total revenues), the dependent variable in our main model specification is the interest 
income (int_inc_real). The use of the interest income for the dependent variable is favoured 
also because of the fact that, among the three input categories considered in this exercise, the 
largest expenditure category is represented by the funding costs, which are more relevant for 
the determination of the interest income than the total income (total income includes also the 
non-interest income). Nevertheless, we run a separate regression also with the total income 
(tot_inc_real) as the dependent variable in order to check if the results are robust to the 
choice between the interest income and the total income for the dependent variable. In both 
cases, the dependent variable is an absolute value and it is adjusted for inflation meaning that 
the dependent variable is represented by the real interest income and the real total income, 
respectively. 
The decision to use the absolute value of the interest income and total income as dependent 
variables, rather than scaling them to total assets which has been practiced by most of the 
studies that have applied the Panzar-Rosse method, is based on Bikker et al. (2007) who 
claim that the scaling the income variable to total assets misspecifies the Panzar-Rosse 
model. According to this view, by scaling the income variable (both interest and total 
income) to total assets transforms the revenue equation into a price equation, hence, 
producing an upwardly biased H-statistic. Using the interest income or the total income 
scaled to total assets for the dependent variable will always produce a positive H-statistic, 
which means that monopoly will always be rejected (see chapter 3 for a detailed elaboration 
on this issue). In a study covering 18,000 banks from 101 countries throughout the world, 
Bikker et al. (2007) found that using the absolute value of income as a dependent variable, 
monopoly cannot be rejected in 28% of the investigated cases against 0% under models using 
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revenues scaled to total assets as the dependent variable. In order to test the hypothesis of 
Bikker et al. (2007), we run separate regressions to test whether, and how the H-statistics 
produced from the regressions with an unscaled dependent variable differ from the 
regressions that use a scaled dependent variable. 
In selecting the variables for the input prices, we follow the “intermediation approach” 
(Sealey and Lindley, 1977) which treats banks as firms that produce loans by using as inputs 
deposits and other loanable funds, labour, and capital. Therefore, in line with most of the 
studies applying the Panzar-Rosse approach to measure banking competition, input prices in 
our model consist of three categories: a) price of funds (variable p_funds), which is measured 
by the interest expenses to total funds ratio; b) price of labour (variable p_labour), which is 
measured by the ratio between personnel expenses and total assets;
13
 and c) price of physical 
capital (variable p_physcapital), which is measured by the other operating expenses to fixed 
assets ratio.
14
 These three variables representing the input prices are the variables of main 
interest in our model, since the sum of their coefficients will produce the H-statistic, which is 
our measure of competition. In line with all the literature in this field
 
the dependent variable 
(int_inc_real) and the variables on the input prices (p_funds, p_labour, and p_physcapital) 
are transformed into natural logarithms in order for the coefficients of the input prices to be 
interpreted as constant elasticities. 
 A number of variables are included to control for bank specific features that may affect bank 
revenues. The variable loans_ta is included in the regression to account for bank-specific 
differences with regard to the composition of total assets and is computed as the gross loans 
                                                          
13
 The most appropriate measure of labour costs is considered to be the ratio between the personnel expenditures 
and the number of bank employees. However, because there are a lot of missing data on the number of 
employees in the BankScope database, most studies have used the share of personnel expenses to total assets, 
which is used also in our estimation. 
14
 Other operating expenses include depreciation, amortization, occupancy costs, operating lease rentals and 
other administrative expenses. 
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to total assets ratio. A higher loan to total assets ratio is expected to have a positive impact on 
the level of interest income, since loans represent the main source of banks’ income.  
The variable equity_ta represents the share of equity to total assets and is included in the 
regression to control for the degree of the bank’s risk-aversion. This variable is expected to 
have a negative sign, since banks with higher capitalization ratio tend to be more 
conservative and, as such, tend to finance safer projects which bear lower interest rates 
(Molyneux et al., 1994). On the other hand, based on Maudos and Fernández de Guevara 
(2004), higher equity ratio may be expected to have a positive impact on banks’ revenues 
since banks with higher equity ratios may set higher interest rate margins in order to 
compensate for the higher costs of equity financing compared to the cost of external 
financing.  
In our regression, we control also for the quality of the loan portfolio by including the loan-
loss provisions to total loans ratio (prov_loans). A higher loan-loss provisions ratio reflects a 
lower-quality loan portfolio. The impact of the loan-loss provisions ratio on the revenues, on 
the one hand, may be expected to be negative since a lower quality of the portfolio implies 
more defaulted loans and, hence, less interest received by the bank. On the other hand, the 
impact on the revenues may be expected to be positive, considering that banks may charge 
higher interest rates on loans in order to compensate the potential losses arising from the 
defaulted loans.  
In line with Bikker et al. (2009), our regression model does not contain total assets as an 
explanatory variable to control for bank’s size. According to Bikker et al. (2009), the 
inclusion of total assets among the explanatory variables entails the same bias as the scaling 
of the dependent variable to total assets, thus transforming the reduced-form revenue 
100 
 
equation into a price equation (see chapter 3 for a detailed elaboration on this issue). In order 
to test the hypothesis of Bikker et al. (2009), we run a separate regression in which we 
include the total assets (logta) variable among the explanatory variables to check whether and 
how the H-statistic differs from the regressions run without controlling for total assets. 
In our regression, we control also for the potential impact of the macroeconomic environment 
on banks’ revenues. The real GDP growth (rgdpgrowth) is included to control for the impact 
of the overall macroeconomic activity on the level of bank revenues. Its impact is expected to 
be positive, since in good times for the economy the demand for loans is expected to increase 
thus leading to higher income for the banks. The regression controls also for the impact of 
banking reform, using the EBRD index of banking reform (see chapter 2 for a more detailed 
explanation of this index). Higher values of the index indicate a more advanced level of 
banking reform.  
Given that foreign-owned banks have a large presence in the banking systems of the CEE 
countries, it is important to control for the potential impact of foreign ownership. Foreign-
owned banks are considered to differ from domestically-owned banks mainly in terms of 
higher efficiency, given that foreign banks may be superior in terms of their technology and 
the screening of applicants (Lehner and Schnitzer, 2008). Efficiency may affect the bank’s 
revenues, which represent the dependent variable in our regression, through its impact on the 
interest rates. Foreign banks may differ from the domestic banks also with regard to the 
composition of their loan portfolios, given that foreign banks are considered to be more 
conservative and to focus on the financing of safer projects (Claeys and Hainz, 2007). 
Investing in safer projects can have a negative impact on the bank’s revenues, since the low-
risk projects usually bear lower loan interest rates. On the other hand, the impact on revenues 
can be positive considering that lower-risk projects may lead to less loan defaults and, hence, 
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higher revenues received by the bank. Therefore, we control for bank’s foreign ownership by 
including a dummy variable (dv_foreign) which takes a value of 1 if the bank is 51% or more 
foreign owned and 0 if the bank is domestically owned. Given that the readily available 
BankScope database provides information only on the current ownership of the bank, we 
utilize the shareholders’ history from this database, through which we identify the bank’s 
ownership for the available years. However, it must be noted that this variable is 
characterized by a more pronounced absence of data which reduces our overall sample size. 
Given that the foreign banks that operate in the CEE region originate from different 
countries, we consider that the origin of the foreign banks may play a role on the way that 
banks exercise their activity, especially given the fact that foreign banks operating in the CEE 
countries are mostly subsidiaries of their parent banks that operate in the country of origin. 
This implies that the strategy and the organizational culture of the foreign-owned banks is 
largely in line with their parent banks, which may imply significant differences among the 
foreign-owned banks depending on how advanced the country of the origin is. According to 
Hasselman (2006), the activity of the foreign banks is mostly determined by the strategic 
considerations of the parent banks. Therefore, we have constructed a dummy variable 
(dv_origin) which takes a value of 1 if the foreign bank comes from an EU-12 country or 
United States and 0 if the foreign bank’s origin is some other country. 
In order to take into account the potential impact from time-specific effects, the model 
includes a complete set of year dummies (dv_year). By including the year dummies we also 
minimize the possibility of cross-group residual correlation if there has been some year-
specific development that has affected all the banks included in the sample (e.g. global 
financial crisis). If such a development is not controlled by year dummies, then it enters the 
error term and leads to cross-group residual correlation. Also, since the banks included in our 
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sample are from different countries, a complete set of country dummies is included in the 
model in order to control for country-specific effects (dv_country). 
Data description 
The bank-specific data in this study are sourced from the Fitch-IBCA Bankscope database, 
which provides annual data on banks operating all around the globe. The data on the real 
GDP growth rates are obtained from the European Union Commission (AMECO database) 
and International Monetary Fund. The index on banking reform is obtained from the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) transition reports. 
Table 4.2 Summary statistics 
            
Variable   Obs   Mean   Std. Dev.   Min   Max 
      
int_inc_real 2916 105167 235138 115 3177846 
p_funds 2906 0.039 0.036 0.000 0.816 
p_labour 2495 0.018 0.015 0.001 0.220 
p_physcapital 2884 2.454 5.332 0.029 94.029 
loans_ta 2904 0.550 0.203 0.000 1.396 
equity_ta 2926 0.154 0.133 -0.124 0.987 
prov_loans 2628 0.019 0.049 -0.482 0.497 
ta 2926 1732561 3849060 2981 38100000 
rgdpgrowth 2909 3.976 4.172 -17.729 13.501 
ebrd_bankreform 2914 3.343 0.572 1.000 4.000 
dv_foreign 2155 0.638 0.481 0.000 1.000 
dv_origin 2155 0.484 0.500 0.000 1.000 
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4.3.2 Estimation Methodology and Diagnostic Tests 
Since we are dealing with panel data, we have started our estimation strategy by initially 
considering the pooled OLS, the fixed effects (FE) and the random effects (RE) methods to 
estimate our regression. However, these methods are likely to produce inconsistent and 
biased estimates due to the autocorrelation problem encountered in our model. The 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data rejects the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation, thus suggesting the relationship that we are investigating has a dynamic 
nature and should not be estimated with a static model (Appendix 2.1.1). 
The alternative to tackle the autocorrelation problem is to use a dynamic model for our 
estimation by including the lag of the dependent variable among the explanatory variables. 
Apart from the need to tackle the statistical problems related to a static model, the dynamic 
model also enables us to capture the persistence of the dependent variable when there is at 
least some degree of continuity in the banking environment and banking behaviour. The 
underlying reason why this is possible with a dynamic model is that the lagged dependent 
variable captures the entire time-path (or history) of the dependent variable. In other words, 
in a dynamic model history is accounted for, while in a static model history is excluded. In 
our regression, where the dependent variable consists of the interest revenues, we consider 
that the past values of the dependent variable to some extent are expected to be reflected in 
the current values given the fact that revenues are considered to change gradually unless 
extraordinary circumstances appear in the economy. The reason why revenues are expected 
to change gradually over time may be related to the fact that the factors that potentially affect 
the interest rates (e.g. monetary policy, banks’ efficiency) and the factors that may affect the 
supply and demand for loans (e.g. banks’ lending strategies, the real GDP growth) are 
expected to change gradually rather than being characterized by continuous structural breaks. 
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The FE and RE models are not considered to represent appropriate methods for the estimation 
of dynamic models because of the likely correlation between the lagged dependent variable 
and the error term, which causes an endogeneity problem in our model. Therefore, we 
proceed with the estimation of our model using the General Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator which has been developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and augmented by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The GMM estimator overcomes 
the problem of endogeneity between the lagged dependent variable and the error term by 
using instrumental variables from within the dataset to instrument the lagged dependent 
variable. Since the instrumentation is not limited to one instrument for parameter to be 
estimated, then it is possible to have more than one moment condition per parameter to be 
estimated.
15
 This represents another important advantage of the GMM compared to other 
methods, since the greater is the number of moment conditions included in the model the 
greater is the number of potentially valid instruments that are available and the more efficient 
the dynamic estimation is likely to be (Bond, 2002). In addition, the GMM method is 
particularly suitable for datasets with a large number of individuals (N) and a short time-
series, which is consistent with our data set that is composed of over 299 banks and a time-
series of 10 years.  
As mentioned above, the GMM estimator was principally developed in two stages, starting 
with Arellano and Bond (1991), which is known as “difference” GMM, and then augmented 
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which is known as “system” 
GMM. Under the “difference” GMM, equations are estimated using the first differences of 
the variables, whereas the instrumental variables consist of the lagged levels of the suspected 
endogenous variables. The “system” GMM estimates the model by creating a system of two 
                                                          
15
 Moment conditions specify variables that are not correlated with the error term, including the lagged values 
and even future values of the time varying variables. 
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equations for each time period, where one is a first-order differenced model instrumented by 
lagged levels as in Arellano and Bond (1991), and the other is an equation where variables 
are held in their original levels and instrumented with lags of their own first differences. 
Hence, the system GMM produces a greater number of moment conditions, since endogenous 
variables are instrumented by both lags of their own levels and lags of their own first 
differences.  
The larger number of moment conditions that can be used implies that more information is 
used in the estimation, which makes the “system” GMM a more efficient estimator compared 
to the “difference” GMM. Nevertheless, the greater number of moment conditions sometimes 
may generate too many instruments which, especially for small datasets, may be problematic. 
The problem of “too many instruments” weakens the diagnostic tests for the validity of 
instruments, by making them increasingly unable to reject the null hypothesis of instrument 
validity. In our case, the number of instruments is 50 which is not considered to be high 
taking into account that we have 299 groups in the model. 
Another advantage of “system” GMM over the “difference” GMM is that the former allows 
for the effects of time invariant regressors in the model to be estimated, whereas the latter 
differences them out.  
Therefore, we choose the “system” GMM as our preferred estimator to assess the level of 
banking system competition in the CEE countries. Before interpreting the estimation results, 
a number of diagnostic tests are performed to verify whether the model is well specified. 
Unlike other methods, the GMM does not require distributional assumptions such as 
normality, and also is robust to heteroscedasticity. 
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Diagnostic tests 
The diagnostic tests in the GMM approach start with the tests on the validity of instruments. 
The instrument validity test can be performed in two ways: a) Arellano-Bond tests for first-
order and second-order serial correlation in the residuals; and b) the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions. 
The Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator requires that there is no second-order serial 
correlation in the error term of the first-order differenced model. In our case, this requirement 
is satisfied given that the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation cannot be 
rejected, thus suggesting that the instruments are valid. However, for this test to be reliable 
the model should have first-order autocorrelation in the differenced error terms, which 
implies that errors in levels do not follow a random walk. The null hypothesis that there is no 
first-order serial correlation in the error term can be rejected at the 1% level of significance, 
suggesting that the test for second-order serial correlation in our regression is reliable 
(Appendix 2.1.3). 
The other tests on the validity of instruments are represented by the Sargan test and Hansen 
test, which test whether the overidentifying instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. 
The Sargan test is not robust to the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, 
whereas the Hansen test is robust to both and, as such, is considered to be more reliable 
(Roodman, 2005). In our case, the Sargan test rejects the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term, but the hypothesis is not rejected by the Hansen test with 
a p-value of 0.402 (Appendix 2.1.3). While the Hansen test is preferred, it can be weakened 
(i.e. its ability to reject the null hypothesis of validity of overidentifying instruments) in the 
presence of “too many instruments” (Roodman, 2009). The presence of this problem is 
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shown by a p-value close to 1. However, this does not appear to be a problem in our 
regressions. 
The Hansen test statistics can be used also to test the validity of subsets of instruments 
through the Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets. In this regard, we 
test for the joint validity of the differenced instruments used for the level equation. The test 
results suggest that the null hypothesis that differenced instruments are valid may not be 
rejected (p-value = 0.389), hence providing support to the choice of the “system” GMM 
against the “differenced” GMM to estimate our equation.  
Another concern related to the specification of panel data models has been raised by Sarafidis 
et al. (2009), who claim that panel data are likely to suffer from cross-sectional dependence, 
“which may arise due to spatial dependence, economic distance, common shocks”. In order to 
tackle this problem, we have followed the conventional method of including year dummies in 
the model. However, Sarafidis et al. (2009) claim that the inclusion of time dummies may not 
be sufficient to tackle the problem of cross-sectional dependence. These authors suggest that 
the above tests of instrument validity may be indicative for the presence of a cross-sectional 
dependence problem. In this regard, our results that there is no evidence of second-order 
serial correlation in the residuals may imply that there is no heterogeneous error cross-section 
dependence.     
The last specification test for our model is related to the size of the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable which, in our case, is in line with the suggestion of Roodman (2006), who 
claims that a good estimate of the true parameter should lie between the estimates obtained 
from the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the Fixed Effects (FE) methods. The coefficient 
of the lagged dependent variable obtained through the GMM is 0.856, which is larger than 
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the coefficient of 0.515 obtained through the FE method and smaller than the coefficient of 
0.922 obtained through the OLS method (Appendix 2.1.3).  
Given that one of the main assumptions of Panzar-Rosse approach for the measurement of 
competition is that markets are in long-run equilibrium, we have investigated the long-run 
equilibrium by estimating equation 4.2 with the return on assets (ROA) as the dependent 
variable.
16
 The estimation provided an HROA coefficient (measuring constant elasticity) of -
0.01, which can be considered as very close to zero and, hence, makes the Panzar-Rosse 
approach applicable for our sample of data (Appendix 2.1.2). The fact that the joint impact of 
the input prices on the ROA is statistically different from zero might raise concerns on 
whether the market is in long-run equilibrium. However, taking into account the suggestion 
of Bikker et al. (2009) that HROA must not necessarily equal zero if the market is in structural 
equilibrium but under imperfect competition, we consider that the Panzar-Rosse approach is 
applicable to our sample of data. In addition, the introduction of dynamics in our model 
enables a gradual adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. 
 
4.3.3 Estimation results 
This section presents the estimation results from the application of the Panzar-Rosse 
approach to measure banking sector competition in the CEE countries during the period 
1999-2009. Table 4.3 presents four model specifications, which differ from each other mainly 
with regard to the dependent variable. The main model specification is presented in the first 
column and uses the interest income as the dependent variable. 
                                                          
16
 The long-run equilibrium test is explained in more details in Chapter 3 and in section 4.2 of Chapter 4. In line 
with Claessens and Laeven (2004), the measure of ROA is expressed as ln(1+ROA) in order to adjust for 
potential negative values that might have occurred due to bank losses in any year. 
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The estimation results suggest that the competitive behaviour of banks operating in the CEE 
countries is consistent with monopoly given that the sum of the coefficients of input prices 
(logp_funds, logp_labour, logp_physcapital) has produced a negative H-statistic equal to -
0.064 (Table 4.3, Specification 1). The linear combination test suggests that the joint impact 
of the input prices on the interest income (i.e. the dependent variable) is statistically 
insignificant, implying that the H-statistic is not significantly different from zero, which 
provides further evidence in support of the monopoly behaviour given that also an H=0 is 
considered to imply monopoly behaviour (Table 4.4). The negative value of the H-statistic 
suggests that the increase of input prices leads to a reduction of banks’ interest revenues. 
Based on the microeconomic theory, under a monopoly structure, an increase of input prices 
will increase firms’ marginal costs which will lead to an increase of output prices and to a 
reduction of the level of output. The reduction of the output level will subsequently lead to a 
decline of banks’ revenues. We would like to acknowledge that a negative H-statistic might 
also be consistent with oligopoly (see section 3.4). In this context, the negative value of the 
H-statistic might still signal that the banking sectors of the CEE countries exert a high degree 
of market power, but the magnitude of the market power would be lower than in the case of 
monopoly. However, if the issue raised by Bikker et al. (2009) that banks might be operating 
with constant average costs in equilibrium were to hold, then our interpretation of the H-
statistic should be taken with reservation, given their claim that a negative H-statistic might 
not rule out that the market is competitive (see the discussion in section 3.4 for a more 
detailed elaboration). However, unless this issue is investigated by relevant empirical 
evidence, we will treat their claim just as a theoretical possibility and continue interpreting 
the H-statistic values based on the original Panzar-Rosse framework.   
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The estimation of the Panzar-Rosse model using a dynamic model enables us to estimate also 
the long-run H-statistic, which in our case has a value of -2.63. This suggests that the 
competitive behaviour of banks operating in the CEE countries in the long run is consistent 
with monopoly and the degree of market power is higher than in the short run. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the studies that have applied the Panzar-Rosse method 
have not reached a conclusion on whether the interest income or the total income is a more 
appropriate measure to be used as dependent variable. Therefore, for comparison we have run 
an additional regression using total income as the dependent variable. The results seem to be 
consistent, producing an H-statistic of -0.14, which in absolute size is larger than the H-
statistic obtained in the first specification but still is negative and suggests that CEE banking 
sectors are characterized by monopoly behaviour (Table 4.3, Specification 2). Given that both 
specifications produce a negative H-statistic, it may be considered that the choice between the 
interest income and total income for the dependent variable is not highly relevant for 
assessing the competitive behaviour of the banks. 
Taking into consideration the number of banks operating in the CEE countries, the finding 
that the banking systems of these countries have been characterized by monopoly behaviour 
might be considered as unexpected. However, the persisting low degree of financial 
intermediation, the higher interest rate spreads compared to the Euro Area and the slow 
progress in the development of competition policy may represent important illustrative facts 
that banks that have operated in the CEE during the period 1999-2009 have behaved like 
monopolies.  
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Table 4.3 Estimation results of the H-statistic for the CEE countries 
            
      VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Laglogint_inc_real 0.856*** 
 
0.748*** 
 
0.171*** 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.043) 
logp_funds 0.129*** 0.156*** 0.220*** 0.376*** 0.342*** 
 
(0.042) (0.050) (0.050) (0.031) (0.034) 
logp_labour -0.141*** -0.185** -0.173*** 0.155*** 0.154*** 
 
(0.046) (0.091) (0.058) (0.019) (0.022) 
logp_physcapital -0.051 -0.111 -0.134*** 0.025** 0.024** 
 
(0.035) (0.082) (0.045) (0.010) (0.010) 
loans_ta_c4 0.063 0.072 0.061 0.193** 0.379*** 
 
(0.077) (0.123) (0.089) (0.097) (0.100) 
equity_ta_c4 -0.853** -1.559* -1.287*** 0.541*** 0.582** 
 
(0.346) (0.855) (0.351) (0.199) (0.271) 
prov_loans_c4 -0.168 0.916* -0.215 -0.179 -0.645 
 
(0.297) (0.539) (0.323) (0.394) (0.516) 
rgdpgrowth 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
ebrd_bankref1 -0.161*** -0.186** -0.102 0.027 -0.059 
 
(0.062) (0.080) (0.067) (0.028) (0.036) 
dv_foreign 0.066 0.047 0.070 -0.030 -0.049* 
 
(0.042) (0.077) (0.051) (0.023) (0.025) 
dv_origin 0.057 0.122 0.098* 0.017 -0.006 
 
(0.060) (0.112) (0.054) (0.020) (0.022) 
logpfunds_dvnoneu 
  
-0.150** 
  
   
(0.067) 
  logplabour_dvnoneu 
  
-0.176** 
  
   
(0.087) 
  logpphyscapital_dvnoneu 
  
0.112** 
  
   
(0.055) 
  dv_noneu 
  
-1.700*** 
  
   
(0.497) 
  Laglogtot_inc_real 
 
0.709*** 
   
  
(0.173) 
   Laglogintinc_ta 
   
0.280*** 
 
    
(0.053) 
 logta 
    
0.850*** 
     
(0.046) 
      dv_year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
dv_country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      Constant 1.747*** 3.286** 3.222*** -0.143 -0.807*** 
 
(0.654) (1.477) (0.704) (0.173) (0.254) 
      Observations 1,610 1,607 1,610 1,610 1,610 
Number of bank 299 298 299 299 299 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Note a): Appendix 2.1 presents the STATA outputs for all the model specifications. 
Note b): Specification 1 uses the real interest income as dependent variable; Specification 2 uses the real total 
income as dependent variable; Specification 3 uses real interest income as dependent variable, but includes the 
interactions of input price variables with the dummy variable for non-EU countries; Specification 4 uses the 
interest income to total assets ratio as dependent variable; Specification 5 uses the real interest income as 
dependent variable, but includes the total assets variable among the explanatory variables; 
 
 
Given that within the CEE countries there are differences between the non-EU and EU 
countries in many aspects of banking sector structure and operating environment, we have 
also tested whether the degree of banking sector competition in the non-EU members of the 
CEE region has differed from the EU members of this region. We have conducted this test by 
interacting each of the input prices variables (i.e. the components of the H-statistic) with the 
dummy variable dv_noneu which takes a value of 1 if the country is not an EU member 
(Table 4.3, specification 3).
17
 According to Brambor et al. (2006), the coefficient of a 
constitutive component of the interaction term can be interpreted alone only assuming that 
the other constitutive component of the interaction term equals zero. In our case, the 
coeficients of the primary variables p_funds, p_labour and p_physcapital reflect the impact 
of input prices on banks’ revenues when the other component of the interaction term 
dv_noneu equals zero. In other words, the sum of the coefficients of  p_funds, p_labour and 
p_physcapital represents the H-statistic for the EU countries of our sample (dv_noneu=0), 
which is -0.09. The coefficients of the interaction terms in our regression 
(logpfunds_dvnoneu, logplabour_dvnoneu and logpphyscapital_dvnoneu) suggest that when 
dv_noneu equals 1, i.e. when the country is not an EU member, the input prices have a 
statistically significant additional impact on bank’s revenues compared to the situation when 
the country is an EU member. Summing up the coefficient of each interaction term 
                                                          
17
 The inclusion of the interaction term is done in line with Brambor et al. (2006) who suggest that in the case of 
multiplicative interaction models, the regression should include all the constitutive terms of the interaction term 
and the interaction term itself. These authors suggest that the coefficients of the constitutive terms should not be 
interpreted as average effects. The coefficient of one component term can be interpreted only assuming that the 
other component of the interaction term equals zero. 
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(logpfunds_dvnoneu, logplabour_dvnoneu and logpphyscapital_dvnoneu) with the coefficient 
of its respective constitutive term (p_funds, p_labour and p_physcapital), we obtain the H-
statistic for the non-EU members of our sample, which represents the impact of input prices 
on bank’s revenues when the country is an EU member plus the additional impact when the 
country is not an EU member. The sum of these coefficients is presented in Table 4.4 
(specification 3) and shows an H-statistic of  -0.30 for the non-EU countries. The negative 
values of the H-statistics for the EU and non-EU countries suggest that banks operating in 
both the EU and non-EU countries of the CEE region are characterized with monopoly 
behaviour. However, the fact the the H-statistic of non-EU countries is lower (i.e. more 
negative) than the H-statistic of the EU countries suggests that the banking sectors of non-EU 
countries are characterized by an even lower degree of competition compared to the banking 
sectors of the EU countries. Recalling the evidence provided in chapter 2, the non-EU 
countries of the CEE region have been characterized by a lower degree of financial 
intermediation, higher interest rate spreads, and lower development of competition policy, 
compared to the EU members of the region, which might serve as indicators of a lower 
degree of banking sector competition in these countries. Banks operating in the non-EU 
countries of the CEE are also likely to face less competition from cross-border lending, given 
the smaller number of large foreign corporations operating in these countries. In addition, the 
persistently high profitability ratios recorded by the banking sectors of these countries might 
have well accommodated banks in the existing positions as to not induce a more aggressive 
competitive behaviour which could eventually undermine their profits. 
Regarding the impact of individual variables on the interest income, the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable (Laglogintinc_real) is positive and highly significant, showing a 
high level of persistence of the bank interest revenues over the periods (Table 4.3). This 
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implies that bank revenues in the current year are largely consistent with the bank revenues in 
the previous year. The statistically significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable 
confirms the dynamic nature of our model and may serve as evidence in support to Goddard 
and Wilson (2009) who suggest that the Panzar-Rosse method should be estimated using 
dynamic models rather than static models as used by the majority of studies applying this 
method.    
Funding costs (logp_funds) have a significantly positive impact on the interest income, 
implying that an increase of deposit and other funds interest rate results in a higher level of 
interest income (Table 4.3, Specification 1). This relationship between funding costs and 
interest income principally suggests that banks pass a portion of the increase of funding costs 
to their customers, presumably by charging them higher interest rates on loans and on other 
interest-generating assets. On the other hand, labour costs (logp_labour) have a significantly 
negative impact, while the physical capital costs (logp_physcapital) have a statistically 
insignificant impact.   
Regarding other control variables, the degree of risk-aversion, measured by the equity to total 
assets ratio (equity_ta) has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, showing that 
more conservative banks tend to generate less interest income. The structure of the assets 
(loans_ta) and the quality of the loan portfolio (prov_loans) have statistically insignificant 
coefficients. Also, bank’s ownership (dv_foreign) and country-of-origin (dv_origin) both 
statistically insignificant coefficients. Regarding country-level variables, the real GDP 
growth rate (rgdpgrowth) has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, suggesting 
that when the economy is growing banks’ interest revenues tend to increase. This may 
primarily reflect the growing demand for loans during the “boom” periods. The ebrd_bankref 
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variable is significantly negative, suggesting that the progress in banking reform had a 
negative impact on banks’ revenues.  
Table 4.4 Joint impact of the input prices on the dependent variable 
              
  Coefficient  Std. error z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       Specification 1 -0.064 0.066 -0.960 0.337 -0.194 0.066 
       Specification 2 -0.140 0.138 -1.020 0.309 -0.410 0.130 
       Specification 3 -0.300 0.115 -2.610 0.009 -0.526 -0.075 
       Specification 4 0.556 0.043 13.070 0.000 0.473 0.640 
       Specification 5 0.519 0.051 10.220 0.000 0.419 0.618 
       
Note a): The joint impact of the input prices on the dependent variable is calculated using the linear 
combinations command (lincom) in STATA. The “coefficient” in this table represents the sum of the 
coefficients on logp_funds, logp_labour and logp_physcapital (for Specification 3: logpfunds_dvnoneu+ 
logp_funds, logplabour_dvnoneu+logp_labour, logpphyscapital_dvnoneu+logp_physcapital) which produces 
the H-statistic. 
Note b): Specification 1 corresponds to the model with the interest income as dependent variable; Specification 
2 corresponds to the model with the total income as dependent variable; Specification 3 uses real interest income 
as dependent variable, but includes the interactions of input price variables with the dummy variable for non-EU 
countries; Specification 4 corresponds to the model with the interest income to total assets ratio as dependent 
variable; Specification 5 corresponds to the model with the interest income as dependent variable, but which 
includes also total assets among the explanatory variables.  
 
The overall finding of our analysis that the competitive behaviour of banks operating in the 
CEE countries complies with monopoly behaviour is not consistent with most other studies 
that have applied the Panzar-Rosse approach to investigate banking sector competition for the 
CEE countries as well as with studies that have applied this approach to other regions which 
have mostly found monopolistic competition (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2003; Mamatzakis et 
al., 2005; Claessens and Laeven, 2003). However, we attribute this difference to the model 
specification, claiming that we have made an improvement to the model specification by 
taking into account the suggestion of Bikker et al. (2007, 2009) not to control for total assets 
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as well as not to scale the dependent variable (i.e. interest or total income) to total assets (see 
discussion in chapter 3, page 73-78). In order to test the hypothesis of Bikker et al. (2009) 
that the inclusion of total assets as an explanatory variable leads to a higher H-statistic, we 
estimate equation 4.2 with total assets (logta) among the explanatory variables (Table 4.3, 
Specification 5).
18
 As expected, the H-statistic turns from negative in the previous 
specification to positive with a coefficient of 0.519 which would suggest that the behaviour 
of banks operating in the CEE countries is consistent with monopolistic competition (Table 
4.4, Specification 5). This would make our findings consistent with most of the studies that 
have applied the Panzar-Rosse approach to measure banking sector competition for the CEE 
countries and other regions. Similarly, we estimate equation 4.2 with the interest income/total 
assets as the dependent variable (Table 4.2, Specification 4). The results are similar to 
Specification 5, with an H-statistic of 0.556 (Table 4.4, Specification 5). This confirms also 
our explanation in chapter 3 (Box 3.1) that the scaling of the dependent variable to total 
assets and the inclusion of the total assets as an explanatory variable entails the same 
misspecification bias, by turning the H-statistic from a negative value into a positive value 
when the market is operating under monopoly. These results may serve as evidence in 
support of the hypothesis of Bikker et al. (2007, 2009) on the scaling of the dependent 
variable to total assets and the inclusion of total assets as an explanatory variable in a Panzar-
Rosse model.  
                                                          
18
 Given that the scaling of the dependent variable to total assets and the inclusion of total assets as an 
explanatory variable (Specifications 4 and 5) transform the reduced-form revenue equation into a price equation 
(i.e. the dependent variable becomes the ex-post interest rate), in these specifications the control variables 
equity_ta, loans_ta, prov_loans, and logta are treated as endogenous based on the predicted relationship 
between these variables and the interest rate. For a more detailed elaboration on these relationships see the 
description of variables in Chapter 6. 
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4.4 Estimation of the Banking Sector Competition in Kosovo 
Kosovo’s banking system started to operate after the end of the war in 1999, when Kosovo 
inherited a destroyed economy, while the banking system was inexistent. However, within a 
relatively short period of time, Kosovo built the basis of a contemporary banking system, 
fully privately owned and with a dominating presence of foreign capital. The continuous 
increase in the number of banks is considered to have increased the competition among 
banks, which was primarily expressed through a faster geographical expansion of banks, 
lower interest rate spread, larger range of products and better quality of services. However, 
the number of banks operating in Kosovo remains relatively low compared to other countries 
in the region, while the market structure continues to be characterized by a relatively high 
degree of market concentration. The interest rate spreads, in spite of the continuous decline, 
remain among the highest in the CEE region, while the degree of financial intermediation is 
the lowest. These facts make the investigation of banking sector competition in Kosovo an 
interesting exercise. Hence, in the following sections we apply the Panzar-Rosse approach to 
quarterly bank-level data on the banks operating in Kosovo which are sourced from the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo. 
4.4.1. Model description 
In this section, we apply the Panzar-Rosse approach to estimate the competition in the 
banking sector of Kosovo for the period 2001-2010. The regression used to estimate the 
Panzar-Rosse H-statistic for the banking system of Kosovo is in principle similar to equation 
4.2, which is used to estimate banking competition in CEE countries, but is modified by few 
restrictions that are mainly related to data limitations.  
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                                                                                                                                             (4.3) 
 
where, 
i is the index for bank, t is the index for year, and α is the constant. 
 
Table 4.5 Description of variables 
 
Variable Description 
totinc_real total income adjusted for inflation 
pf interest expenditures / total funds 
plc general and administrative expenses / total 
assets 
loans/ta loans / total assets 
equity/ta equity / total assets 
prov_loans loan_loss provisions / total loans 
dv_year dummy variable for year 
ε error term 
 
Since the activity of Kosovo’s banking sector is mainly concentrated in the traditional 
banking activities, where interest income dominates the overall structure of bank revenues, 
the dependent variable in our regression could be the interest income. However, since the 
non-interest income is continuously becoming more important, we run the regression also 
with total income as the dependent variable and check whether the value of the H-statistic is 
robust. Similar to equation 4.2, we use the absolute value of income as the dependent 
ititit
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variable, rather than scaling it to total assets. Both the total income and the interest income 
are adjusted for inflation. 
Also, in selecting the variables for the input prices, we follow the ‘’intermediation approach’’ 
(Sealey and Lindley, 1977) which treats banks as firms that produce loans by using as inputs 
deposits and other loanable funds, labour, and capital. However, because separate data on 
labour costs for the Kosovo’s banking system are available only as of 2008, we follow 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2003) in using the general and administrative expenses to total 
assets ratio to account for both labour and physical capital expenditures in order not to reduce 
the number of observations in our model. In line with the other studies in this field, the 
dependent variable and the variables representing the input prices (pf and plc) are 
transformed into logarithms in order for the coefficients (β1 and β2) to be interpreted as 
constant elasticities.  
The regression includes the same set of bank-level control variables as in equation 4.2. 
However, we have not been able to control for the country-level variables. The quarterly real 
GDP growth data are still not produced in Kosovo, and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has not produced the banking reform index for 
Kosovo since Kosovo was not an EBRD member.
19
  
The data used in this analysis are bank-level balance sheet and income statement quarterly 
data for the period 2001-2010 for all commercial banks operating in Kosovo, collected from 
the Central Bank of the Republic of Kosovo.  
 
 
                                                          
19
 Kosovo became a member of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 2012. 
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Table 4.6 Summary statistics 
            
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      totinc_real 252 4.279 5.082 0.013 21.932 
pf 252 0.006 0.012 0.000 0.185 
plc 252 0.014 0.010 0.004 0.080 
loans_ta 255 0.479 0.193 0.000 0.780 
equity_ta 255 0.131 0.095 0.024 0.792 
prov_loans 255 0.049 0.045 -0.033 0.283 
       
 
4.4.2 Estimation Methodology 
The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data suggests that there is autocorrelation in 
the data and that a static model would not be appropriate for our estimation (Appendix 2.2.1). 
One of the methods to overcome the problem of autocorrelation in a panel model consists of 
the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable in the model. 
However, this may cause correlation between the error term and the lagged dependent 
variable, leading to an endogeneity problem in the model. This endogeneity problem may be 
tackled by using the General Methods of Moments (GMM) approach which uses instruments 
from within the sample to substitute for the lagged dependent variable. However, because our 
analysis relies on a small sample of data in terms of the number of individual groups (N), the 
GMM method is not applicable since it is appropriate for samples with large N.   
The autocorrelation problem in our model may indicate that our dependent variable might be 
affected also by other variables that are not included among our explanatory variables. In 
addition, if the omitted variables have an autoregressive statistical generating mechanism, 
then the model may be characterized also by an autocorrelated error term.  
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In order to tackle the autocorrelation problem in our model, the next attempt is to model the 
dynamics in the error term, using the Unobserved Components Model, estimated according to 
Cochrane-Orcutt (1949). This method estimates the slope coefficients of a static model 
conditional on AR(1) dynamics in the residuals; i.e. in equation 4.3 εit = ρεit-1 + νit (where vit is 
white noise). However, the Unobserved Components model is valid only under the 
assumption that the common factor restrictions hold. Based on Spanos (1986) and McGuirk 
and Spanos (2004), common factor restrictions are explained in Box 4.1. 
Box 4.1 Testing for Common Factor Restrictions  
To explain the Common Factor Restrictions (CFR), for simplicity, we assume a model with 
only two explanatory variables and an autoregressive error term of first order – AR(1). 
Yit = α + α2Xit + α3Nit + εit         (4.3) 
where, εit = ρεit-1 + νit          (4.4)     
εit-1 is the disturbance term, and 
νit is the white noise component 
Lagging once each of the equation (4.3) components, we get: 
Yit-1 = α + α2Xit-1 + α3Nit-1 + εit-1       (4.5) 
Solving equation (4.5) for εit-1: 
εit-1 = Yit-1 – α – α1Xit-1 – α2Nit-1       (4.6) 
Substituting equation (4.6) into equation (4.4): 
εit = ρ(Yit-1 – α – α2Xit-1 – α3Nit-1) + νit      (4.7) 
εit = ρYit-1 – ρα – ρα2Xit-1 – ρα3Nit-1) + νit       (4.8) 
Substituting equation (4.8) into equation (4.3): 
Yit = α + α2Xit + α3Nit + ρYit-1 – ρα – ρα2Xit-1 – ρα3Nit-1 + νit    (4.9) 
Collecting the terms of equation (4.9): 
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Yit = (1-ρ)α + α2Xit + α3Nit + ρYit-1 – ρα2Xit-1 – ρα3Nit-1 + νit    (4.10) 
According to Sargan (1964), equation (4.10) is a restricted version of the following dynamic 
linear regression model: 
Yit = α + α1Yit-1 + α2Xit + α3Nit + α4Xit-1 + ρα5Nit-1 + νit    (4.11) 
The coefficient of Xit-1 in equation (4.9) is – ρα2, which is equivalent to the product of the 
coefficients of Yit-1 and Xit in equation 4.11. More precisely, the negative of the coefficient on 
the lagged explanatory variable equals the product of the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable and the coefficient on the current value of the explanatory variable. This defines the 
following non-linear restriction: 
– ρα2Xit-1 = ρYit-1 * α2Xit        (4.12) 
In terms of equation (4.11), this expression is: 
– α4Xit-1 = α1Yit-1 * α2Xit         (4.13) 
Similarly, the coefficient of Nit-1 in equation (4.10) is – ρα3 which is equivalent to the product 
of the coefficients of Yit-1 and Nit. Hence, 
– ρα3Nit-1 = ρYit-1 * α3Nit         (4.14) 
– α4Nit-1 = α1Yit-1 * α3Nit         (4.15) 
Expressions in equation (4.13) and (4.14) represent the common factor restrictions. The 
dynamic linear regression (equation 4.11) can be transformed into its restricted form 
(equation 4.10) only if these restrictions hold. 
 
Therefore, in order to apply the unobserved components method to our analysis, we must 
initially test whether the CFRs hold in our model. To test for CFR, we first transform our 
model (equation 4.3) into a dynamic linear regression model of order one (equation 4.16). 
Equation 4.16 is estimated both by the fixed effects (FE) method and by pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) in order to check the CFR test for robustness.
20
 
                                                          
20
 Between the Fixed effects and the Random effect methods, the Hausman test suggests that our regression 
should be estimated with the Fixed Effects method. Appendix 4.2.2 provides the STATA outputs on the 
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 (4.16) 
Having estimated equation (4.16), we test the null hypothesis that CFRs hold. The test for 
CFRs is performed based on the derivation explained in Box 1.  
Box 4.2 Results of the test for Common Factor Restrictions  
CFR test results from the estimation of equation (4.16): 
 
testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logpf] = -_b[Laglogpf] 
      FE  F(1, 203) =       11.20 
            Prob > F =        0.0010 
        
 
         OLS F(1, 212) =           41.32 
               Prob > F =         0.0000 
                                 
 testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logplc] = -_b[Laglogplc] 
      FE        F(1, 203) =        2.01 
               Prob > F =        0.1581 
 
      OLS        F(1, 212) =        1.67 
               Prob > F =        0.1972 
 
      testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[loans_ta] = -_b[Lagloans_ta] 
      FE        F(1, 203) =       20.00 
               Prob > F =        0.0000 
 
     OLS F(1, 212) =       10.31 
               Prob > F =        0.0015 
 
 
    testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[equity_ta] = -_b[Lagequity_ta] 
      FE  F(1, 203) =       10.29 
                Prob > F =        0.0016 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
estimation of the Hausman test, whereas Chapter 5 provides a detailed explanation of the Fixed Effects and 
Random Effects methods.  
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     OLS    F(1, 212) =       0.10 
                Prob > F =        0.7482 
   
    testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[prov_loans] = -_b[Lagprov_loans] 
 
      FE    F(1, 203) =         0.01 
               Prob > F =         0.9288 
 
      OLS F(1, 212) =         4.39 
              Prob > F =         0.0374 
 
Based on the above-presented results, it appears that the null hypothesis that CFRs hold 
cannot be rejected for three of the variables, hence we consider that we can apply the 
unobserved components method to estimate our model, even though when tested jointly for 
all the variables CFRs do not appear to hold.  
testnl (_b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logpf] = -_b[Laglogpf]) (_b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logplc] = -
_b[Laglogplc]) (_b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[loans_ta] = -_b[Lagloans_ta]) 
(_b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[equity_ta] = -_b[Lagequity_ta])(_b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[prov_loans] 
= -_b[Lagprov_loans]) 
         
FE    F(5, 203) =         11.61 
              Prob > F =        0.0000 
 
        
OLS F(5, 212) =        9.72 
               Prob > F =         0.0000 
 
 
The test results suggest that CFR hold for three of the variables (Box 4.2). Hence, we apply 
the unobserved components method to a static fixed effects panel to estimate equation (4.3), 
i.e. to estimate the degree of competition in the Kosovo’s banking system. 
Since one of the main assumptions of the Panzar-Rosse approach is that the market is 
operating in long-run equilibrium, we initially perform the long-run equilibrium test by 
estimating equation (4.2) with Return on Assets (ROA) as a dependent variable. The H-
statistic obtained from the test for long-run equilibrium is almost zero (HROA = -0.05) which 
may suggest that the market is operating in long-run equilibrium (Appendix 2.2.5). In 
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addition, the modelling of the dynamics in the error term may enable a gradual convergence 
towards the equilibrium position even if the market in not entirely in long-run equilibrium. 
Hence, we consider that the Panzar-Rosse approach may be applied to estimate the banking 
sector competition in Kosovo. 
4.4.3 Estimation Results 
This section presents the results from the estimation of the Panzar-Rosse model for the 
banking sector of Kosovo for the period 2001-2010. Table 4.7 presents the estimation results, 
where the main model is presented in the first column while the other columns present 
alternative models. The estimation results produce an H-statistic that ranges between zero and 
one (0<H<1) which suggests monopolistic competition both when using total income or 
interest income as the dependent variable. However, given that the joint impact of input 
prices is more statistically significant when total income is used as the dependent variable, we 
refer to the regression run with total income as the dependent variable as the main model, 
whereas the regression with interest income as the dependent variable is treated as an 
alternative regression. 
Based on the estimation results, the H-statistic for the banking system of Kosovo has a 
positive value of 0.33 which suggests that the behaviour of banks operating in Kosovo is 
consistent with monopolistic competition (Table 4.7, specification 1).
21
 This result is 
confirmed also by the linear test for the joint impact of the input prices on the total income, 
presented in Table 4.8 which suggests that the joint impact of input prices is significantly 
different from zero (p-value =0.000). The H-statistic has a positive coefficient also when the 
regression is run using interest income as the dependent variable (H-statistic=0.167), but the 
                                                          
21
 The H-statistic is calculated by summing the coefficients of variables that represent the input prices (price of 
funds: PF, and price of labour and physical capital: PLC). 
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coefficient is smaller than with the total income as the dependent variable (Table 4.8). Given 
that both specifications produce a positive H-statistic (i.e. 0<H<1), the results may be 
considered as suggesting that the competitive behaviour of banks operating in Kosovo has 
been in line with monopolistic competition. 
Table 4.7 Estimation of the H-statistic for the banking system of Kosovo 
 
          
     VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     logpf 0.415*** 0.491*** 0.240*** 0.230*** 
 
(0.046) (0.060) (0.048) (0.050) 
logplc -0.082 -0.324*** 0.210*** 0.357*** 
 
(0.076) (0.083) (0.066) (0.063) 
loans_ta 0.949*** 1.970*** 
  
 
(0.333) (0.353) 
  equity_ta -1.968*** -2.945*** 
  
 
(0.749) (0.738) 
  prov_loans 0.410 1.039 
  
 
(0.955) (1.010) 
  Lagloans_ta 
  
0.785*** 0.622** 
   
(0.236) (0.247) 
Lagequity_ta 
  
-2.397*** -2.053*** 
   
(0.526) (0.548) 
Lagprov_loans 
  
-0.154 -0.341 
   
(0.685) (0.722) 
logta 
  
0.593*** 
 
   
(0.084) 
 
     dv_year YES YES YES YES 
     Constant 3.193*** 1.215*** -0.113 -1.356*** 
 
(0.141) (0.266) (0.224) (0.193) 
     Observations 238 238 230 230 
Number of bank 10 10 10 10 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
     Note a): Appendix 2.2 presents the STATA outputs for all the model specifications. 
Note b): Specification 1 uses the real total income as the dependent variable; Specification 2 uses real interest 
income as the dependent variable; Specification 3 uses total income as the dependent variable, but includes the 
total assets variable among the explanatory variables; Specification 4 uses the total income to total assets ratio as 
the dependent variable. 
Note c): Given that the scaling of the dependent variable to total assets and the inclusion of total assets as an 
explanatory variable (Specifications 3 and 4) transform the reduced-form revenue equation into a price equation 
(i.e. the dependent variable becomes the interest rate), in these specifications the control variables equity_ta, 
loans_ta, and prov_loans are treated as endogenous (hence, included in lags) based on the predicted relationship 
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between these variables and the interest rate. For a more detailed elaboration on these relationships see the 
description of variables in chapter 6. 
 
Compared to the results from the previous section, where competition was measured for 
banks operating in the CEE region, it appears that banking sector competition in Kosovo was 
higher than the average of the CEE region. This may primarily reflect the fact that Kosovo’s 
banking system has been newly created and banks have competed more aggressively to seize 
the market opportunities. Banks in Kosovo during the period under investigation have been 
highly active in expanding their branch networks throughout the country which represents a 
very important form of product differentiation. In addition, even though the highest among 
the CEE region, the interest rate spreads in Kosovo have recorded a continuous decline 
during these years, potentially reflecting the evolving competition between banks. Similarly, 
the high degree of market concentration that characterized Kosovo’s banking sector since the 
beginning of its operations has declined continuously.  
Regarding the impact of individual variables on the total income (i.e. the dependent variable), 
Table 4.7 (Specification 1) shows that the price of funds variable (PF) has a significantly 
positive coefficient, suggesting that an increase in the price of funds will result in higher 
revenues which may imply that an increase of bank’s financing costs may be passed to the 
clients, presumably by charging them higher interest rates. The other component of input 
prices in our model which is the price of labour and physical capital (PLC) and is measured 
by the ratio of general and administrative expenses to total assets, has a negative coefficient 
but is statistically insignificant. The coefficient on loans to total assets (loans_ta) is positive 
and highly significant, indicating that a higher loan-to-total assets ratio results in a higher 
level of bank revenues. The coefficient on the variable equity to total assets (equity_ta) is 
significantly negative, suggesting that more risk-averse banks tend to be characterized by a 
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lower level of income. The loan-loss provisions to total loans ratio (prov_loans), which 
measures the quality of the loan portfolio, resulted statistically insignificant.   
Table 4.8 The joint impact of the input prices on the dependent variable 
              
  Coefficient  Std. error z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       Specification 1 0.333 0.081 4.120 0.000 0.174 0.493 
       Specification 2 0.167 0.090 1.860 0.065 -0.010 0.344 
       Specification 3 0.450 0.067 6.730 0.000 0.318 0.582 
       Specification 4 0.587 0.065 9.080 0.000 0.460 0.715 
       Note a): The joint impact of the input prices on the dependent variable is calculated using the linear 
combinations command (lincom) in STATA. The “coefficient” in this table represents the sum of the 
coefficients on logpf and logplc which is the H-statistic. 
Note b): Specification 1 corresponds to the model with the total income as dependent variable; Specification 2 
corresponds to the model with the interest income as dependent variable. Specification 3 corresponds to the 
model with the total income as dependent variable, but includes the total assets variable among the explanatory 
variables; Specification 4 corresponds to the model with total income to total assets ratio as dependent variable. 
 
Similar to section 4.3, where we estimated the banking sector competition for the CEE 
countries, in this section we run two alternative model specifications in order to test the 
hypotheses of Bikker et al. (2007, 2009) on the scaling of the dependent variable to total 
assets and the inclusion of total assets among the explanatory variables. Specification 3 
presents the results from the estimation of our model using the total income/total assets as the 
dependent variable, whereas specification 4 presents the model with the total income as 
dependent variable but including the total assets among the explanatory variables (Table 4.7 
and 4.8).
22
 In both specifications, the H-statistic is higher compared to the model where the 
                                                          
22
 Given that the scaling of the dependent variable to total assets and the inclusion of total assets as an 
explanatory variable (Specifications 3 and 4) transform the reduced-form revenue equation into a price equation 
(i.e. the dependent variable becomes the ex-post interest rate), in these specifications the control variables 
equity_ta, loans_ta and prov_loans are treated as endogenous (hence, included in lags) based on the predicted 
relationship between these variables and the interest rate. For a more detailed elaboration on these relationships 
see the description of variables in Chapter 6. 
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absolute value of total income is used as the dependent variable (Table 4.8). These results 
may be considered as further evidence in favour of the hypotheses of Bikker et al. (2007, 
2009).  
4.5 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, the Panzar-Rosse model has been applied to estimate banking sector 
competition in the CEE countries. A separate estimation is conducted to estimate the banking 
sector competition in Kosovo in order to address the data limitations arising from the newly 
created banking system in this country. In both cases, the Panzar-Rosse method was applied 
on panel data accounting for dynamics in order to address the serial correlation problem as 
well as to satisfy the suggestions of the authors who claim that the adjustment towards long-
run equilibrium is not an instant process, but takes place gradually over time. Unlike most of 
the studies that have applied the Panzar-Rosse method to estimate banking sector 
competition, we have not scaled our dependent variable to total assets and neither have we 
included the total assets among the control variables, which is in line with the 
recommendations of Bikker et al. (2007, 2009).  
The estimation of banking sector competition for the CEE countries has been conducted 
using the General Method of Moments. The estimation results have produced a negative H-
statistic, which implies that the behaviour of banks operating in the CEE countries is 
consistent with monopoly behaviour. Taking into consideration the number of banks 
operating in the CEE countries, this finding might be considered as unexpected. However, the 
persisting low degree of financial intermediation, the higher interest rate spreads compared to 
the Euro Area and the slow progress in the development of competition policy may represent 
important illustrative facts suggesting that the banks that have operated in the CEE during the 
period 1999-2009 have behaved like monopolies. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged 
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that a negative H-statistic might be consistent also with oligopoly, implying that our estimate 
of the H-statistic would still signal the presence of a high degree of market power, but which 
is more moderate compared to the monopoly. Another reservation regarding the interpretation 
of the H-statistic is related to the proposal of Bikker et al. (2009), who show that a negative 
H-statistic does not necessarily indicate monopoly behaviour if banks’ average costs are 
constant in equilibrium (see section 3.4). In such a situation, the negative value of the H-
statistic might not be able to rule out the imperfect competition, so our interpretation that the 
behaviour of banks operating in CEE countries is consistent with monopoly would need to be 
taken with reservation. Nevertheless, since the proposal of Bikker et al. (2009) is a theoretical 
possibility rather than a norm, we continue to interpret the H-statistic based on the original 
Panzar-Rosse framework and leave this issue to be investigated by future empirical research. 
Within the CEE sample of countries, market power resulted to be higher among the banks 
operating in the non-EU countries of the CEE region compared to the EU countries of this 
region. These countries have been characterized by an even lower degree of financial 
intermediation, higher interest rate spreads, and lower development of competition policy, 
compared to the EU members of the CEE region. The banks operating in the non-EU 
countries of the CEE are also likely to face less competition from cross-border lending, given 
the smaller number of large foreign corporations operating in these countries. In addition, the 
persistently high profitability ratios recorded by the banking sectors of these countries might 
have well accommodated banks in their existing positions as to not induce a more aggressive 
competitive behaviour, which could eventually undermine their profits.  
The estimation of banking sector competition in Kosovo has been conducted using the 
Unobserved Components Model, which incorporates the dynamics in the error term. GMM 
estimation of a dynamic panel model, which is considered as more appropriate for large – i.e. 
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large N - panel datasets, could not be applied in the case of Kosovo due to the small number 
of banks. The estimation results suggest that the conduct of banks operating in Kosovo has 
been consistent with monopolistic competition. Compared to the previous results, it appears 
that the degree of banking sector competition in Kosovo is higher than the average degree of 
competition for the overall CEE region. This may primarily reflect the fact that Kosovo’s 
banking system has been newly created and banks have competed more aggressively to seize 
the market opportunities. Despite the fact that the interest rate spread in Kosovo is the highest 
among the CEE countries, it has followed a continuously declining trend, thus potentially 
reflecting increasing competition between banks. 
In both the estimations, the dependent variable in the main regression has consisted of the 
interest income, given that financial intermediation dominates the banks’ activity in these 
countries, but for comparison also total income has been used. The results have generally 
been consistent, suggesting that the choice between the interest income and the total income 
for the dependent variable is not decisive for the measurement of banking sector competition 
using the Panzar-Rosse approach. 
In order to test for potential upward bias on the H-statistic arising from for the inclusion of 
total assets in the regression, we have estimated alternative model specifications both by 
scaling the dependent variable to total assets and by including the total assets variable among 
the explanatory variables. Both the estimation for the CEE countries and for Kosovo provide 
evidence in support of the view of Bikker et al. (2007, 2009), who claim that the inclusion of 
total assets inflates the H-statistic and, as a consequence, that monopoly is always rejected. In 
the case of CEE countries, the H-statistic becomes positive, thus rejecting the monopoly and 
suggesting monopolistic competition. In the case of Kosovo, the H-statistic remains positive, 
but the coefficient is higher. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The main challenge during the transition process of the banking sector in the CEE countries 
was the management of non-performing loans, which became a serious threat to the stability 
and development of the banking sector. The reasons for the high non-performing loans were 
multiple, starting from the legacies inherited from the centrally-planned economies, the poor 
corporate management of the newly created banks, the weak institutions, and the poor 
macroeconomic performance of these countries. However, the long process of the 
governments’ interventions to clean banks’ balance sheets from the non-performing loans and 
reform the banking sector by privatizating the state-owned banks and strengthening the 
financial regulatory and supervisory institutions, led to substantial improvement of loan-
portfolio quality in the CEE countries. 
The issue of bank risks is considered as highly important both in the literature and among the 
regulators, primarily because banks’ bankruptcies are expected to be associated with much 
larger negative consequences for the economy compared to the bankruptcy of other types of 
firms. According to Beck et al. (2010), banks differ from other types of firms because of 
three main reasons: a) potential bankruptcy of banks entails high social costs which are 
mainly related to potential losses for the uninformed depositors who are not able to properly 
assess the risks they face; b) the bankruptcy of a bank can negatively affect also other banks 
through the contagion effect
23
, thus affecting negatively the overall financial stability, the 
payments system and, in turn, the functioning of the real economy; and c) banks are special 
firms because of the presence of banking regulation, which implies also the existence of a 
safety net for banks that, among others, includes deposits insurance, lender of last resort 
                                                          
23
 Contagion effect can occur in two forms: (i) the bankruptcy of a bank increases the uncertainty of other 
banks’ clients regarding the immunity of their own banks and may induce them to withdraw their deposits; (ii) 
because banks hold claims on other banks, the bankruptcy of one of the banks may cause losses also to other 
connected banks.  
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support and a procedure for the resolution of banking crisis. The existence of such a safety 
net may impose a considerable financial burden for the regulator and the government, thus 
increasing the overall cost of a bank’s bankruptcy. 
Acknowledging the potential costs associated with bank risks, the economic literature has 
largely dealt with factors that lead banks to take higher risks. In this context, considerable 
attention has been paid to the relationship between competition and the risk-taking behaviour 
of banks, with a significant part of the literature arguing that competition leads to a higher 
level of risk-taking by banks. Based on this view, regulators, especially in the past, have often 
undertaken measures to restrict banking sector competition, aiming at safeguarding the 
banking system stability. However, the other strand of the literature promotes the view that 
banking competition reduces the level of risk taken by banks, suggesting that banks with 
more market power undertake higher levels of risk compared to banks operating in more 
competitive markets. 
The investigation of the relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking is 
particularly important for the CEE countries, given that banking sector competition in these 
countries is a more recent phenomenon that started to evolve more substantially in the second 
decade of the transition process, when foreign banks started to enter these markets. In 
addition, banking sector competition in these countries is expected to increase further as the 
non-EU countries of the CEE move towards EU membership. The integration prospects make 
these countries more attractive to large European financial corporations that are currently 
operating in more competitive markets, with relatively lower profit margins, to extend their 
activity towards transition economies, which are viewed as potentially more profitable.   
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Aiming at shedding light to the relationship between banking sector competition and risk-
taking in the CEE countries, in this chapter, we investigate this relationship for a sample of 
15 CEE countries during the period 1999-2009. The measure of competition in this study 
consists of the Panzar-Rose H-statistic, which we estimate for each country and for each year. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to use the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic in estimating the 
impact of banking sector competition on risk-taking for the CEE countries; the previous 
studies have mostly used market concentration indices, which might not represent adequate 
measures of competition. For comparison, we use also the Lerner Index as a measure of 
market power and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a measure of market concentration. 
The degree of the bank’s risk (i.e. the dependent variable) in this study is proxied by the ratio 
between loan-loss provisions and total loans, which reflects the quality of the bank’s loan 
portfolio. The regression includes also for the impact of other bank-specific variables as well 
as macroeconomic and institutional variables expected to be important for the determination 
of banks’ risk-taking. Given the potential differences between the non-EU and the EU 
countries with respect to the banks’ behaviour and the operating environment, we also test 
whether the relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking in the non-EU 
countries of the CEE region is significantly different from that in the EU countries of the 
region. The estimation is conducted using the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition method. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 presents a critical review of the literature 
dealing with the relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking. Section 5.3 
reviews the empirical literature on this field. Section 5.4 presents the estimation of the impact 
of competition on risk-taking for our sample of data, including the model description, the 
estimation methodology, and the estimation results. Section 5.5 concludes.  
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5.2 Theoretical Background 
This section provides a review of the theory on the relationship between banking sector 
competition and the risk-taking behaviour of banks. We start the section with a discussion on 
the “franchise value” hypothesis, which is one of the most important theories on the 
relationship between competition and bank risk-taking. We continue the section by 
explaining that the competition – risk-taking relationship is affected also by other factors 
such as the disclosure of risk information by banks, the deposit insurance scheme and the 
regulatory capital requirements. The relationship is further addressed from the perspective of 
asymmetric information theories; the “risk-shifting” effect and the “margin” effect; and 
finally from the viewpoint of relationship lending. 
 
5.2.1 The ‘’Franchise Value’’ hypothesis  
The view that more intense competition leads to higher risk-taking by banks is mainly based 
on the “franchise value” or “charter value” hypothesis, derived from the work of Keeley 
(1990). Franchise value refers to the present value of future profits that would be earned by a 
bank if it continued to operate in the market. According to Demsetz et al. (1996), the 
franchise value originates from two main sources: the “market-related” and the ‘’bank-
related’’ sources.  The market-related sources consist of the regulatory measures that restrict 
competition by giving the opportunity, i.e. the franchise, to only a limited number of banks to 
operate in the market and to have larger potential profits. The bank-related sources of the 
franchise value mainly include the bank’s efficiency and the valuable lending relationships 
which enable the bank to earn higher profits if it continues to operate. Keeley (1990) based 
his work on the concept of “market-related” franchise value, considering that the supply of 
bank franchises (or charters) was limited, so only a certain number of banks had the 
possibility of operating in the market, thus possessing a degree of market power. As a result, 
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these banks have the possibility to charge higher interest rates on loans and pay lower interest 
rates on deposits; hence, earn higher profits. Under these conditions, banks would be inclined 
to take less risk and hold higher capital ratios, since potential bankruptcy would imply giving 
up the opportunity to earn the profits that could be earned if the bank continued to operate. In 
other words, the opportunity cost of going bankrupt is very high for these banks. On the other 
hand, a higher level of competition might imply a larger number of banks operating in the 
market, which would seek to maintain/increase their market share by offering higher interest 
rates on deposits and lower interest rates on loans, thus reducing the interest rate margin and 
leading to a lower level of profit for each of the banks. As a consequence, the decline in the 
value of profits that a bank can earn upon continuing to operate in the market makes the 
franchise less valuable. The decrease of the franchise value, in turn, reduces the opportunity 
cost of the bankruptcy and, as a result, the bank takes higher levels of risk because the 
potential bankruptcy would pose a lower cost in terms of the foregone future profits. 
Therefore, according to Keeley (1990), the increase of competition reduces the franchise 
value and induces banks to undertake higher risks in order to maintain/increase their profits. 
The higher level of undertaken risk will then be reflected into a lower quality of the asset 
portfolio and a lower level of bank capitalization. 
The franchise value hypothesis is supported also by a number of other authors such as 
Hellman et al. (2000) and Repullo (2003) who have claimed that increased competition leads 
to higher risk-taking by banks. The focus of these studies is the competition between banks in 
the market for deposits, where they find that higher competition induces banks to offer higher 
deposit interest rates in order to attract higher levels of deposits. The higher deposit rates, in 
turn, narrow the interest rate margin, leading to lower profits and, hence, lower franchise 
value. Under these conditions, banks are supposed to have two investment alternatives 
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consisting of prudent assets, which are low-risk and low-return assets, and gambling assets, 
which are high-risk and high-return assets. Under the conditions of higher deposit rates, 
banks will tend to favour the investments in gambling assets, which provide a higher return in 
the present period, while the lower franchise value implies a lower opportunity cost in terms 
of foregone future profits if the bank goes bankrupt.  
The impact of competition on bank’ risk-taking, however, depends also on a number of other 
factors, such as the disclosure of risk information by banks, the presence of deposit insurance 
schemes, and the regulatory capital requirements which interact with competition in 
determining the risk-taking attitude of banks. 
 
5.2.2 The disclosure of risk information by banks 
The relationship between competition and the risk-taking behaviour of banks is argued to be 
affected also by the extent to which banks disclose information about their risk levels. 
According to Hellman et al. (2000), banks that prefer to invest in riskier assets tend to offer 
higher deposit interest rates, which enable them to attract higher volumes of deposits and 
increase their investments in “gambling” assets that provide higher rates of return. However, 
according to Matutes and Vives (2000), if banks would reveal the quality of their assets 
portfolio, which would make their level of risk observable to the public, rational depositors 
would punish the risky banks by depositing less. In other words, depositors would impose 
discipline on banks with respect to their risk-taking behaviour were the quality of banks’ 
asset portfolio to be observable. Similarly, Cordello and Yeyati (1998) claim that when the 
banks’ risk is observable, banks tend to improve their asset quality, which will also make 
depositors accept lower interest rates. As a result, a bank’s margin will not be affected by the 
increase of competition and the quality of its asset portfolio will remain sound. A similar 
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view is shared also by Shy and Stanbecka (1998) who refer to the quality of a bank’s asset 
portfolio as an important strategic instrument in competing in the deposit market. The view 
that increased competition does not necessarily lead to higher deposit rates and, therefore 
higher risk-taking, is supported also by Niinimäki (2004) who claims that depositors avoid 
the banks offering excessively high deposit rates, considering that high deposit rates are 
usually offered by risky banks. As a result, a “credit rationing” equilibrium takes place in the 
deposit market, in which rational depositors do not supply deposits to banks that provide 
suspiciously high interest rates.
24
 
However, even in cases when the bank information is observable to the public, banks may not 
necessarily be adequately monitored by depositors. As cited by Birchler (2000), Dewatripont 
and Tirole (1994, p. 31) claim that bank debt is mainly held by small depositors, who are 
unsophisticated and, as such, unable to adequately assess bank risks.
25
 In addition, the authors 
claim that bank depositors are large in number and they have little individual incentive to 
monitor the bank activities. A similar view is shared also by Freixas and Rochet (1997, p. 
264) who claim that bank debt is mostly held by uninformed and dispersed small depositors 
that are not able to perform proper monitoring of banks’ activities. Taking into account these 
views, the depositor monitoring of banks may be less effective in preventing banks from 
engaging in excessive risk-taking. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 “Credit rationing” will be explained later in this chapter.  
25
 It uses Dewatripont, M. and Tirole, J. (1993), La Réglementation Prudentielle des Banques, HEC University 
de Lausanne, Payot, Lausanne. 
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5.2.3 Deposit Insurance Scheme 
An important determinant of banks’ behaviour with respect to their risk-taking is the presence 
of a deposit insurance scheme (DIS) that aims at insuring depositors against potential losses 
occurring from a bank’s bankruptcy. The presence of a DIS may worsen the risk-taking 
incentives of banks, since they have the backing of the deposit insurance fund to pay back the 
depositors in case of failure.  
The presence of a DIS also reduces depositors’ incentives to monitor banks’ risk position, 
since their deposits will be guaranteed irrespective of the riskiness of banks’ assets. Indeed, 
depositors may even favour a riskier bank-behaviour, which would enable the bank to realize 
higher returns and pay higher interest rates to the depositors, thus destroying the “credit 
rationing” equilibrium in the deposit market that takes place when deposits are not insured 
and the risk is observable to the depositors (Niinimäki, 2004). With deposit insurance in 
place, banks are not likely to compete through asset quality to attract larger volumes of 
deposits but, instead, competition will mainly rely on deposit interest rates. In other words, 
since depositors will be indifferent to the risk position of the bank, interest rates will 
represent the main factor that determines a depositor’s decision to place his deposits in a 
bank. As a result, the interest rate elasticity of the supply of deposits will increase, implying 
that the volume of deposits available to the banks will be more sensitive to the level of 
interest rates (Cordello and Yeyati, 1998). In order to attract more deposits, banks must offer 
higher interest rates on deposits, which decrease their interest margins and, potentially, lead 
to lower profits. As a consequence, banks will tend to invest in riskier assets which, if 
successful, will provide higher returns and, if not successful, the depositors will be 
compensated by the deposit insurance scheme. To summarise, the presence of a deposit 
insurance scheme may lead to higher deposit interest rates and higher moral hazard by banks. 
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The impact of competition on bank risk-taking would depend also on the nature of the DIS 
with respect to the form of banks’ contributions to the deposit insurance fund. If the banks’ 
contributions to the fund consist of a flat premium not related to the risk position of the bank, 
then the increase of competition will increase banks’ moral hazard, inducing higher levels of 
risk-taking by banks as discussed above. However, the potential adverse effects deriving from 
a deposit insurance scheme might be mitigated by adopting a risk-based deposit insurance 
scheme, under which banks would pay an insurance premium that reflects the risk position of 
the bank, implying that banks that have riskier asset portfolios would pay higher 
contributions to the deposit insurance fund (Shy and Stanbecka, 1998). Under a risk-based 
DIS, banks would be inclined to maintain a better-quality asset portfolio, since increased risk-
taking would be associated with higher contributions to the deposit insurance fund. As a 
consequence, banks will favour investing in prudent assets, which provide lower returns 
compared to the riskier assets, but they will also be able to offer lower interest rates on 
deposits. Therefore, under a risk-based DIS, competition for deposits among banks through 
deposit interest rates will be less intense and the level of risk-taking will be lower, implying 
that risk-based deposit insurance may lower banks’ moral hazard problem. 
 
5.2.4 Regulatory Capital Requirements 
Among the most widely used regulatory measures to deal with the banks’ moral hazard are 
the regulatory capital requirements. As discussed above, when competition increases, banks 
tend to offer higher deposit rates, which will reduce the banks’ profits by reducing the interest 
margins. In order to maintain/increase their profits, banks are then inclined to invest in riskier 
assets that provide higher returns, but at the same time increase the probability of bank failure 
if the investments are not successful.  
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If banks face higher capital requirements, then a potential default would cost shareholders 
their own equity. This view has been elaborated by Hellman et al. (2000) and Repullo (2003) 
who claim that with capital requirements in place, the banks’ equity is put at risk, so banks do 
not have the incentives to engage in high levels of risk that could potentially push them to 
bankruptcy. According to this view, increased competition will not trigger high levels of risk 
if capital requirements are high enough to put a sufficient amount of the bank’s equity at risk. 
However, according to Hellman et al. this view is ambiguous because, apart from the “equity-
at-risk” effect, there may also take place a negative “franchise value” effect, which makes 
capital requirements induce higher levels of risk-taking by banks. According to this view, if 
injecting additional capital is costly for the bank, an increase in capital requirement will 
imply lower profits for the bank in each period which, in turn, decreases the bank’s franchise 
value. As a result of the decrease of the franchise value, the bank would be induced to invest 
in riskier assets. In addition, the higher the level of equity that the bank holds, the lower will 
be the return to equity from bank lending, which will decrease the franchise value of the bank 
and also the equity at risk, since lower profits have a negative impact on bank’s equity. On 
the other hand, Repullo rejects the claim that higher capital requirements may have a negative 
franchise value effect, stating that higher capital requirements have only the “equity-at-risk” 
effect, thus discouraging higher risk-taking and ensuring a prudent equilibrium. According to 
Repullo, when the cost of capital exceeds the return from prudent assets, in order to maintain 
the profit margins, banks will offer lower deposit interest rates, meaning that the franchise 
value will be preserved.  
The discussion so far has emphasized the detrimental impact of increased competition in the 
deposit market on bank behaviour, while it has largely ignored the impact of competition in 
the loan market for the risk-taking behaviour of the banks. The focus of the aforementioned 
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theoretical studies on the competition for deposits is to some extent justified by Niinimäki 
(2004) who claims that competition in the deposit market may lead to excessive risk-taking 
while, when competition takes place in the loan market, there is risk-taking, but excessive 
risk is avoided. According to this study, when competition takes place only in the loan 
market, even though investment in extremely risky assets promise higher returns, the 
probability that the project will turn out successful is so low, that it makes the expected profit 
from lower-risk investments to be higher, suggesting that banks will not favour excessive 
risk-taking. Excessive risk-taking in the asset side according to Niinimäki (2004) would 
occur if competition takes place in the deposit market, because competition for deposits 
would drive deposits rates upwards, thus reducing banks’ interest margins and profits. In 
order to compensate for the declining profits, banks would be inclined to invest in riskier 
assets which, if successful, would provide higher rates of return. However, based on the 
previous argument of Niinimäki (2004) that banks tend to hesitate to invest in high-risk assets 
when their probability of default is high, then competition for deposits should not necessarily 
imply excessive risk-taking by banks on the asset side of the balance sheet. 
 
5.2.5 Asymmetric information theories 
Another strand of the banking literature investigates the impact of competition on bank risk-
taking from the perspective of asymmetric information theories, which are addressed in this 
section. We begin the section by introducing the adverse selection theory in the context of 
financial intermediation and by providing a link between banking competition and the 
likelihood of adverse selection in the banking market. Since screening procedures represent 
an important tool for tackling the adverse section problem, the section continues with a 
discussion on the relationship between competition and the level of screening performed by 
banks. Further, we introduce the concept of moral hazard in the banking system and address 
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the relationship between banking competition and the scale of monitoring as an instrument to 
avoid moral hazard. This subsection ends with a brief discussion of “credit rationing” theory 
linked to banking competition.  
Adverse Selection   
One of the problems faced by banks in the financial intermediation process is adverse 
selection, where banks have difficulties in distinguishing between low-risk and high-risk 
borrowers. The increase of competition among banks may further exacerbate the adverse 
selection problem, thus increasing the possibility of granting access to finance to high risk 
borrowers (Marquez, 2002). According to Marquez, as the number of banks increases, each 
bank has less information about the market participants because of the “information 
dispersion” among banks. When the market is operated by few banks, in equilibrium banks 
may not grant loans to some of their old customers who are known to be of poor credit 
quality. However, as the number of banks increases each bank has information on a smaller 
number of potential borrowers, implying that the bank will not be able to use the information 
on borrowers’ past performance when deciding whether to grant a loan. Consequently, banks 
can end up granting loans also to bad borrowers, which will lead to a higher level of risk in 
the banks’ asset portfolios. However, this theory does not take into account the information-
sharing infrastructure such as credit bureaus that are nowadays present almost in every 
country. These information-sharing facilities enable banks to have access to the information 
on the credit worthiness of all the existing and previous borrowers in the financial system of a 
country. Therefore, the presence of these facilities may limit the “information dispersion” 
problem in the banking industry, thus contributing to the mitigation of the adverse selection 
problem. 
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Screening 
The adverse selection problem is also tackled through screening procedures, whereby banks 
induce the potential borrower to reveal information that is relevant for the bank’s decision as 
to whether or not to issue a loan to that particular customer. The ability and willingness of 
banks to screen the potential borrowers may be affected to a large extent by the level of 
competition in the banking market. The majority of studies examining the impact of 
competition on bank screening argue for a negative relationship, implying that higher 
competition leads to less screening by banks, thus increasing the probability that a larger 
share of poor quality borrowers will be granted credit (Chan et al., 1986; Manove et al., 
2001). According to Chan et al., by reducing the interest rate spread and, therefore profits, the 
increase of competition will push banks to cut their screening expenditures and thus perform 
less screening on loan applicants. Other authors, such as Dell’Ariccia (2000) and Bolt and 
Tieman (2004) argue that a larger number of competing banks corresponds to stronger 
incentives to deviate from appropriate screening of potential borrowers because of the 
additional market share the deviating banks will be able to seize. In other words, facing 
stronger competition, banks will ease the acceptance criteria for loan applicants, thus 
enabling a larger number of them to obtain access to credit. This will enable banks to seize a 
larger market share while worsening the adverse selection problem and undertaking higher 
levels of risk in the asset portfolio. Lowering the acceptance criteria leads to the ‘’winner’s 
curse’’ problem, developed by Shaffer (1998), which claims that as the number of banks 
increases there is higher probability that a number of bad borrowers that have not passed the 
screening test in some of the banks will find at least one other bank where they will pass this 
test. As a result, in aggregate terms, a higher proportion of bad borrowers will be able to 
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obtain access to credit, thus deteriorating the quality of the loan portfolio in the banking 
system.    
However, increased competition may not necessarily have a negative impact on banks’ 
screening effort. Chen (2007) views screening as an additional component of competing 
strategy for the bank, arguing that a bank can compete with other banks by offering lower 
loan interest rates as well as by increasing its screening effort. According to this author, apart 
from preferring lower loan interest rates, good borrowers may also prefer to be better 
screened, so that they can be correctly recognized by the bank which, in turn, would reward 
them with easier and more favourable access to finance in the future. 
Moral Hazard     
Another asymmetric information problem often associated with the financial intermediation 
process in the banking industry is related to moral hazard, which can occur both on the 
bank’s side and on the borrower’s side. As discussed earlier in this chapter, banks can 
commit moral hazard by investing in riskier assets, which may put the depositors at risk. If 
the investment in risky assets turns out to be successful, the bank will earn higher returns than 
if it had invested in prudent assets. Conversely, if the investment does not turn successful, the 
losses will be borne either by depositors or by the deposit insurance fund if there is one in 
place. The moral hazard behaviour can also take place on the side of the borrower when the 
borrower decides to use the funds for different purposes than those initially agreed with the 
lender (Bebczuk, 2003). More specifically, the borrower can undertake a higher level of risk 
than was agreed with the lender, thus increasing the probability of loan default.  
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Monitoring 
In order to mitigate the possibility of moral hazard by the borrower, banks can engage in 
monitoring the borrowers’ activity, aiming at preventing them from conducting “hidden 
actions”. The extent to which banks engage in monitoring activity depends, among others, on 
the degree of competition in the banking market; thus, establishing another channel through 
which the degree of competition is predicted to affect banks’ risk. 
The literature on agency problems in the banking industry mainly suggests that monitoring is 
more likely to take place when banks have market power, whereas, as the competition 
increases banks tend to reduce their monitoring activity (Covitz and Heitfield, 1999; Caminal 
and Matutes, 2002). According to Caminal and Matutes (2002), competitive banks monitor 
only when monitoring costs are low, whereas monopolistic banks monitor for low and 
intermediate monitoring costs, but not for very high costs. Caminal and Matutes claim that a 
monopoly bank has a stronger incentive to monitor, because of the higher proportion of the 
rents it can appropriate by monitoring. A monopoly bank has a higher margin which, on the 
one hand, implies that it can allocate more expenditures for monitoring and, on the other 
hand, has more incentives to monitor because returns from the successful loans are higher. 
However, does it imply that monopoly banks are associated with a lower level of risk in their 
asset portfolios? According to Caminal and Matutes (2002), monopoly banks grant borrowers 
easier access to finance, since, rather than screening the potential borrower before approving 
the loan, their attention is mainly concentrated on the monitoring of the loan after it has been 
issued. As a consequence, a number of poor quality borrowers may pass more easily the 
screening test of the monopoly bank and secure access to credit, thus increasing the overall 
riskiness of monopoly bank’s loan portfolio.   
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“Credit Rationing” 
The relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking can be addressed also 
from the perspective of “credit rationing” theory, developed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
which claims that even though borrowers may be willing to pay higher interest rates, in 
equilibrium, banks may view the demand as excessive. More specifically, as entrepreneurs 
tend to undertake higher levels of risk when interest rates increase, the “credit rationing” 
theory argues that banks will quit lending at very high loan interest rates, supposing that only 
high-risk borrowers will be willing to pay very high interest rates. Within the banks’ efforts 
to alleviate the moral hazard problem, “credit rationing” and monitoring are viewed as 
substitutes for each other (Caminal and Matutes, 2002). This means that a bank can either 
decide to perform “credit rationing”, i.e. quit lending when it perceives that a pool of loan 
applicants is composed of risky entrepreneurs, or it can decide to engage in monitoring, i.e. 
grant applicants easier access to finance and then monitor their activities to reduce moral 
hazard. According to Caminal and Matutes (2002) and Koskela and Stanbecka (2000), 
monopoly banks do not apply “credit rationing”, while competitive banks do. According to 
this theory, monopoly banks would be more prone to risk-taking since, by monitoring instead 
of “credit rationing”, they will enable the high-risk applicants to gain access to finance (i.e. 
enter into the bank’s loan portfolio), thus increasing the riskiness of their asset portfolio. 
Once the borrower receives the loan, the bank is then constrained in terms of controlling the 
project’s riskiness. 
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Covitz and Heitfield (1999) 
Covitz and Heitfield (1999) present a different view with respect to the relationship between 
banking sector competition, risk-taking, and monitoring. They claim that competitive markets 
are characterized with higher levels of bank risk-taking compared to monopoly markets, 
suggesting that in a competitive banking environment the level of risk in the banks’ loan 
portfolios is determined by the attitudes of borrowers towards the risk rather than by banks’ 
risk preferences. In a monopoly market, borrowers do not have alternative sources of bank 
financing, so they must obey to bank’s conditions in order to secure access to finance. In this 
regard, if the bank considers that a project bears excessive risk, it may either refuse to finance 
it or it may affect the risk level by pushing the applicant to revise the project. Whereas, in a 
competitive market, since borrowers have more alternatives to secure banking finance, banks 
are more reluctant to refuse applications and are less able to affect the level of risk in the 
applicants’ projects. According to this theory, borrowers in a competitive market also have 
the control over interest rates, whereas a monopoly bank controls both the level of risk and 
the interest rates. A monopoly bank chooses a more conservative equilibrium, which 
incorporates a lower interest rate and a lower level of asset-portfolio risk. By setting a lower 
loan interest rate, the monopoly bank induces the entrepreneurs to undertake safer projects, 
while it also monitors them in order to prevent potential moral hazard. Conversely, in a 
competitive market, as entrepreneurs are inclined to undertake higher levels of risk, they will 
compensate the bank with a higher loan interest rate and the bank, in turn, will not engage in 
monitoring. Based on this view, competitive banks will neither “credit ration” nor engage in 
monitoring, thus ending up with a higher level of risk in their portfolios. To summarize, the 
view of Covitz and Heitfield (1999) postulates that monopoly banks perform both more 
screening and monitoring, thus incurring lower levels of risk in their portfolios, while 
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competitive banks engage in higher levels of risk-taking in order to maintain their market 
shares. However, the positive relationship between competition and risk-taking in the view of 
Covitz and Heitfield is largely attributed to the ability of borrowers to affect interest rates, 
claiming that in a competitive market borrowers are ready to pay higher interest rates and at 
the same time undertake higher risks. This leads to the conclusion that competitive banks 
may end up charging higher loan interest rates than monopoly banks, which is at odds with 
most of the competition – interest rates literature that suggests the opposite. 
 
5.2.6 The “Risk-Shifting Effect” and the “Margin Effect” 
The impact of competition on the level of bank risk-taking through its impact on loan interest 
rates has been addressed also by Boyd and de Nicoló (2005) who suggest that monopoly 
banks take higher risks, while increased competition leads to lower risk in banks’ asset 
portfolios. This theory is viewed as an important challenge to the “franchise value” 
hypothesis, which claims that increased competition depletes the monopoly rents, thus 
inducing the bank to finance riskier projects that promise a higher rate of return. According to 
Boyd and de Nicoló, as monopoly banks tend to charge higher loan interest rates, 
entrepreneurs will be inclined to engage in riskier projects, which promise them higher rates 
of return, in order to compensate for the high interest payments. As a consequence, the asset 
portfolio of the monopoly bank will be characterized by a higher level of risk. Conversely, 
when competition increases, banks will tend to offer lower loan interest rates which, in turn, 
will induce borrowers to undertake safer projects. This implies that the increase of 
competition in the banking market leads to a lower risk in banks’ asset portfolios.  
The view of Boyd and de Nicoló (2005) was partially supported by Martinez-Miera and 
Repullo (2010), who refer to it as the risk shifting effect. According to them, the risk-shifting 
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effect mostly occurs in highly concentrated markets, presumably because of the considerably 
high interest rates charged by banks. However, they criticise the view of Boyd and de Nicoló 
for not taking into account the fact that the decline of interest rates due to more intense bank 
competition also reduces interest revenues from non-defaulted loans, which may lead to 
higher fragility. The impact of the decline in interest rates on the interest revenues, by 
Martinez-Miera and Repullo is referred as the margin effect. They claim that as competition 
intensifies, the risk-shifting effect is dominated by the margin effect. This implies that when 
market concentration is very high, the existing level of interest is high enough to make banks 
capable of withstanding a potential decline of the interest rate without seriously threatening 
the bank performance and stability. Under these conditions, the decline in interest rate will 
lead to lower risk-taking by borrowers, while the decline of interest revenues will not threaten 
the overall bank performance. However, as competition continues to intensify and interest 
rates continue to decline, the negative impact for bank stability stemming from the decline of 
overall interest revenues will start to dominate the positive impact from lower risk-taking by 
borrowers, thus leading to a more fragile position for the bank. To summarise, Martinez-
Miera and Repullo (2010) argue for a U-shaped form of the relationship between market 
power and the risk of bank failure, claiming that bank risk will decrease with the decline of 
market power, but only up to a certain level, and then will start to increase as market power 
declines further. 
 
5.2.7 Relationship Lending 
Relationship lending represents another channel through which the competitive conditions in 
the banking market may affect banks’ risk-taking. Relationship lending is referred to a lasting 
lender-borrower relationship which can benefit both the bank and the borrowers. The benefits 
of the bank are mainly related to the role of relationship lending in attenuating the 
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asymmetric information of the bank with respect to the borrowers. In a lasting lending 
relationship, the bank is able to accumulate borrower-specific information, which provides 
informational rent by facilitating the bank’s lending decisions in the future. Regarding the 
borrowers, relationship lending may improve their access to finance both with regard to the 
amount of credit they can obtain and the cost of credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). The 
improved access to finance, especially for the high quality borrowers, occurs because during 
the previous periods the bank has been able to collect information on the quality of the 
borrowers, which enables it to distinguish between good and bad borrowers.   
The degree to which banks engage in relationship lending may have implications also for the 
choice of asset portfolio (Besanko and Thakor, 2004). As postulated by Demsetz et al. 
(1996), relationship lending represents one of the “bank-related” sources of the franchise 
value, implying that the more a bank is engaged in relationship lending the higher will be its 
franchise value. This also implies that the more a bank is engaged in relationship lending the 
costlier would be its potential bankruptcy, as elaborated by the “franchise value” hypothesis, 
since the bank would give up the opportunity to further generate rents from the utilization of 
the borrower-specific information that has obtained during the period of the lending 
relationship. In this regard, a bank which is more deeply engaged in relationship lending, i.e. 
has a higher franchise value, is expected to undertake a lower level of asset risk so as not to 
put at risk the continuation of its activity and the expected rents.  
The extent to which banks can engage in relationship lending and the relationship between 
this type of lending and the level of risk undertaken by the bank depends also on the level of 
banking sector competition. Relationship lending is argued to be more present in 
monopolistic markets, since borrowers are inclined to build stronger ties with their creditors 
in the absence of other alternatives in the market. According to Petersen and Rajan (1994), 
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monopolistic banks are more prone to engage in relationship lending and especially with 
young firms. Based on their view, monopolistic banks can build strong ties with young firms 
considering that in the beginning of their business firms are more fragile and need financial 
support with better terms. Monopolistic banks tend to charge the young firms lower interest 
rates in the beginning of their business with the purpose of extracting extra rents when they 
become mature and have a stronger financial position. By engaging in relationship lending 
with the young firms, the monopolistic bank will benefit in terms of information rents, but 
will also induce the young firms to engage in lower-risk projects due to the lower interest 
rates charged initially, whereas the additional rents extracted in the future will not affect the 
firm’s choice between different levels of project risks. However, providing fragile young 
firms with low interest rate financing may increase the overall riskiness of the monopolistic 
bank’s loan portfolio due to the potential uncertainties linked with the future performance of 
the young firms.  
Relationship lending is less likely to take place when banks operate in a competitive market. 
Under these conditions, potential borrowers face a larger number of alternatives, making it 
difficult for a bank to maintain strong ties with its clients. In this regard, contrary to 
monopolistic banks, the competitive banks may not expect to extract additional rents from 
future surpluses of their borrowers (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
 
5.2.8 Summary 
In this section we presented the theoretical background on the relationship between 
competition and risk-taking behaviour of banks. We started the analysis with the “franchise 
value” hypothesis which claims that competition leads to higher risk-taking by banks. We 
showed that this relationship depends also on the degree to which banks disclose their risk 
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information to the public, claiming that the more information is available to the public the 
lower will be the impact of competition on risk-taking. In addition, we showed that the 
impact of competition on risk-taking may depend also on regulatory capital requirements and 
the presence of a deposit insurance scheme but the direction of impact is quite ambiguous. 
The relationship between competition and risk-taking was then addressed from the 
perspective of information asymmetry where it was emphasized that in general competition 
may increase the asymmetric information problems. But there are also views that claim the 
opposite. The section continued with a discussion of the “risk shifting” effect and the “margin 
effect”, which treat the relationship between competition and risk-taking based on the impact 
of loan interest rates on the risk attitude of borrowers. The section ended with the discussion 
of relationship lending, which is argued to be discouraged by competition. Relationship 
lending is considered to reduce the level of banks’ risk, but there are arguments that claim the 
opposite. In general, the theoretical literature is largely inconclusive with regard to the impact 
of banking competition on the risk-taking behaviour of banks.      
 
5.3 Review of empirical studies                 
In this section we present a review of studies that have empirically investigated the 
relationship between competition and the risk-taking behaviour of banks. We also provide a 
critical assessment of methodologies used in these studies. Similar to the theoretical studies, 
the relationship between competition and banks’ risk-taking remains ambiguous also in the 
empirical literature, with one strand claiming that higher competition impairs the stability of 
the banking system, while the other maintains that the stability of the banking system is 
enhanced when there is more intense competition between banks. One characteristic of the 
empirical studies investigating this relationship is that they use different indicators to proxy 
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and measure competition. Also, different indicators are used to measure the level of risk 
taken by banks. Often, the differences in the empirical results are attributed to the differences 
in the indicators used to measure competition and the bank’s risk. 
The debate on the relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking has 
primarily started from the work of Keeley (1990) who developed the “franchise value” 
hypothesis. Keeley provided empirical support for his hypothesis by investigating the 
liberalization of legal entry barriers for bank holding companies in the US during the period 
1970-1986, which represents a rather indirect measure of banking competition. His findings 
suggest that banks possessing higher market power, as expressed by the market-to-book asset 
ratio, i.e. Tobin’s Q, held higher capital-to-asset ratios and lower default risk as expressed by 
lower risk premiums on uninsured certificates of deposits.
26
 Using Tobin’s Q as a measure of 
market power, Salas and Saurina (2003) supported the “franchise value” hypothesis, finding 
that banks with higher market power tend to have higher capitalization ratios and lower 
shares of loan losses to total loans. This hypothesis was supported also by Dick (2006) who 
investigated the impact on the degree of risk taken by banks in different states in the US 
during the period 1993-1999 of the removal of regulatory restrictions on banks’ ability to 
open branches. The results of this study suggested that the deregulation led to higher risk-
taking by banks, as measured by charged-off losses over loans or by the loan-loss provisions. 
The author suggests that banks might have used their greater geographic diversification as a 
hedge against higher risk-return combinations. However, a similar study by Jayaratne and 
Strahan (1998) found that loan-losses decreased sharply after the liberalization of state-wide 
branching. According to Jayaratne and Strahan, the liberalization of geographic expansion 
has enabled the more efficient banks to expand at the expense of less efficient banks, 
                                                          
26
 Keeley (1990) used the Tobin’s Q to proxy market power based on the suggestion of Lindenberg and Ross 
(1981) who found a high correlation between price-cost margins and Tobin’s Q.  
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resulting in overall bank performance improvement. In addition, the enhancement of banks’ 
efficiency implied cost savings which have been passed to bank borrowers through lower 
interest rates on loans. Based on Boyd and De Nicoló’s (2005) “risk-shifting” hypothesis, 
lower loan interest rates may then result in a lower level of risk-taking by borrowers and, 
consequently, a sounder loan portfolio for banks. Similarly, using data for 70 countries for 
the period from 1980 to 1997, Beck et al. (2003) found that countries with fewer regulatory 
restrictions on bank competition and with national institutions that encourage competition in 
general are less likely to incur systemic banking crises.  
Other studies in this field have used more direct measures of competition such as the Panzar-
Rosse H-statistic or market concentration indices and, similarly, the results remain 
inconclusive with regard to the impact of competition on banks’ risk-taking. Using 
BankScope data for EU-15 countries, Schaeck and Čihák (2007) used separately the H-
statistic and the market share of the three largest banks as proxies for competition, while 
using the equity-to-total assets ratio as a measure of the bank risk. By finding a positive 
relationship between the H-statistic and the level of bank capitalization, their results suggest 
that increased competition reduces banks’ risk. In addition, they also found that the degree of 
bank’s capitalization is negatively affected by the degree of market concentration. The view 
that competition enhances banking stability has been supported also by Schaeck et al. (2006) 
who used a duration analysis model to measure the time needed for the transition from a 
sound banking system to a systemic banking crisis. Using the H-statistic as a measure of 
competition, they found that banking competition increases the duration of transition from a 
sound banking system to a systemic crisis.  However, this study also found that concentration 
increases the time to crisis, seemingly a contradictory finding. The authors justify these 
results by supporting the previous findings of Claessens and Laeven (2003) who claimed that 
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concentration and competition describe different features of a banking market, and therefore 
they have independent effects on the stability of the banking system. Similar “contradictory” 
results were found also by Beck et al. (2003) who found that,  on the one hand, countries that 
encourage banking competition are less likely to incur banking crisis and, on the other hand, 
that crises are less likely in more concentrated banking systems. 
A negative relationship between competition and banks’ risk-taking was also found by Boyd 
et al. (2006), who provided empirical support for the theoretical findings of Boyd and De 
Nicoló (2005) that competition enhances banking stability. As a measure of competition they 
used the Herfindahl Hirschman index (HHI), whereas bank risk was measured by the “Z-
score” (which is a proxy for the solvency risk, measuring the number of standard deviations 
below the mean by which profits would have to decline so as to deplete the equity capital).
27
 
The HHI has a significantly negative sign, suggesting that lower market concentration (i.e. 
higher competition) is associated with a higher “z-score’’ (i.e. a lower probability of bank 
failure). The authors further disaggregate the relationship between the HHI and the “z-score”, 
looking at the three components of the “z-score” separately and find that the risk of failure in 
more concentrated banking systems is higher mainly because of the higher volatility of 
banks’ return on assets ratio in more concentrated markets. The impact of the higher volatility 
of return on assets ratio appears to outweigh the effect of the positive relationship between 
the HHI and the return on assets. 
Motivated by the theoretical findings of Boyd and De Nicoló (2005), Jiménez et al. (2007) 
estimated the relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking for the Spanish 
banking system. Finding a negative relationship between market power and non-performing 
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 “Z-score’’ is defined as Z = (ROA+EA) / δ(ROA), where ROA is the return on assets, EA is the equity-to-
total assets ratio, and δ(ROA) represents the standard deviation of ROA. A higher “Z-score” implies a lower 
level of solvency risk, since greater losses would be needed to occur in order to deplete the existing capital and 
push the bank to default. 
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loans, their results strongly support the “franchise value” hypothesis; thus, contesting the 
view of Boyd and De Nicoló (2005). Jiménez et al. (2007) also tested for a potential non-
linear relationship between market power and non-performing loans, by including the squared 
value of the market power variable in the regression, and found a negative relationship, thus 
rejecting also the claims of Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) for a U-shaped relationship 
between market power and bank risk.    
Investigating the impact of competition on credit risk for the EU countries, Chen (2007) 
found a negative but insignificant effect of the H-statistic on the level of non-performing 
loans and loan-loss provisions, suggesting that competition did not represent an important 
determinant of developments in the loan portfolio quality in EU countries. However, this 
study reports a positive relationship between the net interest margin and non-performing 
loans and loan-loss provisions, suggesting that the increase of loan interest rates was 
associated with lower quality loan portfolio. If interest rates are higher when banks possess 
more market power, then this finding might be considered as a support to the view of Boyd 
and De Nicoló (2005) who claim that market power impairs the loan portfolio quality, since 
higher interest rates charged by banks lead to higher risk levels undertaken by borrowers. 
Similarly, Yeyatti and Micco (2003) investigated the impact of the penetration of foreign 
banks and banking competition on the banks’ risk-taking in the Latin American banking 
sectors. The measures of competition in this study consisted of the H-statistic and market 
concentration, while the level of bank risk was measured by the “Z-score” as a proxy for the 
probability that losses exceed the bank’s equity capital. The main findings of this study 
suggest that the penetration of foreign banks in Latin American banking sectors reduced the 
banking sector competition which, in turn, was associated with lower bank fragility. These 
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results provide support to the “franchise value” hypothesis by suggesting that a decrease of 
competition, i.e. an increase of market power, enhances banking stability. 
A more comprehensive study on the relationship between competition and banking stability 
has been conducted by Berger et al. (2009) who use three types of measures for banking 
stability, consisting of a measure of the overall bank risk (i.e. the “Z-score”), a measure of 
credit risk (i.e. the share of non-performing loans to total loans) and a measure of the bank’s 
capitalization ratio (i.e. the share of equity to total assets). Different measures have been used 
also for market power, including the Lerner Index and market concentration indices.
28
 The 
results lend support to the view that market power is associated with a higher credit risk, 
because of the positive relationship between market power measures and the share of non-
performing loans to total loans. On the other hand, the authors also find that market power 
has a positive impact on the “Z-score” and the capitalization ratio, suggesting that banks with 
higher market power tend to have a lower probability of default and keep higher 
capitalization ratios. According to these authors, banks possessing higher market power tend 
to ask for higher loan interest rates and so may incur higher rates of non-performing loans, 
but at the same time protect their “franchise value” by holding higher capital ratios. To 
summarise, the results of this study suggest that despite increasing the loan risk, market 
power tends to enhance overall bank stability, thus lending support to the “franchise value” 
hypothesis. 
Similarly, Agoraki et al. (2009) investigate the impact of market power, as measured by the 
Lerner index, on the bank risk as measured by the “Z-score” and the non-performing loans 
for a sample of 13 Central and Eastern Europe Countries for the period 1998-2005. The 
results of this study support the “franchise value” hypothesis by finding that market power is 
                                                          
28
 The Lerner index is a measure of market power, indicating by how much the price exceeds the marginal costs. 
The Lerner index is expressed as L = (P – MC)/P, where P stands for the price and MC for the marginal costs.  
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associated with both lower non-performing loans and a higher “Z-score”, i.e. lower solvency 
risk.  
 
5.3.1 Review of methodologies 
This subsection provides a discussion on the methodologies used in some of the above 
mentioned studies that have investigated the relationship between measures of competition 
and measures of banks’ risk-taking. All of these studies have used bank-level panel data 
methods to estimate these relationships, while there are differences with regard to the 
econometric approaches, with some of the studies applying static models and the others using 
dynamic models.  
Salas and Saurina (2003) have used the simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method to 
estimate the relationship between competition and banks’ risk taking. A static model was 
used also by Yeyatti and Micco (2003) who also controlled for bank-specific fixed effects. In 
practice, panel-data static models often suffer from the autocorrelation problem, which 
implies that the model should be a dynamic model. Similar to most of the studies reviewed in 
the previous section, both Salas and Saurina (2003) and Yeyatti and Micco (2003) are limited 
in the sense that they do not provide information on their diagnostic tests to support that their 
models are well specified.  
Chen (2007) employed a panel-data fixed effects model but, due to the strong temporal 
dependence of the dependent variable, included also the lagged dependent variable among the 
explanatory variables, thus specifying a dynamic model. Even though the author reports that 
the re-specified model revealed satisfactory diagnostics, the model may still be misspecified 
due to the endogeneity between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. 
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Another important issue is related to studies that estimate the relationship between 
competition and risk-taking by using the H-statistic as a measure of competition (Yeyatti and 
Micco, 2003; Chen, 2007; Schaeck and Čihák, 2007). Since the H-statistic is itself an 
estimated variable, it contains its own standard errors, which should be corrected in the 
second-stage regressions; otherwise, the standard errors in the second-stage model do not 
reflect the imprecision of the first-stage estimation. In this regard, Schaeck and Čihák (2007) 
report that they have applied the “bootstrapping procedure” to correct the standard errors of 
the H-statistic in the second-stage regression, whereas Yeyatti and Micco (2003) and Chen 
(2007) do not report any measures to correct the standard errors of the H-statistic, which 
implies that the validity of their inferences on the impact of competition may be questionable. 
 
5.4 Estimation of the impact of banking sector competition on 
risk-taking in the CEE countries 
This section deals with the estimation of the impact of banking sector competition on the 
level of risk-taking by banks in the transition economies of the Central and Eastern Europe 
countries during the period 1999 – 2009. The level of bank risk in this study is proxied by 
credit risk, given the fact that lending activity dominates banking system activity in the 
countries covered in this study. The degree of risk-taking in our regression is measured by the 
loan-loss provisions to total loans ratio, which is a measure of the quality of the loan portfolio 
and, hence, proxies the degree of bank’s risk. Competition is measured by the Panzar-Rosse 
H-statistic which we estimate separately for each country/year. The choice of the H-statistic 
to measure competition is based on the features of the Panzar-Rosse approach, which uses 
bank-level data to directly quantify banks’ competitive behaviour. Nevertheless, we test also 
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for the impact of alternative measures of competition that are used in the literature, such as 
the Lerner Index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.  
This section continues with the estimation of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic for each 
country/year. Then, in the next section we use the H-statistic to estimate the impact of 
competition on the degree of bank’s risk-taking. The regression controls also for the impact 
of other factors, including bank-specific variables, macroeconomic variables, and institutional 
variables.  
5.4.1 Estimation of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic for each country/year 
In this section, we estimate the banking sector competition, i.e. the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, 
for each country and each year, which will then be included as an explanatory variable to 
estimate the impact of competition on banks’ risk-taking.  
The Panzar and Rosse (1987) model is a non-structural approach for the measurement of 
competition, grounded in the microeconomic approach that measures competition by directly 
quantifying the conduct of banks and not taking into account the market structure. The P-R 
model produces the so-called H-statistic, which measures the sum of elasticities of bank’s 
revenues with respect to input prices. The H-statistic indicates how bank’s revenues respond 
to an increase of input prices and takes values from below 0 to 1. An H≤0 implies that banks’ 
competitive behaviour is consistent with monopoly; 0<H<1 implies that banks’ behaviour is 
consistent with monopolisitic competition; and H=1 implies perfect competition (for a more 
detailed explanation of the Panzar-Rosse method see chapter 3). However, if the proposal of 
Bikker et al. (2009) on the possibility of banks having constant average costs in equilibrium 
were to hold, then a negative H-statistic might not necessarily be considered to indicate 
imperfect competition (see section 3.4 for a more detailed elaboration). Nevertheless, since 
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there is no compelling empirical evidence on this issue, we treat this just as a theoretical 
possibility and continue to interpret the H-stastistic based on the original Panzar-Rosse 
framework. 
The measurement of the banking sector competition for each country/year is conducted by 
estimating the following equation which uses cross-section data from each country for the 
period 1999-2009.  
   
            (5.1) 
where i denotes the bank. 
The dependent variable in this regression is represented by the interest income (intincome), 
but we run this regression also using total income (totincome) as the dependent variable. This 
enables us to produce two alternative H-statistics for each country/year and for comparison 
we use both of them separately in estimating the impact of competition on the degree of risk-
taking.  
The control variables consist of input prices, which are the variables of interest, and control 
variables. The input prices in our model are represented by the price of funds (pfunds) which 
is the ratio between interest expenses and total deposits; the price of labour (plabour) which 
is the ratio between personnel expenses and total assets; and the price of physical capital 
(pphysicalcapital) which is the ratio of other operating expenses to fixed assets.  
Compared to chapter 4, where we estimated the level of competition for the overall CEE 
region, in this section we have restricted the number of control variables in order to retain the 
degrees of freedom given the small number of cross-section observations for some of the 
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countries in the analysis. Hence, we control only for the loans to total assets ratio (loans_ta) 
and for the equity to total assets ratio (equity_ta), which appeared to be the most 
systematically statistically significant in all the different combinations. The loans to total 
assets ratio is included in the model to control for the structure of assets; and the equity to 
total assets ratio measures the degree of risk-aversion. The variables are log-transformed in 
order that coefficients can be interpreted as constant elasticities. 
The H-statistic is calculated as the sum of the input prices coefficients, which in our case is 
β1+ β2+ β3. The equation is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) which has known 
small-sample properties that make it suitable for our analysis given the small number of 
cross-section observations for some of the countries included in our sample. For all the cross-
section estimations we have also performed the standard diagnostic tests for 
homoscedasticity, normality and linearity. In the vast majority of cases the null hypotheses 
for these tests cannot be rejected. 
Before estimating the H-statistic, we have conducted also the test for long-run equilibrium, 
which is based on a model similar to equation 5.1 but where the dependent variable is the 
Return on Assets (ROA) instead of the interest income (see chapter 4 for a more detailed 
explanation of the long-run equilibrium test). The results show that the HROA (i.e. the sum of 
input prices coefficients) that is derived from this model is zero or very close to zero for each 
country-year included in the analysis (the linear combinations are mostly not significantly 
different from zero), suggesting that the Panzar-Rosse model is applicable to these countries 
individually (see Appendix 3.1). 
However, it should be noted that the cross-section estimation of the H-statistic for the CEE 
countries suffers from data limitations both in terms of sample size for individual countries 
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and data quality. For some of the countries in our analysis, there was only a small number of 
yearly observations available, which imposed that for some countries/years the estimation to 
be conducted on a fairly small number of cross-section observations. This may be a 
consequence of the small number of banks operating in some of the countries at certain years, 
but it can also be a consequence of the insufficient coverage of the transition countries by the 
BankScope database. The other issue is related to the data quality. Table 4.2 shows that for 
all the variables used in the cross-section estimation (i.e. p_funds, p_labour, p_physcapital, 
loans_ta, equity_ta), the minimum and maximum values have quite a high divergence from 
the mean. This may signal a substantial presence of outliers in the data. The presence of 
outliers is more concerning when estimation is conducted on very small samples of data, 
because the leverage of a particular observation can be large. We have considered the 
possibility of removing the outliers, but due to the large presence of outliers it was likely to 
cause a considerable reduction in the number of observations. Therefore, in order to avoid a 
further reduction of our already small sample sizes, we removed only the outliers that clearly 
appeared to be far away from the mean, which on average are no more than ten outliers for a 
variable. 
Despite these caveats related to the sample size and the quality of data, we decided to proceed 
with the estimation of the H-statistic for each country/year, which will then be used as an 
explanatory variable in the estimation of the impact of competition on banks’ risk-taking and 
net interest margins. The existing literature that has investigated these relationships for the 
transition economies has mostly proxied the competition by using market concentration 
indices, which are largely considered to be a poor measure of competition, while, to the best 
of our knowledge, none of them has used the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic that is considered to be 
a more adequate measure of competition. Therefore, despite the limitations, we intend to 
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estimate the H-statistic for each country/year and be the first to use it in the estimation of the 
impact of competition on banks’ risk-taking and net interest margins in the transition 
economies. 
Beucase of these caveats related to the estimation process and other reservations on the 
interpretation of the H-statistic that have been discussed above, we use also the Lerner Index 
obtained from Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2013) as an alternative measure of competition. 
This will enable us to verify the inferences derived from the models where H-statistic was 
used as a measure of competition. 
 
5.4.1.1 The results of cross-section estimations of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic 
This section presents the estimated H-statistics for each of the CEE countries that are 
included in our analysis and for each of the years covered in our analysis.
29
 The estimation 
results that are presented in Table 5.1 indicate several important points.  
First, H-statistics could not be estimated for some years because of the small number of banks 
reported in the BankScope database for some of the countries in those years. Second, the H-
statistics for most of the countries and for most of the years have a negative value which is 
consistent with the overall finding in chapter 4, in which the H-statistic was estimated from a 
pooled sample of CEE countries for the period 1999-2009. Third, from the individual country 
results, it is difficult to build an overall picture regarding the trend of the H-statistic over the 
years in the CEE countries because of the variations between countries, except for the period 
2007-2009 that seems to have been characterized by declining H-statistics in most of the 
                                                          
29
 The H-statistics could not be estimated for Kosovo and Montenegro due to the small number of cross-section 
observations. 
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countries. This may be an indication of lower banking sector competition during the crisis 
years. 
 
Table 5.1 Estimation results of the H-statistics for individual countries 
 
Year Albania
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia
Czech 
Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia
1999 - - - -0.948 -1.468 - -7.902 -
2000 - - - 0.643 -0.636 - -3.173 -
2001 - - - -0.441 -1.388 - -1.450 -
2002 -0.095 - -1.597 -1.336 0.577 -11.030 -1.948 -0.466
2003 0.041 - -1.761 -2.836 0.693 -9.083 -1.819 -0.349
2004 2.213 0.084 -0.927 -1.185 0.894 -4.239 -1.584 -1.365
2005 2.932 -1.138 -1.879 -4.464 -1.306 - -1.417 -1.746
2006 2.191 -1.003 -1.073 -4.693 -1.407 -11.728 -1.318 -0.999
2007 -1.132 -1.620 -1.357 -3.769 0.294 -6.001 -0.776 -0.363
2008 0.148 0.343 -0.570 -3.935 -1.444 0.399 0.908 -0.119
2009 - -0.677 -0.798 -3.317 -2.730 - -0.435 -0.955
Year Lithuania Macedonia Poland Romania Serbia Slovakia Slovenia
1999 - - 0.262 5.187 - -0.192
2000 - - -4.222 0.555 - 2.618 -1.469
2001 - - 1.062 0.336 - -1.526 -
2002 -4.995 -2.711 0.410 0.423 - -1.134 -5.998
2003 -2.272 -0.421 -0.091 -0.385 0.174 -2.368 -0.528
2004 -4.095 0.298 -0.836 0.035 -0.104 -3.782 0.507
2005 -4.412 0.489 -1.576 -1.114 0.101 -2.282 4.527
2006 -6.173 -0.783 0.835 0.830 -0.363 -3.954 -3.609
2007 -7.582 -2.247 1.351 -0.039 -0.931 -4.050 1.694
2008 -9.199 -1.431 -1.984 -0.025 -0.864 -4.005 2.626
2009 -7.042 0.400 -1.379 -0.473 -2.561 -2.573 2.200
 
Fourth, the H-statistic estimated using the interest income as the dependent variable (h_stat1) 
and the H-statistic estimated using the total income as the dependent variable (h_stat3) appear 
to have similar values and trend which suggests that using either interest income or total 
income as the dependent variable produces similar results (see Appendix 3.3 for the h_stat3 
estimates). Fifth, both the h_stat1 and the h_stat3 for most of the countries show a clear 
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inverse relationship with the Lerner Index which is a measure of market power (see Appendix 
3.4 for the Lerner Index values).
30
 In addition, as shown in the example presented in Figure 
5.1, our estimates of the H-statistics and the Lerner Index are similar also in terms of the 
variation from year to year (see Appendix 3.5 for the figures on all the sample countries). The 
inverse relationship and the similarity with regard to the variation with the Lerner Index may 
also serve as evidence that our H-statistic estimate is properly measuring the degree of 
competition.  
However, it must be noticed that both our estimates of the H-statistic and the estimates of the 
Lerner Index obtained from Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2013) are characterized by a 
pronounced degree of volatility from one year to the other. Given that both the H-statistic and 
the Lerner Index are characterized by a similar degree of volatility, it may be considered that 
a potential reason for the high degree of volatility may be the small sample of observations 
available and the potentially poor quality of data for the transition economies in the 
BankScope database. In our estimation of the H-statistic, the small number of observations in 
some of the cases imposed estimations with minimal degrees of freedom (e.g. only 1 degree 
of freedom in extreme cases). On the other hand, recalling the review of the empirical 
literature applying the Panzar-Rosse model in the banking sector (section 3.4), we notice that 
also when applied to EU countries data the Panzar-Rosse method produced quite volatile 
yearly H-statistics (Nathan and Neave ,1989; Molyneux et al., 1994; Vesala, 1995). For 
example, in the study of Molyneux et al. (1994), the behaviour of banks operating in the UK 
shifted from monopoly in one year to almost perfect competition in the following year. On 
this issue, Bikker and Groenveld (1998) suggested that it is unlikely that competitive 
                                                          
30
 The Lerner Index for each country/year is obtained from Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2013), who have 
estimated the Lerner Index for individual CEE countries for the years 2002-2010. 
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conditions change so drastically from year to year. Bikker and Groenveld attribute these 
changes to the fact the gradual market dynamics were not accounted for in the model. Hence, 
the high volatility of the cross-section H-statistic estimates appears to be quite usual also in 
the rest of the literature, which may raise the question as to whether it is appropriate to 
measure competition on a cross-section basis given that it is a dynamic process and gradual 
changes must be taken into account in the model. In order for the cross-section estimates of 
the H-statistic to be a more credible measure of competition, it is recommended to have also 
comparisons with other measures of competition such as the Lerner Index (implemented 
above) and the Boone Indicator (not implemented in this thesis).   
 
Figure 5.1 Examples of the variation of the H-statistics and the Lerner Index in selected CEE 
countries 
 
 
 
 
 
Sixth, there are a few cases where the H-statistic is higher than 1, something which is not 
foreseen by the theory on which the Panzar-Rosse approach was established. However, the F-
test suggests that for all these cases the sum of the input prices (that compose the H-statistic) 
is not significantly different from 1. A potential reason for having H-statistics higher than 1 
may be the fact that the number of observations for some countries/years is quite small and 
the quality of data reported for the transition countries in the BankScope database might not 
be of good quality, which might have repercussions for the estimation results. However, 
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given that this phenomenon has appeared also in other studies such as Bikker and Haaf 
(2002) and Coccorese (2009), which have applied the Panzar-Rosse method to estimate 
yearly H-statistics for EU countries, then the problem may be more general and potentially 
related to the issue as to whether it is appropriate to estimate competition on cross-section 
data given the potential need to incorporate the gradual dynamics in the model. 
 
5.4.2 Estimation of the impact of banking sector competition on banks’ 
risk-taking 
This section presents the empirical estimation of the relationship between banking sector 
competition and bank’s risk-taking. For the measure of competition, we use the cross-section 
estimates of the H-statistic from the previous section. In addition, we use also other measures 
of market power such as the Lerner Index and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index in order to be 
able to compare the results. The regression includes also other bank-specific, macroeconomic 
and institutional indicators that are considered to be important for the determination of the 
level of risk taken by the banks. 
 
5.4.2.1 Model description 
The estimation of the relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking in the 
banking sectors of the CEE countries during the period 1999-2009 is conducted using the 
following regression: 
 
          
   (5.2) 
Where i denotes the bank and t denotes the year. 
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Table 5.1 Description of variables 
 
Variables Description 
prov_loans 
 
loan-loss provisions / total loans 
h-stat Panzar Rosse H-statistic 
nonintinc_ta total non-interest operating income / total 
assets 
equity_ta equity/total assets 
logta natural logarithm of total assets 
loans_ta total loans/total assets 
nim net Interest Margin = (interest income - 
interest expenses)/average earning assets 
growth_loans annual growth rate of loans 
rgdpgrowth real GDP growth rate 
gdp_percap gdp per capita  
cpi_ebrd inflation 
exch_rate exchange rate (national currency/Euro) 
ebrd_bankref EBRD banking reform index 
propertyrights Property Rights Index (Heritage Foundation) 
 
dv_foreign dummy variable for foreign ownership (1 for 
foreign ownership) 
dv_origin dummy variable for the country-of-origin of 
the bank (1 for EU-12 or US) 
dv_year dummy variable for year 
dv_country dummy variable for country 
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The dependent variable in equation 5.2 is the loan-loss provisions to total loans ratio (prov-
loans) which is a measure of banks’ loan portfolio risk. When a loan becomes non-
performing, the bank is required to allocate provisions to cover potential losses from non-
performing loans.
31
 Hence, an increase in the loan-loss provisions tends to reflect a 
deterioration of the loan portfolio quality and subsequently higher bank risk.  
Banking sector competition in our model is represented by the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic 
(H_stat1) which is estimated for each country/year. By using the Pazar-Rosse H-statistic in 
estimating the relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking we have 
followed a number of authors who have used this variable such as Yeyatti and Micco (2003), 
Schaeck et al. (2006), Schaeck and Čihák (2007) and Chen (2007). For comparison, we run a 
separate regression in which we replace the h_stat1 variable with the h_stat3. As explained in 
the previous section, these two measures differ from each other with respect to the dependent 
variable that has been used when they were estimated.
32
 
The use of the H-statistic as a continuous variable has been suggested by Vesala (1995) who 
claimed that the H-statistic is an increasing function of the demand elasticity, implying that a 
higher H-statistic implies a higher intensity of competition. The interpretation of the H-
statistic as a continuous variable and the use of its magnitude to measure the degree of 
competition are supported also by Claessens and Leaven (2004), under the assumption that 
the bank faces a demand function with constant elasticity and a Cobb-Douglas production 
                                                          
31
 Non-performing loans are the loans that belong to one of the lower credit quality grades (Angklomkliew et 
al., 2009). In some countries, a loan is considered to be non-performing if it is in arrears for more than 60 days, 
whereas in some countries non-performing loans include loans that are in arrears for more than 90 days. 
32
 The dependent variable in a Panzar-Rosse model may be the bank’s interest income or the total income. Since 
there is no conclusive argument on which is more appropriate, in order to test for robustness, we have run 
separate cross-section estimations using the interest income as the dependent variable and the total income. The 
h_stat1 variable was estimated using interest income as the dependent variable and the h_stat3 was estimated 
using total income as the dependent variable. 
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technology. The predicted sign for the competition variable can be either positive or negative 
given that the theory so far did not come to a conclusion on the relationship between banking 
sector competition and risk-taking (Section 5.2).  
Despite the fact that the H-statistic has been widely used as a continuous measure of 
competition, there are also arguments that may oppose its use as a continuous measure. If the 
proposal of Bikker et al. (2009) on the possibility that banks’ average costs in equilibrium 
may be constant were to hold, then the negative values of H-statistic might not be interpreted 
as indicating monopoly behaviour (see section 3.4 for a more detailed elaboration). In other 
words, the negative values of the H-statistic would not necessarily indicate a high level of 
market power (i.e. lack of competition). Nevertheless, since there is no compelling direct 
empirical evidence to support this proposal, we treat this issue as a theoretical possibility and 
leave it to be investigated by future research; therefore, we continue to interpret the H-
statistic based on the original Panzar-Rosse framework.  
For another comparison with our results and given the potential caveats of the H-statistic, we 
run a separate model using the Lerner Index (lerner_index variable) instead of the H-statistic. 
The Lerner Index is obtained from the study of Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2013) who have 
estimated this index for individual CEE countries for each year in the period 2002-2010.
33
 
The Lerner Index is inversely related to the H-statistic, with higher values of the Lerner Index 
implying higher market power, i.e. lower competition.  
Some of the studies that have investigated the relationship between banking sector 
competition and risk-taking have used the degree of market concentration as a measure of 
competition, considering that higher market concentration implies lower competition. 
                                                          
33
 The Lerner Index estimates are not available for Estonia and Lithuania. 
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However, by recalling the discussion on the efficient structure hypothesis and the 
contestability theory from chapter 3, it may be argued that market concentration is not an 
adequate measure of banking sector competition. In addition, the market concentration index 
takes into account only the banks operating within a country, thus excluding the potential 
competitive pressures coming from outside a country’s borders, which is especially important 
for the EU member states that have more integrated financial sectors. Nevertheless, in order 
to make our results comparable with the results of other studies, we run a separate regression 
in which we replace the H-statistic variable with the market concentration index. In addition, 
even if the degree of market concentration does not represent an adequate measure of 
competition, still it may represent an influential factor for the risk-taking behaviour of the 
banks. 
Apart from the variable of main interest, which is the variable on the banking sector 
competition, our model includes also other control variables considered to be important for 
the determination of banks’ risk-taking. The other control variables included in the model can 
be classified in three categories: a) bank-specific variables; b) macroeconomic variables; c) 
institutional variables; and d) dummy variables for countries and years. 
a) Bank-specific variables 
Non-interest income (Lagnonintinc_ta) 
The non-interest income to total assets ratio (Lagnonintinc_ta) is included in the regression to 
control for the potential impact of the diversification of banks’ revenues on the quality of 
loan portfolio. The larger the share of the non-interest income, the lower is likely to be the 
dependence of the bank on the income from the lending activity, which implies that a 
potential deterioration in the quality of the loan portfolio, and hence a reduction of the 
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interest income, is expected to have a lower impact on the overall performance of the bank. 
Therefore, banks with higher non-interest income may be less concerned for the quality of 
loans and, hence, may be likely to engage in higher levels of lending risk. Banks that are able 
to secure strong earnings from the non-interest generating assets may be able to afford higher 
potential losses from the interest-generating assets, which may make them more likely to 
invest in high-risk and high-return assets. The non-interest income variable is likely to be 
endogenous to the quality of the loan portfolio (i.e. the dependent variable), since the 
causality may run also from the quality of the loan portfolio towards the structure of assets. 
When the quality of loans deteriorates, i.e. when the loan-loss provisions increase, banks may 
be less willing to expand their lending activity, so they may tend to extend their focus 
towards safer assets, such as the non-interest generating assets. Therefore, in order to reduce 
the possibility of the potential endogeneity, the non-interest income variable is is included in 
its first lag. 
The degree of risk-aversion (Lagequity_ta) 
The risk attitude of a bank considerably depends on the amount of equity held by the bank, 
which in our regression is represented by the equity to total assets ratio (Lagequity_ta). 
According to Saunders and Allen (2002), banks hold equity as a cushion against losses that 
may occur from the materialization of the credit, market or operational risk. When holding 
equity as a cushion against potential losses, a potential bankruptcy of the bank will cost the 
shareholders their own equity. Therefore, banks that hold higher capital ratios are likely to be 
more conservative in terms of risk-taking in order to be able to preserve the shareholders 
equity (Hellman et al., 2000; Repullo, 2003). As a result, the expected sign of the equity ratio 
is negative. This variable is included in the regression in its first lag in order to reduce the 
possibility of the potential endogeneity with the loan-loss provisions. The endogeneity 
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between the equity ratio and the loan-loss provisions may arise given that provisions are 
recorded as an expense in the bank’s income statement and, hence, affect the net profit which, 
in turn, may have an impact on the bank’s equity. 
Net Interest Margin (Lagnim) 
The extent of loan repayment and, subsequently, the amount of loan-loss provisions, are 
considered to be affected also by the level of interest rates, which in our regression are 
represented by the net interest margin (Lagnim). Saunders and Allen (2002) argue that the 
relationship between high loan interest rates and expected loan repayments is negative, 
implying that an increase of loan interest rates leads to higher loan-loss provisions. According 
to these authors, this happens because of the adverse selection and the risk-shifting effect. 
The adverse selection is considered to take place because, when loan rates increase, the 
“good” borrowers may leave the loan market and decide to self-finance their investment 
projects, thus leaving the “bad” borrowers to dominate the pool of loan applicants. The 
remaining “bad” borrowers, who may have limited liability and equity at stake, may cause the 
risk-shifting effect by engaging in high risk – high return projects in order to compensate for 
the high interest rate payments. If the project is successful they will be able to repay the loan, 
whereas if they default their own losses will be limited. Nevertheless, the relationship 
between the interest rates and the credit risk may be seen also from another perspective. 
Higher interest rates may discourage the weak borrowers from applying for loans, hence 
leading to a market dominated by financially stronger borrowers who are capable of 
withstanding higher interest rates. Hence, the increase of the net interest margin may have a 
negative impact on the level of risk taken by the banks. In order to avoid the potential 
endogeneity with the loan-loss provisions, also the net interest margin is used in its first lag. 
The endogeneity may arise from the fact that changes in the credit risk (i.e. loan-portfolio 
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quality) may affect the interest rates charged by the bank (i.e. higher credit risk implies 
higher risk-premiums in the interest rates). 
Bank’s size (logta) 
The variable logta represents the natural logarithm of total assets and is included to control 
for bank size. The risk-taking behaviour of a bank may well be related also to its size. Larger 
banks may be considered as safer considering that they might have been operating for a 
longer period in the market, during which they may have established lending relationships 
with their clients which, in turn, gives them an advantage in terms of the information they 
possess. Larger banks are also likely to have stronger financial positions and longer 
experience in the banking industry, which makes them capable of building more advanced 
risk management capacities. According to EBRD (2006), smaller banks in the transition 
economies tend to focus on lending to small and medium enterprises, which are likely to be 
more risky. On the other hand, larger banks may at the same time be viewed as more risky 
due to the “too big to fail” effect. Since larger banks are systemically important and their 
potential bankruptcy might cause problems to the overall financial sector and the economy in 
general, the governments and other state authorities are often keen to bail out the large banks 
that are in difficulties. Under these conditions, moral hazard behaviour is more likely to take 
place at the larger banks, since these banks might undertake excessive levels of risk, being 
aware that state authorities will intervene to bail them out in case difficulties occur. 
Credit growth (Laggrowth_loans) 
The second decade of banking transition in the CEE countries was characterized by a rapid 
credit growth, which raised concerns about a potential deterioration of the loan-portfolio 
quality. Rapid expansion of lending activity may signal that banks are pursuing “aggressive” 
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strategies in the lending market, which may be associated with lax lending criteria that enable 
them to increase their market shares. Such strategies may enable poor-quality borrowers to 
gain access to credit, thus worsening the quality of banks’ loan-portfolios. Hence, among the 
explanatory variables in our regression we control also for the impact of the annual growth 
rate of loans (Laggrowth_loans) which is expected to have a positive impact on the loan-loss 
provisions ratio. This variable is included in its first lag in order to avoid potential 
endogeneity to the dependent variable. The endogeneity may arise from the fact that a 
potential increase of credit risk may induce banks to restrain their credit growth.   
Foreign ownership (dv_foreign) 
The degree to which banks engage in risk-taking may be well related to whether the bank is 
domestically owned or foreign owned. The theoretical literature on the foreign banks 
emphasizes the differences between the foreign owned banks and the domestically owned 
banks in terms of the asymmetric information they face. According to Dell’Ariccia and 
Marquez (2004), foreign banks are advantaged in terms of the possession of screening 
technologies to identify the good borrowers by analysing “hard” information, i.e. the 
information which can be observed by concrete evidence. Conversely, domestic banks have 
the advantage of possessing additional “soft” information on the borrowers, which they 
obtain from being part of the community where they operate. In this context, Sengupta (2007) 
claims that foreign banks may end up lending to less risky and larger borrowers, which is also 
known as “cream-skimming”. Larger borrowers may be viewed as less risky, assuming that 
they can provide externally audited financial reports, and may have more advanced business 
planning capacities, which reduce the risk of non-repayment. On the other hand, the lending 
activity of domestic banks is mainly focused on smaller and more opaque borrowers, which 
are also expected to be more risky. A similar view is shared also by Claeys and Hainz (2007) 
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who claim that foreign banks are more conservative in the sense that they concentrate more 
on financing safer projects. 
Therefore, in order to control for the potential differences between the domestically owned 
and foreign owned banks, in our model we include a dummy variable (dv_foreign) which 
takes a value of 1 when the bank is more than 51% foreign owned and 0 when the bank is 
domestically owned. Given that the readily available BankScope database provides 
information only on the current ownership of the bank, we utilize the shareholders’ history 
from this database through which we identify the bank’s ownership for the available years. 
However, it must be noted that this variable is characterized by a pronounced rate of missing 
data which reduces our overall sample size.   
Country-of-origin of the banks (dv_origin) 
Given that the foreign banks operating in the CEE region originate from different countries, 
we consider that the country-of-origin of the banks may also play a role in the way that banks 
exercise their activity, especially given the fact that foreign banks operating in the CEE 
countries are mostly subsidiaries of their parent banks. This implies that their strategy and 
organizational culture may largely be in line with the standards in their home countries. In 
this context, Hasselman (2006) has found that the activity of foreign banks in the transition 
economies is mostly determined by the strategic considerations of the parent banks. 
Therefore, we construct a dummy variable (dv_origin) which takes a value of 1 if the foreign 
bank is an EU-12 or US country and 0 if the bank’s origin is some other country. 
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b) Macroeconomic variables 
Real GDP growth (rgdpgrowth) 
The general economic activity or the business cycle is considered to have an important 
influence on the loan repayment capacity of borrowers. The general economic activity in our 
regression is controlled by the real GDP growth rate (rgdpgrowth). In good times for the 
economy, i.e. when the GDP is growing, income tends increase and so does the capacity of 
the borrowers to repay their loans. Under such conditions, loan repayments are more orderly 
and the quality of the loan portfolio improves, thus reducing the need for allocating loan-loss 
provisions. In addition, during good times for the economy, banks are more optimistic for the 
future, so they may allocate less loan-loss provisions, given that loan losses are less likely to 
happen. However, the increased confidence of the banks when the economy is growing may 
have its own risks, since by being more optimistic on the future performance of the economy 
banks may apply more relaxed lending criteria and grant access to credit also to “bad” 
borrowers, which may lead to a deterioration of the loan portfolio quality. 
GDP per capita (gdp_percap) 
The GDP per capita (gdp_percap) is included in the regression to control for the general 
economic development of each country in the analysis, and is expressed in thousands of US 
dollars. A higher level of economic development implies a higher level of wealth for its 
citizens and, thus a higher capacity of loan repayment. In addition, GDP per capita is often 
used as a proxy for the general quality of the institutions, since more developed countries are 
expected to have more functional institutions. Therefore, banks operating in countries with 
higher GDP per capita are expected to have better loan-portfolio quality, i.e. lower loan-loss 
provisions. 
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Inflation (cpi_ebrd) 
Inflation in our regression is represented by the annual growth rate of the Consumer Price 
Index (cpi_ebrd). Higher inflation reduces real wages when the wages are not adjusted for 
inflation, thus weakening the loan repayment capacity of the borrowers and leading to higher 
loan-loss provisions. On the other hand, if loan interest rates are fixed and not adjustable to 
inflation, then the real interest rate may decline and make it easier for the borrowers to repay 
their loans when inflation increases. 
Exchange rate (logexch_rate) 
Another macroeconomic variable in our regression is the exchange rate (logexch_rate), which 
is expressed as national currency/euro. An increase of the exchange rate implies a 
depreciation of the national currency. The impact of the national currency depreciation on the 
loan repayment capacity of the borrowers depends on the currency in which loans are 
denominated. In the CEE countries the structure of bank loans is dominated by loans 
denominated in the national currency, while foreign currency deposits represent considerable 
shares of total deposits in some of the countries, especially in those relying more on 
remittances and tourism (e.g. Albania, Croatia). Under these conditions, a depreciation of the 
national currency would increase the loan repayment capacity of the borrowers, thus leading 
to lower loan-losses. Therefore, the depreciation of the exchange rate is expected to have a 
negative sign on the loan-loss provisions.  
 
 
 
182 
 
c) Institutional indicators 
EBRD banking reform index (ebrd_bankref) 
The banking sector reform process in the transition economies led the transformation from 
centrally-planned to market-based banking sectors. This process included the liberalization of 
the commercial banks operations, the entry of private banks in the markets, the development 
of a legal framework, and the development of regulatory and supervisory institutions. These 
reforms might have influenced also the risk-taking behaviour of the banks. Hence, among the 
control variables, we include also the EBRD banking reform index (ebrd_bankref), which 
takes values from 1 to 4+, with higher values indicating more advanced reform progress (a 
more detailed explanation of the index was provided in chapter 2).   
Property rights index (propertyrights_hrt) 
The lack of adequate protection of property rights is often considered to be among the main 
sources of uncertainty for the banks. The evidence presented in chapter 2 shows that the 
protection of property rights in the CEE countries has recorded a slow progress during the 
period under investigation. The protection of property rights is mainly related to the existence 
of the laws for the protection of the private property rights and the degree to which these laws 
are implemented by the judicial authorities. To control for the degree of property rights 
protection, we use the Property Rights Index (propertyrights_hrt) of the Heritage Foundation. 
This index is focused on the likelihood that private property will be expropriated and on 
issues related to the independence of the judicial system, the existence of corruption within 
the judicial system, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. The 
index takes values from 0 to 100, with higher values showing a better protection of property 
rights. In a country with a higher property rights index, which basically reflects a more 
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efficient judicial system, banks face lower risks with regard to the implementation of 
contracts with their clients. If a client does not repay the loan, the bank can easily proceed 
with the execution of the collateral. Also, this will contribute to a higher self-discipline on the 
side of clients to honour the contracts between them and the banks. Conversely, when the 
judicial system is not efficient, moral hazard by borrowers is more likely to happen because, 
being aware that their collateral will not be executed or at least will take time until its 
execution, the “bad” borrowers may be induced not to repay the loan. Therefore, a better 
protection of the property rights is expected to lead to a lower non-performing loans ratio 
and, hence, lower loan-loss provisions.     
d) Dummy variables for countries and years 
Dummy variables for countries (dv_country) 
Since the banks included in our sample are from different countries, a complete set of country 
dummies (dv_country) is included in the model in order to control for unobserved country-
specific effects. Our data set includes banks from 15 different countries, where specific 
country characteristics may have an important role in determining the level of risk taken by 
banks. Some authors suggest that country dummies should be included in the regression to 
account for the “underlying historical fabric (…) that is not captured by any of the time and 
country varying regressors” (Plümper and Troeger, 2004). 
Dummy variables for years (dv_year) 
To take into account the potential impact from the time-specific effects, the model includes a 
complete set of year dummy variables (dv_year). By including the year dummies we also 
minimize the possibility of cross-group residual correlation if there has been some year-
specific development that has affected all the banks included in the sample (e.g. global 
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financial crisis). If such a development is not controlled by year dummies, then it enters the 
error term and leads to cross-group residual correlation.  
Data 
The bank-level data that are used in our estimation are sourced from the BankScope database. 
The data on the real GDP growth rate have been obtained from the EU Commission 
(AMECO database) and the IMF, whereas the GDP per capita and inflation data are obtained 
from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The exchange rate 
data are sourced from the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw). The 
banking reform index is obtained from the EBRD, whereas the Property Rights Index is 
obtained from the Heritage Foundation. 
Table 5.2 Summary statistics 
            
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
            
prov_loans 2628 1.934 4.945 -48.156 49.689 
h_stat1 2650 -1.212 2.122 -11.728 5.187 
Lagnonintinc_ta 2468 2.953 4.757 -5.357 73.832 
Lagequity_ta 2480 15.359 13.067 -12.440 98.660 
Lagnim 2470 5.111 3.864 -12.080 38.820 
logta 2926 12.953 1.731 8.000 17.456 
Laggrowth_loans 2230 40.675 59.849 -94.700 476.000 
rgdpgrowth 2909 3.976 4.172 -17.729 13.501 
gdp_percap 2925 7709.1 5039.1 933.4 27128.5 
cpi_ebrd 2926 6.561 9.603 -2.700 97.128 
logexch_rate 2869 2.054 1.782 -0.581 5.636 
ebrd_bankref1 2914 3.343 0.572 1.000 4.000 
propertyrights_hrt 2691 45.730 18.508 10.000 90.000 
dv_foreign 2155 0.638 0.481 0.000 1.000 
dv_origin 2155 0.484 0.500 0.000 1.000 
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5.4.2.2 Estimation methodology 
The data set used in our analysis consists of cross-section individuals that are observed for 
several time periods. Hence, our model may be estimated by the conventional panel data 
techniques, such as: a) pooled OLS, which assumes no correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the error term; b) the fixed effects (FE) method, which allows the unobserved 
individual heterogeneity to be correlated with the explanatory variables, thus enabling the 
model to control for the unobserved time invariant characteristics related to the individuals in 
the sample; and c) the random effects (RE) method, which assumes that the unobserved 
heterogeneity is not correlated with the explanatory variables but is distributed independently 
from the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2002). 
The choice between these methods is guided by the relevant diagnostic tests. These 
estimators vary from each other mainly with respect to how they treat the unobserved effects. 
Initially, we look at the F-test which enables us to choose between the OLS and the fixed 
effects method, by testing the null hypothesis that individual unobserved effects are equal to 
zero. If the null hypothesis is accepted we choose the OLS method; alternatively, we choose 
the FE as our preferred estimator. The F-test shows a p-value of 0.000 which strongly rejects 
the null hypothesis, thus suggesting that the individual unobserved effects are statistically 
significant. Hence, between FE and the OLS, we choose FE as our preferred estimator (see 
Appendix 3.6).    
The next step is to choose between the FE and the RE. The most appropriate way to choose 
between these methods is through the Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2002). The main issue that 
is taken into consideration when choosing between the FE and the RE is whether the 
unobserved effects are correlated with the explanatory variables. The Hausman test takes into 
consideration the estimates from both FE and RE and checks if there is a systematic 
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difference between them. Since FE is consistent when the explanatory variables are 
correlated with the unobserved effects, whereas RE is not, a statistically significant difference 
between the estimates of the two estimators goes against the use of the RE method. With a p-
value of 0.000, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the difference in coefficients 
is not systematic, hence suggesting that the RE method is not appropriate to estimate our 
model (Appendix 3.6). According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), FE is consistent and can 
be used even in cases when the Hausman test suggests that the RE method may be applied, 
whereas RE is inconsistent under a model in which the FE is suggested to be the appropriate 
estimator. Hence, taking into account the Hausman test results and the additional advantages 
of the FE method, we choose FE as our preferred estimator. Examples of the advantages of 
using the FE method can include: the FE method captures the unobserved time-invariant 
effects related to each of the individuals included in the sample; the RE assumes that the 
individuals included in the sample have been taken randomly from a large population. In our 
case, the banks included in the analysis represent the majority of the banks operating in the 
respective countries and their selection was not random but rather depended on the 
availability of the data, thus violating the RE method assumption. 
However, a limitation of FE estimation is that this method does not allow the estimation of 
the effects of time-invariant explanatory variables and is not efficient in the estimation of 
slowly-moving variables. In our case, taking into account the variables that compose our 
model, the main limitation of the FE method is the insufficiently efficient estimation of the 
slowly-moving variables such as the property right index and the exchange rate, which 
represent potentially important factors for the determination of the level of risk in the banking 
sector. Variables are considered to be slowly-moving when there is little within-group 
variation which makes the estimation through the FE method difficult. 
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In order to estimate the effects of the slowly-moving variables more efficiently and maintain 
the original features of the FE method, we use the Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition 
(FEVD) method, which represents an augmented version of the FE method and takes into 
account both cross-group and within-group variation.  
 
5.4.3.1 The Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition method 
The FEVD approach has been developed by Plümper and Troeger (2004) as a method that 
enables the estimation of time-invariant variables in the presence of individual fixed effects. 
In other words, the FEVD enables the estimation of a fixed effects model that may include 
also time-invariant explanatory variables. In addition, Plümper and Troeger (2007) claim that 
the FEVD is more efficient compared to the FE also in terms of the estimation of explanatory 
variables that have a low within-group variation. This has been confirmed also by Greene et 
al. (2010), who found that the use of the FE to estimate models that contain slowly changing 
variables produces implausible estimates, while the FEVD estimates are much more 
meaningful.   
In our case, the FEVD estimator enables us to retain the properties of the fixed effects model 
and at the same time enables us to include the time-invariant variables in our model (i.e. the 
country dummies) as well as to estimate more efficiently the variables with low within-group 
variation, which can be referred to also as “rarely changing variables”. In order to identify the 
variables with low within variation, we follow the ‘rule of thumb’ proposed by Plümper and 
Troeger (2007) who suggest that a variable should be treated as “rarely changing” if the ratio 
of the between standard deviation and the within standard deviation (b/w) of that variable is at 
least 2.8.  
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Table 5.3 Identification of slowly-moving variables 
 
    Variable Between stdev Within stdev Between/Within 
        
h_stat1 1.607 1.478 1.088 
Lagnonintinc_ta 4.339 3.500 1.240 
Lagequity_ta 14.173 6.060 2.339 
Lagnim 3.464 1.938 1.787 
logta 1.606 0.646 2.486 
Laggrowth_loans 40.141 50.241 0.799 
rgdpgrowth 1.354 4.017 0.337 
gdp_percap 4186.6 2957.6 1.416 
cpi_ebrd 6.689 7.306 0.915 
logexch_rate 1.805 0.139 12.991 
ebrd_bankref1 0.535 0.243 2.206 
propertyrights_hrt 18.080 4.784 3.779 
dv_foreign 0.452 0.180 2.520 
dv_origin 0.475 0.165 2.878 
     
Table 5.2 shows that there are three variables, namely propertyrights_hrt, dv_origin, and 
logexch_rate which have a between/within ratio of above 2.8 and, therefore, are treated as 
“rarely changing” variables in our estimation. 
The FEVD method is executed through the following steps: 
i) In the first stage, Equation 5.2 is estimated using the normal fixed effects model. 
After the estimation of the regression, we predict the fixed effects vector, which is 
going to be used in the second stage of the regression.  
ii) In the second stage, the fixed effects vector is regressed on the time-invariant and the 
“rarely changing” explanatory variables, which in our case are the country dummies 
and the variables propertyrights_hrt, dv_origin, and exch_rate. The regression is 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). After running the regression, we 
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predict the residuals, which are included among the explanatory variables in the third 
stage of the FEVD model. 
iii) In the third stage, which is the final step of the FEVD model, the regression is 
estimated by pooled OLS and includes all the time-variant and time-invariant 
variables, and also the residuals from the second stage among the explanatory 
variables (the complete procedure and STATA outputs of the FEVD estimation is 
presented in Appendix 3.8).  
However, the above-presented procedure is not recommended for the final estimation unless 
the degrees of freedom in the third stage are adjusted by ui-1 when calculating the variance-
covariance matrix of the time-variant and time-invariant variables. In addition, the term on 
the unobserved components (i.e. residuals), which is one of the explanatory variables in the 
third stage, is an estimated variable from the second stage. Because this variable is an 
estimated variable and not a fixed realization, the error involved in that estimation should be 
taken into account in the third stage. For doing so, Plümper and Troeger (2007) provide the 
STATA program (ado-file) xtfevd 4.0 which executes all the three stages of the FEVD and 
adjusts the standard errors both in terms of the correction of the degrees of freedom and in 
terms of accounting for the fact that the variable residuals in the third stage is an estimated 
variable and not a fixed realization. Therefore, our final estimation is conducted by using the 
xtfevd as estimator.  
However, this approach is limited in terms of not being able to produce the diagnostic tests 
that are relevant for the original FE method. One way to conduct the diagnostic tests is to 
execute all the three stages of the FEVD approach manually and then conduct the diagnostic 
tests. However, given that the third stage estimates are produced with unadjusted standard 
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errors, the validity of the diagnostic tests may be questionable. Given that our data sample 
consists of a large number of observations, in which the correction of the standard errors may 
be expected not to have a large impact, in Appendix 3.8 we present also the seperate 
execution of the three stages and the respective diagnostic tests (Appendix 3.8). The 
estimates obtained through this approach are highly similar to the estimates using xtfevd 4.0, 
which are presented in the next sub-section.  
 
5.4.2.3 Estimation Results 
This section presents the estimation results of the determinants of the loan-loss provisions in 
the CEE countries during the period 1999-2009. The main variable of interest in this analysis 
is the h_stat1, which measures the impact of banking sector competition on banks’ loan-loss 
provisions (i.e. loan-portfolio quality). The estimation results are presented in Table 5.4 
which contains the results of five different model specifications. The first column presents the 
results of the main model specification and the other columns present alternative model 
specifications.  
Our main variable of interest, the h_stat1, has a negative coefficient that is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The coefficient of -0.096 suggests that an increase of the H-
statistic by one standard deviation reduces the loan-loss provisions to total loans ratio by 0.2 
percentage points.
34
 This suggests that banking sector competition has had a negative impact 
on the loan-loss provisions ratio, i.e. has contributed to the improvement of the loan-portfolio 
quality in the banks operating in the CEE countries. This finding contributes to the literature 
on the relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking and is in line with a 
                                                          
34
 The standard deviation of the H-statistic is 2.12. 
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number of empirical studies in this field such as Schaeck and Čihák (2007), Schaeck et al. 
(2006), Beck et al. (2003), Jayaratne and Strahan (1998).  
Table 5.4 Estimation results (dependent variable: loan-loss provisions/total loans) 
            
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES prov_loans prov_loans prov_loans prov_loans prov_loans 
      h_stat1 -0.096* -0.183*** 
   
 
(0.050) (0.057) 
   hstat1_dvnoneu 
 
0.501*** 
   
  
(0.145) 
   h_stat3 
  
-0.089* 
  
   
(0.051) 
  lerner_index 
   
0.028** 
 
    
(0.013) 
 hhi_dep 
    
-0.002*** 
     
(0.001) 
Lagnonintinc_ta 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.009 0.033 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) 
Lagequity_ta -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.005 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) 
Lagnim -0.076 -0.078 -0.076 -0.072 -0.124* 
 
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.076) (0.067) 
logta -0.720*** -0.772*** -0.725*** -0.823*** -0.713*** 
 
(0.247) (0.247) (0.248) (0.289) (0.265) 
Laggrowth_loans 0.004** 0.003** 0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
rgdpgrowth -0.232*** -0.235*** -0.231*** -0.219*** -0.237*** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.027) 
gdp_percap -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
cpi_ebrd -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.021 0.040 
 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.050) (0.043) 
ebrd_bankref1 -0.500 -0.802 -0.513 -0.678 -0.786 
 
(0.695) (0.701) (0.696) (0.914) (0.694) 
dv_foreign 0.187 0.257 0.184 0.446 0.150 
 
(0.705) (0.711) (0.706) (0.761) (0.753) 
propertyrights_hrt -0.059*** -0.051** -0.059*** -0.062** -0.050** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) 
dv_origin 0.268 0.286 0.275 0.178 0.256 
 
(0.608) (0.613) (0.609) (0.672) (0.644) 
logexch_rate -3.864** -3.222** -3.839** -3.245** -4.878*** 
 
(1.530) (1.567) (1.535) (1.642) (1.524) 
dv_noneu 
 
-7.195*** 
   
  
(2.056) 
   eta 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 32.707*** 36.824*** 32.602*** 31.856*** 43.286*** 
 
(8.782) (10.464) (8.800) (9.449) (8.719) 
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Observations 1,497 1,497 1,497 1,385 1,527 
R-squared 0.476 0.484 0.475 0.468 0.462 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Note a): Specification (1) includes the H_stat1 as a measure of competition; Specification (2) includes the 
interaction term between the H_stat1 and the dummy variable for the non-EU countries (hstat1_dvnoneu); 
Specification (3) includes the H_stat3 as a measure of competition; Specification (4) includes the Lerner Index 
(lerner_index) as a measure of market power; Specification (5) replaces the measures of competition with the 
degree of market concentration (HHI_dep). 
Note b): the Stata outputs for all the specifications are presented in Appendix 3.10. 
 
 
Since the H-statistic (h_stat1) is an estimated variable, it is necessary to correct its standard 
errors given the additional variance it carries from the first-stage estimation. However, 
because we run the regression using the xtfevd 4.0 estimator, which adjusts the standard 
errors also to account for the fact that the model includes previously estimated variables, we 
do not conduct further adjustment of the standard errors with means such as bootstrapping 
that we apply in Chapter 6.  
The negative relationship between competition and bank’s risk-taking may primarily be 
attributed to the fact that with more competition depositors have more alternatives where to 
place their deposits and, as a result, they are more likely to “penalize” the excessive risk-
taking banks by moving their deposits to safer banks. Based on the discussion from the 
theoretical background section, this can be the case when assuming that depositors are well 
informed on the risk behaviour of the bank. However, as earlier explained, it may not always 
be the case that depositors are well informed on the risk profile of the bank. Nevertheless, 
depositors may receive signals that may help them better understand the risk behaviour of the 
bank. Such a signal may be the deposit interest rates offered by a bank. Rapidly increasing 
deposit interest rates may imply that the bank behaviour is being too aggressive. Under these 
conditions, continuously increasing deposit rates up to a certain limit may be attractive for the 
depositors, but excessively high deposit rates may induce banks to engage in high risk – high 
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return projects, which can induce depositors to shift their deposits to safer banks. In other 
words, “credit rationing” may take place in the deposits market. 
Another argument as to why the increase of competition may lead to lower risk-taking by 
banks is related to the negative impact of competition on banks’ profits. Bank profits are 
expected to decline when competition increases, primarily due to the expected decline of 
interest rate margins. A higher degree of risk-taking by banks, as a response to increased 
competitive measures, would imply larger potential loan-losses and, as a consequence, higher 
loan-loss provisions that would further reduce bank profits. Therefore, in order to preserve 
themselves from a further decline of profits, banks may respond to increased competition by 
taking measures that improve the risk-management. Examples of these measures may include 
review of the bank’s investment strategy as well as the advancement of risk-assessment 
capacities such as enhancement of screening technologies and investments in personnel 
training. 
Apart from estimating the average impact of competition on loan-loss provisions for the 
overall sample, we run an additional estimation to check whether competition in the non-EU 
countries of our sample affects bank’s risk-taking differently compared to the EU countries of 
our sample. To do this, we interact our measure of competition (h_stat1) with the dummy 
variable dv_noneu that takes the value 1 if the country is not an EU member. The interaction 
term between the h_stat1 and the dv_noneu is denoted as hstat1_dvnoneu.
35
 Specification 2 in 
Table 5.4 (specification 2) presents the results from the regression that includes the 
interaction term. According to Brambor et al. (2006), who suggest that the coefficient of one 
                                                          
35
 The inclusion of the interaction term is done by following Brambor et al. (2006), who suggest that in the case 
of multiplicative interaction models the regression should include all the constitutive terms of the interaction 
term and the interaction term itself. These authors suggest that the coefficients of the constitutive terms should 
not be interpreted as average effects. The coefficient of a constitutive term can be interpreted only assuming that 
the other component of the interaction term equals zero. 
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of the constitutive components of the interaction term can be interpreted alone only assuming 
that the other constitutive term equals zero, the coeffiecient of the h_stat1 represents the 
impact of banking sector competition on banks’ risk-taking only in the EU members (i.e. 
dv_noneu=0). The statistically significant negative coefficient of h_stat1 suggests that 
competition reduces the degree of risk-taking in the EU members of the CEE region. 
However, the statistically significant coefficient of the interaction term hstat1_dvnoneu 
shows that in the non-EU countries of the region competition has an additional impact on 
risk-taking compared to the EU countries of the region. Hence, in order to estimate the 
impact of banking sector competition on bank’s risk-taking in the non-EU countries, we sum 
up the coefficient of h_stat1 and the coefficient of the interaction term hstat1_dvnoneu, 
which together represent the impact of competition on risk-taking in EU countries plus the 
additional impact for the non-EU countries. The sum of these two coefficients gives a 
statistically significant coefficient of 0.318 which suggests that, in the non-EU countries of 
the CEE region, competition has a positive impact on the degree of banks’ risk-taking, i.e. 
higher competition leads to higher banking sector risk (Table 5.5).  
Table 5.5. The joint impact of h_stat1 and hstat1_dvnoneu 
              
prov_loans Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
(1) 0.318 0.128 2.48 0.013 0.067 0.570 
        
The relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking in the non-EU countries 
appears to be the opposite of the EU countries where competition appeared to reduce the 
degree of banks’ risk-taking. This may reflect deficiencies in other but unobserved factors, 
given data limitations, which might have affected the relationship between competition and 
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risk-taking in the non-EU members. Such deficiencies may include the quality of the 
licensing process, which can be affected by the professional capacity of the regulator, but also 
by potential influences of other factors affecting the licensing process (e.g. political 
influences). Another important element related to the licensing process is related to the 
quality of bank applications interested to enter the banking markets. The political instability 
and weak rule of law that have characterized most of the non-EU countries of the CEE during 
the period under investigation might have discouraged a number of good-quality foreign 
banks from entering these markets, creating room for competition to be increased through the 
licensing of weaker banks. Another potential deficiency in the non-EU countries may be 
related to the quality of personnel available to the banks. The quality of the personnel largely 
reflects the quality of education that is provided in these countries, which is generally 
considered to have lagged behind the EU standards. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, apart from Specification 1 in which we 
estimate the relationship between competition and risk-taking using the h_stat1 (Panzar-
Rosse H-statistic) as a measure of competition, we run also a set of additional regressions as 
robustness checks to the inferences derived from the Specification1. Specification 3 shows 
that the estimation results appear highly similar also when using the h_stat3 instead of the 
h_stat1 as a measure of competition. This shows that whether the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic is 
estimated with the interest income or with the total income as the dependent variable does not 
make any substantial difference with regard to the estimation of the impact of banking sector 
competition on bank risk-taking.  
In specification 4, we replace the H-statistic with the Lerner Index which is a widely used 
measure of market power. The estimated coefficient of the Lerner Index is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, suggesting that higher market power leads 
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to higher risk-taking by banks. This result confirms our inference on the impact of 
competition measured by the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, where we found that higher 
competition (i.e. lower market power) leads to lower risk-taking by the banks. 
In Specification 5, we replace the H-statistic variable with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(hhi_dep) which measures the degree of market concentration. The estimated coefficient of 
the hhi_dep is negative and highly significant, suggesting that higher market concentration is 
associated with a lower level of risk in the banks’ loan portfolios. If the Structure-Conduct- 
Performance paradigm, which claims that a higher degree of market concentration implies a 
higher degree of market power were to hold, then in our case the sign of the market 
concentration index should have been the same as the sign of the Lerner Index, which 
measures market power, and opposite to the sign of the H-statistic that measures competition. 
In our case, the market concentration index has the same sign as the variable measuring 
competition (H_stat1), which suggests that market concentration may not be capturing the 
impact of competition, but rather some other features of the market. For example, relationship 
lending is more likely to take place in more concentrated markets and may have an important 
impact on the risk taken by the banks. In addition, more concentrated banking markets tend to 
have fewer banks, which makes the bank-supervision process a more straight-forward task 
(World Bank, 2013, page 92). Claiming that market concentration does not appear to capture 
the impact of banking sector competition may serve as evidence in support to Claessens and 
Laeven (2003) who claimed that concentration and competition describe different features of 
a banking market.        
The remaining part of this section is devoted to the interpretation of the estimated coefficients 
of the control variables, which are potentially important for the determination of bank’s risk 
level. These variables control for a number of bank-specific, macroeconomic, and 
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institutional factors that may influence the level of risk taken by banks. As presented in Table 
5.4, the estimation results for the control variables are quite robust across the different model 
specifications, so we will focus only in the results from our main model specification 
(Specification 1). 
 The coefficient of the logta variable, which measures the size of the bank, has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level. This shows that larger banks tend to have a 
lower level of risk in their loan-portfolio, which does not support the “too big to fail” 
hypothesis. Instead, it suggests that larger banks tend to be safer, which may reflect their 
advantages in terms of the possession of borrower-specific information, assuming that they 
have been operating for a longer period in the market, as well as their superior risk-
management capacities stemming from their supposedly stronger financial position.  
Another bank-specific variable that has resulted statistically significant is the annual growth 
rate of loans (Laggrowth_loans). Higher credit growth rates appear to have led to higher risk-
taking, i.e. higher loan-loss provisions. A rapid expansion of loans is likely to be based on lax 
lending criteria. In order to increase their market shares, banks may choose to deviate from 
appropriate screening, thus enabling low-quality borrowers to gain access to credit. The other 
bank-specific variables, consisting of the non-interest income to total assets ratio 
(Lagnonintinc_ta), the equity to total assets ratio (equity_ta) and the net interest margin (nim) 
have the expected signs, but do not have a statistically significant impact on the quality of the 
loan portfolio. 
Regarding the country-level indicators, our results show that real GDP growth rate 
(rgdpgrowth) has a negative coefficient, which is statistically significant at the 1% 
confidence level. This implies that higher GDP growth rates tend to significantly reduce the 
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level of risk in the banks’ portfolios, presumably by enhancing the repayment capacity of the 
borrowers. However, since the allocation of the loan-loss provisions is based also on banks’ 
subjective behaviour, the negative impact of the real GDP growth rate on the loan-loss 
provisions ratio may also reflect the fact that during good times for the economy banks are 
more optimistic for the future, so they may tend to allocate less loan-loss provisions to cover 
potential loan losses, since the repayment capacity of the borrowers is expected to improve.  
The exchange rate (logexch_rate), which is expressed as national currency/euro ratio, has a 
statistically significant negative coefficient. This suggests that the depreciation of the national 
currency improved the loan-repayment capacity of the borrowers, which may reflect the fact 
that the loan structure in most of the CEE countries is composed of loans denominated in 
national currency, while foreign currency savings represent substantial part of deposits in 
some of the countries. Under such conditions, the depreciation of the national currency eases 
the loan repayment for the foreign currency deposit-holders. The other macroeconomic 
variables included in our regression, which are the GDP per capita (gdp_per cap) and the 
inflation rate (cpi_ebrd), have a statistically insignificant impact on the determination of bank 
risk-taking in the CEE countries. 
The coefficient on the property rights index (propertyrights) is negative and statistically 
significant. A better protection of property rights, which is primarily related to a more 
efficient judicial system, appears to significantly reduce the level of risk in the bank loan 
portfolios. In countries with a better protection of property rights, the repayment of loans is 
better enforced. Non-repaying borrowers may be much more easily induced to restart 
repaying their loans, otherwise their collateral will be executed and banks’ losses will be 
mitigated. In addition, by being aware of the efficiency of the judicial system, the borrowers 
will ex-ante be more disciplined in terms of the timely repayment of their loans. The other 
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institutional variable included in our regression, which is the EBRD banking reform index 
(ebrd_bankref), has a statistically insignificant coefficient. Even though the banking reform 
process is considered to have been one of the key factors that improved the stability of the 
banking system in the transition economies, the insignificant coefficient in our regression 
may reflect the fact that the main effects from the banking reform were achieved at the 
beginning of the transition process. Whereas, during the period 1999-2009, which is covered 
in our analysis, the banking reform index is shown to have been quite static or slowly-moving 
from year to year. The dummy variables on foreign ownership (dv_foreign) and country-of-
origin (dv_origin) likewise appear to have insignificant coefficients.  
Lastly, the coefficient of the variable eta that represents the individual fixed effects (i.e. the 
error term of the second stage FEVD regression) equals 1, which is consistent with the 
guideline of Plümper and Troeger (2004). 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
The theoretical literature on the relationship between banking sector competition and risk-
taking remains largely inconclusive with regard to the nature of this relationship. The 
mainstream theory claims that competition leads to higher risk-taking by banks, but this view 
has faced criticism from other authors who claim that competition does not necessarily lead 
to higher risk-taking. The theoretical literature suggests that the relationship between banking 
sector competition and risk-taking depends also on other factors, such as the disclosure of 
risk information by banks, the presence of a deposit insurance scheme and information-
sharing facilities, and the regulatory capital requirements. The debate on the relationship 
between banking sector competition and risk-taking remains open also in the empirical 
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literature, where some studies have found a positive relationship and some have found a 
negative relationship. 
The main part of this chapter consists of the empirical estimation of the impact of banking 
sector competition and banks’ risk taking in the CEE countries during the period 1999-2009. 
In order to use a direct measure of banking sector competition, we estimated the Panzar-
Rosse H-statistic for each country and for each year, while the measure of bank risk consists 
of the ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans ratio. To our knowledge, this is the first 
study to use the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic to measure the impact of banking sector competition 
on risk-taking for a panel of CEE countries. Estimation is conducted using the Fixed Effects 
Vector Decomposition method.  
Despite the fact that the H-statistic has been widely used as a continuous measure of 
competition, it was acknowledged there are also theoretical arguments that may oppose its 
use as a continuous measure. However, in the absence of direct supporting empirical 
evidence, this issue is left to be investigated by future research and we interpret the H-statistic 
based on the original Panzar-Rosse framework. Another reservation is that the cross-section 
estimation of the H-statistic has been conducted on small sample sizes and in the presence of 
outliers. However, in order for our inferences on the impact of competition to be more 
reliable, we have used also the Lerner Index as an alternative measure of competition. 
The estimation results suggest that banking sector competition has had a negative impact on 
the loan-loss provisions ratio implying that, on average, competition contributed to the 
improvement of the loan-portfolio quality in the CEE countries during the period 1999-2009. 
However, the results differ significantly when distinguishing between the EU and non-EU 
countries of the CEE region. While for the EU countries the relationship between banking 
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sector competition and risk-taking remains negative, this relationship is positive for the non-
EU countries of the region, suggesting that an increase of competition in the non-EU 
countries may be detrimental for the stability of the banking sector in these countries. This 
result may be reflecting potential unobserved deficiencies in the non-EU countries, such as 
the quality of the financial institutions licensing process and the quality of personnel 
available to banks, which might have influenced the relationship between competition and 
risk-taking in the banking sectors of these countries. 
For comparison, we have estimated the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic also using the total income 
as the dependent variable (in addition to the H-statistic that was estimated with interest 
income as dependent variable), and the results with respect to the impact of competition on 
risk-taking remain similar. In addition, the results remain similar also when replacing the H-
statistic with the Lerner Index, which is an alternative measure of market power. The 
coefficient on the Lerner Index resulted significantly positive, suggesting that market power 
increases the degree of risk-taking, thus confirming our results on the negative relationship 
between competition and risk-taking. Another alternative measure used in our regression 
consists of the market concentration index, which resulted in a significantly negative 
coefficient, suggesting that banks operating in more concentrated markets tend to undertake 
lower risks. This result implies that market concentration has a similar impact to competition, 
which is in contradiction to the SCP paradigm that views concentration as an inverse measure 
of competition. This finding might serve as evidence in favour of the view that competition 
and concentration measure different features of the market. 
Regarding the impact of the other control variables that are included in the regression, the 
results suggest that bank size is negatively related to the bank’s risk-taking, while the higher 
growth rate of loans tends to lead to higher risk-taking. The overall performance of the 
202 
 
economy seems to be highly important for the quality of the loan portfolio. Higher real GDP 
growth rates appear to improve the quality of loans. The loan-portfolio quality appeared to 
have been significantly enhanced also from the national currency depreciation. Another factor 
that appears to have had a highly significant impact on the enhancement of loan-portfolio 
quality is the protection of property rights. In general, the results suggest that the quality of 
the banks’ loan portfolios is mostly determined by factors related to the operating 
environment, which may be exogenous to banks’ actions. 
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6.1 Introduction 
One of the key objectives of the transition process in the CEE economies was the 
establishment of sound and efficient banking sectors. After a decade of deep reforms which, 
among others, included the privatization of state-owned banks and the “opening-up” to 
foreign bank entry, the banking sectors of the CEE countries were able to achieve stability 
and improve the financial intermediation efficiency. The entry of the foreign banks was 
associated with the adoption of modern commercial banking techniques, which led to a more 
prudent and efficient banking sector in all the countries. During the second decade of the 
transition process, financial intermediation costs pursued a declining trend, but still remained 
at a higher level compared to the average of the Euro Area (see chapter 2).  
High interest margins, despite the potential positive effects for the profitability and 
sustainability of the banks, are viewed as signals of financial intermediation inefficiency and, 
as such, are considered to have a negative impact on economic activity (Chortareas et al., 
2012). When interest margins are high, potential savers are discouraged by the low deposit 
rates, and credit expansion is impeded by the high loan interest rates, thus negatively 
affecting investment. This is particularly important for the CEE and other countries that lack 
well-functioning equity markets. In the absence of developed equity and bond markets, 
financing options for the enterprises are much more limited, so the economy is more 
dependent on the financing from the banking sector and more sensitive to banks’ net interest 
margins. 
The theoretical and empirical literature emphasizes a number of factors that are considered to 
have an important role in determining the level of interest margins. One of the factors most 
frequently “blamed” for the high level of interest margins is lack of competition. The 
economic reasoning for the relationship between banking sector competition and interest 
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margins, in general, is as follows: the lack of competition provides banks with market power 
which enable them to charge high interest margins and earn monopoly rents, while 
discouraging attempts to enhance their efficiency. The empirical studies investigating the 
determinants of the interest margins have mostly found a negative relationship, suggesting 
that higher competition leads to lower interest margins. A few studies have investigated this 
relationship for the CEE region and have similarly found that competition reduces the interest 
margins. 
However, the majority of empirical studies that have investigated the determinants of interest 
margins have used the market concentration index as a measure of competition. Even though 
largely used in the literature, according to some of the theories elaborated in chapter 3, 
concentration may not represent an adequate measure of competition. In this context, the 
findings on the relationship between market concentration and interest margins might not be 
reflecting the relationship between competition and interest margins. Hence, in order to 
estimate the relationship between banking sector competition and interest margins in the CEE 
countries, we use a direct measure of competition consisting of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic 
for each country/year that we have estimated in chapter 5. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first study to use the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic in estimating the relationship between 
banking sector competition and interest margins for the CEE countries. In addition, we 
employ also the Lerner Index, which is an alternative non-structural measure of market 
power. In order to make our results comparable to other studies, we run an additional 
regression using the market concentration index instead of the competition measure. The 
regression controls also for the impact of other variables, including bank-specific variables, 
macroeconomic variables, and institutional variables. For the dependent variable, we follow 
the majority of the studies in this field that use the net interest margin, which is a measure of 
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financial intermediation cost. The estimation is dynamic, conducted on panel data, and uses 
the General Method of Moments. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents a review of theory and empirical 
literature on the determinants of the interest margins. Section 6.3 deals with the estimation of 
the impact of banking sector competition on net interest margins in the CEE countries, and 
includes the model description, the estimation methodology, and the estimation results. 
Section 6.4 concludes. 
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6.2 Determinants of Interest Rate Margins: Review of Theories 
and Empirical Studies 
This section presents a review of the theoretical and empirical studies on the determinants of 
the interest rate margins. The theoretical review starts with a discussion of the Ho and 
Saunders (1981) “dealership model”, which has provided the basis for the analysis of the 
determinants of interest rate margins. Since the main focus of this study is related to the 
effects of competition on interest rate margins, the section addresses this relationship also 
from the perspective of efficiency and banks’ risk-taking theories. The section continues with 
a review of the empirical studies, focusing on the impact of competition on interest rate 
margins. 
 
6.2.1 Theoretical Background on the determinants of interest rate margins 
The examination of the determinants of the banks’ interest margins has primarily started from 
the pioneer work of Ho and Saunders (1981) who developed a model on the determinants of 
interest margins, where banks are viewed as risk-averse ‘dealers’ demanding one type of 
deposits and supplying one type of loans. For this reason, the Ho and Saunders model in the 
literature is known also as the “dealership model”.  
The model considers that in the process of financial intermediation, i.e. the collection of 
deposits and the supplying of loans, banks face uncertainty. This uncertainty primarily is 
sourced from the fact that the supply of deposits to the bank and the demand for bank loans is 
considered to have a stochastic nature, meaning that the inflow of the deposits in the bank 
and the demand for bank loans is not considered to take place in the same time, which makes 
it likely that banks will be holding unmatched portfolios of loans and deposits, thus 
potentially needing to invest in, or get financing from money markets. As a result, banks face 
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the risk to either hold a “long” or a “short” position in the short-term money market, which 
exposes them to the interest rate risk. 
The bank might be holding a “long” position in the short-term money market when the 
amount of deposits exceeds the amount of loans. To simplify the argument, Ho and Saunders 
suppose that the bank receives a long-term deposit for which it agrees to pay an interest rate 
until its maturity, while no demand for loan has yet taken place. Since there is no demand for 
loans, the bank will have to invest the funds in the money market at a risk-free short-term 
rate. By doing so the bank faces a reinvestment risk if the money market short-term rate falls 
at the end of the period, because the bank would have to continue paying the same deposit 
interest rate while having to reinvest its deposits in the money market at a lower interest rate. 
Similarly, the bank faces an interest rate risk if its position in the money market is “short”, 
which implies that the amount of issued loans exceeds the amount of deposits received. The 
bank can have a “short” position in the money market if, for example, the bank receives a 
demand for a long-term loan while no deposits inflow has taken place. In order to fund the 
loan, the bank will have to borrow in the short-term money market for which it will have to 
pay an interest rate. This exposes the bank to the refinancing risk if the short-term money 
market rate were to increase in the end of the period, because the bank would have to 
continue receiving the agreed loan interest rate while having to pay a higher short-term 
interest rate on the borrowings from the money market.  
Being risk-averse as assumed by the model, the bank will have to set interest rates on 
deposits and loans to minimise the potential risks emanating from the fluctuations of the 
interest rates in the money market. Hence, in order to minimize these risks, the bank will set a 
deposit rate lower than the money market rate, while the loan interest rate will be set at a 
higher level than the money market rate, i.e. the bank will apply a risk-premium on the 
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money market rate. The difference between the loan interest rate set by the bank and the 
deposit interest rate is known as the interest rate spread or as the interest rate margin. Ho and 
Saunders refer to the interest rate spread that is set to protect against such transactions 
uncertainties that arise from the risk of money market rate fluctuations as the pure spread.  
However, the decision-making problem that banks face is to determine the optimal interest 
rate spread, i.e. the interest rate spread that maximizes their expected utility. According to the 
Ho and Saunders model, the optimal interest rate spread will depend on four factors which 
represent the main determinants of the interest rate spread: a) the market structure in which 
the bank operates; b) the degree of risk aversion of the bank’s management; c) the average 
size of bank transactions; and d) the variance of interest rates. 
The model predicts that banks will set higher interest rate spreads if they face relatively 
inelastic demand and supply functions in the markets where they operate, which enables them 
to exert monopoly power and set higher interest rate spreads. Conversely, under higher 
banking sector competition the demand for loans and the supply of deposits are characterized 
by higher price-elasticity. Competition increases the price-elasticity, because both borrowers 
and depositors have more alternatives to borrow from, and to deposit their money in. In a 
competitive market, a bank that increases the loan interest rate would face a lower demand 
for loans, because the potential borrowers would flee to other banks and vice versa if the 
bank reduces the interest rate. Similarly, banks that offer higher deposit interest rates would 
be able to attract more deposits; and vice versa for the banks that offer lower deposit rates. 
Hence, competition is considered to reduce the interest rate margin, since banks would tend 
to set lower loan interest rates in order to be able to lend more and higher deposit interest 
rates in order to attract more deposits. However, as far as the bank’s management is risk-
averse, the interest rate spread will be positive even if the market is highly competitive, 
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because banks will always apply a risk-premium on the interest rate to protect themselves 
from potential losses.   
The variance of interest rates is considered to have a positive impact on the interest margin, 
since banks will set higher premiums to compensate for the potential losses arising from the 
fluctuations in the money market interest rates. As explained above, since banks are viewed 
as entities that keep unmatched portfolio of loans and deposits, they may often need to 
reinvest in, or to get refinancing from the money market at different interest rates. This 
represents a source of uncertainty for the banks. 
The interest rate spread is considered to be positively related also to the degree of the risk-
aversion of the bank’s management and the size of bank transactions. The original study of 
Ho and Saunders (1981) does not provide a more detailed elaboration on the relationship of 
these two influences and the interest margin. Hence, we will expand the discussion on these 
relationships in section 6.3.1 which describes the variables that are included in our empirical 
model for the investigation of the determinants of the net interest margins in the CEE 
countries.  
In spite of the fact that the main source of the risk in the Ho and Saunders model is the 
interest rate risk deriving from the unmatched portfolio of loans and deposits, the size of the 
gap between the volume of loans and deposits is not among the factors considered to 
determine the size of the interest rate spread. According to the authors, in cases when 
deposits are greater than loans the bank will reduce the deposit interest rate to discourage the 
additional deposits and also reduce the loan interest rate to induce the demand for loans, such 
that the interest rate spread remains the same. The bank will act similarly also when the 
demand for loans is greater than the inflow of deposits by increasing the loan interest rate to 
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discourage the demand for loans and increasing the deposit rate to attract additional deposits, 
such that the interest rate spread does not change. 
The Ho and Saunders (1981) model, which assumes that banks’ loan portfolio is 
homogenous, was extended by Allen (1988) who accounts for heterogeneity in the loan 
portfolio, by considering two types of loans. According to the author, product diversification 
can enable the bank to set optimal interest rate spreads for individual products, which can 
result in a lower overall interest rate spread. The Allen (1988) model was further expanded by 
Valverde and Fernández (2007), who assume that the bank portfolio is composed of loans 
and non-traditional assets (which include fee generating assets and other earning assets that 
are different from loans) and deposits.  
Further extensions to the Ho and Saunders (1981) model include Angbazo (1997) who 
expands the model to take into account also the credit risk, i.e. the probability of loan default, 
claiming that a higher probability of loan default has a positive impact on the interest margin. 
Another extension to the model was done by Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) who 
take into account the productive nature of the bank by including within the factors 
determining the interest rate spread production costs arising in the process of collecting 
deposits and issuing loans. The authors predict that production costs have a positive impact 
on the interest rate margin. 
To summarise, the examination of the determinants of the bank interest margins has begun 
with the “dealership model” of Ho and Saunders (1981) which was later extended by other 
authors in order to account for additional factors potentially determining the interest rate 
spread. In all these models, the degree of market competition is one of the main determinants 
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of the interest rate spread and its impact is predicted to be negative, implying that higher 
competition will lead to lower interest rate spreads. 
 
6.2.2 Competition and interest rate margins: the perspective of efficiency 
theories 
Bank interest margins are often viewed as a reflection of the degree of financial 
intermediation efficiency (Claeys and Vennet, 2008; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; 
Sologoub, 2006). A higher interest margin is considered to reflect a lower level of bank’s 
efficiency. Inefficient banks are predicted to set higher interest margins in order to 
compensate for the additional costs that arise from their cost inefficiencies. However, banks 
may be able to set higher interest margins to compensate for their inefficiencies only if 
banking markets operate under imperfect competition, otherwise the inefficient banks would 
not be able to survive in competitive markets.
36
 When competition increases, banks are likely 
to compete through their interest rates, with the banks applying lower interest margins being 
more likely to increase their market shares and survive in the market. However, banks may 
not necessarily be able to reduce their interest margins without enhancing their efficiency. 
Therefore, the increase of competition may induce banks to enhance their efficiency in order 
to be able to set more competitive interest margins. However, even though most of the 
theories predict that competition enhances efficiency, there are also views that argue for a 
negative impact of competition on the degree of efficiency. Hence, in this section we discuss 
the theories linking banking sector competition to the efficiency in order to better understand 
the potential impact of banking sector competition on interest rate margins, which is the focus 
of our analysis. 
                                                          
36
 The hypothesis that banking systems operate in uncompetitive markets has been confirmed by many empirical 
studies, including our results from Chapter 4 for the CEE countries as well as by other empirical studies such as 
De Bandt and Davis (2000) and Bikker et al. (2007). 
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The debate on the relationship between competition and efficiency was initiated by Hicks 
(1935) who came up with the “quiet life” hypothesis, which suggests that monopoly firms are 
less efficient compared to firms operating in more competitive markets. According to this 
hypothesis, monopoly banks’ managers live a “quiet life”, given that market power enables 
them to charge higher prices and, consequently, realize satisfactory profits without taking 
effort to cut their expenditures. However, this hypothesis is challenged by the fact that it does 
not explain why the owners of monopoly firms would exercise less control on the effort of 
the managers compared to the owners of the competitive firms. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), the owner of a monopoly firm has the same incentives to monitor his 
managers as the owner of a firm under a competitive market. However, considering that the 
monopoly firms are likely to face lower price elasticity of demand, one reason for less 
monitoring under monopoly can be that the managers can more easily use price increase to 
satisfy the profit expectations of the owners, thus reducing the incentives of the owners to 
control the managers’ effort in ensuring cost-efficiency.  
The view that competition increases efficiency is shared also by Leibenstein (1966), who 
suggests that this happens for two reasons. First, when competition increases, the firm’s 
profits are likely to decline, so the firm is exposed to the risk of bankruptcy. Hence, in order 
to avoid the personal costs from the potential bankruptcy of the firm, the managers are 
motivated to exert more effort to increase efficiency and so preserve the firm’s profits. 
Second, when the number of firms increases, this enables the owners to compare the 
performance of their own firm relative to the other firms, thus providing a better tool for 
assessing the effort of the managers. In terms of the impact of competition on bank interest 
margins, the additional effort of the managers to increase efficiency by reducing costs will 
enable them to compete with other banks by setting lower interest margins. 
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Other views on the relationship between competition and efficiency are presented by Berger 
and Hannan (1998), who base this relationship on four pillars. First, market power enables 
the firm to charge higher prices, which provide higher profits to the owners, while managers 
will benefit in the form of a “quiet life”, i.e. managers will not be concerned to increase cost-
efficiency. Second, in the absence of competition, managers can pursue objectives other than 
profit-maximization by spending more on staff or other utility-enhancing inputs. This can be 
related to the argument of  Leibenstein (1966), according to which, when the market is 
operated by fewer firms, the owners are limited in terms of their ability to assess the 
managers’ effort given that their performance cannot be compared to other firms’ 
performance. Third, the managers of monopoly firms may incur additional costs by allocating 
resources to activities that help them to retain market power. For example, bank managers 
can allocate resources to lobbying to limit the issuance of new banking licences or to restrict 
the geographic expansion of bank branches. These activities may deter efficiency due to the 
additional costs, even though they may translate into higher profits due to the retention of 
market power. Fourth, the ability to charge higher prices due to market power and to ensure 
economic profits for the owners may let incompetent managers persist over time. Whereas, in 
more competitive markets, competitive pressures will force the managers to be more efficient 
and keep the costs low in order to remain price competitive. The inability to do so may serve 
as a signal that changes in the management structure are needed. 
Considering that, compared to other firms, banks are more exposed to asymmetric 
information problems, Pruteano-Podpiera et al. (2008) propose a different view regarding the 
relationship between competition and efficiency, which is more specifically related to the 
banking industry. The view of Pruteano-Podpiera et al. (2008) on the link between banking 
sector competition and efficiency is called the ‘banking specificities’ hypothesis. This 
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hypothesis is largely based on the concept of relationship-lending that refers to a long-lasting 
relationship between the bank and the client, during which the bank benefits by accumulating 
borrower-specific information. This information on the borrowers is expected to help the 
bank avoid the adverse selection problems in its future decisions and avoid potential moral 
hazard from borrowers. However, as elaborated in chapter 5, relationship-lending tends to 
decrease when the number of banks increases, since the potential borrowers face a larger 
number of alternatives, making it difficult for a bank to maintain strong ties with its clients. 
In this context, the ‘banking specificities’ hypothesis claims that, by reducing relationship-
lending, the increase of competition necessitates the increase of screening and monitoring by 
banks, which entails additional expenses and reduces the efficiency of the bank.  
To summarise, most of the theories on the relationship between competition and efficiency 
predict that higher competition enhances efficiency, which in the case of the banking sector is 
expected to translate into lower interest margins. However, the ‘banking specificities’ 
hypothesis predicts that competition may have a negative impact on banks’ efficiency, thus 
leading to higher interest rate margins. 
 
6.2.3 Competition and interest rate margins: the perspective of bank risk-
taking theories 
The impact of banking sector competition on interest rate margins has been treated also in the 
literature addressing the link between competition and banks’ risk-taking. Most of the studies 
in this field focus on the competition for deposits, arguing that as banks face more 
competition they tend to attract additional deposits by offering higher deposit interest rates in 
order then to be able to seize larger shares in the loans market (Keeley, 1990; Hellman et al., 
2000; Repullo, 2003). Under competitive conditions, banks will not be able to compensate 
higher deposit rates by increasing loan rates. Instead, banks are more likely to reduce the loan 
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interest rates when competition increases in order to maintain/increase their shares in the 
loans market. As a result, the increase of competition is expected to result in lower interest 
rate margins. 
However, some authors argue that the increase of competition does not necessarily lead to 
higher deposit rates. According to Cordello and Yeyati (1998) and Shy and Stanbecka (1998), 
when the bank risk is observable, depositors are ready to accept even lower interest rates on 
their deposits from the banks that are viewed as safer in terms of asset quality. Hence, instead 
of competing through interest rates, banks may decide to use the quality of their assets as a 
strategic instrument to compete in the market for deposits.  
Similarly, Chen (2007) argues that banking sector competition does not necessarily affect the 
interest margins. According to this author, banks can compete by offering lower loan interest 
rates as well as by increasing the screening of the loan applicants. In this view, apart from 
preferring lower loan interest rates, “good” borrowers may also prefer better screening by the 
bank in order to more easily distinguish themselves from the potentially “bad” borrowers. 
This will benefit the good borrowers by granting them easier and more favourable access to 
bank finance in the future. 
Covitz and Heitfield (1999) present a different view regarding the impact of banking sector 
competition on interest rates, arguing that banks operating in more competitive markets 
charge higher loan interest rates. According to this view, in a monopoly market, borrowers 
are more restricted to obey the terms and conditions set by the bank, since they do not have 
alternative sources to secure bank financing. In this context, if the bank considers that the 
loan applicant’s project bears excessive risk, it can either refuse to finance the project or may 
request the applicant to revise the project. Since in more competitive markets borrowers have 
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more financing alternatives, banks are more reluctant to refuse the loan applications and are 
more limited in terms of affecting the level of risk in the loan applicant’s project. According 
to the view of Covitz and Heitfield (1999), the riskier borrowers in more competitive markets 
tend to compensate the bank for the higher risk by being ready to pay higher loan interest 
rates.       
 
6.2.4 Review of empirical studies 
This section presents a review of the empirical literature that examines the determinants of 
net interest margins. The main focus of the section is the impact of banking sector 
competition on the net interest margin, which is also the main focus of this chapter. The 
empirical literature dealing with this issue has mostly followed the dealership model of Ho 
and Saunders (1981) who examined the determinants of the interest rate margins both 
theoretically and empirically. In both cases, competition is viewed as an important 
determinant of the interest rate margins. The studies that have followed the dealership model 
can be separated into the group that examines the determinants of the interest margin based 
on a two-stage model, which is in line with the original empirical estimation of Ho and 
Saunders (1981), and the group of studies that adapt the Ho and Saunders model into a 
single-stage model. 
The main motivation to use a two-stage model is to initially estimate the pure spread which, 
as defined in the section 6.2.1, represents the interest rate spread that banks set to preserve 
themselves from money-market transaction uncertainties. The two-stage approach was first 
used by Ho and Saunders (1981) for a sample of over 100 major US banks, using quarterly 
data for the period 1976–1979. The first step of the model consists of cross-section 
estimations of the actual net interest margins on a set of bank-specific variables that were not 
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taken into account in the theoretical model. These variables consist of: a) implicit interest 
payments
37
, b) the opportunity cost of non-interest bearing reserve requirements; and c) the 
risk of loan default. The intercept term of these cross-section regressions represents the pure 
spread which implies that, at any time, the observable net interest margins will comprise of a 
pure spread, due to the underlying transactions uncertainty, plus the mark-ups for the implicit 
interest payments, the opportunity cost of non-interest bearing reserve requirements, and for 
the risk of loan default. Hence, the first step of the model will generate an estimate of the 
pure spread for the banks in the sample for each period, which is then used as a dependent 
variable in the second stage of the model. In the second stage, the dependent variable pure 
spread is regressed on the “theoretically motivated” variables that were accounted for in the 
Ho and Saunders (1981) theoretical model, which are: the market structure; the degree of 
bank’s management risk aversion; the average size of bank’s transactions; and the variance of 
interest rates.        
The two-stage approach of Ho and Saunders (1981) was followed also by other authors such 
as Saunders and Schumacher (2000), Brock and Suarez (2000), and Männasoo (2012). 
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) investigate the determinants of interest rate margins in six 
selected EU countries and US for the period 1988-1995. Their findings suggest that banks 
operating in banking systems that are more restricted in terms of geographic restrictions on 
branching and universality of banking services appear to have higher interest rate spreads due 
to the higher monopoly power they may possess. A similar approach was followed also by 
Brock and Suarez (2000) for a sample of Latin American countries and Männasoo (2012) for 
Estonia, but they did not control explicitly for the impact of competition on the net interest 
margin. 
                                                          
37
 Implicit interest payments represent the payments through service charge remissions or other types of 
subsidies to the depositors due to the regulatory restrictions on the explicit deposit interest rate payments. 
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The other group of studies applying the dealership model have followed a single-stage model, 
where the net interest margin is estimated on a set of explanatory variables, which include the 
variables that were considered both in the theoretical and the empirical model of Ho and 
Saunders (1981). A number of authors have extended the model to account for additional 
explanatory variables, such as those capturing macroeconomic developments and institutional 
factors. One of the first studies to apply a single-stage dealership model is Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga (1999) who investigated the determinants of bank interest margins for a sample 
of 80 countries for the period 1988-1995. The authors estimate the determinants of the net 
interest margins by using a comprehensive set of explanatory variables, including variables 
explaining bank characteristics, macroeconomic indicators, financial structure variables, 
taxation and regulatory variables, and legal and institutional indexes. The impact of banks’ 
market power on the interest margins is intended to be captured by the market concentration 
index, which was found to have a positive but statistically insignificant impact on the net 
interest margins. An insignificant impact of concentration on the net interest margin was 
found also by Velverde and Fernández (2007) for a sample of seven EU countries, and by 
Chortareas et al. (2012) for a sample of Latin American countries.  
Other studies using the market concentration as a proxy for the market power have mostly 
found a positive and statistically significant impact on the net interest margin, suggesting that 
a higher degree of market concentration provides banks with a higher degree of market power 
which, in turn, enables them to set higher interest margins (Corvoisier and Gropp, 2001; 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2003; Peria and Mody, 2004; Gelos, 2006; Hassan Khan and Khan, 
2010; Schwaiger and Liebeg, 2007; Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008). Nevertheless, there 
are studies such as Tarus et al. (2012), who have found a negative relationship between 
market concentration and net interest margins for the banking system of Kenya in the period 
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2000-2009. They justify their findings based on the fact that the banking system of Kenya is 
dominated by foreign banks, which tend to apply lower interest rate margins. 
The literature on the determinants of the interest rate margins has paid attention also to the 
region of the Central and Eastern Europe, which is also the main focus of our study. These 
studies include Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008) for a sample of 31 Western and Eastern 
Europe countries for the period 1994-2001; Schwaiger and Liebeg (2007) for a sample of ten 
CEE countries that are EU member states and Croatia for the period 2000-2005; Kasman et 
al. (2010) for the new EU members and the candidate countries for the period 1996-2005; and 
Poghosyan (2010) for a sample of 11 CEE countries for the period 1995-2006. These studies 
have found a positive relationship between the market power and the net interest margin, 
except Poghosyan (2010) who has found a statistically insignificant impact of market power 
on the net interest margin.  
Most empirical studies that have investigated the determinants of the banks’ interest margins 
have used the degree of the market concentration as a proxy for market power. The use of the 
degree of market concentration as proxy for market power is based on the SCP paradigm, 
which is considerably criticized for claiming that a higher degree of market concentration 
implies a lower degree of competition (see chapter 3 for a detailed discussion on these 
issues). Therefore, it is questionable whether the results of these empirical studies on the 
impact of concentration on the net interest margins can be taken as valid inferences for the 
impact of market power/competition on net interest margins.   
A few studies have used more direct measures of the market power/competition, which are 
known as non-structural measures of competition. In this regard, Chortareas et al. (2012), in a 
study covering nine Latin American countries for the period 1999-2006 use the Panzar-Rosse 
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H-statistic as a measure of competition and find a significantly negative relationship between 
the H-statistic and the net interest margin, suggesting that higher banking sector competition 
leads to lower interest margins. The H-statistic was used also by Gelos (2006), but its 
relationship with the interest margin appeared statistically insignificant. However, none of 
these studies consider the fact that the H-statistic itself is an estimated variable, which 
contains its own standard errors that should be corrected when applied in a second-stage 
regression; otherwise, the standard errors in the second-stage regression do not reflect the 
imprecision of the first-stage estimation. Some other studies have used the Lerner Index to 
control for the impact of market power on the banks’ interest margins. Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara (2004) used the Lerner Index in a study covering five EU countries for 
the period 1993-2000, where they found a positive relationship between the Lerner Index and 
the net interest margin, suggesting that higher market power leads to higher interest margins. 
Similarly, Kasman et al. (2010) used the Lerner Index in a sample of the new EU members 
and the EU candidate countries for the period 1996-2005 and found a positive relationship.   
The literature that has used the dealership model to estimate the determinants of the net 
interest margins is mostly based on static models for panel data, with only few studies using 
dynamic models. Valverde and Fernández (2007) use the General Method of Moments 
(GMM) to account for the dynamics in the model, considering that the past values of the 
interest margins will affect the current values. The GMM approach was applied also by 
Chortareas et al. (2012). In both cases, the lagged dependent variable, i.e. the lagged interest 
margin, is statistically significant suggesting that the current values of the interest margins are 
affected by the past values.      
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6.3 Estimation of the impact of banking sector competition on   
net interest margins in the CEE countries 
This section presents the estimation of the determinants of the net interest margins in 15 CEE 
countries for the period 1999-2009, where the main focus is the investigation of the impact of 
banking sector competition. The estimation uses data on 285 banks with a total of around 
1,500 yearly observations. This section describes the model used to estimate this relationship 
and continues with the discussion of the estimation methodogy, which is followed by the 
interpretation of the estimation results. 
 
6.3.1 Model description 
For the estimation of the determinants of interest margins we follow the literature applying 
single-stage dealership models, given that the main objective of our exercise is to estimate the 
impact of competition on the interest margin that is derived from actual data, rather than the 
impact on the pure spread which is an estimated variable and may not be a sufficiently 
precise estimate. Moreover, the constant term of a regression picks up the influence on the 
dependent variable of all omitted systematic influences. So, in the two-stage approach the 
assumption has to be imposed that the pure spread is the only omitted systematic influence. If 
this is not the case, then what is being estimated is not the pure spread alone (as claimed by 
the methodology). 
The explanatory variables included in our regression consist of bank specific variables that 
are mainly in line with Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) but, in order to capture the 
potential impact of the overall macroeconomic environment and the institutional factors on 
the interest margins we expand the set of explanatory variables to include also 
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macroeconomic and institutional variables in line with Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). 
Hence, the model takes the following form: 
 
 
 
(6.1.) 
Where, i (1,...n) indexes the banks and t (1,..,T) the years. 
Table 6.1 Description of variables 
 
Variables Description 
nim 
Net interest margin: 
(interest income - interest expenses)/average 
earning assets 
Lagnim lagged dependent variable 
h-stat Panzar Rosse H-statistic 
equity_ta equity / total assets 
nonintinc_ta 
total non-interest operating income / total 
assets 
loggross_loans Logarithm of gross loans 
prov_loans loan-loss provisions / total loans 
lqdassets_custstfunding 
liquid assets / customer deposits and short-
term funding 
nonintexp_ta total non-interest expenses / total assets 
earningassets_ta total earning assets / total assets 
bankdep_custdep bank deposits / customer deposits 
ebrd_bankref EBRD index of banking reform 
economic_freedom 
Economic Freedom Index (Heritage 
Foundation) 
rgdpgrowth real GDP growth rate 
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ititititit
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itititit
itititititit
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gdp_percap gdp per capita 
cpi_ebrd inflation 
dv_foreign 
dummy variable for foreign ownership (1 
for foreign ownership) 
dv_origin 
dummy variable for the country-of-origin of 
the bank (1 for EU-12 or US) 
dv_year dummy variable for year 
dv_country dummy variable for country 
 
For the dependent variable we follow the majority of studies that investigate the determinants 
of the interest margins by using the Net Interest Margin (NIM), which is calculated as total 
interest income minus total interest expenditures divided by total earning assets. By choosing 
the NIM for the dependent variable, we decide to use an ex-post measure of interest margins 
rather than an ex-ante measure. The ex-post measure is calculated by using actual interest 
income and interest expenditure data, whereas the ex-ante measure of the interest margin is 
calculated from the contractual interest rates on loans and deposits. The ex-post interest 
margin is considered to be a better measure compared to the ex-ante, since the ex-post 
measure includes only the interest that is received by the bank, thus controlling for the unpaid 
interest from the defaulted loans. Nevertheless, the default risk premium is still incorporated 
in the ex-post measure, since the risk-averse banks will set higher interest margins in order to 
be compensated for the perceived credit default risk (Gelos, 2006). In addition, ex-ante 
interest margins are difficult to use in a study like this given that the available databases 
usually report the ex-ante interest rates at the country level and not for the individual banks. 
Moreover, the ex-ante interest rates are usually collected from different sources, thus making 
inter-country comparisons more difficult. 
As mentioned in section 6.2.4, most of the studies investigating the determinants of the net 
interest margins use the market concentration indices to control for banking sector 
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competition. However, by recalling the discussion on the efficient structure hypothesis and 
the contestability theory from chapter 3, it may be considered that market concentration may 
not be an adequate measure of banking sector competition. In addition, the market 
concentration index takes into account only the banks operating within a country, thus 
excluding the potential competitive pressures coming from outside a country’s borders, which 
is especially important for the EU member states that have more integrated financial sectors. 
Taking into account these criticisms, we consider that inferences on the relationship between 
competition and the net interest margins derived from studies that use the degree of market 
concentration as a proxy for competition might be questionable. 
Therefore, to control for the impact of banking sector competition on the net interest margins, 
we use the H-statistic (h_stat1) that is produced by using the Panzar-Rosse approach, which 
directly quantifies the competitive behaviour of the bank (chapter 3 provides a detailed 
explanation of the Panzar-Rosse approach). To our knowledge, this is the first study to use 
the H-statistic as a measure of competition within the literature investigating the determinants 
of bank interest margins in the CEE countries, and one of the few within the overall literature 
in this field. The use of the H-statistic marks an important difference also to the study of 
Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) which, otherwise, we largely follow with respect 
to the choice of explanatory variables. The procedure and the results of the estimation of the 
H-statistic for each country/year are presented in chapter 5 (Section 5.4.1). Unlike Gelos 
(2006) and Chortareas et al. (2012), who do not acknowledge the fact that the H-statistic is an 
estimated variable, we acknowledge this fact and apply the bootstraping technique to correct 
the standard errors of the H-statistic. As higher values of the H-statistic reflect higher degree 
of competition, the expected sign of the H-statistic with regard to its impact on the NIM is 
negative, meaning that competition is expected to reduce the net interest margins. Under 
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more competition, banks are expected to use the reduction of the interest margins as a 
competing strategy for increasing/maintaining their market share. By reducing the interest 
margins, banks will be offering higher deposit interest rates in order to become more 
attractive to the depositors and lower loan interest rates in order to induce the demand for 
loans. For comparison, we run a separate regression in which we replace the h_stat1 variable 
with the h_stat3. As explained in the previous section, these two measures differ from each 
other with respect to the dependent variable that has been used when they were estimated.
38
 
The investigation in this chapter assumes the interpretation of the H-statistic as a continuous 
variable, as in chapter 5, and the supporting literature for, and possible caveats to this, are 
discussed in section 5.4.2.1. 
In order to verify our inferences on the impact of competition on the net interest margin, we 
run a separate model using the Lerner Index (lerner_index) as a measure of market power. 
The Lerner Index is obtained from the study of Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2013) who have 
estimated this index for individual CEE countries for each year in the period 2002-2010.
39
 
The Lerner Index is considered to be inversely related to the H-statistic, with higher values of 
the Lerner Index implying higher market power. Hence, the expected sign of the Lerner Index 
is positive, with higher market power being expected to lead to higher interest margins. For 
comparison with other studies, we also run a regression that controls for the impact of the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (hhi_dep) which is a measure of market concentration.  
                                                          
38
 The dependent variable in a Panzar-Rosse model may be the bank’s interest income or the total income. Since 
there is no conclusive argument on which is more appropriate, in order to test for robustness, we have run 
separate cross-section estimations using both the interest income as the dependent variable and the total income. 
The h_stat1 variable was estimated using interest income as the dependent variable; and the h_stat3 was 
estimated using total income as the dependent variable. 
39
 The Lerner Index estimates are not available for Estonia and Lithuania. 
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The model controls also for other variables which can be classified in three categories: a) 
bank-specific variables; b) institutional variables; and c) macroeconomic variables. 
a) Bank-specific variables 
The degree of risk aversion (equity_ta)  
In line with the original dealership model, one of the variables in our model controls for the 
degree of risk aversion, which is proxied by the equity to total assets ratio (equity_ta).
40
 
Banks holding higher equity ratios are considered to be more risk-averse, because the costs 
associated with a potential bankruptcy would imply the loss of their equity. And more risk-
averse banks are expected to have higher net interest margins, according to Ho and Saunders 
(1981). In addition, since equity financing is considered to be more expensive than external 
financing, banks holding higher equity ratios are expected to set higher interest margins in 
order to compensate for the higher costs of holding equity. According to Claeys and Vennet 
(2008), the relationship between banks capitalization and the interest margin is expected to be 
positive for two reasons. First, a high capitalization ratio enables the bank to increase the 
portfolio of riskier assets which have higher rates of return, thus leading to a higher interest 
rate margin. Second, a higher capitalization ratio serves as a good signal of bank’s 
creditworthiness, thus making the bank more attractive to depositors willing to deposit their 
money in safer banks at lower deposit interest rates.  On the other hand, according to 
Molyneux et al. (1994), the equity ratio may have a negative impact on a bank’s interest 
income since better capitalized banks tend to be more conservative and, hence, invest in less 
risky assets which also have lower interest rates. Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
                                                          
40
 According to Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004), the degree of risk-aversion would be better reflected 
by the amount of capital held in excess of the regulatory capital requirements. However, the data on the capital 
adequacy ratio in the BankScope database is available only for a small number of the banks. Hence, the equity 
to total assets ratio is the most widely used measure of the degree of risk-aversion in the empirical literature.  
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(1999), the capitalization ratio in our model is treated as a potentially endogenous variable 
with the NIM. Banks that have higher interest margins may be considered to have also higher 
profits which, in turn, may enable them to raise additional capital.  
Credit default risk (prov_loans) 
Since our measure of the interest margin is calculated based on ex-post interest revenues and 
expenses, we consider that the impact of the credit risk on the net interest margin may be 
treated from two perspectives: first, a higher credit risk may have a positive impact on the 
NIM, since banks are expected to set higher risk premiums on the loan interest rates in order 
to compensate for the potential losses associated with credit default; second, the impact on 
the NIM can be negative since defaulted loans will not generate interest income. For the 
measure of credit risk, we follow Poghosyan (2010) and Tarus et al. (2012) who use the loan-
loss provisions to total loans ratio (prov_loans) to explain the impact of credit risk on interest 
rate margins. A more direct measure of credit risk could be the non-performing loans ratio, 
but this variable is characterized by a considerable missing of data in the BankScope 
database.  
The credit risk variable is treated as endogenous due to the potential impact of the NIM on 
credit risk. Saunders and Allen (2002) argue that high loan interest rates lead to higher credit 
defaults which require more loan-loss provisions to be allocated. However, higher interest 
rates may also reduce the credit risk by discouraging the potentially weak borrowers from 
applying for loans (see chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion on the relationship between 
net interest margins and credit risk). 
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Average size of the bank transactions (loggross_loans) 
One of the most important determinants of the interest margins in the theoretical model of Ho 
and Saunders (1981) is the average size of the bank transactions, which is expected to have a 
positive impact on the net interest margin. The larger the size of the transaction, i.e. credit 
transaction, the larger is expected to be the potential loss associated with that transaction, so a 
higher risk premium will be applied. However, since the data available in the BankScope 
database do not provide sufficient information for the calculation of the average size of bank 
transactions, we follow Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) by using the amount of 
gross loans (loggross_loans). Despite using it as a control variable, we do not consider it as a 
very good measure of the average size of the bank transactions, because the number of loans 
in a portfolio, irrespective of the volume of the portfolio, may vary according to the mix of 
household and firm customers. Nevertheless, the evidence provided in EBRD (2006) that 
smaller banks mainly lend to smaller companies may serve as a supportive evidence for the 
use of gross loans to proxy the average transactions size. The loggross_loans variable is 
treated as potentially endogenous given that the change of loan interest rates may affect the 
demand and, therefore, the volume of loans.  
Opportunity cost of bank reserves (lqdassets_custstfunding) 
Central banks usually request the banks to hold a certain fraction of their deposits as reserves, 
which usually are held as cash in bank treasuries and as deposits with the central bank. The 
required reserves are remunerated at an interest rate that is lower than the market rate, thus 
incurring an opportunity cost to the bank. Therefore, a higher volume of reserves held by 
banks is expected to have a positive impact on the net interest margin, since banks will tend 
to compensate for the opportunity cost of holding reserves. Since the BankScope database 
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does not provide sufficient information related to the volume of reserves held by banks, we 
follow Poghosyan (2010) and Männasoo (2012) by using the bank’s liquid assets as a proxy 
for its reserves, based on the fact that reserves comprise an important part of the liquid assets. 
Therefore, as a proxy for the opportunity cost of bank reserves we use the ratio between the 
liquid assets and total customer deposits and short-term funding (lqdassets_custstfunding). In 
principle, this ratio is expected to have a positive impact on the net interest margin, since 
banks would tend to compensate the opportunity cost of holding reserves by setting higher 
interest margins. On the other hand, since the liquid assets are composed of reserves and 
other short-term assets that have a lower return compared to other assets, a higher share of 
liquid assets may imply less interest income for the bank and, consequently, a lower net 
interest margin. 
Non-interest operating income (nonintinc_ta) 
The bank income is usually classified in two categories: the income generated by core 
banking activities, which is the interest income; and the income from other bank activities 
(e.g. income from fees and commissions, brokerage activities, foreign exchange transactions) 
which is called non-interest income (Stiroh, 2006).  Even though there may be no direct link 
between the interest income and the non-interest income, indirectly they can affect each 
other. For example, a bank realizing strong earnings from non-interest generating activities 
may be more competitive in the interest generating activities by being able to afford to set 
lower interest rate margins. Hence, among the variables included in the regression to explain 
the net interest margins we include also the non-interest income to total assets ratio 
(nonintinc_ta) which is expected to have a negative sign. This variable is treated as 
potentially endogenous given that the causality between the non-interest income and the net 
interest margin can also take the opposite direction. For example, banks can reduce their 
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interest rates to induce demand for loans and compensate part of the reduced interest income 
by increasing the revenues from non-interest generating assets.   
Operating Expenditures (nonintexp_ta) 
Operating expenditures are considered to be an important determinant of the net interest 
margins. Banks that operate with higher expenditures are expected to set higher interest 
margins in order to be able to compensate for the higher costs. In our regression we control 
for the impact of operating expenditures by including among our explanatory variables the 
total non-interest expenses to total assets ratio (nonintexp_ta). However, if banks can increase 
their profits by setting higher net interest margins, then they can be less motivated to improve 
their operating efficiency, which implies that the causality can also go from the net interest 
margin to the operating costs (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). In order to control for this 
potential two-way causality, we treat the nonintexp_ta variable as potentially endogenous.   
Implicit interest payments (implicit_rate) 
Apart from paying an explicit interest rate on deposits, banks often provide “free” services to 
their clients which imply additional expenses for the banks and are known as implicit interest 
payments. To measure the implicit interest payments, we follow Ho and Saunders (1981), 
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) and Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) by using 
the operating expenses minus non-interest income expressed as a percentage of total assets 
(implicit_rate). The implicit_rate is expected to have a positive impact on the net interest 
margin, since banks are expected to compensate the additional expenses of interest implicit 
payments by setting higher interest margins. However, since the implicit_rate in itself 
contains the operating expenses (nonintexp_ta) and non-interest income (nonintinc_ta), both 
of which are used as individual explanatory variables, its use in the main model causes a 
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multicolineaerity problem. Hence, we include the implicit_rate only in a separate model 
specification, in which we exclude the nonintexp_ta and the nonintinc_ta variables. The 
implicit_rate variable is treated as potentially endogenous given that both of its components 
are individually considered to be potentially endogenous. 
Quality of management (earningassets_ta) 
The behaviour of the net interest margins is considered to be related also to the bank’s 
management quality, supposing that a good management leads to a profitable-composition of 
a bank’s portfolio. Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) use the operating costs to gross 
income ratio as a proxy for the quality of management which, in our view, is quite similar to 
the operating expenditures to total assets ratio that is one of the explanatory variables in our 
regression. Therefore, we follow Agoraki (2010) who uses the earning assets to total assets 
ratio (earningassets_ta) as a proxy of the quality of management, claiming that better 
management is reflected into a higher earning assets to total assets ratio. According to 
Agoraki (2010), the quality of management (earningassets_ta) should have a positive impact 
on the net interest margin as it reflects profitable management decisions. However, it may 
also be expected that the quality of management may have a negative impact on the net 
interest margin, since a higher-quality management is expected to make the bank more 
competitive by enhancing the efficiency and reducing the interest margins. Controlling for 
the quality of management in our regression, except its importance from the economic point 
of view, is important also from the statistical point of view. Usually the quality of 
management is one of the variables that is not measured empirically and is left to enter the 
error term. By including this variable among the explanatory variables we take it out of the 
error term which reduces the potential endogeneity in the model.  
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Composition of deposits (bankdep_custdep) 
According to Claeys and Vender Vennet (2008), the composition of deposits may be an 
important determinant of the net interest margin. To control for the composition of deposits, 
we use the share of deposits from banks to total customer deposits (bankdep_custdep). Given 
that deposits from banks are considered to be more expensive compared to deposits from 
customers, a higher share of deposits from banks would result in higher interest expenditures, 
thus reducing the net interest margin. On the other hand, a higher reliance on deposits from 
banks may push banks to charge higher loan interest rates in order to compensate for the 
higher interest expenditures, which may increase the net interest margin. Therefore, the 
expected sign of the bankdep_custdep variable may be considered as rather ambiguous.  
 Foreign Ownership (dv_foreign) 
Even though the original dealership model does not consider a bank’s ownership to be among 
the determinants of interest margins, some authors argue that foreign ownership may have an 
important role in the determination of the interest margins. Lehner and Schnitzer (2008) 
argue that one of the channels through which foreign ownership may have a negative impact 
on the interest margins is the efficiency channel. Foreign banks are considered to be superior 
in terms of screening utilities and technology utilization, which may lead to lower average 
costs. In addition, a higher entry of foreign banks may increase competition, thus potentially 
leading to lower interest margins. According to Claeys and Hainz (2007), foreign ownership 
may affect the interest margins through the portfolio channel. Based on this view, foreign 
banks are more conservative and tend to engage mainly in the financing of safer projects, 
which bear lower interest rates. 
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However, according to Poghosyan (2010), the control for foreign ownership may not be 
necessary in a dealership model, given that the channels of efficiency and competition are 
already controlled for in such models. Most of the dealership models include a variable on the 
cost efficiency of the bank as well as a variable on the market structure or banking sector 
competition, implying that the efficiency and competition channels, through which foreign 
ownership is considered to affect the interest margins, are already controlled for. Also, the 
portfolio channel in most cases is controlled for by a credit risk variable such as the non-
performing loans ratio or the loan-loss provisions ratio.  
In our model, assuming that foreign ownership may affect the net interest margin also 
through other channels, different from the above mentioned (e.g. corporate governance), we 
include the foreign ownership variable in order to control for whether the net interest margins 
of the foreign owned banks differ significantly from the net interest margins of the domestic 
banks. For comparison, we also run a separate regression that does not control for bank’s 
ownership. Given that the readily available BankScope database provides information only 
on the current ownership of the bank, we utilize the shareholders’ history from this database 
through which we identify the bank’s ownership for the available years. Based on this 
information, we construct a dummy variable (dv_foreign) which takes a value of 1 when the 
bank is more than 51% foreign-owned and 0 when the bank is domestically owned. It must be 
noted that this variable is characterized by a more pronounced rate of missing data than are 
the other variables, which reduces our number of observations. 
Country-of-origin of the banks (dv_origin) 
Given that the foreign banks that operate in the CEE region originate from different 
countries, we consider that the country-of-origin of the banks may also play a role in the way 
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that banks exercise their activity, especially given the fact that foreign banks operating in the 
CEE countries are mostly subsidiaries of their parent banks. This implies that their strategy 
and organizational culture may largely be in line with the standards in their home countries. 
According to Hasselman (2006), the activity of foreign banks in the transition economies is 
mostly determined by the strategic considerations of the parent banks. Therefore, we 
construct a dummy variable (dv_origin) which takes a value of 1 if the bank is an EU-12 or 
US country and 0 if the bank’s origin is some other country.      
 
b) Institutional variables 
EBRD banking reform index (ebrd_bankref) 
The banking sector reform process in the transition economies led the transformation from 
centrally-planned to market-based banking sectors. This process included the liberalization of 
the commercial banks’ operations (including also interest rate liberalization), the entry of 
private domestic and foreign banks in the markets, the development of the legal framework, 
and the development of regulatory and supervisory institutions. These reforms transformed 
the banking sectors of the CEE countries into modern banking sectors, thus potentially 
affecting also the financial intermediation efficiency. Hence, among the control variables we 
include also the EBRD banking reform index (ebrd_bankref) which takes values from 1 to 
4+, with higher values indicating more advanced reform progress (a more detailed 
explanation of the index was provided in chapter 2). 
Economic Freedom Index (economic_freedom_hrt)  
The Economic Freedom Index (economic_freedom_hrt) of the Heritage Foundation indicates 
the freedom of individuals to exercise their economic activity. The economic freedom index 
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looks at ten areas which include: the protection of property rights; freedom from corruption; 
fiscal freedom; government spending; business freedom; labour freedom; monetary freedom; 
trade freedom; investment freedom; and financial freedom. The index takes values from 0 to 
100, with higher values indicating a higher level of economic freedom. This index can be 
considered as a general indicator of the overall operating environment given the wide scope 
of the activities that it covers. The perceptions on the operating environment are considered 
to be an important element for the banks in the process of setting risk-premiums on loan 
interest rates. Therefore, the economic freedom index is expected to have a negative impact 
on the net interest margin, since a higher index reflects a more secure business environment. 
This index has been used also by other studies on this field, including Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(2003) and Schwaiger and Liebeg (2007).  
c) Macroeconomic variables 
Real GDP growth rate (rgdpgrowth) 
The real GDP growth rate (rgdpgrowth) is included in the regression to control for the change 
of economic conditions. A higher growth rate of the real GDP suggests that the business 
activity in the economy is increasing, implying better performance for businesses and a 
higher level of income. The increase of the business performance and income in the economy 
is expected to reduce the default rates of the borrowers and, consequently, reduces the credit 
risk for the banks. As a response to the decrease of the credit risk, banks are expected to 
reduce their risk premiums on their loan rates, thus reducing their net interest margins. 
However, when the economy is growing, aggregate demand increases, thus encouraging 
firms to further expand their business activity. The expansion of business activity implies 
higher investments which, in turn, increase the demand for loans. The increase of the demand 
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for loans may cause an upward pressure to the loan interest rates, which implies that the 
growth rate of the real GDP may have a positive impact on the net interest margin. 
Nevertheless, it must be considered that despite the potential increase of loan interest rates 
due to the higher demand, the net interest margin may not be much affected if banks have to 
offer higher deposit rates in order to be able to finance the credit growth. When the economy 
is growing, savers have more favourable opportunities to invest their savings; hence, higher 
interest rates must be offered in order to attract the depositors to save their money in the 
banks.  
The empirical literature has mostly found a negative relationship between real GDP growth 
and the net interest margin (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Gelos, 2006, Kasman et al. 
2010; Valverde and Fernández, 2007). However, there are also studies that have found a 
positive impact (Claessens et al. 2001; Schwaiger and Liebeg, 2007).   
GDP per capita (gdp_percap) 
GDP per capita (gdp_percap) is included to control for the differences in the economic 
development of the countries and, as such, also reflects differences in banking technology, 
and other aspects of banking regulations omitted from the regression (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 1999). GDP per capita is often regarded also as a proxy for the quality of 
institutions, since more developed countries are also expected to have better institutions. The 
impact of the GDP per capita on the net interest margins is expected to be negative, since a 
higher level of economic development is expected to imply lower risks for the banks.   
Inflation (cpi_ebrd) 
Inflation is generally considered to have a positive impact on the net interest margin. Higher 
inflation rates may be expected to increase the default risk of the borrowers, thus leading 
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banks to charge higher loan interest rates (Chortareas et al., 2012). However, recalling our 
results from chapter 5, where we have found an insignificant impact of inflation on the loan-
loss provisions ratio in the CEE countries, it is likely that banks have not increased their risk-
premiums on loan interest rates as a way to protect against the potential impact of inflation on 
credit risk.   
According to Perry (1992), the relationship between inflation and the net interest margin 
depends on whether inflation is anticipated or unanticipated. If the inflation is anticipated, 
banks will make an upward adjustment to the loan interest rates, thus increasing their interest 
margins. On the other hand, if the inflation rate is unanticipated, banks may be slow in 
adjusting the interest rates.  
The empirical literature on the determinants of the net interest margins has mainly found a 
positive impact of inflation on the interest margin (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; 
Claeys and Vennet, 2008; Kasman et al., 2010; Chortareas et al., 2012). On the other hand, a 
few studies have found a negative impact (Abreu and Mendes, 2003; Peria and Mody, 2004).        
Volatility of interbank interest rates (stdev_interbank) 
Based on the theoretical background of the dealership model, the volatility of market interest 
rates is an important risk to the banks. Fluctuations in money market interest rates may affect 
a bank’s financial position by affecting its yields when reinvesting in the money market and 
its costs when refinancing from the money market. Hence, banks apply risk-premiums to both 
loan and deposit rates in order to protect in relation to the money market interest rate risk. To 
proxy the volatility of the money market interest rates, we follow Maudos and Fernández de 
Guevara (2004) by using the annual standard deviation of the daily three-month interest rates 
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in the inter-bank market (stdev_interbank).
41
 However, the use of this variable in our case 
incurs problems due to missing data for some of the countries in the sample, which 
considerably reduces our sample size. The interbank interest rate data are fully missing for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and partially missing for some other countries such as Albania, 
Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia. Hence, we exclude this variable from the main model, but 
run a separate regression in which we control for the volatility of the interbank interest rates. 
Taking into account that banks operating in the CEE countries heavily rely on customer 
deposits and that the inter-bank market is not well-developed, we do not expect the money 
market interest rates to have an important impact on the banks’ net interest margins. 
Dummy variables for countries (dv_country) 
Since the banks included in our sample are from different countries, a complete set of country 
dummies (dv_country) is included in the model in order to control for unobserved country-
specific effects. 
Dummy variables for years (dv_year) 
To take into account the potential impact from the time-specific effects, the model includes a 
complete set of year dummy variables (dv_year). By including the year dummies we also 
minimize the possibility of cross-group residual correlation if there has been some year-
specific development that has affected all the banks included in the sample (e.g. global 
financial crisis). If such a development is not controlled by year dummies, then it goes to the 
error term and leads to cross-group residual correlation, hence to biased and inconsistent 
estimates.  
                                                          
41
 The data for the daily three-month interbank market interest rates are sourced from the Bloomberg database. 
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Data 
The bank-level data that are used in our estimation are sourced from the BankScope database. 
The data on the real GDP growth rate have been obtained from the EU Commission 
(AMECO database) and the IMF; whereas the GDP per capita and inflation data are obtained 
from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The banking reform 
index is obtained from the EBRD, whereas the Economic Freedom Index is obtained from the 
Heritage Foundation. 
Table 6.2 Summary statistics 
 
          
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
nim 2915 5.029 3.835 -16.940 38.820 
Lagnim 2470 5.111 3.864 -12.080 38.820 
h_stat1 2650 -1.212 2.122 -11.728 5.187 
equity_ta 2926 15.373 13.280 -12.440 98.660 
nonintinc_ta 2912 2.905 4.944 -5.357 85.668 
loggross_loans 2908 12.255 1.899 4.812 17.195 
prov_loans 2628 1.934 4.945 -48.156 49.689 
lqdassets_custstfunding 2894 46.814 39.329 0.030 586.210 
nonintexp_ta 2908 4.636 4.516 -0.969 75.827 
earningassets_ta 2919 85.041 12.273 0.498 99.860 
bankdep_custdep 2626 2.381 19.419 0.000 477.994 
ebrd_bankref1 2914 3.343 0.572 1.000 4.000 
economic_freedom_hrt 2676 59.792 7.487 29.400 78.000 
rgdpgrowth 2909 3.976 4.172 -17.729 13.501 
gdp_percap 2925 7709.1 5039.1 933.4 27128.5 
cpi_ebrd 2926 6.561 9.603 -2.700 97.128 
dv_foreign 2155 0.638 0.481 0 1 
dv_origin 2155 0.484 0.500 0 1 
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6.3.2 Methodology and Diagnostic tests 
The estimation of the determinants of net interest margins for our sample of data is conducted 
using the system General Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimator, which was 
initially developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and extended by Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998).
42
 The reasons to use the system GMM approach include: 
- The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in static, fixed effects estimation 
of our panel data rejects the hypothesis of no autocorrelation, hence 
suggesting that our model should be estimated with a dynamic approach 
(see Appendix 4.1 for the autocorrelation test). To account for the 
dynamics in our model, we introduce the lagged dependent variable among 
the explanatory variables. However, this will not be the appropriate 
solution if our estimator consists of the usual static panel data techniques 
such as fixed effects or random effects estimation, due to the potential 
endogeneity between the error term and the lagged dependent variable. 
The system GMM approach overcomes the problem of endogeneity 
between the lagged dependent variable and the error term as well as the 
endogeneity between the explanatory variables by using instrumental 
variables from within the dataset.   
- Enables the consideration of both the time and cross-sectional variation in 
the model. 
- The error term in the GMM model allows for for bank-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
                                                          
42
 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed explanation of the General Method of Moments. 
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- Is suitable for data sets with large number of individuals (N) and short 
time-series (T) which is the case with our sample. 
- Apart from the statistical reasons, there is also an economic rational for 
using a dynamic model to estimate the determinants of the net interest 
margins. The dynamic model enables us to capture the persistence of the 
dependent variable when there is at least some degree of continuity in the 
banking environment and banking behaviour. The underlying reason why 
this is possible with a dynamic model is that the lagged dependent variable 
captures the entire time-path (or history) of the dependent variable. In 
other words, in a dynamic model history is accounted for, while in a static 
model history is excluded. In our regression, where the dependent variable 
is the net interest margin, we consider that the past values of the dependent 
variable to some extent are expected to be reflected in the current values, 
given that interest rates are partially affected by some factors that are 
expected to change gradually over time. For example, the efficiency of 
banks and the monetary policy stance are considered to represent 
important factors for the determination of the net interest margins, but 
these are considered to change gradually rather than having a high degree 
of instability from year to year. 
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Diagnostic tests 
The diagnostic tests in the GMM approach start with the tests of the validity of instruments. 
The instrument validity can be tested in two ways: a) Arellano-Bond tests for first-order and 
second-order serial correlation in the residuals; and b) the Sargan test and the Hansen test of 
over-identifying restrictions. 
The Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator requires that there is no second-order serial 
correlation in the error term of the first-order differenced model. In our case, this requirement 
is satisfied, suggesting that the instruments are valid. However, for this test to be reliable the 
model should have first-order autocorrelation in the differenced error terms, which implies 
that errors in levels do not follow a random walk. The null hypothesis that there is no first-
order serial correlation in the error term can be rejected at the 1% confidence level, 
suggesting that the test for second-order serial correlation is reliable (Appendix 4.3, 
Specification 1). 
The other tests on the validity of instruments are represented by the Sargan test and Hansen 
test, which control whether the over-identifying instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
term. The Sargan test is not robust to the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, 
whereas the Hansen test is robust to both and, as such, is considered to be more reliable 
(Roodman, 2005b). In our case, the Sargan test rejects the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, but the hypothesis is not rejected by the 
Hansen test with a p-value of 0.555 (Appendix 4.3, Specification 1). 
The Hansen test statistics can be used also to test the validity of subsets of instruments 
through the Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets. In this regard, we 
initially test for the joint validity of the differenced instruments used for the “level” equation. 
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The test results suggest that the null hypothesis that the differenced instruments are valid may 
not be rejected, hence providing support to the choice of the “system” GMM over the 
“differenced” GMM to estimate our equation.43 Similarly, the Hansen test statistics do not 
reject the null hypothesis for the validity of other subsets of instruments, including the 
instruments for the lagged dependent variable and the subset of instruments for other 
explanatory variables that are considered to be potentially endogenous. Similarly, the Hansen 
test does not reject the exogeneity hypothesis for the variables that are considered as 
exogenous (see Appendix 4.3, Specification 1). 
Another concern related to the specification of panel data models has been raised by Sarafidis 
et al. (2006), who claim that panel data models are likely to suffer from cross-sectional 
dependence, “which may arise due to spatial dependence, economic distance, common 
shocks”. In order to tackle this problem, we have followed the conventional method of 
including year dummies in the model. However, Sarafidis et al. (2006) claim that the 
inclusion of time dummies is not sufficient to tackle the problem of cross-sectional 
dependence, suggesting that the above-mentioned tests of instrument validity may be 
indicative for the presence of a cross-sectional dependence problem. In this regard, our 
results that there is no evidence of second-order serial correlation in the residuals may imply 
that there is no heterogeneous error cross-section dependence. Also, our results on the 
validity of the lagged dependent variable instruments may be considered as indication that 
there is no obvious problem with heterogeneous error cross-section dependence. 
Finally, we perform a specification check for our model related to the size of the coefficient 
on the lagged dependent variable which, in our case, is in line with the suggestion of 
Roodman (2006), who claims that a good estimate of the true parameter obtained through the 
                                                          
43
 See Chapter 5 for a detailed explanation of the differences between “system” GMM and “differenced” GMM.  
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GMM should lie between the estimates obtained from the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
the Fixed Effects (FE) methods. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable obtained 
through the GMM is 0.63, which is larger than the coefficient of 0.36 obtained through the 
FE method and smaller than the coefficient of 0.75 obtained through OLS (see Appendix 4.2 
for the FE and OLS estimation results). 
 
6.3.3 Estimation results 
This section presents the estimation results for the investigation of the determinants of net 
interest margins in the CEE countries for the period 1999-2009. Table 6.3 presents a number 
of different model specifications, where the first column (specification 1) presents the main 
specification and the rest are alternative specifications, which are mainly included to test for 
robustness.  
The lagged dependent variable (Lagnim) is highly significant in all the model specifications, 
thus confirming the dynamic nature of our model and showing that net interest margins are 
persistent over time and follow a gradual adjustment towards new conditions. The coefficient 
of 0.628 (specification 1) shows a moderate persistence of the lagged net interest margin, 
suggesting that the margins in the current year to some extent reflect the margins of the 
previous year. 
As expected, our results show a significant negative impact of the H-statistic on the net 
interest margin, suggesting that competition has contributed to the decline of net interest 
margins in the CEE countries. The coefficient of the H-statistic (h_stat1) is statistically 
significant at the 10% confidence level. Since we use a dynamic model to estimate the impact 
of competition on net interest margins, we are able also to estimate the long-run impact of 
competition. In the long run, the H-statistic has a coefficient of -0.66, which suggests that in 
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the long run the impact of competition on net interest margins remains negative and the 
impact is larger than in the short run.    
Table 6.3 Estimation results (dependent variable: net interest margin) 
                
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES nim nim nim nim nim nim nim 
        Lagnim 0.628*** 0.638*** 0.639*** 0.612*** 0.647*** 0.666*** 0.592*** 
 
(0.086) (0.082) (0.088) (0.106) (0.083) (0.070) (0.081) 
h_stat1 -0.029* -0.016 
   
-0.033* 0.178** 
 
(0.016) (0.017) 
   
(0.018) (0.086) 
hstat1_dvnoneu 
 
-0.069 
     
  
(0.055) 
     h_stat3 
  
-0.030* 
    
   
(0.016) 
    lerner_index 
   
0.012*** 
   
    
(0.004) 
   hhi_dep 
    
0.0003** 
  
     
(0.0001) 
  equity_ta 0.036** 0.041** 0.031* 0.038* 0.041** 0.034* -0.007 
 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) 
nonintinc_ta -0.108 -0.142 -0.078 -0.100 -0.112 -0.171* -0.239** 
 
(0.099) (0.106) (0.084) (0.104) (0.106) (0.089) (0.113) 
loggross_loans 0.190* 0.190* 0.149 0.170* 0.214** 0.237** 0.035 
 
(0.098) (0.101) (0.100) (0.102) (0.084) (0.101) (0.063) 
prov_loans 0.076 0.093 0.072 0.086 0.097** 0.075 0.022 
 
(0.050) (0.072) (0.066) (0.060) (0.049) (0.072) (0.050) 
lqdassets_custstfun -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
nonintexp_ta 0.132 0.120 0.098 0.136 0.171* 0.179** 0.271*** 
 
(0.101) (0.119) (0.101) (0.113) (0.097) (0.083) (0.091) 
earningsassets_ta -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.025*** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
bankdep_custdep 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
ebrd_bankref1 -0.005 0.093 -0.035 0.239 0.211 -0.156 0.186 
 
(0.230) (0.269) (0.242) (0.264) (0.238) (0.205) (0.240) 
economic_freedom_ -0.028** -0.023 -0.027** -0.022 -0.021 -0.019 -0.032* 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) 
rgdpgrowth 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.045*** 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.051*** 0.055*** 
 
(0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012) 
gdp_percap 0.00005** 0.00005** 0.00004** 0.00003 0.00004* 0.00002 0.00006** 
 
(0.00002) (0.0002) (0.00002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.00002) (0.00002) 
cpi_ebrd 0.010 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.001 0.011 0.015 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.015) 
dv_foreign -0.133 -0.158 -0.090 -0.122 -0.165* 
  
 
(0.089) (0.104) (0.094) (0.100) (0.097) 
  dv_origin -0.013 0.010 -0.005 0.015 0.005 
  
 
(0.099) (0.106) (0.099) (0.108) (0.117) 
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dv_noneu 
 
1.856*** 
     
  
(0.493) 
     hstat1_nonintexpta 
      
-0.067* 
       
(0.034) 
dv_year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
dv_country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        Constant 3.320 0.954 3.463 2.458 0.598 1.860 4.161** 
 
(2.127) (2.481) (2.287) (2.184) (1.988) (2.239) (1.972) 
        Observations 1,498 1,498 1,498 1,380 1,530 1,822 1,498 
Number of bank 285 285 285 265 285 347 285 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
     
Note a): Specification (1) includes the h_stat1 as a measure of competition; Specification (2) includes the 
interaction term between the h_stat1 and the dummy variable for the non-EU countries (hstat1_dvnoneu); 
Specification (3) includes the h_stat3 as a measure of competition; Specification (4) includes the Lerner Index 
(lerner_index) as a measure of market power; Specification (5) replaces the measure of competition with the 
degree of market concentration (i.e. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: HHI_dep); Specification (6) excludes the 
foreign ownership variables; Specification (7) includes the interaction term between operating expenses 
(nonintexp_ta) and the degree of competition (h_stat1). 
Note b): The respective STATA outputs for all the model specifications are presented in Appendix 4.3. These 
outputs show the pattern of instrumentation according to the identification of potentially endogenous variables 
in the discussion of variables above. 
 
 
Since the H-statistic is an estimated variable from a first-stage regression (see chapter 5, 
section 5.4.1) and when used in the second-stage regression may carry over imprecision from 
the first-stage, we apply the bootstrapping technique in order to correct its standard errors 
(Table 6.4).
44
 This is a conservative approach to inference, with bootstrapping typically 
yielding standard errors on our estimate of the H-statistic (h_stat1) that are somewhat larger 
than the default cluster-robust standard errors. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44
 The h_stat1 variable is obtained by estimating the Panzar_Rosse model for each country and for each year 
(see Chapter 5). The h_stat1 is estimated using bank’s interest income as a dependent variable. 
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Table 6.4 Bootstrapped standard errors of h_stat1 
              
 
    Observed     Bootstrap 
  
Normal-based 
      Coef.     Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       _bs_1 -0.029 0.017 -1.73 0.084 -0.061 0.004 
        
The bootstrapped standard errors confirm our results that banking sector competition has a 
significantly negative impact on the net interest margin. When competition increases, banks 
are expected to offer higher interest rates on deposits in order to attract more deposits and 
lower interest rates on loans in order to be more competitive in the credit market, thus ending 
up with lower interest rate margins. The H-statistic’s coefficient of -0.029 suggests that an 
increase of the H-statistic (h_stat1) by one standard deviation, holding other variables 
constant, would lead to a decline of the net interest margin by 0.06 percentage points.
45
 From 
the economic point of view, the impact of the banking sector competition on the net interest 
margin does not seem to be very large. However, it must be noticed that the size of the H-
statistic coefficient shows the impact of banking sector competition on the net interest margin 
holding other variables in the model constant. This means that the actual size of the H-
statistic’s coefficient does not include the impact that competition is expected to have on the 
NIM through other channels already controlled for in the model. For example, the H-
statistic’s coefficient does not account for the impact that competition may have on the NIM 
by inducing the enhancement of banks’ cost-efficiency, which is already controlled for by the 
operating expenses to total assets ratio (nonintexp_ta). Given the significantly negative 
impact of the H-statistic, policies that promote the banking sector competition may be 
considered to be desirable. This is especially important given our findings from chapter 5, 
which suggest that, overall, banking sector competition has a negative impact on the level of 
                                                          
45
 The standard deviation of the H-statistic is 2.12.  
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risk taken by the banks operating in the CEE region. However, the encouragement of banking 
sector competition requires special attention when speaking for the non-EU countries of the 
region given our findings from chapter 5 that suggest a positive relationship between banking 
sector competition and risk-taking in the non-EU countries. Hence, in order to utilize the 
efficiency benefits of increased competition in the non-EU countries, further strengthening of 
regulatory and supervisory capacities is needed to prevent the potentially detrimental effects 
of increased competition for the stability of the banking sector.  
Apart from estimating the average impact of competition on the net interest margin for the 
overall sample, we run an additional estimation where we check whether competition in the 
non-EU countries of our sample affects banks’ net interest margins differently compared to 
the EU countries of our sample. We interact our variable of competition h_stat1 with the 
dummy variable for the non-EU countries (dv_noneu) that takes the value 1 when the country 
is not a member of the EU. The interaction term between the h_stat1 and the dv_noneu is 
denoted as hstat1_dvnoneu.
46
 The estimation results of the regression that includes the 
interaction term are presented in Table 6.3 (specification 2). The coefficient of h_stat1, which 
in this case reflects the impact of banking sector competition on the net interest margin for 
the EU countries of our region (i.e. dv_noneu=0), is negative but statistically insignificant 
suggesting that competition does not represent a statistically significant determinant of banks’ 
net interest margins in the EU countries. Also, the coefficient of the interaction term 
hstat1_dvnoneu which is included in the regression to check if there is an additional impact 
of competition on net interest margins if the country is not an EU member is statistically 
                                                          
46
 The inclusion of the interaction term is done in line with Brambor et al. (2006) who suggest that in the case of 
multiplicative interaction models, the regression should include all the constitutive terms of the interaction term 
and the interaction term itself. These authors suggest that the coefficients of the constitutive terms should not be 
interpreted as average effects. The coefficient of one component term can be interpreted only assuming that the 
other component of the interaction term equals zero. 
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insignificant. However, summing up the coefficient of the primary variable h_stat1 and the 
coefficient of the interaction term hstat1_dvnoneu, which together represent the impact of 
competition on net interest margins in the non-EU countries of the CEE region, we obtain a 
coefficient of -0.085 that is statistically significant at the 10 percent confidence level (Table 
6.5). This result suggests that, unlike in the EU countries of the region where competition 
does not appear to significantly affect the net interest margins of the banks, in the non-EU 
countries competition has a significantly negative impact on the net interest margins. Apart 
from the statistical significance, the results suggest a difference also in terms of the size of 
the impact where the coefficient for the non-EU countries is higher than for the EU countries.  
Table 6.5. The joint impact of h_stat1 and hstat1_dvnoneu 
              
nim Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
(1) -0.085 0.051 -1.66 0.097 -0.185 0.015 
        
Considering that, compared to the EU countries, the non-EU countries are generally 
characterized by weaker institutions, including also the bank regulatory and supervisory 
institutions, it might be expected that banks operating in the non-EU countries may respond 
more aggressively to the increase of competitive pressures. This argument may be related 
also to the results presented in chapter 5, where banking sector competition in the non-EU 
countries appeared to have a positive impact on the degree of banks’ risk-taking, which is 
opposite to the EU countries where competition seemed to have a negative impact on banks’ 
risk-taking.  
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As explained earlier in this chapter, apart from the h_stat1 we include also a number of 
alternative measures of competition/market power in order to reinforce our inferences on the 
relationship between banking sector competition and net interest margins.  
In Specification 3, as a measure of competition we use an alternative H-statistic variable 
(h_stat3) which differs from h_stat1 based on the model specification that was used when 
this variable was estimated.
47
 The estimation results appear robust, with h_stat3 having a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 10% confidence level, which is similar 
in magnitude to the h_stat1. This also shows that whether the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic is 
estimated with interest income or total income as the dependent variable, the inferences on 
the relationship between banking sector competition and net interest margins remain similar. 
An another model specification replaces the H-statistic with the Lerner Index (lerner_index) 
which is a measure of market power (Specification 4). We have obtained the lerner_index 
variable from Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2013) who estimated this index for individual CEE 
countries for each year.
48
 The coefficient on the lerner_index is positive and highly 
significant, suggesting that higher market power leads to higher net interest margins. This 
finding is consistent with our results which suggest that higher competition (i.e. lower market 
power) leads to lower interest margins. The robustness of our results is shown also by the 
other control variables that retain the same sign and mostly the same level of statistical 
significance in both cases, using the H-statistic for the measure of competition and using the 
Lerner Index.  
                                                          
47
 The h_stat3 variable was obtained by estimating the Panzar-Rosse model for each country/year using total 
income as the dependent variable. 
48
 The Lerner Index is not available for Estonia and Lithuania. 
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In specification 5, we replace the H-statistic with the market concentration index (HHI_dep) 
which, despite the many critiques, in the literature is broadly considered as a measure of 
market power. The estimation results suggest that market concentration has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the net interest margin, which is in line with most of the 
previous empirical studies that have found that banks operating in more concentrated markets 
tend to set higher net interest margins.  
The remaining part of this section presents the interpretation of the estimated coefficients for 
the other control variables, which are considered as potential determinants of the net interest 
margins. These variables include bank-specific, macroeconomic, and institutional indicators 
that may influence banks’ net interest margins. As shown in Table 6.3, the estimation results 
for the control variables are quite robust across the different model specifications, so we will 
focus in the interpretation of results from our main model specification (Specification 1). 
The risk-aversion variable, proxied by the equity to total assets ratio (equity_ta), has a 
positive coefficient which is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, suggesting 
that bank’s equity ratio plays an important role in the determination of the net interest margin. 
According to this result, banks that maintain higher equity ratio tend to have higher net 
interest margins. Since equity financing is considered to be more expensive than other forms 
of financing and bears a higher opportunity cost, banks tend to compensate this cost by 
charging higher loan interest rates. In addition, since more capitalized banks are considered to 
be safer, a higher equity ratio may enable the bank to attract deposits at a lower interest rate, 
which will lead to a higher net interest margin.  
The diversification of bank’s activity, measured by the non-interest income to total assets 
ratio (nonintinc_ta) has the expected negative coefficient, but which is statistically 
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insignificant. This suggests that the diversification of banks’ activity toward the non-interest 
generating assets did not have a significant impact on the net interest margins in the CEE 
countries. This may be related to the fact that the share of non-interest generating assets in the 
banking sectors of the CEE countries is still low and, as such, banks may not significantly 
rely on this source of income to compensate potential reductions in the income from the 
interest-generating assets.   
The loggrossloans variable, which is included in the model to proxy for the average size of 
the bank’s transactions, has a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 10% 
confidence level, suggesting that larger loans tend to be associated with higher interest rates. 
Banks may apply higher risk-premiums on larger loans given that potential default on larger 
loans is expected to incur larger losses for the banks. 
The variable controlling for the quality of the loan portfolio, i.e. the credit risk (prov_loans), 
has the expected positive sign but its coefficient is statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, 
since its p-value is 0.133, this variable might be considered as border-line at the 10% 
confidence level. A positive coefficient of this variable suggests that banks with lower-
quality loan portfolios tend to charge higher loan interest rates in order to compensate for the 
potential losses occurring from the defaulted loans. In addition, since potential loan 
repayment problems usually start to take place in a later stage after the loan has been 
disbursed, banks facing higher credit risk tend to charge higher loan interest rates in order to 
collect a higher amount of the interest during the period that the loan is performing which, to 
some extent, would compensate the losses from a potential default in the future.   
The variable consisting of liquid assets expressed as a percentage of customer deposits and 
short-term funding (lqdassets_custstfunding), which is included in the regression to control 
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for the opportunity cost of holding reserves, has a statistically insignificant impact. This 
suggests that the opportunity cost of holding reserves was not significantly incorporated in 
the banks’ interest rates. However, as discussed in the section on variables description, even 
though the reserves may compose a considerable part of the liquid assets, still the total 
amount of liquid assets may not be an appropriate proxy for the reserves. Hence, this variable 
might not properly account for the true impact of banks’ reserves on the net interest margins. 
The coefficient on the non-interest operating expenditures to total assets ratio (ninintexp_ta), 
which may serve as a proxy for the cost-inefficiency of the banks, has the expected positive 
sign but statistically insignificant. Banks with higher non-interest expenses (i.e. overhead 
costs) would be expected to set higher interest margins in order to compensate for the higher 
level of their operating expenses. However, the statistically insignificant impact of this 
variable might be attributed to the fact that our regression controls for bank’s foreign 
ownership, the impact of which on the net interest margin is expected to be channelled 
mainly through the bank’s cost efficiency (Poghosyan, 2010). In order to test for this, we 
have run a separate regression (Specification 6), in which we exclude the foreign ownership 
variables. The estimation results from this regression show a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient for the nonintexp_ta variable, suggesting that more inefficient banks 
tend to set higher net interest margins in order to compensate for the higher operating 
expenses. Supposing that the degree to which banks can compensate their cost inefficiencies 
by setting higher interest margins may depend on how competitive the market is, we run an 
alternative model specification in which we include the interaction term between the 
operating expenses (nonintexp_ta) and the H-statistic (Specification 7).
49
 The interaction term 
                                                          
49
 This model specification does not control for foreign ownership, given that the non-interest expenditures to 
total assets ratio (nonintexp_ta) resulted statistically insignificant when we included the foreign ownership 
variables in the regression. 
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is denoted as hstat1_nonintexpta. The higher the degree of competition, the lower is expected 
to be the ability of banks to transfer their cost-inefficiencies into higher interest margins. The 
estimation results from this model specification show that the interaction term 
hstat1_nonintexpta has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, which suggests that 
the increasing impact of the operating expenditures on the net interest margin is reduced 
when competition increases. In other words, this finding suggests that inefficient banks are 
less able to charge higher interest rates when the market is competitive.  
The model controls also for the impact of the quality of management on the net interest 
margin. The quality of management is proxied by the earning assets to total assets ratio 
(earningsassets_ta), with a higher ratio implying a better quality of management. The 
coefficient on the earningsassets_ta is positive and highly significant, suggesting that banks 
with better management quality tend to operate with lower net interest margins. The share of 
the deposits from banks to total customer deposits (bankdep_custdep), which is included in 
the regression to control for the composition of deposits, is statistically insignificant showing 
that the composition of deposits does not appear to be relevant for the determination of the 
net interest margins. 
The Economic Freedom Index (economic_freedom_hrt), which is included in the regression 
to control for the overall institutional environment in each country, is statistically significant 
at the 5% confidence level with a negative coefficient. This suggests that countries with a 
higher economic freedom index which, among others, implies better protection of property 
rights and lower corruption, are characterized by lower interest rate margins. A higher 
economic freedom index indicates a less uncertain operating environment for the banks, 
which might be reflected in lower risk-premiums on the loan interest rates. The EBRD 
banking reform index (ebrd_bankref) has a statistically insignificant coefficient. 
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Regarding the macroeconomic variables, the results suggest that the real GDP growth rate 
(rgdpgrowth) has a positive and highly significant impact on the net interest margin 
(statistically significant at the 1% confidence level). This may be reflecting the positive 
impact of the GDP growth on the demand for loans which makes upward pressure on the loan 
interest rates. A positive coefficient is found also for the GDP per capita (gdp_percap) which 
is included in the regression to control for the overall level of economic development in each 
country. Its impact on the net interest margin in principle is expected to be negative, 
assuming that banks operating in more developed countries face lower levels of risk and, as 
such, apply lower risk premiums on their loan interest rates. On the other hand, the positive 
impact of the GDP per capita might also reflect the fact that more developed countries are 
considered to have better institutions, which have a positive impact on the banks’ interest 
revenues by ensuring a more timely repayment of loans.    
The variable on the inflation rate (cpi_ebrd) resulted statistically insignificant, suggesting that 
banks’ net interest margins in the CEE countries have not been significantly responsive to 
change of inflation rates. Statistically insignificant appear also the dummy variables on 
foreign ownership (dv_foreign) and on the country-of-origin of the banks (dv_origin), 
suggesting that the net interest margins of the foreign owned banks are not significantly 
different from the net interest margins of the domestically owned banks. 
Apart from the model specifications presented in Table 6.3 we have run also another two 
model speficifactions whose results are presented in Appendix 4.3. In Specification 8, we 
control for the impact of implicit interest payments (implicit_rate1) on the net interest 
margin. This variable represents bank expenses arising from the provision of “free” services 
to the clients. The results suggest that implicit interest payments have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the net interest margin, suggesting that banks providing 
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more “free” services to the clients tend to compensate them through higher interest margins. 
This model specification does not include the non-interest income to total assets variable 
(nonintinc_ta) and the non-interest expenses to total assets variable (nonintexp_ta) because 
these two variables jointly compose the implicit_rate1 variable. The H-statistic, which is our 
variable of main interest, is robust in this model specification. 
According to the theoretical background of the dealership model, an important determinant of 
the net interest margin is considered to be the volatility of the interbank-market interest rate. 
Hence, in the next model specification controls for the impact of the volatility of money 
market interest rates using the annual standard deviation of the daily 3-month interbank rates 
(stdev_interbank). The coefficient on the stdev_interbank has a positive sign but is 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that net interest margins do not respond significantly to 
fluctuations in the money market interest rates. The statistically insignificant impact of the 
stdev_interbank variable can be attributed to the fact that banks operating in the transition 
economies more heavily rely on financing through customer deposits, while the interbank 
markets in most of these countries are characterized by a low rate of activity. It must also be 
noted that because of the missing data, the model specification with the stdev_interbank 
variable excludes from the sample Bosnia and Herzegovina due to the lack of an interbank 
market while it has a pronounced rate of missing data also for some of the other countries in 
the sample. The h_stat1 variable remains statistically significant and with a negative sign also 
in this regression (the STATA output for this model specification is presented in Appendix 
4.3, Specification 9). 
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6.4 Conclusions 
In contrast to the relationship between banking sector competition and risk-taking, where 
both the theoretical and empirical literature were quite inconclusive with regard to the impact 
of competition on risk-taking, in the case of the relationship between banking sector 
competition and the net interest margins both the theoretical and empirical literature generally 
agree that competition leads to lower interest margins. However, the vast majority of 
empirical studies that have investigated this relationship have used the market concentration 
index as a measure of competition, which may make the inferences derived by these studies 
on the relationship between competition and net interest margins questionable. 
Therefore, in order to provide a more reliable picture regarding this relationship, we have 
used the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic to estimate the impact of banking sector competition on net 
interest margins in the CEE countries during the period 1999-2009. To our knowledge, this is 
the first study to use the H-statistic as a measure of banking sector competition when 
investigating the determinants of the net interest margins in the CEE countries. The 
estimation is performed on panel data with a dynamic model, using the General Method of 
Moments approach. It was noted that since the investigation in this chapter required the H-
statistic to be interpreted as a continuous variable, thus the discussion of this issue in Chapter 
5 is also applicable here. Similarly, the Lerner Index is employed as an alternative measure of 
competition. 
Our estimation results suggest that banking sector competition has had a significantly 
negative impact on net interest margins in the CEE countries. This implies that the decline of 
the interest rate spreads that took place in the CEE countries during the period 1999-2009 
was significantly driven by the increase of banking sector competition. However, by 
distinguishing between the EU and non-EU countries we found that the impact of banking 
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sector competition on banks’ net interest margins in the EU countries was statistically 
insignificant, as opposed to the non-EU countries were we found a statistically significant 
negative impact. Recalling the estimation results of chapter 5, where we found that in the 
non-EU countries competition had a positive impact on the degree of banks’ risk-taking, we 
might infer that banks operating in the non-EU countries of the CEE region have responded 
more aggressively to the increase of competition by reducing the interest margins, but at the 
same time undertaking higher levels of risk compared to the banks operating in the EU 
countries of the CEE region. This implies that more effective financial regulatory and 
supervisory authorities are needed in the non-EU countries in order to preserve the stability of 
the banking sectors from the potentially detrimental effects of increased competition.  
In order to make our inferences on the relationship between banking sector competition and 
net interest margin even more credible, we have used also alternative measures of banking 
sector competition. First, we estimated an alternative Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, by using the 
total income instead of the interest income in the first-stage regression. The new H-statistic 
retains the negative sign, while its statistical significance slightly declines. Second, we used 
the Lerner Index as a measure of market power and the results show a significantly positive 
impact, thus confirming our finding that market power leads to higher net interest margins. 
Third, we included the market concentration index, which has a significantly positive 
coefficient, suggesting that banks operating in more concentrated markets have higher net 
interest margins.  
Regarding the impact of the control variables, the estimation results suggest that banks 
holding higher capitalization ratios tend to have higher net interest margins. Similarly, the 
average size of the loan transactions appears to be associated with higher interest rates, 
possibly reflecting higher potential risks that are associated with larger transactions. 
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Operating costs appear to have a positive impact on the net interest margins, but the ability of 
banks to translate higher operating costs into higher net interest margins appears to decline as 
competition increases. Better management quality appears to be associated with lower 
interest margins. The degree of economic freedom has a significantly negative effect, which 
may be reflecting the fact that more reformed countries are viewed as less uncertain by the 
banks and, hence, lower risk premiums are applied. Regarding the macroeconomic indicators, 
both the real GDP growth rate and the GDP per capita appear to have a significantly positive 
impact on net interest margins. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis was to assess the degree of competition in the banking sectors of CEE 
countries and to help policy makers better understand the economic effects associated with 
increased banking sector competition. Banking sector competition has attracted much 
attention in the economic literature primarily because of its impact on a broad range of 
dimensions of banking sector activity. The two most important banking sector dimensions 
that are considered to be closely related to competition are the banks’ risk-taking behaviour 
and their intermediation efficiency. The predicted impact of banking sector competition on 
these two important dimensions of banking sector activity has created the ground for an 
ongoing debate in the literature on whether banking sector competition is beneficial or 
detrimental for the economy. The existing studies in this field have generally been quite 
limited as they address the impact of competition only on single dimensions of banking sector 
activity while failing to provide a more comprehensive picture of the overall impact of 
competition. Therefore, in order to provide a more complete picture of the effects associated 
with increased banking sector competition, and contribute to the existing debate, this thesis 
has investigated the impact of competition both on the degree of banks’ risk taking and on the 
net interest margins. The thesis is focused on three main issues: a) estimating the degree of 
banking sector competition in CEE countries; b) estimating the impact of banking sector 
competition on banks’ risk-taking; and c) estimating the impact of banking sector competition 
on net interest margins. 
In this chapter we present the main findings of this thesis, followed by some policy 
recommendations that will help the authorities design policies to support the development of 
a more stable and efficient banking sector. In addition, we outline the main contributions of 
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this thesis to the existing literature as well as discuss the limitations encountered in this 
research project and opportunities for further research related to this field.      
 
7.2 Main Findings  
The development of modern banking systems in CEE countries started with the transition 
from the mono-bank system to the two-tier banking system in the beginning of the 1990s, but 
it needed a decade of costly reforms to make these banking systems adequately operational in 
the sense of enabling them to provide efficient financial intermediation and to be capable of 
sustaining potential shocks, endogenous or exogenous to banks’ actions. A decade after the 
beginning of the transition process, substantial progress was recorded in building more stable 
and efficient banking sectors, which no longer represented a burden on public finances but 
rather began to be an important promoter of economic development in these countries. The 
liberalization of the banking markets and the consequent entry of foreign banks created the 
conditions for the development of banking sector competition. However, as depicted in the 
second chapter of this thesis (chapter 2), the banking sectors in CEE countries still have 
higher interest rate spreads and lower financial intermediation ratios compared to the Euro 
Area countries, potentially indicating that banks may be exerting some monopoly power. 
As the main aim of this thesis was to assess the degree of banking sector competition in these 
countries and the effects associated with higher competition, in the third chapter of this thesis 
(chapter 3) we presented a critical review of the theoretical and empirical studies on the 
measurement of competition. This is highly important given that no consensus has been 
reached on the most appropriate method of measuring competition. The structural approach 
for the measurement of competition, which is largely considered as the traditional approach, 
is based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm that views the degree of 
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market concentration as a measure of competition and maintains that a higher degree of 
market concentration implies lower competition. However, the SCP paradigm has been 
largely criticised in the literature which has questioned its appropriateness as a reliable 
framework for the measurement of competition.  
The criticisms are mostly directed at the assumed one-way causality from structure to 
conduct and performance, and the exclusion of the possibility that the conduct of the bank 
may also affect its market share and the market structure in general (i.e. the Efficient 
Structure hypothesis). In addition, the contestability theory claims that even highly 
concentrated markets can be competitive if they are fully contestable. The criticisms directed 
at the structural approach have led to the development of the non-structural approach which 
quantifies the competitive behaviour of the bank without taking into consideration the 
structural features of the market. The most widely used non-structural method for the 
measurement of competition is represented by the Panzar-Rosse method which measures the 
degree of competition by estimating the elasticity of bank revenues with respect to changes in 
input prices, i.e. the so-called ‘Panzar-Rosse H-statistic’. Depending on the response of bank 
revenues to changes in input prices, it can be inferred whether a banks’s behaviour is in line 
with monopoly, monopolistic competition, or perfect competition. Although the Panzar-
Rosse approach has been widely used and accepted as an appropriate method for measuring 
the degree of competition, Bikker et al. (2009) present a theoretical argument which may 
challenge the original interpretation of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic when the market is 
competitive. Based on their view that, in equilibrium, if firms’ costs are  constant over a 
range of scales, a negative H-statistic would not rule out that the market is competitive.  This 
would represent a caveat also for the use of the H-statistic as a continuous measure in 
chapters 5 and 6, since negative values of the H-statistic would not necessarily be considered 
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to indicate a high level of market power. However, in the absence of more recent direct 
empirical evidence on the nature of banks’ costs in equilibrium, we have treated this proposal 
as a theoretical possibility and left this issue to be investigated by future empirical research. 
Another complication to the interpretation of the H-statistic may be related to the fact that a 
negative H-statistic may also be consistent with oligopoly. However, this might not represent 
a serious limitation given that both monopoly and oligopoly are characterized by a high 
degree of market power. Another widely used non-structural measure of market power is the 
Lerner Index which measures the degree of mark-up on the price over the marginal cost. A 
higher mark-up corresponds to a higher degree of market power being exerted by the bank.  
Even though no general agreement has been reached on which is the most appropriate method 
of measuring competition, the Panzar-Rosse approach is being increasingly accepted as the 
preferred method. Hence, taking into account its increasing acceptance in the literature, and 
its advantages as a measure of competition, we have chosen the Panzar-Rosse approach to 
measure banking sector competition in our sample of countries. For comparison purposes and 
given the potential caveats of the H-statistic, in chapters 5 and 6 we have used the Lerner 
Index as an alternative measure of competition, which has enabled us to verify the inferences 
on the impact of competition on the degree of risk-taking and net interest margins, 
respectively.  
Chapter 4 of the thesis presents the empirical assessment of the degree of banking sector 
competition in CEE countries and the assessment of competition for the banking sector of 
Kosovo separately using the Panzar-Rosse approach. The estimation results suggest a lack of 
competition in the banking sectors of CEE countries. In other words, the behaviour of banks 
operating in these countries appears to be consistent with monopoly (or oligopoly), thus 
potentially reflecting the low degree of financial intermediation, the higher interest rate 
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spreads compared to banks in the Euro Area and the slow progress in the development of 
competition policy in these countries. Within the CEE sample countries, market power seems 
to be higher amongst the banks operating in the non-EU countries of the region. These 
countries have been characterized by an even lower degree of financial intermediation, higher 
interest rate spreads, and lower development of competition policy compared to the EU 
members. Banks operating in the non-EU countries of the CEE are also likely to face less 
competition from cross-border lending, given the smaller number of large foreign 
corporations operating in these countries. In addition, the persistently high profitability ratios 
recorded by the banking sectors of these countries might well have secured banks in their 
existing positions, thereby reducing the incentive for a more aggressive competitive 
behaviour which could eventually undermine their profits. Regarding the banking sector of 
Kosovo, the competitive behaviour appears to be consistent with monopolistic competition. 
Based on this result, competition in the banking sector of Kosovo is higher compared to the 
average of the CEE region. This may primarily reflect the fact that Kosovo’s banking system 
has been newly created and banks have competed more aggressively to seize the 
opportunities in a largely unexplored market. 
The next objective of our thesis has been to estimate the impact of competition on the level 
risk taken by banks operating in CEE countries. The theoretical and empirical literature is 
broadly inconclusive on whether competition induces banks’ risk-taking which may result in 
some degree of instability or, conversely, enhances the soundness and stability of the banking 
sector. In order to test this relationship, we investigated the relationship between the 
estimated values of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic for each country/year (from chapter 5), and 
the ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans as a measure of banks’ risk-taking. The 
estimation results in chapter 5 suggest that competition has had a negative impact on the 
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degree of risk-taking by banks, thus providing evidence in favour of the hypothesis that 
competition enhances banking stability. The negative relationship between competition and 
banks’ risk-taking may primarily be attributed to the fact that with greater competition 
depositors have more alternatives for placing their deposits and, as a result, they may 
“penalize” the banks that are considered to take excessive risks by moving their deposits to 
safer banks. In addition, since bank profits are expected to decline when competition 
increases, primarily due to lower interest margins, banks might be expected to concentrate on 
safer projects in order to prevent potential losses from riskier loans which would further 
erode their profits.  
However, by distinguishing between the EU and the non-EU countries of the region, we 
found that in the non-EU countries banking sector competition had a positive impact on the 
degree of banks’ risk-taking, which is opposite to the relationship found for the EU members 
of the region. This might reflect deficiencies in other but unobserved factors, given available 
data, that might have affected the impact of competition on risk-taking in the non-EU 
countries. Examples may include the quality of the licensing process and the quality of the 
personnel involved.  
Regarding the impact of the other control variables, the results suggest that the bank’s size is 
negatively related to the bank’s risk-taking which may reflect the better risk-diversification 
opportunities of the larger banks, and also the lower degree of asymmetric information faced 
by these banks, assuming that they have been operating for a longer period in the market. On 
the other hand, a higher growth rate of loans appears to have induced higher risk-taking, thus 
reflecting the lower lending-criteria that may be applied when banks pursue a more 
aggressive lending strategy. The macroeconomic performance of the country seems to be 
highly important for the quality of the loan portfolio. Higher real GDP growth rates and 
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national currency depreciation appear to have an enhancing impact on the quality of loans. 
Also, the protection of property rights has a highly significant negative coefficient, 
suggesting that a better protection of property rights represents a key factor for the 
improvement of the loan portfolio quality. In general, the results suggest that the quality of 
the banks’ loan portfolio is most significantly determined by factors related to the operating 
environment which are mostly exogenous to the bank’s actions.  
In order to present a more complete picture of the effects associated with competition, the 
next objective of this thesis was to investigate the impact of banking sector competition on 
the net interest margins. The theoretical and empirical literature generally agree that 
competition has a negative impact on net interest margins. The empirical results from the 
sixth chapter of this thesis (chapter 6) are consistent with the majority of the literature in this 
field, suggesting that banking sector competition has had a negative impact on net interest 
margins in CEE countries. By distinguishing the impact of banking sector competition in the 
non-EU countries from that in the EU countries of the CEE region, we found that competition 
has had a stronger impact in reducing the banks’ net interest margins in the non-EU countries. 
Recalling the estimation results of chapter 5, where we found that competition had a positive 
impact on banks’ risk-taking in the non-EU countries of the region, it may be inferred that 
banks operating in the non-EU countries have responded more aggressively to the increase of 
competition by narrowing the interest margins and undertaking higher risk, while the 
regulatory and supervisory authorities were less effective in the oversight of the banks. 
Regarding the impact of other control variables, the estimation results suggest that banks 
holding higher capitalization ratios tend to have higher net interest margins, thus reflecting 
the more conservative behaviour of better capitalized banks, but also the fact that better 
capitalized banks tend to compensate the opportunity cost of holding more capital by 
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charging higher interest rates. Similarly, the average size of loan transactions appears to be 
associated with higher interest rate margins, thus reflecting higher potential risks that are 
associated with larger transactions. Operating costs result to have a positive impact on the net 
interest margins, but the ability of banks to translate higher operating costs into higher net 
interest margins appears to decline as competition increases. Better management quality 
appears to be associated with lower interest margins. The index of ‘economic freedom’, used 
as a proxy for the overall progress of reforms in transition economies has a significantly 
negative coefficient which might be reflecting the fact that the faster reforming countries are 
viewed as less uncertain by banks and, hence, are subject to lower risk premiums. Regarding 
the macroeconomic indicators, the real GDP growth rate is shown to have a significantly 
positive impact on the net interest margins, reflecting the upward pressure on the level of 
interest rates of the higher demand for loans. A positive impact is found also for the GDP per 
capita which, apart from measuring the degree of economic development, is also considered 
to proxy the quality of the institutions. 
To summarise, the main findings of this thesis suggest that the level of competition in the 
banking sectors of CEE countries is, on average, low and that the behaviour of these banks 
are characterized by monopoly behaviour. On the other hand, the thesis also provides 
evidence that more competition would bring desirable effects for CEE countries by increasing 
both the soundness of the banking sector and by increasing the efficiency of financial 
intermediation. However, our inferences on the degree of banking sector competition and the 
effects associated with higher competition should be taken with reservation if banks have 
constant average costs. Future empirical work on the nature of banks’ average costs in 
equilibrium is recommended in order to derive inferences on the appropriateness of the 
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current interpretation of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic as an approach for measuring the degree 
of competition. 
In addition, our inferences on the effects associated with higher banking sector competition in 
chapters 5 and 6  need to be treated with reservation also because of the limitations that have 
characterized our cross-section estimation of the H-statistics. Possibly because of the small 
samples of data for some countries/years and the suspected poor quality of data, in some 
cases we have obtained H-statistic values higher than 1, which are not theoretically possible 
in the original Panzar-Rosse approach, and with substantial year-to-year variation in the 
statistic. Nevertheless, given that our inferences on the effects associated with higher 
competition, derived by using the H-statistic as a measure of competition, are consistent with 
the inferences derived by using the Lerner Index, we consider that potential limitations 
related to the estimation of H-statistics did not have a serious impact on our final results.   
 
7.3 Policy Implications 
This thesis provides a platform for drawing several policy recommendations, which can help 
policy makers design policies that contribute to the building of more stable and efficient 
banking sectors in CEE countries. It should be noted that the following policy 
recommendations are based on a straightforward consideration of the results of the thesis, 
without consideration of the potential caveats that have been acknowledged throughout the 
thesis. 
First, the evidence provided in chapter 4 suggests that the competitive behaviour of the banks 
operating in CEE countries is consistent with monopoly. Taking into consideration the 
overall evidence presented in chapters 5 and 6, we consider that the respective authorities 
should encourage greater competition in the banking sectors of these countries in order to 
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contribute to the enhancement of the loan portfolio quality and the reduction of the interest 
rate margins. For the non-EU countries of the region, competition should be encouraged to 
utilize the financial intermediation efficiency benefits, but this should be condiditional to the 
further strengthening of the institutional capacities that secure an adequate oversight of 
banks’ behaviour with regard to the risk-taking. Even though the identification of the 
measures that lead to more competition has not been amongst the main objectives of this 
research project, a few policy options that may encourage banking sector competition in CEE 
countries are highlighted here: 
 The increase of the number of banks based on prudent licensing criteria. 
 The reduction of barriers to entry and exit for banks in order to make the markets 
more contestable. Higher contestability will put pressure on the existing banks to 
behave more competitively in response to the threat of potential new entrants. 
 Given the fact that the overall results presented in chapter 5 do not provide 
evidence in favour of a trade-off between competition and stability, competition 
policy might not need to be subordinated to stability policies. In this regard, the 
European Union transition countries have substantially strengthened the 
competition policy for the banking sectors during the last two decades (EBRD, 
2009). However, this recommendation does not stand for the non-EU countries, 
where stability-oriented policies should prevail until adequate institutional 
capacities are developed to safeguard the banking stability from the potentially 
detrimental effects of increased competition.  
 The authorities (central banks or supervisory agencies) should encourage banks to 
make the ‘terms and conditions’ of individual bank products easily 
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understandable for the clients so that they can make comparisons between the 
products offered by different banks. 
 The authorities should ensure that ‘switching costs’ do not serve as a source of 
market power for the banks. Because switching an account from one bank to 
another may be costly, clients are often “locked” into a certain bank which can 
therefore exert market power on the prices charged to its clients. Bank customers 
should have free and low-cost mobility to shift from one bank to another. 
 The authorities should improve the coverage of information by the credit bureaus 
so that the additional information possessed by the existing banks does not serve 
as a barrier to entry to potential new entrants. 
Second, we consider that the negative relationship between banking sector competition and 
risk-taking that was found in the fifth chapter of this thesis is largely attributed to the threat 
that depositors will “penalize” the banks that undertake excessive risks by shifting their 
deposits to alternative safer banks. In order for this competition effect to be stronger, the 
authorities should force the banks to disclose information related to the quality of their loan 
portfolio. In the short term, the disclosure of risk information may trigger panic among the 
depositors of low-quality banks; but, in the long-term, disclosure would encourage banks to 
use the quality of their loan portfolio as a competing instrument. In order for this policy to be 
effective, the authorities should also invest in the financial education of the public, given that 
depositors might lack adequate knowledge to understand the risk profile of the bank. This is 
especially important for the non-EU countries of the CEE, where financial illiteracy is 
considered to be higher. 
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Third, based on the evidence presented in chapter 5 that higher credit growth is associated 
with a lower quality of loan portfolios, the authorities should undertake substantial and timely 
measures to address the potential problems associated with the rapid credit growth. 
According to Herzberg and Watson (2007), these measures should be directed mainly at 
encouraging banks to maintain prudential screening procedures. In addition, the authorities 
and the banks should closely monitor whether there are risks being built up in the sectors that 
receive credit more heavily. If the expansion of credit is oriented towards potentially risky 
sectors, then counter-cyclical loan provisioning could be introduced in order to discourage 
the rapid growth of credit, or ceilings to credit growth rate may be imposed.  
Fourth, the chapter 5 results provide evidence that the protection of property rights represents 
a highly important factor for the enhancement of loan quality in CEE countries. Therefore, 
further progress in the protection of property rights should be treated as a high priority by all 
these countries. The progress in this field, apart from a well defined legal framework, 
requires efficient judicial systems to effectively implement the laws related to the protection 
of creditor rights. This includes the need for specialized commercial courts and trained judges 
to increase the efficiency of the resolution of claims process.  
Fifth, based on the empirical results from chapter 6, the index (or degree) of economic 
freedom appears to be an important factor for the reduction of net interest margins. The 
degree of economic freedom takes into account factors grouped into four categories: rule of 
law, limited government, regulatory efficiency, and the degree of market openness. The 
progress in these fields enhances the operating environment for banks and reduces their risk 
perceptions, thus leading to lower risk premiums applied on bank loans. 
274 
 
7.4 Contributions to knowledge 
This thesis has contributed to the existing literature by providing new empirical evidence on 
the degree of banking sector competition in CEE countries as well as on the impact of 
competition on the degree of banks’ risk-taking and net interest margins. The thesis has 
contributed also to the debate on the measures of competition by reinforcing previous claims 
on the improvement of the model specification for the estimation of the Panzar-Rosse model, 
and by providing comparisons between the impact of different measures of competition on 
the degree of banks’ risk-taking and net interest margins. These contributions can be 
summarized as follows: 
First, this is the first study to find that the competitive behaviour of the banks operating in 
CEE countries was characterized by monopoly behaviour during the period 1999-2009 
period. In addition, we have distinguished between the banks operating in the non-EU 
countries of the CEE region and those operating in the EU countries of the region. The 
estimation results suggest that banks operating in the non-EU countries exert higher 
monopoly power that those operating in the EU countries of the region. Bearing in mind that 
none of the existing studies in this field have found monopoly behaviour in the banking 
sectors of the region, the value of our findings lies on the fact that they can serve as evidence 
to raise the alert on the deficiency of banking sector competition in these countries.  
Second, this is the first study to have estimated the degree of competition in the banking 
sector of Kosovo. Due to the specific conditions related to the availability of data, a separate 
estimation had to be conducted for the case of Kosovo. Given the characteristics of Kosovo’s 
banking sector, which is characterized by a high degree of market concentration, high interest 
rate spreads, and a low degree of financial intermediation, the findings of this study may be 
valuable for the assessment of competitive conditions by the authorities. In addition, in spite 
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of the above mentioned features, Kosovo’s banking sector appears to be characterised by a 
lower degree of market power compared to the average of the CEE region. This may be of 
interest to the researchers in the field of banking sector competition since it indicates that a 
higher degree of market concentration is not necessarily associated with higher degree of 
market power.  
Third, on a more technical point, the sensitivity tests presented in chapter 4 reinforce the 
claims of Bikker et al. (2007, 2009) that the scaling of the dependent variable to total assets 
and/or the inclusion of total assets in the regression to control for the bank’s size effect makes 
the Panzar-Rosse model misspecified. According to these authors, as a consequence of the 
misspecification, the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic will always be positive and the monopoly 
hypothesis will always be rejected. These claims are confirmed by our sensitivity tests 
through which we have found that by scaling the dependent variable to total assets, and/or 
including the total assets as an explanatory variable, the H-statistic for CEE countries shifts 
from a negative value to a positive value; i.e. the competitive behaviour shifts from monopoly 
to monopolistic competition. This evidence is confirmed also in the case of Kosovo where the 
H-statistic remains positive but with a higher coefficient. The evidence provided by this study 
contributes to the existing literature by also confirming that the scaling of the dependent 
variable to total assets and the inclusion of the total assets as an explanatory variable cause 
the same misspecification bias. The findings also contribute to the debate on the choice 
between ‘interest income’ and ‘total income’ for the dependent variable when estimating the 
Panzar-Rosse model by showing that the results remain broadly similar. 
Fourth, to our knowledge, chapter 5 of this thesis represents the first study to use the Panzar-
Rosse H-statistic as a measure of banking sector competition in investigating the relationship 
between competition and risk-taking in CEE countries. In addition, this is the first study to 
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find that banking sector competition has had a negative impact on the degree of banks’ risk-
taking in these countries. The value of these findings is that, apart from contributing to the 
existing debate in the literature on the relationship between competition and risk-taking in the 
banking sector, they may help to encourage policy makers in the EU countries of the CEE 
region to give higher priority to those measures that enhance competition in the banking 
sector; whereas, for the non-EU countries our findings highlight the need that the increase of 
competition should be associated with further strengthening of financial regulatory and 
supervisory authorities. In this context, this is the first study to distinguish between the 
impact of banking sector competition on the degree of risk-taking in the EU and non-EU 
countries of the region. 
Fifth, to our knowledge, chapter 6 is the first study to have used the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic 
in the estimation of the relationship between banking sector competition and banks’ net 
interest margins. Furthermore, the findings from this chapter are consistent with the 
inferences derived by other studies in this field. Also, this is the first study to have 
distinguished between the relationship between competition and net interest margins in the 
EU and non-EU countries of the region. 
Sixth, in both chapter 5 and 6 we used alternative measures of competition in order to verify 
our inferences regarding the impact of banking sector competition. (a) We used two 
alternative H-statistics, estimated using respectively interest income and total income as the 
dependent variable in the first-stage regression. The results, both with regard to the impact of 
competition on risk-taking and on net interest margins, appeared robust. (b)  Using the Lerner 
Index, which is a measure of market power, in both chapters showed that it has the opposite 
impact compared to the H-statistic, thus confirming our inferences on the impact of 
competition on banks’ risk-taking behaviour and net interest margins. The use of the Lerner 
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Index as an alternative measure of competition is particularly important given the potential 
caveats related to our cross-section estimation of the H-statistic. As elaborated also in section 
7.2, because of potential data-related limitations, for some countries/years our cross-section 
estimations produced H-statistic values of greater than 1, which are not considered as 
theoretically possible in the original Panzar-Rosse approach. 
Seventh, the evidence presented in chapter 6 provides support for Poghosyan (2010) who 
claims that control for foreign ownership may not be necessary in a dealership model given 
that efficiency and competition, which represent the main channels through which foreign 
ownership is expected to affect the interest rates, are already controlled for in such models. In 
our estimation results, the non-interest expenditures to total assets ratio, which is included in 
the regression to control for cost-inefficiencies, is statistically insignificant when the model 
controls for foreign ownership and statistically significant when not controlling for foreign 
ownership. 
Eighth, the three empirical chapters of this thesis control also for the country-of-origin of the 
banks which, to our knowledge, has not been done by any of the existing studies in the fields 
covered by this thesis. Controlling for country-of-origin is particularly important given the 
fact that most of the foreign banks operating in CEE countries are subsidiaries which largely 
align their strategies with those of their parent banks. Depending on the origin of the parent 
banks, the subsidiaries operating in the CEE region may reflect part of the “banking culture” 
in their country of origin.  
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7.5 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
This section presents some of the limitations encountered by this research project and 
provides some suggestions that would further enrich the literature on banking sector 
competition in CEE countries. The limitations of this study are mainly related to the data 
availability for some of the investigated topics. These can be summarized as follows: 
First, the cross-section estimation of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic could not be conducted for 
Kosovo and Montenegro due to the small number of banks in these countries. Therefore, they 
have been excluded from the analysis in chapters 5 and 6 in which the impact of banking 
sector competition on banks’ risk-taking and net interest margins were estimated. Hence, the 
estimation of the effects associated with banking sector competition in these countries 
remains to be addressed by future research. The small number of cross-sectional units poses a 
limitation also for other countries in the sample, for some of which the H-statistic could not 
be estimated for the early years of the period under investigation. 
Second, an investigation of the nature of banks’ long-run average costs might help clarify the 
issue raised by Bikker et al. (2009) regarding the interpretation of the H-statistic when the 
market is competitive. According to Bikker et al., the H-statistic can take a negative value 
also when the market is competitive if banks operate with constant average costs. If this 
hypothesis holds, it would cause problems for the original interpretation of the Panzar-Rosse 
model because the negative values of the H-statistic would no longer be able to rule out that 
the banking sector is operating in a competitive environment, and compromise the use of the 
H-statistic as a continuous variable since the negative values could no longer be considered to 
indicate a high degree of market power. 
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Third, our cross-section estimates of the H-statistic in Chapter 5 are characterized by a 
pronounced rate of volatility from one year to the other, which is consistent with the volatility 
in the estimates of the Lerner Index for the CEE countries obtained from the study of 
Efthyvoulou and Yildirim (2013). The high degree of volatility of these estimates, among 
others, might be attributed to the serious limitations in terms of sample size for some 
contry/years as well as to the potentially poor quality of data on the transition economies in 
the BankScope database. Nevertheless, taking into account the fact that the cross-section 
estimates of the H-statistic appeared quite volatile also in studies that have investigated 
competition in EU banking markets, then the high degree of volatility in our H-statistic cross-
section estimates may be linked to a more general problem related to the measurement of 
competition on a cross-section basis. One reason for this might be that competition is a 
dynamic process, so that gradual changes should be accounted for in the model. The use of 
other methods for the measurement of competition (including the Boone Indicator, which was 
not used in this thesis) on a yearly basis for the CEE countries is recommended to further 
investigate the volatility in the estimated degree of competition. The high degree of volatility 
in the yearly measures of competition may raise a very important question as to whether it is 
appropriate to measure the degree of competition on cross-section samples, especially for the 
transition economies where serious limitations on sample size and data quality exist. 
Fourth, the alternative model specifications both in chapters 5 and 6 show that the Lerner 
Index yields more statistically significant estimates than our estimates of the H-statistic. The 
lower statistical significance of the estimated effects of the H-statistic may be a result of 
different reasons, potentially including the following.  
1. if the alternative assumption introduced by Bikker et al. (2009) on the structure of 
banking costs were to hold for a substantial proportion of banks in our sample, then 
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the H-statistic would not uniformly indicate the competitive behaviour of banks, in 
which case the precision of the estimated H-statistic effect would be reduced. 
Nevertheless, given that the view of Bikker et al. is not based on overwhelming 
empirical evidence, in this thesis we treat it only as a theoretical possibility and leave 
it to be investigated by future research. The imprecision of our estimated effects of the 
H-statistic may be consistent with the proposition of Bikker et al. on constant costs, 
but it is not a direct proof of this proposition.  
2. Given that both of these are estimated variables, the differences in the degree of 
statistical significance between the H-statistic and the Lerner Index estimates may be 
related to the respective modelling procedures whereby these measures are obtained. 
For example, the estimation of the Lerner Index might have been conducted after a 
large-scale cleaning of the data, which has not been the case in our estimation of the 
H-statistic. 
Fifth, the estimation of the relationship between banking sector competition and banks’ risk-
taking in chapter 5 relies on a measure of loan portfolio quality that proxies the level of risk 
taken by banks. In order for the inferences related to the impact of competition on banks’ 
risk-taking to be more reliable, it is desirable to estimate the impact of competition also on 
other measures of risk, such as the capitalization ratios and the probability of bank to default. 
Sixth, the use of the net interest margins as a measure of financial intermediation cost in 
chapter 6 is consistent with the vast majority of studies in this field which consider that net 
interest margin is the most appropriate indicator to measure the financial intermediation cost. 
However, the value of the net interest margin may be limited in the sense that it does not 
allow researchers to distinguish whether it is changing because of the performance in 
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collecting the interest income or it is changing because the risk premiums in the ex ante 
interest rates have changed. Even though the variable on the loan-portfolio quality is included 
in the regression, this does not fully control for the risk-premiums given the fact that banks’ 
risk-perceptions are not based only the current quality of their loan portfolios, but also on 
expected future developments. Therefore, for comparison, it would be desirable to estimate 
also the determinants of ex-ante interest rate spreads. 
Seventh, our finding that competition leads to lower net interest margins provides evidence in 
favour of a positive relationship between banking sector competition and overall economic 
activity. However, in order to have a more complete picture regarding the effects associated 
with higher competition it would be desirable to investigate also the impact of competition on 
other indicators such as the access of firms to bank financing and the general financial 
inclusion rate. These topics are particularly important for CEE countries, especially for the 
non-EU countries of the region given the lower rate of access to finance and financial 
inclusion in these countries. 
Eighth, in this thesis we have measured the average competitive behaviour of the banks in the 
totality of their operations. However, given that banks organize their operations based on 
different business lines, it would be an interesting exercise to measure the competitive 
behaviour of banks across those different business lines. For example, lending to enterprises 
may be characterized by a different degree of competition compared to lending to 
households. A method for measuring competition for different business lines is the Boone 
Indicator, which is a recently developed method that became current in the literature during 
the course of writing this thesis.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Appendix 1.1 Selected macroeconomic indicators 
 
a) Real GDP growth rates (in percent) 
                        
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Albania 13.5 6.6 7.9 4.2 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.4 5.9 7.5 3.3 
Bosnia and H. 10.8 4.3 2.4 5.1 3.9 6.3 3.9 6.0 6.2 5.7 -2.9 
Bulgaria 4.4 5.7 4.2 4.7 5.5 6.7 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.2 -5.5 
Croatia -1.0 3.8 3.7 4.9 5.4 4.1 4.3 4.9 5.1 2.2 -6.0 
Czech Rep. 1.7 4.2 3.1 2.1 3.8 4.7 6.8 7.0 5.7 3.1 -4.7 
Estonia -0.3 10.0 7.5 9.2 7.8 6.3 8.9 10.1 7.5 -3.7 -14.3 
Hungary 3.2 4.2 3.7 4.5 3.9 4.8 4.0 3.9 0.1 0.9 -6.8 
Kosovo - - - - 5.4 2.6 3.8 3.4 6.3 6.9 2.9 
Latvia 3.3 6.1 7.3 7.2 7.6 8.9 10.1 11.2 9.6 -3.3 -17.7 
Lithuania -1.1 3.3 6.7 6.8 10.3 7.4 7.8 7.8 9.8 2.9 -14.8 
Macedonia 4.3 4.5 -4.5 0.9 2.8 4.6 4.4 5.0 6.1 5.0 -0.9 
Montenegro 
  
1.1 1.9 2.5 4.4 4.2 8.6 10.7 6.9 -5.7 
Poland 4.5 4.3 1.2 1.4 3.9 5.3 3.6 6.2 6.8 5.1 1.6 
Romania -0.4 2.4 5.7 5.1 5.2 8.5 4.2 7.9 6.3 7.3 -6.6 
Serbia - - 5.3 4.3 2.5 9.3 5.4 3.6 5.4 3.8 -3.5 
Slovakia 0.0 1.4 3.5 4.6 4.8 5.1 6.7 8.3 10.5 5.9 -4.9 
Slovenia 5.3 4.3 2.9 3.8 2.9 4.4 4.0 5.8 6.9 3.6 -8.0 
            Source: EU Commission, IMF World Economic Outlook (various issues). 
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b) GDP per capita (in thousands of US dollars) 
                        
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Albania 1,120 1,189 1,326 1,440 1,845 2,342 2,649 2,855 3,380 4,097 3,796 
Bosnia and 
H. 1,310 1,390 1,462 1,626 2,203 2,638 3,121 3,606 4,547 5,535 5,122 
Bulgaria 1,582 1,546 1,723 1,988 2,562 3,176 3,744 4,313 5,542 6,814 6,400 
Croatia 5,065 4,823 5,152 5,958 7,625 9,167 10,004 11,046 13,214 15,637 14,241 
Czech Rep. 5,876 5,545 6,077 7,401 8,975 10,742 12,200 13,887 16,880 20,761 20,412 
Estonia 4,141 4,137 4,564 5,381 7,258 8,904 10,496 12,491 16,135 16,476 13,462 
Hungary 4,788 4,635 5,238 6,567 8,281 10,152 10,902 11,193 13,699 15,459 12,819 
Kosovo - 1,124 1,590 1,611 1,667 1,813 1,834 1,875 2,046 2,291 2,293 
Latvia 3,039 3,295 3,518 3,972 4,798 5,935 6,952 8,688 12,610 14,859 11,437 
Lithuania 3,098 3,264 3,489 4,086 5,391 6,565 7,731 8,861 11,587 14,071 11,023 
Macedonia 1,835 1,785 1,703 1,863 2,286 2,645 2,854 3,119 3,868 4,632 4,543 
Montenegro 1,432 1,756 1,942 2,583 3,143 3,478 4,084 5,827 6,842 6,269 - 
Poland 4,341 4,454 4,981 5,184 5,675 6,625 7,967 8,956 11,152 13,867 11,313 
Romania 1,594 1,672 1,872 2,125 2,752 3,513 4,602 5,702 7,954 9,565 7,504 
Serbia 2,472 933 1,520 2,021 2,630 3,145 3,349 3,953 5,393 6,514 5,889 
Slovakia 3,794 5,328 5,619 6,420 8,483 10,371 11,525 12,777 15,541 18,181 16,245 
Slovenia 9,008 8,557 9,271 10,920 14,201 16,834 18,151 19,400 23,505 27,128 24,366 
            Source: EBRD Transition Report (various issues). 
 
c) Annual inflation rates (in percent) 
 
                      
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Albania 0.4 0.1 3.1 5.2 2.3 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.9 1.1 3.4 
Bosnia and H. -0.9 1.9 1.9 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 3.0 6.0 1.9 7.7 -2.7 
Bulgaria 0.7 9.9 7.4 5.9 2.3 6.1 5.0 7.3 8.4 12.3 2.8 
Croatia 4.0 4.6 3.8 1.7 1.8 2.1 3.3 3.2 2.9 6.1 2.4 
Czech Rep. 2.1 4.0 4.7 1.8 0.2 2.8 1.9 2.6 3.0 6.3 7.3 
Estonia 3.3 4.0 5.8 3.6 1.3 3.0 4.1 4.4 6.6 10.4 -0.1 
Hungary 10.0 9.8 9.2 5.3 4.7 6.8 3.6 3.9 8.0 6.1 4.2 
Kosovo - - - - 1.3 -1.1 -1.3 0.6 4.4 9.4 -2.4 
Latvia 4.7 2.6 2.5 1.9 2.9 6.2 6.7 6.5 10.1 15.4 3.5 
Lithuania 0.8 1.0 1.5 0.3 -1.1 1.2 2.7 3.8 5.7 11.0 4.2 
Macedonia -0.7 5.8 5.5 1.8 1.2 -0.4 0.5 3.2 2.3 8.3 -0.8 
Montenegro 67.6 97.1 22.6 16.0 6.7 2.4 2.3 3.0 4.2 8.3 3.4 
Poland 7.3 10.1 5.5 1.9 0.8 3.5 2.2 1.2 2.4 4.3 3.8 
Romania 45.8 45.7 34.5 22.5 15.3 11.9 9.1 6.6 4.9 7.9 5.6 
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Serbia 41.1 70.0 91.8 19.5 11.7 10.1 16.5 12.7 6.5 12.4 8.1 
Slovakia 10.6 12.0 7.3 3.0 8.5 7.5 2.5 4.5 2.8 4.6 1.6 
Slovenia 6.2 8.9 8.4 7.5 5.6 3.6 2.5 2.5 3.6 5.7 0.9 
            Source:EBRD Transition Report (various issues). 
 
 
Appendix 1.2 Banking system ownership and reform indicators 
 
a) State-ownership of the banking system (in percent) 
                        
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Albania 81.1 64.8 59.2 54.1 51.9 6.7 7.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bosnia and H. 75.9 55.4 17.3 6.3 5.2 4.0 3.6 3.2 1.9 0.9 0.8 
Bulgaria 50.5 19.8 19.9 14.1 0.4 2.3 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.4 
Croatia 39.8 5.7 5.0 4.0 3.4 3.1 3.4 4.2 4.7 4.4 4.1 
Czech Rep. 41.2 27.8 3.8 4.6 3 2.9 2.5 2.2 - - - 
Estonia 7.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hungary 7.8 7.7 9.1 10.7 7.4 6.6 7.0 7.4 3.7 3.5 3.9 
Kosovo 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Latvia 2.6 2.9 3.2 4 4.1 4.0 4.3 4.4 4.2 19.5 17.1 
Lithuania 41.9 38.9 12.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Macedonia 2.5 1.1 1.3 2 1.8 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.4 
Montenegro - - - - - 16.4 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Poland 24.9 23.9 24.4 26.6 25.7 21.7 21.5 21.1 19.5 18.3 22.1 
Romania 50.3 50 45.4 43.6 40.6 7.5 6.5 5.9 5.7 5.6 7.9 
Serbia 89.0 90.9 68.0 35.6 34.0 23.4 23.9 14.9 15.7 16.0 - 
Slovakia 50.7 49.1 4.9 2.9 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.9 
Slovenia 42.2 42.5 48.9 13.3 12.8 12.6 12.0 12.5 14.4 15.4 16.7 
            Source: EBRD Transition Report (various issues). 
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b) Foreign-ownership of the banking system (in percent) 
                        
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Albania - - 40.8 45.9 47.1 93.3 92.3 90.5 94.2 93.6 92.4 
Bosnia and 
H. - - 65.3 76.7 79.7 80.9 90.9 94.0 93.8 95.0 94.5 
Bulgaria 28.4 71.5 72.7 75.2 82.7 81.6 74.5 80.1 82.3 83.9 84.0 
Croatia 39.9 84.1 89.3 90.2 91.0 91.3 91.3 90.8 90.4 90.8 91.0 
Czech Rep. 27.1 75.4 89.1 85.8 86.3 84.9 84.4 84.7 - - - 
Estonia - - 97.6 97.5 97.5 98.0 99.4 99.1 98.8 98.2 98.3 
Hungary - - 66.5 85.0 83.5 63.0 82.6 82.9 64.2 84.0 81.3 
Kosovo - 100.0 75.4 77.4 74.3 73.9 78.8 83.3 85.8 89.9 90.0 
Latvia - - 65.2 42.8 53.0 48.6 57.9 63.3 63.8 65.7 69.3 
Lithuania - - 78.2 96.1 95.6 90.8 91.7 91.8 91.7 92.1 91.5 
Macedonia - - 51.1 44.0 47.0 47.3 51.3 53.2 85.9 93.1 93.3 
Montenegro - - - 16.9 23.5 31.0 87.7 91.9 78.7 84.6 87.1 
Poland 49.3 72.5 72.0 70.7 71.5 71.3 74.3 74.2 75.5 76.5 72.3 
Romania 47.8 50.9 51.4 52.9 54.8 58.5 59.2 87.9 87.3 87.7 84.3 
Serbia - - 13.2 27.0 38.4 37.7 66.0 78.7 75.5 75.3 - 
Slovakia 37.8 40.6 78.3 84.1 96.3 96.7 97.3 97.0 99.0 99.2 91.6 
Slovenia - - 15.2 16.9 18.9 20.1 22.6 29.3 28.8 31.1 29.5 
            Source: EBRD Transition Report (various issues). 
 
c) EBRD banking reform index 
                        
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Albania 2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 
Bosnia and 
H. 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 
Bulgaria 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Croatia 3 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Czech Rep. 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Estonia 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Hungary 4 4 4 4 4 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
Kosovo - - - - - - - - - - - 
Latvia 3 3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.0 3.7 
Lithuania 3 3 3 3 3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Macedonia 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 
Montenegro 
     
2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 
Poland 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
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Romania 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Serbia 1 1 1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0 
Slovakia 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Slovenia 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
            Source: EBRD Transition Report (various issues). 
Note: Since the EBRD did quit the compilation of transition indicators for the Czech Republic after year 2007, 
for the years 2008 and 2009 we have assumed that the index has maintained the same value with the previous 
three years.  
 
 
Appendix 1.3 Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
                        
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Albania 3.9 4.7 5.9 6.4 7.7 9.4 14.9 21.8 30.0 35.2 36.7 
Bosnia and H. 48.0 37.4 26.2 30.3 34.7 36.9 43.1 49.5 61.8 67.4 54.4 
Bulgaria 11.8 12.3 14.7 19.3 26.5 35.4 41.0 44.9 62.8 71.7 75.5 
Croatia 32.3 32.0 36.3 43.6 45.8 48.5 52.6 59.2 62.3 64.7 67.2 
Czech Rep. 54.0 47.2 39.1 29.6 30.5 31.3 35.4 39.4 46.3 50.6 52.0 
Estonia 31.9 36.1 39.0 44.7 50.6 60.8 69.7 82.8 91.3 96.4 108.0 
Hungary 25.9 32.5 33.3 35.0 42.7 45.9 51.2 55.6 62.6 69.8 69.5 
Kosovo - 0.2 0.9 3.0 7.8 14.1 18.8 22.3 28.3 33.1 35.7 
Latvia 15.7 19.2 26.3 32.5 40.2 50.8 68.2 87.5 88.7 90.5 104.6 
Lithuania 14.3 13.2 13.5 16.1 22.8 28.8 40.9 50.1 60.0 62.7 70.1 
Macedonia 20.9 17.8 17.6 17.7 18.3 21.5 24.4 29.3 35.7 42.4 43.9 
Montenegro - - - 8.1 11.3 14.6 18.0 36.3 80.3 87.0 76.5 
Poland 25.5 26.6 27.3 27.4 28.1 28.1 28.9 33.3 39.4 49.6 50.4 
Romania 8.1 7.2 8.7 10.1 13.7 15.7 20.0 25.9 35.1 45.0 46.1 
Serbia 28.8 49.1 33.8 17.3 19.3 23.0 29.0 29.2 35.2 40.2 45.2 
Slovakia 54.4 51.1 37.2 39.3 31.8 30.4 35.1 38.7 42.4 45.0 51.1 
Slovenia 33.3 35.8 37.9 38.7 41.3 47.9 56.3 65.9 78.8 85.3 92.9 
            Source: World Bank Development Indicators. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Appendix 2.1 Estimation of the Banking Sector Competition in 
the CEE countries  
 
 
Appendix 2.1.1 Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
 
xtserial logint_inc_real logp_funds  logp_labour  logp_physcapital  loans_ta_c4   equity_ta_c4 
prov_loans_c4 rgdpgrowth ebrd_bankref1 dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 
dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun 
dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F(  1,     250) =    253.562 
     Prob > F =      0.0000 
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Appendix 2.1.2 Stata output for the long-run equilibrium test 
 
xtabond2 logroaa Laglogroaa logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4 
prov_loans_c4  rgdpgrowth ebrd_bankref1 dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 
dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun 
dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Laglogroaa, laglimits (1 
1)) gmm(equity_ta_c4, laglimits (2 2))  iv(logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital loans_ta_c4  
prov_loans_c4  rgdpgrowth  dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 
dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol 
dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin ebrd_bankref1) robust twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, 
>  perm. 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
dv_mng dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estim 
> ation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1611 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       299 
Number of instruments = 69                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(34) =    479.56                                      avg =      5.39 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Laglogroaa |   .2247084   .0820117     2.74   0.006     .0639684    .3854483 
  logp_funds |  -.0015453   .0029399    -0.53   0.599    -.0073074    .0042168 
 logp_labour |  -.0109404   .0029401    -3.72   0.000    -.0167029   -.0051779 
logp_physc~l |  -.0007426   .0011516    -0.64   0.519    -.0029996    .0015144 
 loans_ta_c4 |   .0078644    .005774     1.36   0.173    -.0034525    .0191814 
equity_ta_c4 |   .1076016   .0336082     3.20   0.001     .0417307    .1734724 
prov_loans~4 |  -.3386661   .0615636    -5.50   0.000    -.4593285   -.2180037 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0006972   .0002182     3.19   0.001     .0002695    .0011249 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.0007438   .0039261    -0.19   0.850    -.0084389    .0069513 
  dv_foreign |  -.0039706    .002259    -1.76   0.079    -.0083982     .000457 
   dv_origin |  -.0001632   .0021775    -0.07   0.940     -.004431    .0041046 
     dv_2000 |   .0015656   .0052417     0.30   0.765    -.0087079     .011839 
     dv_2001 |   .0008196   .0059471     0.14   0.890    -.0108364    .0124757 
     dv_2002 |   .0039822   .0039835     1.00   0.317    -.0038252    .0117897 
     dv_2003 |   .0024416   .0033022     0.74   0.460    -.0040306    .0089139 
     dv_2004 |   .0026396   .0030139     0.88   0.381    -.0032675    .0085467 
     dv_2005 |   .0018429    .003201     0.58   0.565     -.004431    .0081168 
     dv_2006 |  -.0004538   .0033713    -0.13   0.893    -.0070615    .0061539 
     dv_2007 |  -.0008569   .0028305    -0.30   0.762    -.0064047    .0046908 
     dv_2008 |  -.0032461   .0024104    -1.35   0.178    -.0079705    .0014782 
      dv_bos |   .0021012   .0050831     0.41   0.679    -.0078615    .0120639 
      dv_bul |   .0031075   .0055694     0.56   0.577    -.0078082    .0140232 
      dv_cro |  -.0008089   .0064633    -0.13   0.900    -.0134767    .0118589 
      dv_cze |  -.0032459   .0062267    -0.52   0.602      -.01545    .0089581 
      dv_est |   .0102429   .0083921     1.22   0.222    -.0062053    .0266912 
      dv_hun |   .0131646   .0068432     1.92   0.054    -.0002479     .026577 
      dv_lat |   .0017874   .0062253     0.29   0.774     -.010414    .0139888 
      dv_lit |  -.0025717   .0048434    -0.53   0.595    -.0120646    .0069213 
      dv_mac |  -.0037315    .008605    -0.43   0.665     -.020597     .013134 
      dv_pol |    .004599   .0055617     0.83   0.408    -.0063017    .0154998 
      dv_rom |   .0077004    .004449     1.73   0.083    -.0010194    .0164202 
      dv_ser |   .0042616   .0079402     0.54   0.591    -.0113009    .0198242 
      dv_svk |  -.0002928   .0054148    -0.05   0.957    -.0109056    .0103201 
      dv_slo |   .0001799   .0041331     0.04   0.965    -.0079208    .0082805 
       _cons |  -.0592405   .0235033    -2.52   0.012    -.1053061   -.0131749 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital loans_ta_c4 prov_loans_c4 
    rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 
    dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit 
    dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin 
    ebrd_bankref1) 
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  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.Laglogroaa 
    L2.equity_ta_c4 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital loans_ta_c4 prov_loans_c4 
    rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 
    dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit 
    dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin 
    ebrd_bankref1 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.Laglogroaa 
    DL.equity_ta_c4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.42  Pr > z =  0.015 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.64  Pr > z =  0.522 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(34)   = 310.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(34)   =  39.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.232 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =  21.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.154 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =  18.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.455 
  gmm(Laglogroaa, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =  23.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.105 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =  16.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.568 
  gmm(equity_ta_c4, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =  16.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.425 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =  23.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.180 
  iv(logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital loans_ta_c4 prov_loans_c4 rgdpgrowth dv_2 
> 000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos d 
> v_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser d 
> v_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin ebrd_bankref1) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   4.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.087 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(32)   =  34.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.337 
 
 
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0132283   .0049459    -2.67   0.007    -.0229222   -.0035345 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 2.1.3 Estimation of equation 4.2 with the Ordinary Least Squares 
and the Fixed Effects methods 
 
Note: These two estimations are conducted in order to compared the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable obtained through the OLS and FE methods, with the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable 
obtained through the GMM approach. 
 
 
regres logint_inc_real Laglogint_inc_real logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital   
loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4 prov_loans_c4   rgdpgrowth ebrd_bankref1 dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000 
dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro 
dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo 
note: dv_2000 omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_mng omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1610 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 34,  1575) = 1589.02 
       Model |  4027.85115    34   118.46621           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  117.420753  1575  .074552859           R-squared     =  0.9717 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.9711 
       Total |   4145.2719  1609  2.57630323           Root MSE      =  .27304 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logint_inc~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Laglogint_~l |   .9227807    .005858   157.53   0.000     .9112904     .934271 
  logp_funds |   .0356194   .0172958     2.06   0.040     .0016942    .0695447 
 logp_labour |  -.0905957   .0154974    -5.85   0.000    -.1209934    -.060198 
logp_physc~l |  -.0285111   .0089852    -3.17   0.002    -.0461352    -.010887 
 loans_ta_c4 |   .1095453   .0426678     2.57   0.010     .0258538    .1932369 
equity_ta_c4 |  -.6824234   .0952439    -7.17   0.000    -.8692417   -.4956051 
prov_loans~4 |  -.0642393   .2251884    -0.29   0.775    -.5059398    .3774613 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0201009   .0027336     7.35   0.000      .014739    .0254628 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.1035429   .0622522    -1.66   0.096    -.2256489     .018563 
  dv_foreign |   .0420595   .0219518     1.92   0.056    -.0009985    .0851174 
   dv_origin |   .0108453   .0208433     0.52   0.603    -.0300383    .0517289 
     dv_2000 |  (omitted) 
     dv_2001 |    .198845    .098981     2.01   0.045     .0046967    .3929934 
     dv_2002 |   .0787677   .0812594     0.97   0.333    -.0806202    .2381557 
     dv_2003 |   .0374891   .0782825     0.48   0.632    -.1160597     .191038 
     dv_2004 |   .2575318   .0797934     3.23   0.001     .1010193    .4140443 
     dv_2005 |   .2664075   .0816885     3.26   0.001     .1061779    .4266371 
     dv_2006 |    .270609   .0813283     3.33   0.001     .1110858    .4301322 
     dv_2007 |    .361783    .082018     4.41   0.000     .2009071    .5226588 
     dv_2008 |   .3510328    .083665     4.20   0.000     .1869263    .5151393 
     dv_2009 |   .2688263   .0900941     2.98   0.003     .0921093    .4455434 
      dv_bos |   .0269802   .0562264     0.48   0.631    -.0833063    .1372666 
      dv_bul |   .1735805   .0776179     2.24   0.025     .0213352    .3258259 
      dv_cro |   .1361894   .0922614     1.48   0.140    -.0447787    .3171576 
      dv_cze |   .1461526   .0929216     1.57   0.116    -.0361104    .3284156 
      dv_est |   .0984147   .1018496     0.97   0.334    -.1013604    .2981899 
      dv_hun |   .2575393   .1006914     2.56   0.011     .0600361    .4550425 
      dv_lat |   .0933631   .0859816     1.09   0.278    -.0752873    .2620134 
      dv_lit |   .1430231    .076882     1.86   0.063    -.0077787     .293825 
      dv_mac |  -.0066482   .0569702    -0.12   0.907    -.1183935    .1050972 
      dv_mng |  (omitted) 
      dv_pol |   .1661237   .0751054     2.21   0.027     .0188067    .3134408 
      dv_rom |   .1894986   .0551218     3.44   0.001     .0813788    .2976185 
      dv_ser |   .1776007   .0537472     3.30   0.001     .0721772    .2830243 
      dv_svk |  -.0330145   .0785104    -0.42   0.674    -.1870104    .1209814 
      dv_slo |   .0858968   .0658147     1.31   0.192    -.0431969    .2149905 
       _cons |   .5730933   .1996854     2.87   0.004     .1814161    .9647705 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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xtreg logint_inc_real Laglogint_inc_real  logp_funds  logp_labour  logp_physcapital 
loans_ta_c4   equity_ta_c4 prov_loans_c4   rgdpgrowth ebrd_bankref1   dv_foreign dv_origin 
dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009, fe 
note: dv_2001 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1610 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =       299 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.8536                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.9182                                        avg =       5.4 
       overall = 0.9086                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(20,1291)         =    376.34 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.7430                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logint_inc~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Laglogint_~l |   .5150843   .0151177    34.07   0.000     .4854263    .5447423 
  logp_funds |   .3186855   .0187352    17.01   0.000     .2819306    .3554403 
 logp_labour |  -.3099779   .0268249   -11.56   0.000    -.3626031   -.2573528 
logp_physc~l |    .021843   .0139445     1.57   0.117    -.0055135    .0491994 
 loans_ta_c4 |   .1127867   .0644962     1.75   0.081    -.0137422    .2393157 
equity_ta_c4 |  -.6863698   .1352978    -5.07   0.000    -.9517975    -.420942 
prov_loans~4 |  -.3595785   .1894383    -1.90   0.058    -.7312191    .0120621 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0144826   .0021074     6.87   0.000     .0103483     .018617 
ebrd_bankr~1 |   .1004838   .0486003     2.07   0.039     .0051396     .195828 
  dv_foreign |  -.0382003   .0438395    -0.87   0.384    -.1242048    .0478042 
   dv_origin |   .0478103   .0449995     1.06   0.288    -.0404698    .1360904 
     dv_2000 |  -.1400757   .0773485    -1.81   0.070    -.2918181    .0116667 
     dv_2001 |  (omitted) 
     dv_2002 |   .0613265   .0597654     1.03   0.305    -.0559214    .1785744 
     dv_2003 |   .0604337   .0590475     1.02   0.306    -.0554058    .1762733 
     dv_2004 |    .215002   .0598944     3.59   0.000      .097501    .3325031 
     dv_2005 |   .2709691   .0613158     4.42   0.000     .1506796    .3912586 
     dv_2006 |   .3276813   .0614122     5.34   0.000     .2072027      .44816 
     dv_2007 |   .4217069    .062363     6.76   0.000      .299363    .5440507 
     dv_2008 |   .4249778   .0637933     6.66   0.000     .2998279    .5501276 
     dv_2009 |   .4033378   .0685702     5.88   0.000     .2688165    .5378591 
       _cons |   4.325737   .2425696    17.83   0.000     3.849863     4.80161 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .67486224 
     sigma_e |  .19656702 
         rho |  .92179651   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(298, 1291) =     6.40           Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Appendix 2.1.4 Stata output for Specification 1 
(Dependent variable: real interest income) 
 
xtabond2 logint_inc_real Laglogint_inc_real logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital  
loans_ta_c4   equity_ta_c4  prov_loans_c4  rgdpgrowth ebrd_bankref1   dv_foreign dv_origin 
dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul 
dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, 
gmm(Laglogint_inc_real, laglimits (2 2)) iv(logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital 
loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4 prov_loans_c4 rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 
dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin ebrd_bankref1) 
robust twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, 
>  perm. 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
dv_mng dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estim 
> ation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1610 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       299 
Number of instruments = 50                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(34) =  11571.78                                      avg =      5.38 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
logint_inc~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Laglogint_~l |    .856097   .0712376    12.02   0.000      .716474    .9957201 
  logp_funds |   .1288184   .0415859     3.10   0.002     .0473114    .2103253 
 logp_labour |   -.141265   .0461301    -3.06   0.002    -.2316784   -.0508516 
logp_physc~l |  -.0512213   .0349461    -1.47   0.143    -.1197144    .0172718 
 loans_ta_c4 |    .063464   .0770991     0.82   0.410    -.0876475    .2145755 
equity_ta_c4 |  -.8533579   .3461235    -2.47   0.014    -1.531748   -.1749682 
prov_loans~4 |  -.1680146   .2972108    -0.57   0.572     -.750537    .4145078 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0217393   .0026259     8.28   0.000     .0165926     .026886 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.1610378   .0619515    -2.60   0.009    -.2824606    -.039615 
  dv_foreign |   .0664987   .0415761     1.60   0.110    -.0149889    .1479863 
   dv_origin |   .0573738   .0603842     0.95   0.342    -.0609771    .1757246 
     dv_2000 |   -.399803   .0848699    -4.71   0.000    -.5661449   -.2334611 
     dv_2001 |   -.176902   .0915276    -1.93   0.053    -.3562928    .0024889 
     dv_2002 |  -.2458918     .06618    -3.72   0.000    -.3756022   -.1161813 
     dv_2003 |  -.2905139   .0568102    -5.11   0.000    -.4018598    -.179168 
     dv_2004 |  -.0879458    .058064    -1.51   0.130     -.201749    .0258575 
     dv_2005 |  -.0517026   .0498771    -1.04   0.300      -.14946    .0460547 
     dv_2006 |   -.021098   .0466469    -0.45   0.651    -.1125243    .0703282 
     dv_2007 |   .0610714   .0428894     1.42   0.154    -.0229903     .145133 
     dv_2008 |   .0416834   .0286796     1.45   0.146    -.0145276    .0978943 
      dv_bos |   .0837723   .0589751     1.42   0.155    -.0318169    .1993614 
      dv_bul |   .3237083   .0964839     3.36   0.001     .1346034    .5128132 
      dv_cro |   .2935497   .1018735     2.88   0.004     .0938812    .4932181 
      dv_cze |   .3997085    .163861     2.44   0.015     .0785469    .7208701 
      dv_est |   .2171297   .1406828     1.54   0.123    -.0586035    .4928628 
      dv_hun |   .4907567   .1769405     2.77   0.006     .1439596    .8375538 
      dv_lat |   .2716002   .0965639     2.81   0.005     .0823384    .4608619 
      dv_lit |   .3244769   .0987172     3.29   0.001     .1309947     .517959 
      dv_mac |     .02283   .0685788     0.33   0.739     -.111582    .1572421 
      dv_pol |   .3784802   .1659952     2.28   0.023     .0531356    .7038249 
      dv_rom |   .3319831   .1270359     2.61   0.009     .0829972    .5809689 
      dv_ser |   .2517166    .084261     2.99   0.003     .0865681    .4168651 
      dv_svk |   .1440336   .1282449     1.12   0.261    -.1073219     .395389 
      dv_slo |   .2253004   .1161147     1.94   0.052    -.0022804    .4528811 
       _cons |   1.747397   .6537905     2.67   0.008     .4659909    3.028803 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4 
    prov_loans_c4 rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 
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    dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun 
    dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign 
    dv_origin ebrd_bankref1) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.Laglogint_inc_real 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4 
    prov_loans_c4 rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 
    dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun 
    dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign 
    dv_origin ebrd_bankref1 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.Laglogint_inc_real 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.37  Pr > z =  0.001 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.49  Pr > z =  0.621 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(15)   =  52.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(15)   =  15.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.402 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   7.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.405 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   8.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.389 
 
 
 
 
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logint_inc~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0636679   .0663535    -0.96   0.337    -.1937185    .0663827 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 2.1.5 Stata output for Specification 2 
(Dependent variable: real total income) 
 
xtabond2 logtot_inc_real Laglogtot_inc_real logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital  
loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4 prov_loans_c4 rgdpgrowth ebrd_bankref1 dv_foreign_domestic_51 
dv_foreignorigin dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 
dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom 
dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Laglogtot_inc_real, laglimits (1 3)) iv(logp_funds logp_labour 
logp_physcapital loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4 prov_loans_c4  rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign_domestic_51 
dv_foreignorigin ebrd_bankref1) robust twostep 
 
 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, per 
> m. 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
dv_mng dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimatio 
> n. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1607 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       298 
Number of instruments = 67                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(34) =   3928.13                                      avg =      5.39 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
logtot_inc~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Laglogtot_~l |   .7090216   .1731275     4.10   0.000      .369698    1.048345 
  logp_funds |   .1560965   .0504079     3.10   0.002     .0572988    .2548941 
 logp_labour |  -.1846465   .0905896    -2.04   0.042    -.3621989   -.0070941 
logp_physc~l |  -.1114678    .082419    -1.35   0.176     -.273006    .0500704 
 loans_ta_c4 |   .0722313   .1232287     0.59   0.558    -.1692926    .3137552 
equity_ta_c4 |  -1.558553   .8551738    -1.82   0.068    -3.234663    .1175564 
prov_loans~4 |   .9159622   .5391583     1.70   0.089    -.1407688    1.972693 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0198814   .0040549     4.90   0.000     .0119338    .0278289 
ebrd_bankr~1 |     -.1856   .0800329    -2.32   0.020    -.3424615   -.0287385 
dv_foreig~51 |   .0470771   .0772964     0.61   0.542     -.104421    .1985753 
dv_foreign~n |   .1215213   .1123898     1.08   0.280    -.0987587    .3418013 
     dv_2000 |  -.5176071   .1104911    -4.68   0.000    -.7341658   -.3010485 
     dv_2001 |  -.3384193   .1322415    -2.56   0.010    -.5976079   -.0792306 
     dv_2002 |  -.3525119   .0933592    -3.78   0.000    -.5354926   -.1695311 
     dv_2003 |  -.3681191   .0923804    -3.98   0.000    -.5491814   -.1870569 
     dv_2004 |  -.1963545   .0986143    -1.99   0.046     -.389635   -.0030739 
     dv_2005 |  -.1298706      .0791    -1.64   0.101    -.2849038    .0251626 
     dv_2006 |  -.1133892   .0598802    -1.89   0.058    -.2307523    .0039739 
     dv_2007 |  -.0246692    .052291    -0.47   0.637    -.1271578    .0778193 
     dv_2008 |  -.0422396   .0324208    -1.30   0.193    -.1057831     .021304 
      dv_bos |   .1201434   .1276271     0.94   0.347    -.1300011    .3702879 
      dv_bul |   .4622687   .1896408     2.44   0.015     .0905796    .8339579 
      dv_cro |   .3959858   .1866421     2.12   0.034      .030174    .7617975 
      dv_cze |   .6724644   .3388879     1.98   0.047     .0082563    1.336673 
      dv_est |   .4571104    .318704     1.43   0.151    -.1675379    1.081759 
      dv_hun |    .949037   .4554885     2.08   0.037      .056296    1.841778 
      dv_lat |   .4050479   .1656863     2.44   0.014     .0803088     .729787 
      dv_lit |   .4206029   .2053688     2.05   0.041     .0180874    .8231184 
      dv_mac |   .0106785   .1291628     0.08   0.934    -.2424759    .2638329 
      dv_pol |   .8146886   .4498143     1.81   0.070    -.0669312    1.696308 
      dv_rom |   .6186788   .3347146     1.85   0.065    -.0373497    1.274707 
      dv_ser |   .2697852   .2698502     1.00   0.317    -.2591116    .7986819 
      dv_svk |   .3881088   .2740726     1.42   0.157    -.1490637    .9252813 
      dv_slo |   .4315863   .2926266     1.47   0.140    -.1419514    1.005124 
       _cons |   3.285585   1.477421     2.22   0.026     .3898934    6.181277 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
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  Standard 
    D.(logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4 
    prov_loans_c4 rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 
    dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun 
    dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo 
    dv_foreign_domestic_51 dv_foreignorigin ebrd_bankref1) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/3).Laglogtot_inc_real 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4 
    prov_loans_c4 rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 
    dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun 
    dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo 
    dv_foreign_domestic_51 dv_foreignorigin ebrd_bankref1 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.Laglogtot_inc_real 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.56  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.54  Pr > z =  0.586 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(32)   = 129.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(32)   =  32.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.429 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(23)   =  24.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.381 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =   8.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.499 
 
 
 
lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logtot_inc~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.1400178   .1377061    -1.02   0.309    -.4099168    .1298811 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 2.1.6 Stata output for Specification 3 
(Dependent variable: real interest income; includes the interactions of the input prices with 
the dummy variable for non-EU countries, dv_noneu=1) 
 
xtabond2 logint_inc_real Laglogint_inc_real logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital  
loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4 prov_loans_c4 rgdpgrowth ebrd_bankref1 dv_foreign dv_origin  
logpfunds_dvnoneu logplabour_dvnoneu logpphyscapital_dvnoneu dv_noneu dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos  dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Laglogint_inc_real, 
laglimits (1 1)) iv(logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4 
prov_loans_c4  rgdpgrowth  dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 
dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol 
dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin ebrd_bankref1 logpfunds_dvnoneu 
logplabour_dvnoneu logpphyscapital_dvnoneu dv_noneu) robust twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, 
>  perm. 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
dv_mng dropped due to collinearity 
dv_slo dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estim 
> ation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1610 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       299 
Number of instruments = 55                      Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(37) =   9144.76                                      avg =      5.38 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
logint_inc~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Laglogint_~l |   .7481205   .0615084    12.16   0.000     .6275661    .8686748 
  logp_funds |   .2199377   .0497753     4.42   0.000     .1223799    .3174955 
 logp_labour |  -.1726025    .057739    -2.99   0.003    -.2857689    -.059436 
logp_physc~l |  -.1337613    .044862    -2.98   0.003    -.2216893   -.0458334 
 loans_ta_c4 |   .0614127   .0891642     0.69   0.491    -.1133459    .2361714 
equity_ta_c4 |  -1.286948   .3513805    -3.66   0.000    -1.975641   -.5982548 
prov_loans~4 |  -.2152835   .3227253    -0.67   0.505    -.8478135    .4172466 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0194693   .0028002     6.95   0.000      .013981    .0249576 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.1024123   .0667293    -1.53   0.125    -.2331993    .0283747 
  dv_foreign |   .0697683   .0508261     1.37   0.170    -.0298489    .1693856 
   dv_origin |   .0984443   .0539122     1.83   0.068    -.0072217    .2041103 
logpfunds_~u |  -.1497955   .0671953    -2.23   0.026     -.281496   -.0180951 
logplabour~u |  -.1763088   .0868361    -2.03   0.042    -.3465044   -.0061133 
logpphysca~u |    .112356   .0549386     2.05   0.041     .0046782    .2200337 
    dv_noneu |  -1.699698   .4968002    -3.42   0.001    -2.673408   -.7259875 
     dv_2000 |  -.3764038   .1089936    -3.45   0.001    -.5900273   -.1627803 
     dv_2001 |  -.2691797   .0957507    -2.81   0.005    -.4568477   -.0815117 
     dv_2002 |  -.2816289   .0680664    -4.14   0.000    -.4150366   -.1482213 
     dv_2003 |  -.3199546   .0633472    -5.05   0.000    -.4441127   -.1957964 
     dv_2004 |  -.1292193   .0646005    -2.00   0.045     -.255834   -.0026047 
     dv_2005 |  -.0920807   .0530327    -1.74   0.083    -.1960228    .0118615 
     dv_2006 |  -.0550208   .0492404    -1.12   0.264    -.1515302    .0414887 
     dv_2007 |   .0168639   .0462488     0.36   0.715    -.0737821    .1075099 
     dv_2008 |   .0361896   .0303028     1.19   0.232    -.0232028    .0955821 
      dv_bos |   .2113067   .0833856     2.53   0.011     .0478739    .3747395 
      dv_bul |  -.0000394   .1020856    -0.00   1.000    -.2001235    .2000447 
      dv_cro |    .396587   .1222791     3.24   0.001     .1569243    .6362496 
      dv_cze |     .13456    .135374     0.99   0.320    -.1307683    .3998882 
      dv_est |  -.0062041   .2102615    -0.03   0.976     -.418309    .4059009 
      dv_hun |   .3086469   .1441874     2.14   0.032     .0260448    .5912491 
      dv_lat |  -.1037993   .1319009    -0.79   0.431    -.3623203    .1547216 
      dv_lit |  -.0429775   .1349103    -0.32   0.750    -.3073967    .2214418 
      dv_mac |   .1172637   .0871842     1.35   0.179    -.0536142    .2881416 
      dv_pol |   .2568178   .1177593     2.18   0.029     .0260138    .4876219 
      dv_rom |   .0787984    .094848     0.83   0.406    -.1071003     .264697 
      dv_ser |   .4997492   .1133245     4.41   0.000     .2776373    .7218612 
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      dv_svk |  -.1385108   .1311398    -1.06   0.291    -.3955401    .1185185 
       _cons |    3.22194    .703504     4.58   0.000     1.843098    4.600783 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4 
    prov_loans_c4 rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 
    dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun 
    dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign 
    dv_origin ebrd_bankref1 logpfunds_dvnoneu logplabour_dvnoneu 
    logpphyscapital_dvnoneu dv_noneu) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.Laglogint_inc_real 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4 
    prov_loans_c4 rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 
    dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun 
    dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign 
    dv_origin ebrd_bankref1 logpfunds_dvnoneu logplabour_dvnoneu 
    logpphyscapital_dvnoneu dv_noneu 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.Laglogint_inc_real 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.66  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.28  Pr > z =  0.783 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(17)   =  68.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(17)   =  19.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.279 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(8)    =   3.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.884 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =  16.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.062 
 
 
 
. lincom (logpfunds_dvnoneu+logp_funds)+ (logplabour_dvnoneu+logp_labour)+ 
(logpphyscapital_dvnoneu+logp_physcapital) 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital + logpfunds_dvnoneu + 
       logplabour_dvnoneu + logpphyscapital_dvnoneu = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logint_inc~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.3001746   .1151065    -2.61   0.009    -.5257791   -.0745701 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Appendix 2.1.8 Stata output for Specification 4 
(Dependent variable: real interest income / total assets) 
Note: Since the scaling of the dependent variable (interest income) to total assets transforms the reduced-form 
revenue equation into a price equation (i.e. the dependent variable becomes the interest rate), in this 
specification the control variables prov_loans_c4,  loans_ta_c4, and  equity_ta_c4 are treated as endogenous 
(hence, included in lags) based on the predicted relationship between these variables and the interest rate. For a 
more detailed elaboration on these relationships see the description of variables in chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
xtabond2 logintinc_ta Laglogintinc_ta logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital loans_ta_c4   
equity_ta_c4 prov_loans_c4 rgdpgrowth ebrd_bankref1 dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000 dv_2001 
dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze 
dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, 
gmm(Laglogintinc_ta, laglimits (1 2)) gmm(prov_loans_c4 loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4, laglimits(2 
3)) iv(logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 
dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun 
dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin 
ebrd_bankref1) robust twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, 
>  perm. 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
dv_mng dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estim 
> ation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1610 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       299 
Number of instruments = 135                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(34) =   3266.35                                      avg =      5.38 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
logintinc_ta |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagloginti~a |   .2796986   .0525003     5.33   0.000     .1767999    .3825974 
  logp_funds |   .3764157   .0305039    12.34   0.000     .3166291    .4362024 
 logp_labour |   .1552258   .0191444     8.11   0.000     .1177035    .1927481 
logp_physc~l |    .024541   .0096414     2.55   0.011     .0056441    .0434378 
 loans_ta_c4 |   .1927259   .0972246     1.98   0.047     .0021691    .3832827 
equity_ta_c4 |   .5405428   .1990778     2.72   0.007     .1503575    .9307281 
prov_loans~4 |  -.1788044   .3944519    -0.45   0.650    -.9519159    .5943071 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0053443    .001768     3.02   0.003     .0018792    .0088095 
ebrd_bankr~1 |   .0269762   .0276653     0.98   0.330    -.0272469    .0811993 
  dv_foreign |  -.0295522   .0233685    -1.26   0.206    -.0753536    .0162492 
   dv_origin |   .0167908   .0195698     0.86   0.391    -.0215654    .0551469 
     dv_2000 |  -.0531937   .0550172    -0.97   0.334    -.1610255    .0546381 
     dv_2001 |  -.0202976   .0412198    -0.49   0.622     -.101087    .0604918 
     dv_2002 |  -.0439547   .0414033    -1.06   0.288    -.1251038    .0371943 
     dv_2003 |  -.0492373   .0264172    -1.86   0.062    -.1010141    .0025395 
     dv_2004 |  -.0186932   .0212339    -0.88   0.379    -.0603108    .0229245 
     dv_2005 |  -.0348371   .0198287    -1.76   0.079    -.0737006    .0040264 
     dv_2006 |  -.0539936   .0194018    -2.78   0.005    -.0920205   -.0159667 
     dv_2007 |   -.045808   .0185136    -2.47   0.013     -.082094   -.0095221 
     dv_2008 |   .0039819   .0166761     0.24   0.811    -.0287027    .0366666 
      dv_bos |  -.1421673   .0566919    -2.51   0.012    -.2532813   -.0310532 
      dv_bul |   -.027412   .0692523    -0.40   0.692    -.1631441    .1083201 
      dv_cro |  -.1888659   .0621879    -3.04   0.002    -.3107519   -.0669798 
      dv_cze |   -.209667    .070246    -2.98   0.003    -.3473466   -.0719874 
      dv_est |  -.2399384   .0844729    -2.84   0.005    -.4055022   -.0743745 
      dv_hun |  -.1069789   .0696538    -1.54   0.125    -.2434978    .0295401 
      dv_lat |  -.1998476   .0636114    -3.14   0.002    -.3245237   -.0751715 
      dv_lit |  -.2454068    .057516    -4.27   0.000    -.3581361   -.1326774 
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      dv_mac |  -.1123052   .0614718    -1.83   0.068    -.2327878    .0081773 
      dv_pol |   -.254986   .0592266    -4.31   0.000     -.371068   -.1389041 
      dv_rom |  -.1560751    .052733    -2.96   0.003    -.2594299   -.0527203 
      dv_ser |  -.1419945   .0630064    -2.25   0.024    -.2654848   -.0185042 
      dv_svk |  -.1698682   .0579088    -2.93   0.003    -.2833674   -.0563691 
      dv_slo |  -.2501276    .055978    -4.47   0.000    -.3598424   -.1404128 
       _cons |  -.1427205   .1730125    -0.82   0.409    -.4818188    .1963777 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 
    dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos 
    dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin ebrd_bankref1) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).Laglogintinc_ta 
    L(2/3).(prov_loans_c4 loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4) 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
    dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul 
    dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom 
    dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin ebrd_bankref1 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.Laglogintinc_ta 
    DL.(prov_loans_c4 loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.00  Pr > z =  0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.73  Pr > z =  0.463 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(100)  = 371.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(100)  = 105.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.345 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(63)   =  68.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.283 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(37)   =  36.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.511 
  gmm(Laglogintinc_ta, lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(76)   =  77.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.415 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(24)   =  27.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.302 
  gmm(prov_loans_c4 loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4, lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =  26.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.139 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(80)   =  78.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.537 
  iv(logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_200 
> 3 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
>  dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv 
> _origin ebrd_bankref1) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(70)   =  77.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.259 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(30)   =  27.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.579 
 
 
 
 
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logintinc_ta |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .5561825   .0425623    13.07   0.000     .4727619    .6396031 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 2.1.7 Stata output for Specification 5 
(Dependent variable: real interest income; includes the total assets among the explanatory 
variables) 
 
Note: Since the inclusion of total assets as an explanatory variable transforms the reduced-form revenue 
equation into a price equation (i.e. the dependent variable becomes the interest rate), in this specification the 
control variables prov_loans_c4,  loans_ta_c4, and  equity_ta_c4 are treated as endogenous (hence, included in 
lags) based on the predicted relationship between these variables and the interest rate. For a more detailed 
elaboration on these relationships see the description of variables in chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
xtabond2 logint_inc_real Laglogint_inc_real logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital  
loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4 prov_loans_c4 rgdpgrowth ebrd_bankref1 dv_foreign dv_origin logta 
dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul 
dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, 
gmm(Laglogint_inc_real, laglimits (1 2)) gmm(prov_loans_c4 loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4, 
laglimits(2 3)) iv(logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital rgdpgrowth  dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo  dv_foreign dv_origin 
logta ebrd_bankref1) robust twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, 
>  perm. 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
dv_mng dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estim 
> ation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1610 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       299 
Number of instruments = 136                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(35) =  75254.98                                      avg =      5.38 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
logint_inc~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Laglogint_~l |   .1706276   .0425804     4.01   0.000     .0871716    .2540836 
  logp_funds |   .3416356   .0341533    10.00   0.000     .2746964    .4085749 
 logp_labour |   .1535432   .0218881     7.01   0.000     .1106433    .1964431 
logp_physc~l |   .0235046   .0103098     2.28   0.023     .0032977    .0437115 
 loans_ta_c4 |   .3791947   .1004432     3.78   0.000     .1823297    .5760597 
equity_ta_c4 |   .5823961   .2709562     2.15   0.032     .0513318     1.11346 
prov_loans~4 |  -.6448098   .5161948    -1.25   0.212    -1.656533    .3669134 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0083582   .0019422     4.30   0.000     .0045515    .0121649 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.0585261   .0363118    -1.61   0.107    -.1296959    .0126436 
  dv_foreign |  -.0492605   .0254986    -1.93   0.053    -.0992369    .0007159 
   dv_origin |   -.006476   .0218612    -0.30   0.767    -.0493232    .0363711 
       logta |    .849701   .0455947    18.64   0.000     .7603371    .9390649 
     dv_2000 |   .3301914   .0705031     4.68   0.000     .1920079    .4683749 
     dv_2001 |   .2686466   .0537629     5.00   0.000     .1632732    .3740201 
     dv_2002 |   .2599727   .0528473     4.92   0.000     .1563939    .3635515 
     dv_2003 |   .1713896   .0379036     4.52   0.000        .0971    .2456792 
     dv_2004 |   .1729323   .0301764     5.73   0.000     .1137876     .232077 
     dv_2005 |   .1211239   .0260523     4.65   0.000     .0700623    .1721854 
     dv_2006 |   .0541615   .0256289     2.11   0.035     .0039298    .1043931 
     dv_2007 |   .0232586   .0233781     0.99   0.320    -.0225616    .0690788 
     dv_2008 |  -.0085506   .0190295    -0.45   0.653    -.0458478    .0287466 
      dv_bos |  -.1454204   .0545237    -2.67   0.008    -.2522849   -.0385559 
      dv_bul |  -.0367587   .0706466    -0.52   0.603    -.1752235     .101706 
      dv_cro |  -.1288558   .0700275    -1.84   0.066    -.2661072    .0083956 
      dv_cze |  -.2114565   .0818432    -2.58   0.010    -.3718663   -.0510467 
      dv_est |  -.2734359   .1366885    -2.00   0.045    -.5413403   -.0055314 
      dv_hun |   -.053273   .0859089    -0.62   0.535    -.2216515    .1151054 
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      dv_lat |  -.2050339   .0757179    -2.71   0.007    -.3534383   -.0566295 
      dv_lit |  -.2727341   .0648462    -4.21   0.000    -.3998304   -.1456378 
      dv_mac |   -.115918   .0650009    -1.78   0.075    -.2433174    .0114814 
      dv_pol |  -.2236011   .0728639    -3.07   0.002    -.3664117   -.0807906 
      dv_rom |  -.0914943   .0599433    -1.53   0.127     -.208981    .0259924 
      dv_ser |  -.1809224   .0797871    -2.27   0.023    -.3373024   -.0245425 
      dv_svk |  -.1468121   .0657711    -2.23   0.026    -.2757211   -.0179031 
      dv_slo |  -.2626862   .0619388    -4.24   0.000    -.3840841   -.1412884 
       _cons |  -.8065431    .254153    -3.17   0.002    -1.304674   -.3084123 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 
    dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos 
    dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin logta ebrd_bankref1) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).Laglogint_inc_real 
    L(2/3).(prov_loans_c4 loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4) 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
    dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul 
    dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom 
    dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin logta ebrd_bankref1 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.Laglogint_inc_real 
    DL.(prov_loans_c4 loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.66  Pr > z =  0.008 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.04  Pr > z =  0.299 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(100)  = 521.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(100)  = 113.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.170 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(63)   =  73.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.167 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(37)   =  39.65  Prob > chi2 =  0.353 
  gmm(Laglogint_inc_real, lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(76)   =  90.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.120 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(24)   =  22.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.539 
  gmm(prov_loans_c4 loans_ta_c4 equity_ta_c4, lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =  40.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.005 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(80)   =  73.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.696 
  iv(logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital rgdpgrowth dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_200 
> 3 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
>  dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_mng dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv 
> _origin logta ebrd_bankref1) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(69)   =  89.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.053 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(31)   =  24.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.797 
 
 
 
 
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logint_inc~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .5186834   .0507656    10.22   0.000     .4191848    .6181821 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 2.2 Estimation of the Banking Sector Competition in 
Kosovo  
 
 
Appendix 2.2.1 Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
 
xtserial logtotinc_real logpf logplc loans_ta equity_ta prov_loans d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 
d2006 d2007 d2008 d2009 d2010 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
     
 
  F(  1,       9) =     27.334 
           Prob > F =      0.0005 
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Appendix 2.2.2 Hausman test for choosing between Fixed Effects and 
Random Effects 
 
xtregar logtotinc_real logpf logplc loans_ta equity_ta prov_loans d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 
d2006 d2007 d2008 d2009 d2010, fe 
 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       238 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =        10 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3928                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.1233                                        avg =      23.8 
       overall = 0.3209                                        max =        39 
 
                                                F(14,214)          =      9.89 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0620                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logtotinc_~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       logpf |   .4148038   .0463096     8.96   0.000     .3235224    .5060851 
      logplc |  -.0815421   .0760726    -1.07   0.285    -.2314896    .0684054 
    loans_ta |   .9486441   .3327446     2.85   0.005     .2927675    1.604521 
   equity_ta |  -1.968462   .7489249    -2.63   0.009    -3.444676   -.4922476 
  prov_loans |   .4104165   .9554703     0.43   0.668    -1.472922    2.293755 
       d2002 |  -.7045141   .1854236    -3.80   0.000    -1.070005   -.3390235 
       d2003 |  -.6712704   .2288307    -2.93   0.004    -1.122321   -.2202197 
       d2004 |  -.6639408   .2535803    -2.62   0.009    -1.163776   -.1641058 
       d2005 |  -.6781914   .2690039    -2.52   0.012    -1.208428   -.1479547 
       d2006 |  -.5701345   .2778916    -2.05   0.041     -1.11789   -.0223792 
       d2007 |  -.4300106   .2862698    -1.50   0.135    -.9942801    .1342589 
       d2008 |  -.6699065   .2950102    -2.27   0.024    -1.251404   -.0884085 
       d2009 |  -.5960965   .3002014    -1.99   0.048    -1.187827   -.0043661 
       d2010 |  -.5713018   .3065441    -1.86   0.064    -1.175534    .0329308 
       _cons |   3.192752   .1409392    22.65   0.000     2.914945    3.470559 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .71762761 
     sigma_u |  .94139636 
     sigma_e |  .26964311 
     rho_fov |  .92417896   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(9,214) =    25.01               Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
  
  
estimates store FE 
 
 
 
xtregar logtotinc_real logpf logplc loans_ta equity_ta prov_loans d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 
d2006 d2007 d2008 d2009 d2010, re 
 
RE GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances       Number of obs      =       248 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =        10 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.7663                         Obs per group: min =        11 
       between = 0.4902                                        avg =      24.8 
       overall = 0.4316                                        max =        40 
 
                                                Wald chi2(15)      =    220.21 
corr(u_i, Xb)      = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------- theta -------------------- 
  min      5%       median        95%      max 
0.6494   0.6499     0.7657     0.7758   0.7758 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logtotinc_~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       logpf |   .4420397   .0506859     8.72   0.000     .3426972    .5413822 
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      logplc |    -.15534   .0904923    -1.72   0.086    -.3327017    .0220216 
    loans_ta |   1.062966   .3435895     3.09   0.002     .3895432    1.736389 
   equity_ta |  -3.365806   .5627121    -5.98   0.000    -4.468702   -2.262911 
  prov_loans |   1.841382   1.115721     1.65   0.099    -.3453902    4.028154 
       d2002 |  -.1671964   .1851821    -0.90   0.367    -.5301466    .1957538 
       d2003 |   .1732807   .2185047     0.79   0.428    -.2549807    .6015421 
       d2004 |   .3508666   .2361125     1.49   0.137    -.1119054    .8136385 
       d2005 |   .4058705   .2508957     1.62   0.106     -.085876     .897617 
       d2006 |   .5969205   .2562752     2.33   0.020     .0946304    1.099211 
       d2007 |   .8565486   .2588082     3.31   0.001     .3492939    1.363803 
       d2008 |   .4248501   .2736696     1.55   0.121    -.1115324    .9612326 
       d2009 |    .480305   .2851676     1.68   0.092    -.0786133    1.039223 
       d2010 |   .4424562   .2976322     1.49   0.137    -.1408923    1.025805 
       _cons |   1.741409   .5873059     2.97   0.003     .5903102    2.892507 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .71762761   (estimated autocorrelation coefficient) 
     sigma_u |  .75238408 
     sigma_e |  .32823095 
     rho_fov |  .84011163   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  
  
 
estimates store RE 
 
 
 
 
hausman FE RE 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |       FE           RE         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       logpf |    .4148038     .4420397       -.0272359               . 
      logplc |   -.0815421      -.15534         .073798               . 
    loans_ta |    .9486441     1.062966       -.1143221               . 
   equity_ta |   -1.968462    -3.365806        1.397344          .49421 
  prov_loans |    .4104165     1.841382       -1.430965               . 
       d2002 |   -.7045141    -.1671964       -.5373177        .0094618 
       d2003 |   -.6712704     .1732807       -.8445511        .0679644 
       d2004 |   -.6639408     .3508666       -1.014807        .0924872 
       d2005 |   -.6781914     .4058705       -1.084062        .0970282 
       d2006 |   -.5701345     .5969205       -1.167055         .107456 
       d2007 |   -.4300106     .8565486       -1.286559        .1223466 
       d2008 |   -.6699065     .4248501       -1.094757        .1101635 
       d2009 |   -.5960965      .480305       -1.076401        .0938099 
       d2010 |   -.5713018     .4424562       -1.013758        .0733781 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                         b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtregar 
          B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtregar 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(14) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       36.60 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0008 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
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Appendix 2.2.3 Test for Common Factor Restrictions with Fixed Effects 
 
 
 
xtreg logtotinc_real Laglogtotinc_real logpf Laglogpf logplc Laglogplc loans_ta Lagloans_ta 
equity_ta Lagequity_ta prov_loans Lagprov_loans d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 
d2009 d2010, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       233 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =        10 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.9124                         Obs per group: min =         8 
       between = 0.9608                                        avg =      23.3 
       overall = 0.8927                                        max =        39 
 
                                                F(20,203)          =    105.76 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5704                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logtotinc_~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Laglogtoti~l |   .5078711   .0430765    11.79   0.000     .4229363     .592806 
       logpf |   .1918663   .0622534     3.08   0.002     .0691202    .3146124 
    Laglogpf |  -.2788719   .0465101    -6.00   0.000    -.3705768    -.187167 
      logplc |  -.0513958   .0699465    -0.73   0.463    -.1893106     .086519 
   Laglogplc |   -.048259    .065035    -0.74   0.459    -.1764898    .0799718 
    loans_ta |   .4732201   .3059234     1.55   0.123    -.1299748    1.076415 
 Lagloans_ta |    .649722   .2908071     2.23   0.027     .0763322    1.223112 
   equity_ta |  -.0038824   .7260424    -0.01   0.996    -1.435434    1.427669 
Lagequity_ta |  -1.482525   .6765563    -2.19   0.030    -2.816504   -.1485462 
  prov_loans |   .8667856   .8337093     1.04   0.300    -.7770548    2.510626 
Lagprov_lo~s |  -.3880092   .8570882    -0.45   0.651    -2.077946    1.301928 
       d2002 |  -.2913091   .1300853    -2.24   0.026    -.5478008   -.0348174 
       d2003 |  -.1221437   .1351936    -0.90   0.367    -.3887075      .14442 
       d2004 |  -.0400188    .146034    -0.27   0.784    -.3279567    .2479192 
       d2005 |   .0309868   .1555165     0.20   0.842    -.2756481    .3376216 
       d2006 |   .1107842   .1627767     0.68   0.497    -.2101656     .431734 
       d2007 |   .2176392   .1716081     1.27   0.206    -.1207237    .5560021 
       d2008 |   .2331301   .1807503     1.29   0.199    -.1232586    .5895189 
       d2009 |   .2397879   .1851005     1.30   0.197    -.1251783    .6047541 
       d2010 |   .1704335   .1834117     0.93   0.354    -.1912028    .5320697 
       _cons |   -.883285   .6591907    -1.34   0.182    -2.183024    .4164538 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .36533703 
     sigma_e |  .22937668 
         rho |  .71725976   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(9, 203) =    10.95              Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
 
testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logpf] = -_b[Laglogpf] 
 
  (1)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logpf] = -_b[Laglogpf] 
 
             F(1, 203) =       11.20 
              Prob > F =        0.0010 
 
 
   
testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logplc] = -_b[Laglogplc] 
 
  (1)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logplc] = -_b[Laglogplc] 
 
             F(1, 203) =        2.01 
              Prob > F =        0.1581 
 
 
 
testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[loans_ta] = -_b[Lagloans_ta] 
 
  (1)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[loans_ta] = -_b[Lagloans_ta] 
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             F(1, 203) =       20.00 
              Prob > F =        0.0000 
 
  
   
testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[equity_ta] = -_b[Lagequity_ta] 
 
  (1)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[equity_ta] = -_b[Lagequity_ta] 
 
             F(1, 203) =       10.29 
              Prob > F =        0.0016 
 
  
   
testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[prov_loans] = -_b[Lagprov_loans] 
 
  (1)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[prov_loans] = -_b[Lagprov_loans] 
 
             F(1, 203) =        0.01 
              Prob > F =        0.9288 
 
 
 
testnl (_b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logpf] = -_b[Laglogpf]) (_b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logplc] = -
_b[Laglogplc]) (_b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[loans_ta] = -_b[Lagloans_ta]) 
(_b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[equity_ta] = -_b[Lagequity_ta])(_b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[prov_loans] 
= -_b[Lagprov_loans])  
 
 
  (1)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logpf] = -_b[Laglogpf] 
  (2)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logplc] = -_b[Laglogplc] 
  (3)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[loans_ta] = -_b[Lagloans_ta] 
  (4)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[equity_ta] = -_b[Lagequity_ta] 
  (5)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[prov_loans] = -_b[Lagprov_loans] 
 
             F(5, 203) =       11.61 
              Prob > F =        0.0000 
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Appendix 2.2.4 Test for Common Factor Restrictions with Ordinary Least 
Squares 
 
reg logtotinc_real Laglogtotinc_real logpf Laglogpf logplc Laglogplc loans_ta Lagloans_ta 
equity_ta Lagequity_ta prov_loans Lagprov_loans  d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 
d2009 d2010 
 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     233 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 20,   212) =  201.66 
       Model |  301.796432    20  15.0898216           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  15.8636944   212  .074828747           R-squared     =  0.9501 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.9453 
       Total |  317.660127   232  1.36922468           Root MSE      =  .27355 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logtotinc_~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Laglogtoti~l |   .8566372   .0244179    35.08   0.000     .8085042    .9047702 
       logpf |   .0824079   .0683808     1.21   0.229    -.0523854    .2172013 
    Laglogpf |  -.5112273   .0459007   -11.14   0.000    -.6017075    -.420747 
      logplc |  -.0456656   .0798455    -0.57   0.568    -.2030584    .1117272 
   Laglogplc |  -.0320475   .0746314    -0.43   0.668    -.1791622    .1150671 
    loans_ta |   .2636345   .3356261     0.79   0.433    -.3979573    .9252263 
 Lagloans_ta |   .2051884   .3285388     0.62   0.533    -.4424328    .8528097 
   equity_ta |   -1.09116   .8293763    -1.32   0.190     -2.72604     .543721 
Lagequity_ta |   .7966793   .7288327     1.09   0.276    -.6400081    2.233367 
  prov_loans |   .4385401    .974599     0.45   0.653    -1.482606    2.359686 
Lagprov_lo~s |  -1.342897   .9786922    -1.37   0.171    -3.272112    .5863175 
       d2002 |  -.2253027   .1535252    -1.47   0.144    -.5279341    .0773288 
       d2003 |  -.1077648   .1576829    -0.68   0.495    -.4185919    .2030624 
       d2004 |  -.0387211    .166525    -0.23   0.816    -.3669781    .2895358 
       d2005 |   .0691781   .1756756     0.39   0.694    -.2771166    .4154729 
       d2006 |   .1628883   .1834051     0.89   0.375    -.1986429    .5244195 
       d2007 |   .2372873   .1920275     1.24   0.218    -.1412405    .6158151 
       d2008 |   .2381073   .1929646     1.23   0.219    -.1422677    .6184824 
       d2009 |    .345374   .1981809     1.74   0.083    -.0452835    .7360316 
       d2010 |   .2842747   .1936752     1.47   0.144    -.0975012    .6660505 
       _cons |  -2.685643   .6433967    -4.17   0.000    -3.953917   -1.417368 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
 
testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logpf] = -_b[Laglogpf] 
 
  (1)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logpf] = -_b[Laglogpf] 
 
             F(1, 212) =       41.32 
              Prob > F =        0.0000 
 
  
 
testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logplc] = -_b[Laglogplc] 
 
  (1)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logplc] = -_b[Laglogplc] 
 
             F(1, 212) =        1.67 
              Prob > F =        0.1972 
 
  
 
testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[loans_ta] = -_b[Lagloans_ta] 
 
  (1)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[loans_ta] = -_b[Lagloans_ta] 
 
             F(1, 212) =       10.31 
              Prob > F =        0.0015 
 
  
  
testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[equity_ta] = -_b[Lagequity_ta] 
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  (1)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[equity_ta] = -_b[Lagequity_ta] 
 
             F(1, 212) =        0.10 
              Prob > F =        0.7482 
 
  
testnl _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[prov_loans] = -_b[Lagprov_loans] 
 
  (1)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[prov_loans] = -_b[Lagprov_loans] 
 
             F(1, 212) =        4.39 
              Prob > F =        0.0374 
  
 
 
testnl (_b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logpf] = -_b[Laglogpf]) (_b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logplc] = -
_b[Laglogplc]) (_b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[loans_ta] = -_b[Lagloans_ta]) (_b[Laglogt 
> otinc_real]*_b[equity_ta] = -_b[Lagequity_ta]) (_b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[prov_loans] = - 
> _b[Lagprov_loans])  
 
 
  (1)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logpf] = -_b[Laglogpf] 
  (2)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[logplc] = -_b[Laglogplc] 
  (3)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[loans_ta] = -_b[Lagloans_ta] 
  (4)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[equity_ta] = -_b[Lagequity_ta] 
  (5)  _b[Laglogtotinc_real]*_b[prov_loans] = -_b[Lagprov_loans] 
 
             F(5, 212) =        9.72 
              Prob > F =        0.0000  
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Appendix 2.2.5 Test for long-run equilibrium  
 
 
xtregar logroa logpf logplc loans_ta Lagequity_ta prov_loans d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 d2006 
d2007 d2008 d2009 d2010, fe  
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       230 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =        10 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2906                         Obs per group: min =         9 
       between = 0.4546                                        avg =      23.0 
       overall = 0.1559                                        max =        38 
 
                                                F(14,206)          =      6.03 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4879                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     Logroa  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       logpf |  -.0229266   .0051288    -4.47   0.000    -.0330383    -.012815 
      logplc |  -.0273721   .0051211    -5.35   0.000    -.0374685   -.0172757 
    loans_ta |   .0106356   .0192548     0.55   0.581    -.0273261    .0485974 
Lagequity_ta |  -.0150172   .0366939    -0.41   0.683    -.0873608    .0573265 
  prov_loans |  -.1386986   .0499344    -2.78   0.006    -.2371465   -.0402506 
       d2002 |   .0336025   .0123314     2.72   0.007     .0092905    .0579145 
       d2003 |   .0513561   .0127881     4.02   0.000     .0261438    .0765684 
       d2004 |   .0509081   .0136024     3.74   0.000     .0240904    .0777259 
       d2005 |    .058894   .0144329     4.08   0.000     .0304388    .0873492 
       d2006 |   .0608434   .0147555     4.12   0.000     .0317523    .0899345 
       d2007 |    .069782   .0150265     4.64   0.000     .0401565    .0994074 
       d2008 |   .0611591   .0159847     3.83   0.000     .0296446    .0926737 
       d2009 |   .0678833   .0163452     4.15   0.000     .0356579    .1001087 
       d2010 |   .0642033   .0163414     3.93   0.000     .0319855    .0964211 
       _cons |   1.097293   .0371129    29.57   0.000     1.024123    1.170462 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .14277961 
     sigma_u |  .00626579 
     sigma_e |  .02008921 
     rho_fov |    .088656   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(9,206) =   -14.81               Prob > F = 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
lincom logpf+logplc 
 
 ( 1)  logpf + logplc = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroa |       Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0502987   .0068301    -7.36   0.000    -.0637646   -.0368329 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 2.2.6 Stata output for Specification 1 
(Dependent variable: real total income) 
 
 
xtregar logtotinc_real logpf logplc loans_ta equity_ta prov_loans d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 
d2006 d2007 d2008 d2009 d2010, fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       238 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =        10 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3928                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.1233                                        avg =      23.8 
       overall = 0.3209                                        max =        39 
 
                                                F(14,214)          =      9.89 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0620                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logtotinc_~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       logpf |   .4148038   .0463096     8.96   0.000     .3235224    .5060851 
      logplc |  -.0815421   .0760726    -1.07   0.285    -.2314896    .0684054 
    loans_ta |   .9486441   .3327446     2.85   0.005     .2927675    1.604521 
   equity_ta |  -1.968462   .7489249    -2.63   0.009    -3.444676   -.4922476 
  prov_loans |   .4104165   .9554703     0.43   0.668    -1.472922    2.293755 
       d2002 |  -.7045141   .1854236    -3.80   0.000    -1.070005   -.3390235 
       d2003 |  -.6712704   .2288307    -2.93   0.004    -1.122321   -.2202197 
       d2004 |  -.6639408   .2535803    -2.62   0.009    -1.163776   -.1641058 
       d2005 |  -.6781914   .2690039    -2.52   0.012    -1.208428   -.1479547 
       d2006 |  -.5701345   .2778916    -2.05   0.041     -1.11789   -.0223792 
       d2007 |  -.4300106   .2862698    -1.50   0.135    -.9942801    .1342589 
       d2008 |  -.6699065   .2950102    -2.27   0.024    -1.251404   -.0884085 
       d2009 |  -.5960965   .3002014    -1.99   0.048    -1.187827   -.0043661 
       d2010 |  -.5713018   .3065441    -1.86   0.064    -1.175534    .0329308 
       _cons |   3.192752   .1409392    22.65   0.000     2.914945    3.470559 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .71762761 
     sigma_u |  .94139636 
     sigma_e |  .26964311 
     rho_fov |  .92417896   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(9,214) =    25.01               Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
 
lincom logpf+logplc 
 
 ( 1)  logpf + logplc = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logtotinc_~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .3332617   .0808082     4.12   0.000     .1739798    .4925436 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 2.2.7 Stata output for Specification 2 
(Dependent variable: real interest income) 
 
 
xtregar logintinc_real logpf logplc loans_ta equity_ta prov_loans d2002 d2003 d2004 d2005 
d2006 d2007 d2008 d2009 d2010, fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       238 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =        10 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5780                         Obs per group: min =        10 
       between = 0.2088                                        avg =      23.8 
       overall = 0.4187                                        max =        39 
 
                                                F(14,214)          =     20.94 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.0817                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logintinc_~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       logpf |   .4906671   .0602136     8.15   0.000     .3719793    .6093549 
      logplc |  -.3236938   .0825687    -3.92   0.000    -.4864459   -.1609416 
    loans_ta |   1.969857   .3527621     5.58   0.000     1.274523     2.66519 
   equity_ta |  -2.944898   .7376445    -3.99   0.000    -4.398877   -1.490918 
  prov_loans |   1.038931   1.009692     1.03   0.305    -.9512839    3.029146 
       d2002 |  -.5105718   .2138205    -2.39   0.018    -.9320358   -.0891077 
       d2003 |   -.461552   .2449761    -1.88   0.061    -.9444271    .0213232 
       d2004 |  -.2362958   .2632803    -0.90   0.370    -.7552505    .2826588 
       d2005 |  -.2154642   .2728257    -0.79   0.431    -.7532341    .3223056 
       d2006 |  -.1600031   .2790694    -0.57   0.567    -.7100798    .3900737 
       d2007 |  -.0123155   .2870494    -0.04   0.966    -.5781217    .5534907 
       d2008 |   -.166603   .3005749    -0.55   0.580    -.7590695    .4258635 
       d2009 |   -.067295   .3020737    -0.22   0.824    -.6627158    .5281259 
       d2010 |  -.0620359   .3053307    -0.20   0.839    -.6638767     .539805 
       _cons |   1.214954   .2662297     4.56   0.000     .6901858    1.739723 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .50816138 
     sigma_u |  .93576268 
     sigma_e |  .31508675 
     rho_fov |  .89816755   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(9,214) =    47.16               Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. outreg2 using chapter4kosovo20022014.xls, bdec(3) 
chapter4kosovo20022014.xls 
dir : seeout 
 
. lincom logpf+logplc 
 
 ( 1)  logpf + logplc = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logintinc_~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .1669733   .0900105     1.86   0.065    -.0104474    .3443941 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 2.2.8 Stata output for Specification 3 
(Dependent variable: real total income; includes the total assets among the explanatory 
variables) 
 
Note: Since the inclusion of total assets among the explanatory variables transforms the reduced-form revenue 
equation into a price equation (i.e. the dependent variable becomes the interest rate), in this specification the 
control variables equity_ta, loans_ta, and  prov_loans are treated as endogenous (hence, included in lags) based 
on the predicted relationship between these variables and the interest rate. For a more detailed elaboration on 
these relationships see the description of variables in chapter 6. 
 
 
 
xtregar logtotinc_real logpf logplc Lagloans_ta Lagequity_ta Lagprov_loans logta d2002 d2003 
d2004 d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 d2009 d2010, fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       230 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =        10 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5793                         Obs per group: min =         9 
       between = 0.9724                                        avg =      23.0 
       overall = 0.9111                                        max =        38 
 
                                                F(15,205)          =     18.82 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.6518                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logtotinc_~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       logpf |   .2401983   .0477304     5.03   0.000     .1460929    .3343038 
      logplc |   .2097146   .0655507     3.20   0.002     .0804746    .3389546 
 Lagloans_ta |   .7848517   .2356233     3.33   0.001      .320296    1.249407 
Lagequity_ta |  -2.396715   .5255864    -4.56   0.000    -3.432963   -1.360467 
Lagprov_lo~s |  -.1541074   .6847477    -0.23   0.822    -1.504158    1.195944 
       logta |     .59276   .0844408     7.02   0.000     .4262763    .7592437 
       d2002 |   .2177703   .1640754     1.33   0.186    -.1057212    .5412619 
       d2003 |   .3130982   .1731668     1.81   0.072    -.0283181    .6545144 
       d2004 |   .3637423   .1791014     2.03   0.044     .0106254    .7168592 
       d2005 |   .3885945   .1844503     2.11   0.036     .0249315    .7522574 
       d2006 |   .4486804   .1882899     2.38   0.018     .0774475    .8199134 
       d2007 |   .5310229   .1911735     2.78   0.006     .1541045    .9079412 
       d2008 |   .5215878   .2019626     2.58   0.011     .1233975     .919778 
       d2009 |   .3880904   .2035488     1.91   0.058    -.0132271    .7894079 
       d2010 |    .332232   .2063775     1.61   0.109    -.0746626    .7391266 
       _cons |  -.1129168   .2244176    -0.50   0.615    -.5553795    .3295458 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .53720685 
     sigma_u |  .40038099 
     sigma_e |  .21167174 
     rho_fov |  .78155646   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(9,205) =     2.00               Prob > F = 0.0408 
 
 
 
logpf + logplc = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logtotinc_~l |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .4499129   .0668395     6.73   0.000      .318132    .5816938 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 2.2.9 Stata output for Specification 4 
(Dependent variable: total income / total assets) 
 
Note: Since the scaling of the dependent variable (total income) to total assets transforms the reduced-form 
revenue equation into a price equation (i.e. the dependent variable becomes the interest rate), in this 
specification the control variables equity_ta, loans_ta, and  prov_loans are treated as endogenous (hence, 
included in lags) based on the predicted relationship between these variables and the interest rate. For a more 
detailed elaboration on these relationships see the description of variables in chapter 6. 
 
 
 
xtregar logtotinc_ta logpf logplc Lagloans_ta Lagequity_ta Lagprov_loans d2002 d2003 d2004 
d2005 d2006 d2007 d2008 d2009 d2010, fe 
 
FE (within) regression with AR(1) disturbances  Number of obs      =       230 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =        10 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3827                         Obs per group: min =         9 
       between = 0.5438                                        avg =      23.0 
       overall = 0.4839                                        max =        38 
 
                                                F(14,206)          =      9.12 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0093                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logtotinc_ta |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       logpf |   .2304827   .0498634     4.62   0.000     .1321746    .3287907 
      logplc |   .3567522   .0629877     5.66   0.000      .232569    .4809354 
 Lagloans_ta |   .6219266   .2468107     2.52   0.012     .1353278    1.108525 
Lagequity_ta |  -2.052696   .5484459    -3.74   0.000    -3.133983   -.9714098 
Lagprov_lo~s |  -.3412769   .7215495    -0.47   0.637    -1.763845    1.081292 
       d2002 |   .4056461   .1686162     2.41   0.017     .0732113    .7380809 
       d2003 |   .4882682   .1803866     2.71   0.007     .1326276    .8439088 
       d2004 |   .4660076   .1888587     2.47   0.014     .0936638    .8383514 
       d2005 |   .4164052   .1952302     2.13   0.034     .0314998    .8013107 
       d2006 |    .433467   .1988466     2.18   0.030     .0414316    .8255024 
       d2007 |   .5009258   .2008022     2.49   0.013     .1050349    .8968166 
       d2008 |   .5245299   .2109067     2.49   0.014     .1087175    .9403423 
       d2009 |   .3195571    .209707     1.52   0.129    -.0938901    .7330043 
       d2010 |   .2291003   .2089016     1.10   0.274     -.182759    .6409597 
       _cons |  -1.356223   .1930753    -7.02   0.000     -1.73688   -.9755664 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      rho_ar |  .54957942 
     sigma_u |  .14895929 
     sigma_e |  .22167187 
     rho_fov |  .31108528   (fraction of variance because of u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(9,206) =    -0.17               Prob > F = 1.0000 
 
 
 
lincom logpf+logplc 
 
 ( 1)  logpf + logplc = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
logtotinc_ta |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .5872349   .0646671     9.08   0.000     .4597407    .7147291 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Chapter 5 
 
Appendix 3.1 Long-run equilibrium test estimates (HROA) for each 
country/year 
[standard errors in parentheses] 
 
                  
Year Albania 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia 
Czech 
Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia 
1999 - - - -0.009 -0.009 - -0.136 - 
    
[0.021] 0.005 
 
[0.149] 
 2000 - - - -0.033 -0.018 - 0.001 - 
    
[0.012] 0.012 
 
[0.019] 
 2001 - - - -0.009 0.003 - 0.047 - 
    
[0.025] 0.014 
 
[0.046] 
 2002 -0.017 - -0.006 -0.027 -0.002 -0.010 -0.018 -0.009 
 
[0.010] 
 
[0.009] [0.006] 0.008 [0.172] [0.018] 0.006 
2003 -0.051 - -0.007 -0.010 -0.032 -0.044 -0.004 -0.011 
 
[0.026] 
 
[0.014] [0.005] 0.013 [0.003] [0.016] 0.004 
2004 0.030 -0.014 -0.008 -0.011 -0.015 -0.021 -0.033 -0.010 
 
[0.027] [0.034] [0.010] [0.003] 0.010 [0.077] [0.020] 0.006 
2005 0.040 -0.015 0.013 -0.003 -0.026 -0.079 -0.015 -0.031 
 
[0.044] [0.030] [0.013] [0.010] 0.010 [0.174] [0.015] 0.010 
2006 0.082 -0.009 -0.031 -0.012 -0.023 0.017 -0.034 -0.023 
 
[0.171] [0.022] [0.017] [0.005] 0.009 [0.358] [0.015] 0.015 
2007 -0.024 -0.014 0.015 -0.029 -0.012 0.082 -0.082 -0.041 
 
[0.042] [0.012] [0.020] [0.010] 0.009 [0.025] [0.061] 0.010 
2008 -0.094 -0.006 -0.005 -0.137 -0.021 0.082 -0.055 -0.077 
 
[0.053] [0.012] [0.018] [0.020] 0.016 [0.001] [0.029] 0.016 
2009 - 0.002 -0.001 -0.061 -0.026 - -0.029 -0.019 
    [0.009] [0.011] [0.013] 0.020   [0.010] 0.022 
                
 
Year Lithuania Macedonia Poland Romania Serbia Slovakia Slovenia 
 1999 - - -0.005 -0.115 - - -0.007 
 
   
[0.011] [0.486] 
  
[0.012] 
 2000 - - -0.015 0.034 - -0.091 0.014 
 
   
[0.009] [0.094] 
 
[0.149] [0.063] 
 2001 - - 0.003 -0.049 - -0.085 - 
 
   
[0.010] [0.060] 
 
[0.038] 
  2002 -0.053 -0.248 -0.017 -0.037 - -0.056 -0.016 
 
 
[0.064] [0.068] [0.012] [0.033] 
 
[0.014] [0.047] 
 2003 0.009 0.073 0.031 -0.047 -0.058 0.001 0.004 
 
 
[0.014] [0.067] [0.021] [0.029] [0.038] [0.026] [0.027] 
 2004 -0.013 -0.033 0.020 -0.005 -0.107 -0.022 -0.005 
 
 
[0.013] [0.022] [0.013] [0.018] [0.056] [0.006] [0.019] 
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2005 -0.001 -0.012 -0.007 -0.032 0.014 -0.015 0.008 
 
 
[0.003] [0.023] [0.015] [0.016] [0.038] [0.007] [0.014] 
 2006 -0.011 -0.062 0.001 -0.005 -0.058 -0.010 -0.020 
 
 
[0.006] [0.023] [0.006] [0.015] [0.037] [0.013] [0.015] 
 2007 -0.044 -0.035 -0.008 0.115 -0.050 -0.021 0.005 
 
 
[0.022] [0.024] [0.014] [0.025] [0.029] [0.009] [0.009] 
 2008 -0.011 -0.062 0.002 0.000 0.094 -0.051 -0.005 
 
 
[0.045] [0.024] [0.026] [0.052] [0.058] [0.015] [0.007] 
 2009 0.074 -0.020 -0.079 -0.031 -0.055 -0.071 -0.001 
   [0.038] [0.037] [0.027] [0.036] [0.020] [0.036] [0.009] 
  
 
A sample of the STATA output from the estimation of the long-run equilibrium test (HROA) for each 
country/year: the case of Hungary 
 
Year 1999: 
regres logroaa logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4  if  
dv_hun==1 & dv_1999==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =       7 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,     1) =    0.59 
       Model |  .002340734     5  .000468147           Prob > F      =  0.7489 
    Residual |  .000788203     1  .000788203           R-squared     =  0.7481 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.5114 
       Total |  .003128937     6   .00052149           Root MSE      =  .02807 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |    -.05782   .1018047    -0.57   0.671    -1.351371    1.235731 
 logp_labour |  -.0502631   .0592109    -0.85   0.552    -.8026095    .7020833 
logp_physc~l |  -.0280184   .0372329    -0.75   0.589    -.5011075    .4450707 
logloans_t~4 |   -.041237    .104749    -0.39   0.761    -1.372199    1.289725 
logequity_~4 |   .0690202   .0799622     0.86   0.547    -.9469959    1.085036 
       _cons |  -.2057127   .3867453    -0.53   0.689    -5.119778    4.708352 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.1361015   .1489519    -0.91   0.529    -2.028715    1.756512 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Year 2000: 
 
regres logroaa logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4  if  
dv_hun==1 & dv_2000==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      11 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,     5) =    1.82 
       Model |  .001128136     5  .000225627           Prob > F      =  0.2636 
    Residual |   .00062012     5  .000124024           R-squared     =  0.6453 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2906 
       Total |  .001748256    10  .000174826           Root MSE      =  .01114 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |   .0013527   .0211307     0.06   0.951    -.0529657     .055671 
 logp_labour |  -.0073281   .0092724    -0.79   0.465    -.0311636    .0165074 
logp_physc~l |   .0072564   .0051159     1.42   0.215    -.0058945    .0204073 
logloans_t~4 |   .0216569   .0217716     0.99   0.366    -.0343088    .0776227 
logequity_~4 |  -.0244348   .0270365    -0.90   0.408    -.0939344    .0450648 
       _cons |  -.0673158   .0515186    -1.31   0.248    -.1997485     .065117 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |    .001281    .018903     0.07   0.949    -.0473106    .0498726 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Year 2001: 
regres logroaa logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4  if  
dv_hun==1 & dv_2001==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =       9 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,     3) =    2.53 
       Model |   .00145944     5  .000291888           Prob > F      =  0.2373 
    Residual |  .000345814     3  .000115271           R-squared     =  0.8084 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4892 
       Total |  .001805254     8  .000225657           Root MSE      =  .01074 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |   .0420775   .0544798     0.77   0.496    -.1313017    .2154566 
 logp_labour |  -.0001844   .0102845    -0.02   0.987    -.0329143    .0325456 
logp_physc~l |   .0047344   .0064903     0.73   0.519    -.0159205    .0253893 
logloans_t~4 |  -.0013638   .0332091    -0.04   0.970    -.1070501    .1043225 
logequity_~4 |   .0037677   .0237346     0.16   0.884    -.0717665    .0793019 
       _cons |   .1380325   .1761816     0.78   0.491     -.422656     .698721 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .0466275   .0461415     1.01   0.387    -.1002153    .1934703 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Year 2002: 
regres logroaa logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4  if  
dv_hun==1 & dv_2002==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    10) =    1.84 
       Model |   .00370144     5  .000740288           Prob > F      =  0.1933 
    Residual |   .00403092    10  .000403092           R-squared     =  0.4787 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2180 
       Total |   .00773236    15  .000515491           Root MSE      =  .02008 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -.0203462   .0171331    -1.19   0.262    -.0585212    .0178288 
 logp_labour |  -.0030573   .0121909    -0.25   0.807    -.0302203    .0241056 
logp_physc~l |   .0057737   .0059317     0.97   0.353    -.0074429    .0189904 
logloans_t~4 |   .0034321   .0128438     0.27   0.795    -.0251856    .0320499 
logequity_~4 |  -.0258332   .0121105    -2.13   0.059    -.0528171    .0011507 
       _cons |  -.1223066   .0644393    -1.90   0.087    -.2658863     .021273 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0176299    .018453    -0.96   0.362    -.0587457     .023486 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
Year 2003: 
regres logroaa logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4  if  
dv_hun==1 & dv_2003==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    10) =    0.85 
       Model |  .001983545     5  .000396709           Prob > F      =  0.5467 
    Residual |  .004682579    10  .000468258           R-squared     =  0.2976 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0537 
       Total |  .006666123    15  .000444408           Root MSE      =  .02164 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -.0014463   .0122288    -0.12   0.908    -.0286938    .0258013 
 logp_labour |   -.013543   .0119517    -1.13   0.284     -.040173     .013087 
logp_physc~l |   .0109908   .0074276     1.48   0.170    -.0055589    .0275405 
logloans_t~4 |   .0072448   .0156588     0.46   0.654    -.0276451    .0421348 
logequity_~4 |  -.0116965   .0114019    -1.03   0.329    -.0371014    .0137084 
       _cons |  -.0735745    .065517    -1.12   0.288    -.2195556    .0724065 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0039985   .0160941    -0.25   0.809    -.0398583    .0318613 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Year 2004: 
regres logroaa logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4  if  
dv_hun==1 & dv_2004==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      20 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    14) =    1.15 
       Model |  .003460445     5  .000692089           Prob > F      =  0.3783 
    Residual |  .008390628    14  .000599331           R-squared     =  0.2920 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0391 
       Total |  .011851073    19  .000623741           Root MSE      =  .02448 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |   -.008795   .0148347    -0.59   0.563    -.0406123    .0230223 
 logp_labour |  -.0251387   .0140758    -1.79   0.096    -.0553284    .0050509 
logp_physc~l |   .0006971   .0063353     0.11   0.914    -.0128907    .0142849 
logloans_t~4 |   .0088033   .0139517     0.63   0.538    -.0211201    .0387266 
logequity_~4 |   .0018409    .015801     0.12   0.909    -.0320489    .0357307 
       _cons |   -.108137   .0619822    -1.74   0.103    -.2410755    .0248015 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0332367   .0196282    -1.69   0.113    -.0753349    .0088616 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
Year 2005: 
regres logroaa logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4  if  
dv_hun==1 & dv_2005==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      21 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    15) =    1.51 
       Model |  .002835006     5  .000567001           Prob > F      =  0.2461 
    Residual |  .005643857    15  .000376257           R-squared     =  0.3344 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1125 
       Total |  .008478863    20  .000423943           Root MSE      =   .0194 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |    .010316   .0119697     0.86   0.402    -.0151967    .0358287 
 logp_labour |  -.0257684   .0096692    -2.66   0.018    -.0463778   -.0051589 
logp_physc~l |   .0006643   .0038949     0.17   0.867    -.0076374     .008966 
logloans_t~4 |   .0109499    .009649     1.13   0.274    -.0096165    .0315163 
logequity_~4 |   .0148268   .0111559     1.33   0.204    -.0089515    .0386051 
       _cons |   -.020955    .045509    -0.46   0.652    -.1179551     .076045 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0147881   .0150407    -0.98   0.341    -.0468465    .0172704 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
Year 2006: 
regres logroaa logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4  if  
dv_hun==1 & dv_2006==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      22 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    16) =    7.44 
       Model |  .020994296     5  .004198859           Prob > F      =  0.0009 
    Residual |  .009025049    16  .000564066           R-squared     =  0.6994 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6054 
       Total |  .030019344    21  .001429493           Root MSE      =  .02375 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |   .0080402   .0076116     1.06   0.307    -.0080956     .024176 
 logp_labour |  -.0428854   .0111665    -3.84   0.001    -.0665574   -.0192135 
logp_physc~l |   .0012949   .0040732     0.32   0.755    -.0073399    .0099297 
logloans_t~4 |   .0167165   .0055595     3.01   0.008     .0049309     .028502 
logequity_~4 |   .0168608   .0103289     1.63   0.122    -.0050356    .0387571 
       _cons |  -.0972261   .0513618    -1.89   0.077    -.2061083    .0116561 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0335503   .0147811    -2.27   0.037    -.0648848   -.0022159 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
Year 2007: 
regres logroaa logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4  if  
dv_hun==1 & dv_2007==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      21 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    15) =    3.90 
       Model |  .132722572     5  .026544514           Prob > F      =  0.0182 
    Residual |  .102060438    15  .006804029           R-squared     =  0.5653 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4204 
       Total |  .234783011    20  .011739151           Root MSE      =  .08249 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |   .0310365   .0545273     0.57   0.578    -.0851858    .1472588 
 logp_labour |   -.104581   .0363585    -2.88   0.012    -.1820773   -.0270848 
logp_physc~l |  -.0080992   .0166227    -0.49   0.633    -.0435296    .0273312 
logloans_t~4 |   .0193048   .0246519     0.78   0.446    -.0332395    .0718491 
logequity_~4 |   .0109373   .0447318     0.24   0.810    -.0844063     .106281 
       _cons |  -.3032011   .2175806    -1.39   0.184    -.7669632     .160561 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0816437   .0612255    -1.33   0.202    -.2121427    .0488553 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
Year 2008: 
regres logroaa logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4  if  
dv_hun==1 & dv_2008==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      20 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    14) =    3.03 
       Model |  .016832711     5  .003366542           Prob > F      =  0.0466 
    Residual |  .015566793    14  .001111914           R-squared     =  0.5195 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3479 
       Total |  .032399503    19  .001705237           Root MSE      =  .03335 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
336 
 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |   .0099974   .0183151     0.55   0.594    -.0292844    .0492793 
 logp_labour |  -.0618005   .0191281    -3.23   0.006    -.1028263   -.0207747 
logp_physc~l |  -.0034986   .0074107    -0.47   0.644    -.0193929    .0123956 
logloans_t~4 |   .0071823   .0097782     0.73   0.475    -.0137899    .0281546 
logequity_~4 |   .0386862   .0151318     2.56   0.023     .0062317    .0711406 
       _cons |  -.1271061    .105278    -1.21   0.247     -.352905    .0986927 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0553017   .0292648    -1.89   0.080    -.1180684     .007465 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
Year 2009: 
regres logroaa logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4  if  
dv_hun==1 & dv_2009==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    10) =    3.17 
       Model |  .002084425     5  .000416885           Prob > F      =  0.0568 
    Residual |  .001315074    10  .000131507           R-squared     =  0.6132 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4197 
       Total |  .003399499    15  .000226633           Root MSE      =  .01147 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -.0020682   .0053232    -0.39   0.706    -.0139291    .0097926 
 logp_labour |   -.022207   .0079164    -2.81   0.019    -.0398458   -.0045682 
logp_physc~l |  -.0047979    .003186    -1.51   0.163    -.0118966    .0023009 
logloans_t~4 |  -.0122318   .0060696    -2.02   0.072    -.0257557     .001292 
logequity_~4 |    .019382   .0075123     2.58   0.027     .0026435    .0361205 
       _cons |     -.0544   .0318568    -1.71   0.119    -.1253813    .0165813 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     logroaa |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0290731   .0095058    -3.06   0.012    -.0502533   -.0078929 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 3.2 Estimates of Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (h_stat1) for 
each country/year using interest income as dependent variable  
[standard errors in parentheses] 
 
                  
Year Albania 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia 
Czech 
Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia 
1999 - - - -0.948 -1.468 - -7.902 - 
    
[1.265] [2.209] 
 
[7.196] 
 2000 - - - 0.643 -0.636 - -3.173 - 
    
[1.040] [1.013] 
 
[1.066] 
 2001 - - - -0.441 -1.388 - -1.450 - 
    
[1.209] [1.853] 
 
[6.543] 
 2002 -0.095 - -1.597 -1.336 0.577 -11.030 -1.948 -0.466 
 
[0.715] 
 
[1.244] [1.033] [1.521] [27.054] [1.068] [1.056] 
2003 0.041 - -1.761 -2.836 0.693 -9.083 -1.819 -0.349 
 
[1.049] 
 
[1.188] [0.962] [1.781] [6.642] [0.848] [0.932] 
2004 2.213 0.084 -0.927 -1.185 0.894 -4.239 -1.584 -1.365 
 
[1.913] [1.047] [0.779] [0.802] [1.522] [17.196] [0.922] [0.768] 
2005 2.932 -1.138 -1.879 -4.464 -1.306 - -1.417 -1.746 
 
[1.235] [0.960] [1.409] [0.860] [1.765] 
 
[1.017] [1.002] 
2006 2.191 -1.003 -1.073 -4.693 -1.407 -11.728 -1.318 -0.999 
 
[6.307] [1.257] [1.406] [1.060] [1.509] [1.404] [0.873] [1.067] 
2007 -1.132 -1.620 -1.357 -3.769 0.294 -6.001 -0.776 -0.363 
 
[3.036] [0.991] [1.688] [1.705] [1.797] [1.476] [1.023] [1.067] 
2008 0.148 0.343 -0.570 -3.935 -1.444 0.399 0.908 -0.119 
 
[2.713] [1.590] [1.578] [1.321] [1.843] [10.779] [1.095] [0.738] 
2009 - -0.677 -0.798 -3.317 -2.730 - -0.435 -0.955 
    [1.513] [1.336] [1.293] [2.317]   [1.006] [0.653] 
                
 
Year Lithuania Macedonia Poland Romania Serbia Slovakia Slovenia 
 1999 - - 0.262 5.187 - - -0.192 
 
   
[1.652] [1.370] 
  
[0.957] 
 2000 - - -4.222 0.555 - 2.618 -1.469 
 
   
[1.640] [1.189] 
 
[4.183] [19.387] 
 2001 - - 1.062 0.336 - -1.526 - 
 
   
[1.396] [1.666] 
 
[3.386] 
  2002 -4.995 -2.711 0.410 0.423 - -1.134 -5.998 
 
 
[5.059] [1.551] [0.818] [0.770] 
 
[1.685] [3.501] 
 2003 -2.272 -0.421 -0.091 -0.385 0.174 -2.368 -0.528 
 
 
[3.133] [0.985] [1.283] [0.841] [0.654] [1.307] [3.046] 
 2004 -4.095 0.298 -0.836 0.035 -0.104 -3.782 0.507 
 
 
[2.977] [0.797] [1.160] [0.961] [0.391] [1.649] [1.916] 
 2005 -4.412 0.489 -1.576 -1.114 0.101 -2.282 4.527 
 
 
[0.789] [2.489] [1.077] [1.044] [0.461] [1.657] [2.947] 
 2006 -6.173 -0.783 0.835 0.830 -0.363 -3.954 -3.609 
 
 
[0.890] [0.722] [0.593] [1.097] [0.644] [2.338] [3.091] 
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2007 -7.582 -2.247 1.351 -0.039 -0.931 -4.050 1.694 
 
 
[2.854] [0.810] [1.269] [1.144] [0.711] [2.728] [2.208] 
 2008 -9.199 -1.431 -1.984 -0.025 -0.864 -4.005 2.626 
 
 
[3.340] [1.221] [0.993] [1.456] [0.758] [1.405] [2.054] 
 2009 -7.042 0.400 -1.379 -0.473 -2.561 -2.573 2.200 
   [1.324] [1.201] [0.884] [1.167] [0.591] [2.103] [2.182] 
 
          
 
A sample of the STATA output from the estimation of the H-statistic (h_stat1) for each 
country/year using the interest income as dependent variable: the case of Hungary 
 
Year 1999: 
 
. regres logint_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
>   if  dv_hun==1 & dv_1999==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =       7 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,     1) =    0.61 
       Model |  5.58366935     5  1.11673387           Prob > F      =  0.7444 
    Residual |   1.8396795     1   1.8396795           R-squared     =  0.7522 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.4869 
       Total |  7.42334885     6  1.23722481           Root MSE      =  1.3563 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -6.262558   4.918355    -1.27   0.424    -68.75618    56.23106 
 logp_labour |  -2.141667   2.860579    -0.75   0.591    -38.48877    34.20544 
logp_physc~l |   .5017295   1.798784     0.28   0.827    -22.35399    23.35745 
logloans_t~4 |    -2.7845   5.060597    -0.55   0.680    -67.08548    61.51648 
logequity_~4 |   2.470567   3.863107     0.64   0.638    -46.61486      51.556 
       _cons |  -8.822171   18.68431    -0.47   0.719    -246.2288    228.5845 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logint_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.86 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.3526 
 
  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |       7.00      6    0.3208 
            Skewness |       1.41      5    0.9236 
            Kurtosis |       0.63      1    0.4277 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |       9.04     12    0.6999 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
  
. estat ovtest 
powers of fitted values collinear with explanatory variables 
(typically because all explanatory variables are indicator variables) 
test not possible 
r(499); 
 
  
. lincom  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital 
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 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -7.902495   7.196116    -1.10   0.470    -99.33781    83.53282 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Year 2000: 
 
 
regres logint_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2000==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      11 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,     5) =    6.40 
       Model |  12.6358992     5  2.52717984           Prob > F      =  0.0313 
    Residual |  1.97297263     5  .394594527           R-squared     =  0.8649 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7299 
       Total |  14.6088718    10  1.46088718           Root MSE      =  .62817 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -2.548329   1.191894    -2.14   0.086    -5.612189    .5155313 
 logp_labour |  -.6945389   .5230167    -1.33   0.242    -2.038996    .6499183 
logp_physc~l |   .0699144   .2885669     0.24   0.818    -.6718704    .8116993 
logloans_t~4 |  -2.079986   1.228043    -1.69   0.151    -5.236771    1.076799 
logequity_~4 |   .0954596   1.525014     0.06   0.953    -3.824713    4.015633 
       _cons |   .9782676    2.90594     0.34   0.750    -6.491689    8.448224 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logint_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.17 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.6825 
 
  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      11.00     10    0.3575 
            Skewness |       3.20      5    0.6685 
            Kurtosis |       4.37      1    0.0366 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      18.58     16    0.2913 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logint_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 2) =      0.18 
                  Prob > F =      0.9041 
 
  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -3.172953   1.066234    -2.98   0.031    -5.913796   -.4321107 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 2001: 
 
regres logint_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2001==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =       9 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,     3) =    1.64 
       Model |  19.0352033     5  3.80704065           Prob > F      =  0.3623 
    Residual |  6.95259281     3  2.31753094           R-squared     =  0.7325 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2866 
       Total |  25.9877961     8  3.24847451           Root MSE      =  1.5223 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |   .2322633   7.724815     0.03   0.978    -24.35155    24.81607 
 logp_labour |  -.9373112   1.458266    -0.64   0.566    -5.578164    3.703542 
logp_physc~l |  -.7451659   .9202674    -0.81   0.477    -3.673867    2.183536 
logloans_t~4 |  -.7516556   4.708797    -0.16   0.883    -15.73715    14.23384 
logequity_~4 |  -1.573968   3.365386    -0.47   0.672    -12.28413    9.136193 
       _cons |   4.405763   24.98118     0.18   0.871     -75.0955    83.90702 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logint_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     2.26 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.1330 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |       9.00      8    0.3423 
            Skewness |       5.33      5    0.3765 
            Kurtosis |       0.22      1    0.6359 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      14.56     14    0.4090 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
powers of fitted values collinear with explanatory variables 
(typically because all explanatory variables are indicator variables) 
test not possible 
r(499); 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -1.450214   6.542502    -0.22   0.839    -22.27138    19.37095 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Year 2002: 
 
 
regres logint_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2002==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    10) =    4.12 
       Model |  27.8387483     5  5.56774967           Prob > F      =  0.0271 
    Residual |  13.5062623    10  1.35062623           R-squared     =  0.6733 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5100 
       Total |  41.3450107    15  2.75633404           Root MSE      =  1.1622 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -1.055642   .9917498    -1.06   0.312    -3.265398    1.154114 
 logp_labour |   -.569551   .7056674    -0.81   0.438    -2.141876    1.002774 
logp_physc~l |  -.3224356    .343356    -0.94   0.370     -1.08748    .4426092 
logloans_t~4 |   .5236653   .7434617     0.70   0.497    -1.132871    2.180201 
logequity_~4 |  -1.517386   .7010155    -2.16   0.056    -3.079346    .0445735 
       _cons |    2.72144   3.730062     0.73   0.482    -5.589656    11.03254 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logint_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.34 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.5577 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      16.00     15    0.3821 
            Skewness |       0.85      5    0.9740 
            Kurtosis |       1.07      1    0.3018 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      17.91     21    0.6546 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logint_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 7) =      0.23 
                  Prob > F =      0.8718 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -1.947628    1.06815    -1.82   0.098    -4.327616    .4323588 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Year 2003: 
 
 
regres logint_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2003==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    10) =    4.19 
       Model |  27.2283843     5  5.44567687           Prob > F      =  0.0259 
    Residual |  13.0078615    10  1.30078615           R-squared     =  0.6767 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5151 
       Total |  40.2362459    15  2.68241639           Root MSE      =  1.1405 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -.1845946   .6445326    -0.29   0.780    -1.620703    1.251513 
 logp_labour |  -.8205112   .6299262    -1.30   0.222    -2.224074    .5830519 
logp_physc~l |  -.8137278   .3914786    -2.08   0.064    -1.685996    .0585408 
logloans_t~4 |   .1702193   .8253122     0.21   0.841    -1.668691     2.00913 
logequity_~4 |  -.7153332   .6009465    -1.19   0.261    -2.054326    .6236591 
       _cons |   6.026974   3.453144     1.75   0.112     -1.66711    13.72106 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logint_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.00 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.9657 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      16.00     15    0.3821 
            Skewness |       3.57      5    0.6123 
            Kurtosis |       0.10      1    0.7503 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      19.67     21    0.5419 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logint_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 7) =      1.66 
                  Prob > F =      0.2611 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -1.818834   .8482541    -2.14   0.058    -3.708862    .0711942 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Year 2004: 
 
 
regres logint_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2004==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      20 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    14) =    6.35 
       Model |  41.9758093     5  8.39516187           Prob > F      =  0.0028 
    Residual |   18.514129    14  1.32243779           R-squared     =  0.6939 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5846 
       Total |  60.4899383    19  3.18368097           Root MSE      =    1.15 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -.1856703    .696841    -0.27   0.794    -1.680246    1.308905 
 logp_labour |  -.4134408   .6611934    -0.63   0.542     -1.83156    1.004678 
logp_physc~l |   -.984931   .2975913    -3.31   0.005    -1.623201   -.3466612 
logloans_t~4 |   .6212375   .6553603     0.95   0.359    -.7843705    2.026845 
logequity_~4 |  -.6962825   .7422308    -0.94   0.364    -2.288209    .8956442 
       _cons |   8.595648   2.911529     2.95   0.010      2.35104    14.84026 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logint_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     1.12 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2901 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      20.00     19    0.3946 
            Skewness |       5.60      5    0.3471 
            Kurtosis |       0.48      1    0.4890 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      26.08     25    0.4034 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logint_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 11) =      3.97 
                  Prob > F =      0.0385 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -1.584042   .9220065    -1.72   0.108     -3.56155    .3934652 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Year 2005: 
 
 
regres logint_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2005==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      21 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    15) =    3.22 
       Model |   27.723267     5  5.54465339           Prob > F      =  0.0357 
    Residual |   25.800187    15  1.72001247           R-squared     =  0.5180 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3573 
       Total |   53.523454    20   2.6761727           Root MSE      =  1.3115 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -.3672263   .8092918    -0.45   0.656    -2.092191    1.357738 
 logp_labour |   -.269897   .6537547    -0.41   0.686    -1.663342    1.123548 
logp_physc~l |  -.7798022   .2633395    -2.96   0.010    -1.341097   -.2185073 
logloans_t~4 |   .2469374   .6523887     0.38   0.710    -1.143596    1.637471 
logequity_~4 |   -.539659   .7542736    -0.72   0.485    -2.147355    1.068037 
       _cons |   8.488468   3.076949     2.76   0.015     1.930107    15.04683 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logint_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.06 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.8135 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      21.00     20    0.3971 
            Skewness |       4.46      5    0.4848 
            Kurtosis |       0.15      1    0.7021 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      25.61     26    0.4847 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logint_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 12) =      2.90 
                  Prob > F =      0.0785 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -1.416925    1.01693    -1.39   0.184    -3.584461      .75061 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Year 2006: 
 
 
regres logint_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2006==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      22 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    16) =    3.42 
       Model |  33.6470161     5  6.72940322           Prob > F      =  0.0273 
    Residual |   31.502247    16  1.96889044           R-squared     =  0.5165 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3654 
       Total |  65.1492631    21  3.10234586           Root MSE      =  1.4032 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -.0472656   .4496975    -0.11   0.918    -1.000582    .9060504 
 logp_labour |  -.6282908   .6597266    -0.95   0.355    -2.026849    .7702672 
logp_physc~l |  -.6423848   .2406477    -2.67   0.017    -1.152535   -.1322346 
logloans_t~4 |   .3799455    .328458     1.16   0.264    -.3163544    1.076245 
logequity_~4 |  -.4012942   .6102406    -0.66   0.520    -1.694946     .892358 
       _cons |   8.354352   3.034495     2.75   0.014     1.921509    14.78719 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logint_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.59 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.4436 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      21.82     20    0.3501 
            Skewness |       1.31      5    0.9334 
            Kurtosis |       0.44      1    0.5093 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      23.57     26    0.6003 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logint_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 13) =      0.49 
                  Prob > F =      0.6981 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -1.317941   .8732767    -1.51   0.151    -3.169205    .5333227 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Year 2007: 
 
 
regres logint_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2007==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      21 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    15) =    4.94 
       Model |  46.9665468     5  9.39330936           Prob > F      =  0.0071 
    Residual |  28.5086843    15  1.90057895           R-squared     =  0.6223 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4964 
       Total |  75.4752311    20  3.77376155           Root MSE      =  1.3786 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |   .4645288    .911327     0.51   0.618    -1.477919    2.406976 
 logp_labour |  -.4755127   .6076668    -0.78   0.446    -1.770724    .8196985 
logp_physc~l |  -.7650031   .2778184    -2.75   0.015    -1.357159   -.1728473 
logloans_t~4 |   .1831579   .4120126     0.44   0.663    -.6950261    1.061342 
logequity_~4 |   -.780727   .7476126    -1.04   0.313    -2.374226    .8127717 
       _cons |   9.954441    3.63647     2.74   0.015     2.203488    17.70539 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logint_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     3.36 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0670 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      21.00     20    0.3971 
            Skewness |       6.59      5    0.2528 
            Kurtosis |       1.67      1    0.1957 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      29.27     26    0.2991 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logint_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 12) =      2.46 
                  Prob > F =      0.1125 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   -.775987   1.023274    -0.76   0.460    -2.957044     1.40507 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Year 2008: 
 
 
regres logint_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2008==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      20 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    14) =    5.97 
       Model |  46.4972354     5  9.29944708           Prob > F      =  0.0037 
    Residual |  21.7961369    14  1.55686692           R-squared     =  0.6808 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5669 
       Total |  68.2933723    19  3.59438802           Root MSE      =  1.2477 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |   1.673787   .6853278     2.44   0.028     .2039048    3.143669 
 logp_labour |   .1099458   .7157528     0.15   0.880    -1.425191    1.645083 
logp_physc~l |  -.8753759    .277298    -3.16   0.007    -1.470121   -.2806308 
logloans_t~4 |   .2195442   .3658903     0.60   0.558    -.5652125    1.004301 
logequity_~4 |  -1.017871   .5662138    -1.80   0.094    -2.232279    .1965371 
       _cons |   15.97316    3.93938     4.05   0.001     7.524035    24.42229 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logint_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     3.14 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0766 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      20.00     19    0.3946 
            Skewness |       8.57      5    0.1274 
            Kurtosis |       1.09      1    0.2960 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      29.66     25    0.2371 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logint_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 11) =      0.74 
                  Prob > F =      0.5493 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .9083566   1.095054     0.83   0.421    -1.440301    3.257014 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Year 2009: 
 
 
regres logint_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2009==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    10) =    6.08 
       Model |  44.7200484     5  8.94400967           Prob > F      =  0.0077 
    Residual |  14.7172475    10  1.47172475           R-squared     =  0.7524 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.6286 
       Total |  59.4372959    15  3.96248639           Root MSE      =  1.2131 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |   1.556056   .5631335     2.76   0.020     .3013161    2.810795 
 logp_labour |  -1.187547    .837462    -1.42   0.187    -3.053528    .6784348 
logp_physc~l |  -.8038466   .3370372    -2.39   0.038    -1.554812   -.0528809 
logloans_t~4 |   .3676475    .642091     0.57   0.580     -1.06302    1.798315 
logequity_~4 |  -.1996797   .7947179    -0.25   0.807    -1.970422    1.571062 
       _cons |   12.12355   3.370078     3.60   0.005     4.614551    19.63255 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logint_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.66 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.4162 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      16.00     15    0.3821 
            Skewness |       2.71      5    0.7446 
            Kurtosis |       0.57      1    0.4516 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      19.28     21    0.5674 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logint_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 7) =      0.22 
                  Prob > F =      0.8809 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logint_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.4353376   1.005602    -0.43   0.674    -2.675958    1.805283 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 3.3 Estimates of Panzar-Rosse H-statistic (h_stat3) for 
each country/year using total income as dependent variable  
[standard errors in parentheses] 
 
                  
Year Albania 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia 
Czech 
Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia 
1999 - - - -0.979 -1.593 - -8.410 - 
    
[0.021] [0.005] 
 
[0.149] 
 2000 - - - 0.516 -0.662 - -3.327 - 
    
[0.012] [0.012] 
 
[0.019] 
 2001 - - - -0.707 -0.795 - -3.276 - 
    
[0.025] [0.014] 
 
[0.046] 
 2002 -0.056 - -1.591 -1.310 0.626 -10.205 -2.193 -0.127 
 
[0.010] 
 
[0.009] [0.006] [0.008] [0.172] [0.018] [0.006] 
2003 0.032 - -1.664 -2.823 0.441 -9.391 -2.039 -0.631 
 
[0.026] 
 
[0.014] [0.005] [0.013] [0.003] [0.016] [0.004] 
2004 1.874 0.133 -0.812 -1.243 0.972 -4.397 -1.673 -1.227 
 
[0.027] [0.034] [0.010] [0.003] [0.010] [0.077] [0.020] [0.006] 
2005 2.512 -0.938 -1.743 -4.410 -1.018 - -1.529 -1.773 
 
[0.044] [0.030] [0.013] [0.010] [0.010] 
 
[0.015] [0.010] 
2006 1.333 -0.780 -1.130 -4.906 -1.231 -12.002 -1.318 -0.906 
 
[0.171] [0.022] [0.017] [0.005] [0.009] [0.358] [0.015] [0.015] 
2007 -1.223 -1.209 -1.498 -3.702 0.387 -6.041 -0.813 -0.404 
 
[0.042] [0.012] [0.020] [0.010] [0.009] [0.025] [0.061] [0.010] 
2008 -0.753 0.491 -0.704 -2.623 -1.369 0.514 0.748 -0.304 
 
[0.053] [0.012] [0.018] [0.020] [0.016] [0.001] [0.029] [0.016] 
2009 - -0.440 -0.887 -3.820 -2.715 - -0.520 -0.810 
    [0.009] [0.011] [0.013] [0.020]   [0.010] [0.022] 
                
 
Year Lithuania Macedonia Poland Romania Serbia Slovakia Slovenia 
 1999 - - -0.067 4.660 - - -0.377 
 
   
[0.011] [0.486] 
  
[0.012] 
 2000 - - -4.297 0.519 - 1.627 -4.592 
 
   
[0.009] [0.094] 
 
[0.149] [0.063] 
 2001 - - 1.059 0.024 - -1.854 - 
 
   
[0.010] [0.060] 
 
[0.038] 
  2002 -5.400 -2.586 0.146 0.504 - -1.106 -5.818 
 
 
[0.064] [0.068] [0.012] [0.033] 
 
[0.014] [0.047] 
 2003 -2.109 -0.474 -0.400 -0.497 0.222 -2.316 -0.574 
 
 
[0.014] [0.067] [0.021] [0.029] [0.038] [0.026] [0.027] 
 2004 -4.212 0.359 -1.009 0.192 0.508 -3.833 0.355 
 
 
[0.013] [0.022] [0.013] [0.018] [0.056] [0.006] [0.019] 
 2005 -4.279 0.322 -1.830 -0.925 0.131 -2.347 4.270 
 
 
[0.003] [0.023] [0.015] [0.016] [0.038] [0.007] [0.014] 
 2006 -5.936 -0.572 0.821 0.889 -0.451 -3.980 -3.559 
 
 
[0.006] [0.023] [0.006] [0.015] [0.037] [0.013] [0.015] 
 2007 -7.848 -1.875 1.141 0.124 -0.394 -4.035 1.732 
 
 
[0.022] [0.024] [0.014] [0.025] [0.029] [0.009] [0.009] 
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2008 -9.314 -1.056 -2.097 0.166 -2.802 -4.335 2.516 
 
 
[0.045] [0.024] [0.026] [0.052] [0.058] [0.015] [0.007] 
 2009 -7.307 0.363 -1.615 -0.154 -2.714 -2.702 2.247 
   [0.038] [0.037] [0.027] [0.036] [0.020] [0.036] [0.009] 
 
          
 
 
A sample of the STATA output from the estimation of the H-statistic (h_stat3) for each 
country/year using the total income as dependent variable: the case of Hungary 
 
 
Year 1999: 
 
regres logtot_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 if  
dv_hun==1 & dv_1999==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =       7 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,     1) =    0.62 
       Model |  6.46545602     5   1.2930912           Prob > F      =  0.7387 
    Residual |  2.07213857     1  2.07213857           R-squared     =  0.7573 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.4562 
       Total |  8.53759459     6  1.42293243           Root MSE      =  1.4395 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -6.653557   5.219852    -1.27   0.423    -72.97806    59.67095 
 logp_labour |  -2.205905   3.035934    -0.73   0.600     -40.7811    36.36929 
logp_physc~l |   .4492402    1.90905     0.24   0.853    -23.80755    24.70603 
logloans_t~4 |  -3.025249   5.370813    -0.56   0.673     -71.2679     65.2174 
logequity_~4 |   2.381969   4.099917     0.58   0.665    -49.71241    54.47635 
       _cons |  -10.18528   19.82966    -0.51   0.698     -262.145    241.7745 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logtot_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.88 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.3482 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |       7.00      6    0.3208 
            Skewness |       1.41      5    0.9236 
            Kurtosis |       0.63      1    0.4277 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |       9.04     12    0.6999 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
powers of fitted values collinear with explanatory variables 
(typically because all explanatory variables are indicator variables) 
test not possible 
r(499); 
 
.  
. lincom  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital 
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 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -8.410222    7.63724    -1.10   0.469    -105.4506    88.63012 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Year 2000: 
 
regres logtot_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 if  
dv_hun==1 & dv_2000==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      11 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,     5) =    7.30 
       Model |  13.8313419     5  2.76626838           Prob > F      =  0.0239 
    Residual |  1.89430933     5  .378861865           R-squared     =  0.8795 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7591 
       Total |  15.7256512    10  1.57256512           Root MSE      =  .61552 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -2.682401   1.167891    -2.30   0.070    -5.684561     .319759 
 logp_labour |  -.6583421   .5124842    -1.28   0.255    -1.975725    .6590404 
logp_physc~l |   .0134621   .2827557     0.05   0.964    -.7133847    .7403089 
logloans_t~4 |  -2.037055   1.203313    -1.69   0.151    -5.130268    1.056159 
logequity_~4 |   .0599047   1.494303     0.04   0.970    -3.781324    3.901133 
       _cons |   .9835645    2.84742     0.35   0.744    -6.335962    8.303091 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logtot_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.28 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.5952 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      11.00     10    0.3575 
            Skewness |       3.47      5    0.6283 
            Kurtosis |       5.17      1    0.0230 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      19.64     16    0.2371 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logtot_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 2) =      0.12 
                  Prob > F =      0.9419 
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. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -3.327281   1.044763    -3.18   0.024    -6.012929   -.6416336 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Year 2001: 
 
regres logtot_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2001==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =       9 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,     3) =    1.56 
       Model |  19.3307905     5  3.86615811           Prob > F      =  0.3800 
    Residual |  7.45356545     3  2.48452182           R-squared     =  0.7217 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2579 
       Total |   26.784356     8   3.3480445           Root MSE      =  1.5762 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -1.706919   7.998283    -0.21   0.845    -27.16102    23.74719 
 logp_labour |  -.8908757    1.50989    -0.59   0.597     -5.69602    3.914268 
logp_physc~l |  -.6785285   .9528459    -0.71   0.528    -3.710909    2.353852 
logloans_t~4 |   .2766926   4.875493     0.06   0.958     -15.2393    15.79269 
logequity_~4 |  -2.168099   3.484525    -0.62   0.578    -13.25741    8.921214 
       _cons |  -1.602016   25.86554    -0.06   0.955    -83.91771    80.71368 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logtot_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     2.32 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.1276 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |       9.00      8    0.3423 
            Skewness |       5.58      5    0.3490 
            Kurtosis |       0.23      1    0.6339 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      14.81     14    0.3914 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
powers of fitted values collinear with explanatory variables 
(typically because all explanatory variables are indicator variables) 
test not possible 
r(499); 
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. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -3.276323   6.774114    -0.48   0.662    -24.83458    18.28193 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
Year 2002: 
 
regres logtot_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2002==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    10) =    3.67 
       Model |  27.7664282     5  5.55328563           Prob > F      =  0.0380 
    Residual |  15.1201256    10  1.51201256           R-squared     =  0.6474 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4712 
       Total |  42.8865537    15  2.85910358           Root MSE      =  1.2296 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -1.281054    1.04933    -1.22   0.250    -3.619108       1.057 
 logp_labour |   -.639196   .7466381    -0.86   0.412    -2.302809    1.024417 
logp_physc~l |  -.2730654    .363291    -0.75   0.470    -1.082528    .5363975 
logloans_t~4 |   .4576285   .7866267     0.58   0.574    -1.295085    2.210342 
logequity_~4 |  -1.493046   .7417162    -2.01   0.072    -3.145692    .1596008 
       _cons |   1.965846   3.946628     0.50   0.629    -6.827789    10.75948 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logtot_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.27 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.6043 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      16.00     15    0.3821 
            Skewness |       0.40      5    0.9953 
            Kurtosis |       1.35      1    0.2455 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      17.75     21    0.6649 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logtot_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 7) =      0.29 
                  Prob > F =      0.8309 
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. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -2.193315   1.130167    -1.94   0.081    -4.711483    .3248529 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Year 2003: 
 
regres logtot_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2003==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    10) =    3.77 
       Model |  26.8530751     5  5.37061502           Prob > F      =  0.0352 
    Residual |  14.2441601    10  1.42441601           R-squared     =  0.6534 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4801 
       Total |  41.0972352    15  2.73981568           Root MSE      =  1.1935 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -.3668158   .6744664    -0.54   0.598    -1.869621    1.135989 
 logp_labour |  -.8815634   .6591817    -1.34   0.211    -2.350312     .587185 
logp_physc~l |  -.7910098   .4096599    -1.93   0.082    -1.703789    .1217694 
logloans_t~4 |  -.0092056    .863642    -0.01   0.992     -1.93352    1.915109 
logequity_~4 |  -.6794424   .6288561    -1.08   0.305    -2.080621    .7217364 
       _cons |   5.418037   3.613517     1.50   0.165    -2.633381    13.46946 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logtot_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.00 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.9507 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      16.00     15    0.3821 
            Skewness |       3.17      5    0.6734 
            Kurtosis |       0.24      1    0.6208 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      19.42     21    0.5584 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logtot_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 7) =      7.94 
                  Prob > F =      0.0118 
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. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -2.039389   .8876493    -2.30   0.044    -4.017195   -.0615831 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Year 2004: 
 
regres logtot_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2004==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      20 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    14) =    5.48 
       Model |   40.600166     5  8.12003319           Prob > F      =  0.0053 
    Residual |  20.7581414    14  1.48272439           R-squared     =  0.6617 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5409 
       Total |  61.3583074    19   3.2293846           Root MSE      =  1.2177 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -.2725631   .7378639    -0.37   0.717    -1.855124    1.309998 
 logp_labour |  -.4072182   .7001178    -0.58   0.570    -1.908821    1.094385 
logp_physc~l |  -.9931261   .3151105    -3.15   0.007    -1.668971   -.3172814 
logloans_t~4 |   .3343896   .6939412     0.48   0.637    -1.153966    1.822746 
logequity_~4 |   -.678811   .7859258    -0.86   0.402    -2.364454    1.006832 
       _cons |   8.495004    3.08293     2.76   0.015     1.882777    15.10723 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logtot_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     1.17 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2784 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      20.00     19    0.3946 
            Skewness |       5.46      5    0.3621 
            Kurtosis |       0.21      1    0.6439 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      25.68     25    0.4250 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logtot_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 11) =      2.38 
                  Prob > F =      0.1251 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
356 
 
. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -1.672907   .9762849    -1.71   0.109     -3.76683    .4210155 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Year 2005: 
 
regres logtot_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2005==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      21 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    15) =    3.19 
       Model |  28.6585188     5  5.73170376           Prob > F      =  0.0369 
    Residual |  26.9454552    15  1.79636368           R-squared     =  0.5154 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3539 
       Total |   55.603974    20   2.7801987           Root MSE      =  1.3403 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -.5465667    .827059    -0.66   0.519    -2.309401    1.216268 
 logp_labour |  -.1721685   .6681072    -0.26   0.800    -1.596205    1.251868 
logp_physc~l |  -.8104452   .2691208    -3.01   0.009    -1.384063   -.2368276 
logloans_t~4 |   .1069495   .6667112     0.16   0.875    -1.314112    1.528011 
logequity_~4 |  -.5148672   .7708329    -0.67   0.514    -2.157859    1.128124 
       _cons |   8.585131     3.1445     2.73   0.015     1.882788    15.28747 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logtot_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.18 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.6679 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      21.00     20    0.3971 
            Skewness |       4.87      5    0.4319 
            Kurtosis |       0.00      1    0.9804 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      25.87     26    0.4702 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logtot_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 12) =      1.63 
                  Prob > F =      0.2352 
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. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   -1.52918   1.039256    -1.47   0.162    -3.744302    .6859412 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Year 2006: 
 
regres logtot_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2006==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      22 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    16) =    3.77 
       Model |  40.0899735     5   8.0179947           Prob > F      =  0.0190 
    Residual |  34.0008632    16  2.12505395           R-squared     =  0.5411 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3977 
       Total |  74.0908367    21  3.52813508           Root MSE      =  1.4578 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |  -.0105539   .4671912    -0.02   0.982    -1.000955    .9798472 
 logp_labour |   -.613954   .6853907    -0.90   0.384    -2.066917    .8390094 
logp_physc~l |  -.6932992   .2500091    -2.77   0.014    -1.223295   -.1633036 
logloans_t~4 |   .4471131   .3412354     1.31   0.209    -.2762737      1.1705 
logequity_~4 |  -.4554263   .6339796    -0.72   0.483    -1.799403    .8885504 
       _cons |   8.700234   3.152541     2.76   0.014     2.017147    15.38332 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logtot_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.61 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.4357 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      21.84     20    0.3493 
            Skewness |       1.22      5    0.9427 
            Kurtosis |       0.86      1    0.3529 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      23.93     26    0.5802 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logtot_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 13) =      0.51 
                  Prob > F =      0.6853 
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. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -1.317807   .9072481    -1.45   0.166    -3.241087     .605473 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Year 2007: 
 
regres logtot_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2007==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      21 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    15) =    5.33 
       Model |  52.0149758     5  10.4029952           Prob > F      =  0.0052 
    Residual |  29.3005716    15  1.95337144           R-squared     =  0.6397 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5196 
       Total |  81.3155474    20  4.06577737           Root MSE      =  1.3976 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |   .5648212   .9238973     0.61   0.550    -1.404419    2.534062 
 logp_labour |  -.5577504   .6160486    -0.91   0.380    -1.870827    .7553262 
logp_physc~l |  -.8200611   .2816504    -2.91   0.011    -1.420385   -.2197374 
logloans_t~4 |   .1580578   .4176956     0.38   0.710    -.7322394    1.048355 
logequity_~4 |    -.74051   .7579248    -0.98   0.344    -2.355988    .8749684 
       _cons |   10.27454    3.68663     2.79   0.014     2.416678    18.13241 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logtot_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     4.67 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0307 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      21.00     20    0.3971 
            Skewness |       6.47      5    0.2636 
            Kurtosis |       1.77      1    0.1832 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      29.24     26    0.3005 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logtot_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 12) =      2.26 
                  Prob > F =      0.1335 
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. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.8129903   1.037388    -0.78   0.445    -3.024131    1.398151 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Year 2008: 
 
regres logtot_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2008==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      20 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    14) =    5.46 
       Model |  46.9277342     5  9.38554685           Prob > F      =  0.0054 
    Residual |  24.0462643    14  1.71759031           R-squared     =  0.6612 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5402 
       Total |  70.9739985    19  3.73547361           Root MSE      =  1.3106 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |   1.600592    .719834     2.22   0.043     .0567011    3.144482 
 logp_labour |   .0932964    .751791     0.12   0.903    -1.519135    1.705728 
logp_physc~l |  -.9461706     .29126    -3.25   0.006    -1.570861   -.3214801 
logloans_t~4 |   .1752183   .3843129     0.46   0.655    -.6490509    .9994875 
logequity_~4 |   -.917842   .5947227    -1.54   0.145    -2.193395    .3577113 
       _cons |   16.22648   4.137728     3.92   0.002     7.351934    25.10102 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logtot_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     2.78 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0957 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      20.00     19    0.3946 
            Skewness |       8.00      5    0.1565 
            Kurtosis |       0.89      1    0.3463 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      28.88     25    0.2689 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logtot_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 11) =      0.36 
                  Prob > F =      0.7863 
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. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .7477174    1.15019     0.65   0.526    -1.719195     3.21463 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
Year 2009: 
 
regres logtot_inc logp_funds logp_labour logp_physcapital logloans_ta_c4 logequity_ta_c4 
if  dv_hun==1 & dv_2009==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      16 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    10) =    5.21 
       Model |  41.1570531     5  8.23141063           Prob > F      =  0.0130 
    Residual |  15.7917578    10  1.57917578           R-squared     =  0.7227 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5841 
       Total |   56.948811    15   3.7965874           Root MSE      =  1.2567 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  logp_funds |   1.463598   .5833286     2.51   0.031      .163861    2.763335 
 logp_labour |  -1.212342   .8674951    -1.40   0.192    -3.145242    .7205575 
logp_physc~l |  -.7713701   .3491241    -2.21   0.052    -1.549267    .0065269 
logloans_t~4 |   .3477781   .6651177     0.52   0.612    -1.134197    1.829753 
logequity_~4 |  -.2292662   .8232182    -0.28   0.786    -2.063511    1.604978 
       _cons |   11.91728   3.490936     3.41   0.007     4.138994    19.69557 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of logtot_inc 
 
         chi2(1)      =     0.52 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.4716 
 
.  
. estat imtest 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |      16.00     15    0.3821 
            Skewness |       3.27      5    0.6590 
            Kurtosis |       0.64      1    0.4248 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |      19.90     21    0.5274 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of logtot_inc 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                   F(3, 7) =      0.28 
                  Prob > F =      0.8360 
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. lincom  logp_funds+ logp_labour+ logp_physcapital 
 
 ( 1)  logp_funds + logp_labour + logp_physcapital = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  logtot_inc |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   -.520114   1.041665    -0.50   0.628    -2.841088     1.80086 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 3.4 Lerner Index estimates for each country/year 
Source: Efthyvoulou, G. and Yildirim, C. (2013)  
 
                  
Year Albania 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia 
Czech 
Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia 
1999 - - - - - - - - 
2000 - - - - - - - - 
2001 - - - - - - - - 
2002 13.910 - 29.060 23.400 11.330 - 9.120 22.210 
2003 3.880 - 24.190 25.380 7.860 - 4.490 21.130 
2004 12.300 15.930 28.810 21.990 8.100 - 6.550 29.640 
2005 24.580 20.380 19.040 20.230 11.560 - 9.690 34.420 
2006 20.160 21.010 27.360 13.280 13.370 - 3.400 43.810 
2007 20.110 22.990 31.320 16.310 17.490 - -4.600 30.650 
2008 19.900 14.590 24.710 12.860 22.420 - -15.660 33.540 
2009 16.710 19.500 23.830 16.620 26.970 - -0.850 24.950 
                
 
Year Lithuania Macedonia Poland Romania Serbia Slovakia Slovenia 
 1999 - - - - - - - 
 2000 - - - - - - - 
 2001 - - - - - - - 
 2002 - 21.770 10.310 25.480 39.610 15.580 36.850 
 2003 - 28.360 -2.620 17.570 47.810 13.650 30.610 
 2004 - 28.380 11.350 24.870 30.930 8.620 34.370 
 2005 - 33.420 7.140 18.180 30.400 10.720 27.010 
 2006 - 33.840 20.890 10.330 15.200 18.240 21.860 
 2007 - 33.420 18.650 15.190 20.800 19.390 24.490 
 2008 - 27.750 14.630 22.050 10.100 29.880 16.180 
 2009 - 22.390 6.570 23.060 13.320 11.500 25.880 
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Appendix 3.5 Graphical presentation of h_stat1, h_stat3, and 
Lerner Index, by countries/years 
Note: h_stat1 represents the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic estimated with interest income as 
dependent variable, whereas h_stat3 represents the H-statistic estimated with total income as 
dependent variable. 
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Appendix 3.6 The Hausman test for choosing between the Fixed 
Effects and Random Effects 
 
Fixed Effects: 
 
xtreg prov_loans  h_stat1 Lagnonintinc_ta Lagequity_ta Lagnim logta Laggrowth_loans rgdpgrowth 
gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 propertyrights_hrt dv_foreign dv_origin  
dv_2002  dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze 
dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, fe 
note: dv_bos omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_bul omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_cro omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_cze omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_est omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_hun omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_lat omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_lit omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_mac omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_pol omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_rom omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_ser omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_svk omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_slo omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1497 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =       292 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1766                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0019                                        avg =       5.1 
       overall = 0.0073                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(22,1183)         =     11.53 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9029                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  prov_loans |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     h_stat1 |  -.0957351   .0424028    -2.26   0.024    -.1789281   -.0125421 
Lagnoninti~a |    .016104   .0288117     0.56   0.576    -.0404237    .0726317 
Lagequity_ta |  -.0105925   .0153113    -0.69   0.489    -.0406328    .0194478 
      Lagnim |  -.0757136   .0512133    -1.48   0.140    -.1761927    .0247655 
       logta |  -.7197035    .194424    -3.70   0.000    -1.101158   -.3382493 
Laggr~_loans |    .003557   .0013026     2.73   0.006     .0010012    .0061127 
  rgdpgrowth |  -.2315257   .0225565   -10.26   0.000    -.2757809   -.1872704 
  gdp_percap |  -.0000895   .0000607    -1.47   0.141    -.0002086    .0000297 
    cpi_ebrd |  -.0060324   .0260887    -0.23   0.817    -.0572176    .0451528 
logexch_rate |  -1.739592   1.171073    -1.49   0.138    -4.037203    .5580185 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.5000553   .5336176    -0.94   0.349    -1.546998    .5468871 
propertyri~t |   -.051843   .0165678    -3.13   0.002    -.0843485   -.0193375 
  dv_foreign |   .1873066   .4465228     0.42   0.675    -.6887584    1.063372 
   dv_origin |   .3416529   .4555611     0.75   0.453     -.552145    1.235451 
     dv_2002 |    1.03645   .5650874     1.83   0.067    -.0722357    2.145135 
     dv_2003 |   .9343079   .5810351     1.61   0.108    -.2056663    2.074282 
     dv_2004 |   .8765537   .6468743     1.36   0.176    -.3925952    2.145703 
     dv_2005 |   1.023502   .6952292     1.47   0.141     -.340518    2.387521 
     dv_2006 |   1.280578   .7375745     1.74   0.083    -.1665223    2.727678 
     dv_2007 |     1.8616    .844517     2.20   0.028     .2046819    3.518518 
     dv_2008 |   1.692532   .9386401     1.80   0.072    -.1490526    3.534117 
     dv_2009 |    .947666    .924118     1.03   0.305    -.8654269    2.760759 
      dv_bos |  (omitted) 
      dv_bul |  (omitted) 
      dv_cro |  (omitted) 
      dv_cze |  (omitted) 
      dv_est |  (omitted) 
      dv_hun |  (omitted) 
      dv_lat |  (omitted) 
      dv_lit |  (omitted) 
      dv_mac |  (omitted) 
      dv_pol |  (omitted) 
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      dv_rom |  (omitted) 
      dv_ser |  (omitted) 
      dv_svk |  (omitted) 
      dv_slo |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   18.42042   3.510954     5.25   0.000     11.53203    25.30881 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  4.1905099 
     sigma_e |  1.9630469 
         rho |  .82004454   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(291, 1183) =     1.87           Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
  
  
 
 
. estimates store FE 
 
 
 
 
Random Effects: 
 
xtreg prov_loans  h_stat1 Lagnonintinc_ta Lagequity_ta Lagnim logta Laggrowth_loans rgdp 
> growth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 propertyrights_hrt  dv_foreign dv_ 
> origin  dv_2002  dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul d 
> v_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, re 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =      1497 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =       292 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1594                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.4818                                        avg =       5.1 
       overall = 0.2325                                        max =        10 
 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                   Wald chi2(36)      =    409.53 
corr(u_i, X)       = 0 (assumed)                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  prov_loans |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     h_stat1 |   -.070693   .0413187    -1.71   0.087    -.1516762    .0102903 
Lagnoninti~a |   .0734185   .0202337     3.63   0.000     .0337612    .1130759 
Lagequity_ta |  -.0096986   .0094784    -1.02   0.306     -.028276    .0088788 
      Lagnim |   .0474545   .0289787     1.64   0.102    -.0093427    .1042518 
       logta |  -.0649677   .0630066    -1.03   0.302    -.1884585     .058523 
Laggr~_loans |   .0034169    .001174     2.91   0.004     .0011159    .0057178 
  rgdpgrowth |  -.2405471   .0220326   -10.92   0.000    -.2837302   -.1973639 
  gdp_percap |  -.0000954   .0000589    -1.62   0.105    -.0002109      .00002 
    cpi_ebrd |   .0064594   .0246753     0.26   0.793    -.0419033     .054822 
logexch_rate |  -3.399164   1.098055    -3.10   0.002    -5.551312   -1.247016 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -1.086604   .5121693    -2.12   0.034    -2.090437   -.0827705 
propertyri~t |   -.056238   .0160259    -3.51   0.000    -.0876482   -.0248278 
  dv_foreign |  -.1053655    .226493    -0.47   0.642    -.5492836    .3385527 
   dv_origin |   .0707703   .2202249     0.32   0.748    -.3608626    .5024032 
     dv_2002 |   .6716817   .5089994     1.32   0.187    -.3259389    1.669302 
     dv_2003 |   .8128463   .5117031     1.59   0.112    -.1900733    1.815766 
     dv_2004 |   .6711675   .5769471     1.16   0.245     -.459628    1.801963 
     dv_2005 |   .7305831   .6223163     1.17   0.240    -.4891344    1.950301 
     dv_2006 |   .8621884   .6544935     1.32   0.188    -.4205953    2.144972 
     dv_2007 |   1.347702    .749779     1.80   0.072    -.1218381    2.817242 
     dv_2008 |   1.039272   .8384962     1.24   0.215    -.6041505    2.682694 
     dv_2009 |   .2593323   .8374417     0.31   0.757    -1.382023    1.900688 
      dv_bos |  -15.08388   4.509079    -3.35   0.001    -23.92152    -6.24625 
      dv_bul |  -13.81152   4.590947    -3.01   0.003    -22.80961   -4.813425 
      dv_cro |  -9.018391      2.994    -3.01   0.003    -14.88652   -3.150259 
      dv_cze |   -1.65792   1.889972    -0.88   0.380    -5.362198    2.046358 
      dv_est |  -3.500768   2.596954    -1.35   0.178    -8.590705    1.589169 
      dv_hun |   5.894208   1.457783     4.04   0.000     3.037006     8.75141 
      dv_lat |  -15.12698   5.728754    -2.64   0.008    -26.35513    -3.89883 
      dv_lit |  -10.44628   3.958691    -2.64   0.008    -18.20517   -2.687392 
      dv_mac |   -2.17254   1.049239    -2.07   0.038    -4.229011   -.1160697 
      dv_pol |  -9.538179    3.80051    -2.51   0.012    -16.98704   -2.089317 
      dv_rom |  -11.78983   3.878146    -3.04   0.002    -19.39085     -4.1888 
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      dv_ser |    1.50526    .901658     1.67   0.095    -.2619571    3.272477 
      dv_svk |  -13.47323    5.01007    -2.69   0.007    -23.29279   -3.653674 
      dv_slo |  -13.46575   5.079113    -2.65   0.008    -23.42063   -3.510869 
       _cons |   23.72353   5.445004     4.36   0.000     13.05152    34.39554 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  .94385363 
     sigma_e |  1.9630469 
         rho |  .18777027   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
  
 
. estimates store RE 
 
 
 
Hausman Test: 
 
 
. hausman FE RE 
 
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (20) does not equal the number of 
        coefficients being tested (22); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be 
        problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your estimators for anything 
        unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients 
        are on a similar scale. 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |       FE           RE         Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     h_stat1 |   -.0957351     -.070693       -.0250421        .0095267 
Lagnoninti~a |     .016104     .0734185       -.0573146        .0205112 
Lagequity_ta |   -.0105925    -.0096986       -.0008939        .0120248 
      Lagnim |   -.0757136     .0474545       -.1231681        .0422261 
       logta |   -.7197035    -.0649677       -.6547358        .1839316 
Laggr~_loans |     .003557     .0034169        .0001401        .0005645 
  rgdpgrowth |   -.2315257    -.2405471        .0090214        .0048332 
  gdp_percap |   -.0000895    -.0000954        5.97e-06        .0000147 
    cpi_ebrd |   -.0060324     .0064594       -.0124917        .0084705 
logexch_rate |   -1.739592    -3.399164        1.659571        .4070466 
ebrd_bankr~1 |   -.5000553    -1.086604        .5865486        .1497675 
propertyri~t |    -.051843     -.056238         .004395        .0042024 
  dv_foreign |    .1873066    -.1053655        .2926721        .3848163 
   dv_origin |    .3416529     .0707703        .2708826        .3987944 
     dv_2002 |     1.03645     .6716817        .3647678        .2454451 
     dv_2003 |    .9343079     .8128463        .1214616        .2752485 
     dv_2004 |    .8765537     .6711675        .2053862         .292538 
     dv_2005 |    1.023502     .7305831        .2929186        .3099451 
     dv_2006 |    1.280578     .8621884        .4183893          .34008 
     dv_2007 |      1.8616     1.347702        .5138982        .3886392 
     dv_2008 |    1.692532     1.039272        .6532605        .4218642 
     dv_2009 |     .947666     .2593323        .6883338        .3907499 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(20) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       65.69 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
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Appendix 3.7 Diagnostic tests for the Fixed Effects model 
 
 
Test for autocorrelation: 
 
xtserial prov_loans h_stat1 Lagnonintinc_ta Lagequity_ta Lagnim logta Laggrowth_loans 
rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 propertyrights_hrt  dv_foreign  
dv_origin dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro 
dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo 
 
 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,     229) =      2.780 
           Prob > F =      0.0968 
 
 
 
In order verify if our regression should be estimated with a dynamic model, we include the 
lagged dependent variable and use the General Method of Moments as estimator: 
 
xtabond2 prov_loans Lagprov_loans  h_stat1 nonintinc_ta equity_ta nim logta growth_loans 
rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 propertyrights_hrt  dv_foreign 
dv_origin  dv_2002  dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul 
dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, 
gmm(Lagprov_loans, laglimits (1 2)) gmm(nonintinc_ta equity_ta nim growth_loans, laglimits (2 
3)) iv( h_stat1 logta rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 
propertyrights_hrt  dv_foreign dv_origin  dv_2002  dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 
dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  
dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo) robust twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, per m. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1528 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       300 
Number of instruments = 163                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(37) =    291.86                                      avg =      5.09 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  prov_loans |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Lagprov_lo~s |  -.0175686   .0548807    -0.32   0.749    -.1251327    .0899955 
     h_stat1 |  -.0083427   .0221235    -0.38   0.706    -.0517039    .0350186 
nonintinc_ta |   .3689671   .1413551     2.61   0.009     .0919162    .6460181 
   equity_ta |   .0243575   .0299825     0.81   0.417    -.0344071     .083122 
         nim |   .0586261   .0791432     0.74   0.459    -.0964918     .213744 
       logta |  -.0145896   .0860434    -0.17   0.865    -.1832316    .1540524 
growth_loans |  -.0099055   .0040528    -2.44   0.015    -.0178489   -.0019621 
  rgdpgrowth |   -.148099    .028454    -5.20   0.000    -.2038679   -.0923301 
  gdp_percap |  -.0000151   .0000631    -0.24   0.811    -.0001388    .0001086 
    cpi_ebrd |  -.0100735   .0268291    -0.38   0.707    -.0626575    .0425105 
logexch_rate |  -.4789595    1.40549    -0.34   0.733     -3.23367    2.275751 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.6758456   .5473154    -1.23   0.217    -1.748564    .3968728 
propertyri~t |  -.0258831   .0135954    -1.90   0.057    -.0525296    .0007635 
  dv_foreign |   .3269181   .2409231     1.36   0.175    -.1452826    .7991188 
   dv_origin |  -.1279041   .2114391    -0.60   0.545    -.5423171     .286509 
     dv_2002 |   .6170778   .7260065     0.85   0.395    -.8058688    2.040024 
     dv_2003 |   .1504611   .5891721     0.26   0.798    -1.004295    1.305217 
     dv_2004 |   .0957789   .6040941     0.16   0.874    -1.088224    1.279782 
     dv_2005 |   .1659445   .6160284     0.27   0.788    -1.041449    1.373338 
373 
 
     dv_2006 |   .2103839   .6115871     0.34   0.731    -.9883048    1.409073 
     dv_2007 |   .5765735   .7211564     0.80   0.424     -.836867    1.990014 
     dv_2008 |   .3539267   .8121203     0.44   0.663      -1.2378    1.945653 
     dv_2009 |   .1527383   .8708659     0.18   0.861    -1.554128    1.859604 
      dv_bos |  -2.843078    5.72318    -0.50   0.619     -14.0603    8.374149 
      dv_bul |  -2.015144   5.666873    -0.36   0.722    -13.12201    9.091723 
      dv_cro |  -1.800209    3.51249    -0.51   0.608    -8.684563    5.084144 
      dv_cze |   .2193141     1.8535     0.12   0.906    -3.413479    3.852107 
      dv_est |  -.0612662   2.639683    -0.02   0.981     -5.23495    5.112418 
      dv_hun |   .9901315   2.046605     0.48   0.629     -3.02114    5.001403 
      dv_lat |  -1.579957   6.935828    -0.23   0.820    -15.17393    12.01402 
      dv_lit |  -1.055322   4.741524    -0.22   0.824    -10.34854    8.237894 
      dv_mac |  -1.095915   1.114547    -0.98   0.325    -3.280387    1.088558 
      dv_pol |  -1.326879   4.444102    -0.30   0.765    -10.03716    7.383402 
      dv_rom |  -2.174143   4.697521    -0.46   0.643    -11.38112    7.032829 
      dv_ser |   .8117405   .8570386     0.95   0.344    -.8680242    2.491505 
      dv_svk |  -1.821448    6.18004    -0.29   0.768     -13.9341    10.29121 
      dv_slo |  -2.006457   6.233746    -0.32   0.748    -14.22438    10.21146 
       _cons |   6.467991   7.768231     0.83   0.405    -8.757461    21.69344 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(h_stat1 logta rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 
    propertyrights_hrt dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 
    dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun 
    dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/2).Lagprov_loans 
    L(2/3).(nonintinc_ta equity_ta nim growth_loans) 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    h_stat1 logta rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 
    propertyrights_hrt dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 
    dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun 
    dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.Lagprov_loans 
    DL.(nonintinc_ta equity_ta nim growth_loans) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.36  Pr > z =  0.174 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.70  Pr > z =  0.484 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(125)  = 475.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(125)  = 122.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.552 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(79)   =  84.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.329 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(46)   =  38.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.783 
  gmm(Lagprov_loans, lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(102)  =  97.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.599 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  24.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.376 
  gmm(nonintinc_ta equity_ta nim growth_loans, lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(18)   =  20.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.326 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(107)  = 102.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.613 
  iv(h_stat1 logta rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 propertyright 
> s_hrt dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_20 
> 09 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser d 
> v_svk dv_slo) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(93)   =  92.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.481 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(32)   =  29.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.602 
 
 
 
 
The results from the above regression suggest that the lagged dependent variable is 
statistically insignificant, thus suggesting that a dynamic model is not recommended for 
our regression. 
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Test for normality: 
 
pantest2 prov_loans h_stat1 Lagnonintinc_ta Lagequity_ta Lagnim logta Laggrowth_loans 
rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 propertyrights_hrt dv_foreign 
dv_origin dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro 
dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo 
 
Test for serial correlation in residuals 
Null hypothesis is either that rho=0 if residuals are AR(1) 
or that lamda=0 if residuals are MA(1) 
Following tests only approximate for unbalanced panels 
LM= 28.966522 
which is asy. distributed as chisq(1) under null, so: 
Probability of value greater than LM is 7.364e-08 
LM5= 5.3820556 
which is asy. distributed as N(0,1) under null, so: 
Probability of value greater than abs(LM5) is 3.682e-08 
 
 
Test for significance of fixed effects 
F= 1.8680556 
Probability>F= 3.524e-13 
 
 
Test for normality of residuals 
 
                    Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
                                                         ------- joint ------ 
    Variable |    Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    __00000B |   1.5e+03   0.0000         0.0000            .              . 
 
 
Histogram of the residuals: 
 
predict residuals, e 
 
histogram residuals 
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Test for heteroscedasticity: 
 
 
. xttest3 
 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (292)  =   9.9e+05 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
 
Appendix 3.8 Estimation of the impact of competition on risk-
taking using Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition: 3-stage approach 
 
 
First stage: Estimate the FE regression and predict the FE vector 
 
In the first stage, Equation 5.2 is estimated using the normal fixed effects model. After 
running the regression, we perform the diagnostic tests to check whether the model is well 
specified. The test for serial correlation is done using the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
in panel data (xtserial) which shows a p-value of 0.097 suggesting that the null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation may be rejected at the 5% confidence level. However, since the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 10% confidence level, we transform the Equation 5.2 into 
a dynamic model by including the lagged dependent variable among the explanatory 
variables and using the General Method of Moments as estimator (Appendix 3.7). The lagged 
dependent variable in this estimation is insignificant, thus not providing evidence that our 
regression should be estimated with a dynamic model. The test for normality is conducted 
using the Stata command pantest2, which rejected the null hypothesis of normality in the 
residuals. However, the histogram of the residuals shows that the residuals are quite normally 
distributed (Appendix 3.7). Next, we test for heteroscedasticity by using the Stata command 
xttest3, which rejects the null hypothesis of homoscedastic variance (Appendix 3.7). In order 
to overcome the problem of heteroscedasticity, we run the regression using robust standard 
errors. Given the large number of groups in our sample we expect robust standard errors to be 
larger than the default standard errors, thus reflecting the loss of information because of the 
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clustering. This is confirmed by our results; hence, we adopt the conservative approach to 
inference, by using robust standard errors to estimate the first stage of our FEVD model.  
 
 
xtreg prov_loans  h_stat1 Lagnonintinc_ta Lagequity_ta Lagnim logta Laggrowth_loans rgdpgrowth 
gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 propertyrights_hrt  dv_foreign dv_origin  
dv_2002  dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze 
dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, fe robust  
note: dv_bos omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_bul omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_cro omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_cze omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_est omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_hun omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_lat omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_lit omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_mac omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_pol omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_rom omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_ser omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_svk omitted because of collinearity 
note: dv_slo omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1497 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =       292 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.1766                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.0019                                        avg =       5.1 
       overall = 0.0073                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(22,291)          =      7.27 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9029                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
                                 (Std. Err. adjusted for 292 clusters in bank) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  prov_loans |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     h_stat1 |  -.0957351   .0701747    -1.36   0.174    -.2338493    .0423791 
Lagnoninti~a |    .016104   .0317533     0.51   0.612    -.0463913    .0785992 
Lagequity_ta |  -.0105925   .0337213    -0.31   0.754    -.0769611    .0557761 
      Lagnim |  -.0757136   .0555341    -1.36   0.174    -.1850129    .0335857 
       logta |  -.7197035   .3214137    -2.24   0.026    -1.352294   -.0871132 
Laggr~_loans |    .003557   .0026119     1.36   0.174    -.0015837    .0086976 
  rgdpgrowth |  -.2315257   .0389193    -5.95   0.000    -.3081247   -.1549266 
  gdp_percap |  -.0000895   .0001217    -0.74   0.463    -.0003289      .00015 
    cpi_ebrd |  -.0060324   .0312622    -0.19   0.847    -.0675611    .0554964 
logexch_rate |  -1.739592   1.784952    -0.97   0.331    -5.252644    1.773459 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.5000553    .641906    -0.78   0.437    -1.763422    .7633117 
propertyri~t |   -.051843   .0197138    -2.63   0.009    -.0906427   -.0130433 
  dv_foreign |   .1873066     .36604     0.51   0.609    -.5331148    .9077281 
   dv_origin |   .3416529   .4678841     0.73   0.466     -.579213    1.262519 
     dv_2002 |    1.03645   .5085984     2.04   0.042     .0354518    2.037447 
     dv_2003 |   .9343079    .544793     1.71   0.087    -.1379262    2.006542 
     dv_2004 |   .8765537   .6856701     1.28   0.202    -.4729477    2.226055 
     dv_2005 |   1.023502   .7586778     1.35   0.178    -.4696897    2.516693 
     dv_2006 |   1.280578   .8920514     1.44   0.152    -.4751129    3.036268 
     dv_2007 |     1.8616   1.204023     1.55   0.123    -.5080975    4.231298 
     dv_2008 |   1.692532   1.313413     1.29   0.199    -.8924618    4.277526 
     dv_2009 |    .947666   1.194254     0.79   0.428    -1.402805    3.298137 
      dv_bos |  (omitted) 
      dv_bul |  (omitted) 
      dv_cro |  (omitted) 
      dv_cze |  (omitted) 
      dv_est |  (omitted) 
      dv_hun |  (omitted) 
      dv_lat |  (omitted) 
      dv_lit |  (omitted) 
      dv_mac |  (omitted) 
      dv_pol |  (omitted) 
      dv_rom |  (omitted) 
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      dv_ser |  (omitted) 
      dv_svk |  (omitted) 
      dv_slo |  (omitted) 
       _cons |   18.42042   6.274419     2.94   0.004     6.071427    30.76942 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  4.1905099 
     sigma_e |  1.9630469 
         rho |  .82004454   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  
After the estimation of the regression, we predict the fixed effects vector, which is going to 
be used in the second stage of the regression.  
 
  
. predict fixed_effects, u 
(1429 missing values generated) 
 
 
 
 
Second stage: Regress the FE vector on the time-invariant and slowly-moving 
variables and predict the residuals 
 
In the second stage, the fixed effects vector is regressed on the time-invariant and the “rarely 
changing” explanatory variables, which in our case are the country dummies and the 
variables propertyrights_hrt, dv_origin, and exch_rate. The regression is estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
 
 
reg fixed_effects propertyrights_hrt dv_origin logexch_rate dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze  
dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1497 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 17,  1479) =  478.89 
       Model |   18655.394    17  1097.37612           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  3389.09644  1479  2.29147833           R-squared     =  0.8463 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8445 
       Total |  22044.4904  1496  14.7356219           Root MSE      =  1.5138 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
fixed_effe~s |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
propertyri~t |  -.0075089   .0092238    -0.81   0.416    -.0256019    .0105842 
   dv_origin |  -.0734024   .0839788    -0.87   0.382    -.2381326    .0913278 
logexch_rate |  -2.124775    .639714    -3.32   0.001    -3.379618   -.8699317 
      dv_bos |  -17.20845   2.662836    -6.46   0.000    -22.43179   -11.98512 
      dv_bul |   -15.9186    2.68871    -5.92   0.000    -21.19269   -10.64451 
      dv_cro |  -10.83444   1.840133    -5.89   0.000    -14.44399   -7.224893 
      dv_cze |  -1.795849   1.104988    -1.63   0.104    -3.963359    .3716619 
      dv_est |  -4.387706   1.523541    -2.88   0.004    -7.376236   -1.399175 
      dv_hun |   6.845226   .6263479    10.93   0.000     5.616601    8.073851 
      dv_lat |  -18.01964   3.386324    -5.32   0.000    -24.66215   -11.37713 
      dv_lit |  -12.22211   2.361795    -5.17   0.000    -16.85493   -7.589283 
      dv_mac |  -2.878854   .5772006    -4.99   0.000    -4.011072   -1.746635 
      dv_pol |  -10.55254   2.266646    -4.66   0.000    -14.99872   -6.106356 
      dv_rom |  -12.50347   2.280155    -5.48   0.000    -16.97616   -8.030792 
      dv_ser |   2.050643   .4803693     4.27   0.000     1.108365     2.99292 
      dv_svk |  -15.59856   3.028052    -5.15   0.000    -21.53829   -9.658826 
      dv_slo |  -15.11279   3.151095    -4.80   0.000    -21.29388     -8.9317 
       _cons |   14.28645   3.074752     4.65   0.000     8.255113    20.31779 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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After running the regression, we predict the residuals which are included among the 
explanatory variables in the third stage of the FEVD model. 
  
. predict resid_stage2, residuals 
(1429 missing values generated) 
 
 
 
 
 
Third stage: Estimate the regression using the pooled OLS method and 
including the residuals estimated in the second stage (resid_stage2) among the 
regressors 
 
In the third stage, which is the final step of the FEVD model, the regression is estimated by 
pooled OLS and includes all the time-variant and time-invariant variables, and also the 
residuals from the second stage among the explanatory variables. 
 
reg prov_loans  h_stat1 Lagnonintinc_ta Lagequity_ta Lagnim logta Laggrowth_loans rgdpgrowth 
gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 propertyrights_hrt  dv_foreign dv_origin  
dv_2002  dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze 
dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo resid_stage2, robust 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =    1497 
                                                       F( 37,  1459) =   15.35 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4758 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.7676 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  prov_loans |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     h_stat1 |  -.0957351   .0507224    -1.89   0.059    -.1952317    .0037615 
Lagnoninti~a |    .016104   .0168365     0.96   0.339    -.0169224    .0491303 
Lagequity_ta |  -.0105925   .0088097    -1.20   0.229    -.0278735    .0066885 
      Lagnim |  -.0757136   .0353142    -2.14   0.032    -.1449856   -.0064416 
       logta |  -.7197035   .1281544    -5.62   0.000      -.97109    -.468317 
Laggr~_loans |    .003557   .0016322     2.18   0.029     .0003553    .0067587 
  rgdpgrowth |  -.2315257   .0298947    -7.74   0.000    -.2901669   -.1728845 
  gdp_percap |  -.0000895   .0000825    -1.08   0.278    -.0002513    .0000723 
    cpi_ebrd |  -.0060324   .0234459    -0.26   0.797    -.0520236    .0399589 
logexch_rate |  -3.864367   1.347682    -2.87   0.004    -6.507968   -1.220767 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.5000553   .4527366    -1.10   0.270    -1.388139    .3880288 
propertyri~t |  -.0593519   .0157922    -3.76   0.000    -.0903298    -.028374 
  dv_foreign |   .1873066   .1299717     1.44   0.150    -.0676447    .4422579 
   dv_origin |   .2682505   .1394815     1.92   0.055    -.0053553    .5418563 
     dv_2002 |    1.03645   .4550925     2.28   0.023     .1437441    1.929155 
     dv_2003 |    .934308   .3703099     2.52   0.012     .2079114    1.660705 
     dv_2004 |   .8765538    .498295     1.76   0.079    -.1008974    1.854005 
     dv_2005 |   1.023502    .561447     1.82   0.069    -.0778277    2.124831 
     dv_2006 |   1.280578   .6355482     2.01   0.044      .033892    2.527263 
     dv_2007 |     1.8616    .874087     2.13   0.033     .1469986    3.576202 
     dv_2008 |   1.692532   .9010555     1.88   0.061    -.0749702    3.460035 
     dv_2009 |   .9476661   .8508842     1.11   0.266     -.721421    2.616753 
      dv_bos |  -17.20845   5.329429    -3.23   0.001    -27.66261   -6.754291 
      dv_bul |   -15.9186   5.373854    -2.96   0.003    -26.45991   -5.377297 
      dv_cro |  -10.83444   3.257707    -3.33   0.001    -17.22473   -4.444151 
      dv_cze |  -1.795849   1.611697    -1.11   0.265    -4.957339    1.365642 
      dv_est |  -4.387706   2.545991    -1.72   0.085    -9.381899    .6064872 
      dv_hun |   6.845226   1.868469     3.66   0.000     3.180054     10.5104 
      dv_lat |  -18.01964   6.639146    -2.71   0.007    -31.04293   -4.996346 
      dv_lit |  -12.22211   4.468503    -2.74   0.006    -20.98748   -3.456731 
      dv_mac |  -2.878854   .9664294    -2.98   0.003    -4.774593    -.983114 
      dv_pol |  -10.55254   4.200733    -2.51   0.012    -18.79266   -2.312417 
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      dv_rom |  -12.50347   4.440428    -2.82   0.005    -21.21378   -3.793169 
      dv_ser |   2.050643   .8927914     2.30   0.022     .2993508    3.801935 
      dv_svk |  -15.59856     5.6752    -2.75   0.006    -26.73098   -4.466136 
      dv_slo |  -15.11279   5.519958    -2.74   0.006    -25.94069   -4.284889 
resid_stage2 |          1   .1260932     7.93   0.000     .7526567    1.247343 
       _cons |   32.70687   6.688868     4.89   0.000     19.58605     45.8277 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Appendix 3.9 Diagnostic tests for the third stage of the FEVD 
regression  
 
After running the third stage regression, we perform the diagnostic tests applicable to OLS 
estimation to check whether the model is well specified. The test results suggest that the 
model suffers from heteroscedasticity; hence, the final model is estimated using robust 
standard errors. The diagnostic test for linearity (estat ovtest) displays evidence of a non-
linear relationship among the variables, but no solution could be found to this problem. 
However, looking at the scatter plots for the relationship between the dependent variable and 
each of the explanatory variables, no non-linear relationship could be observed; hence, we 
maintain the linear functional form for our model. 
 
reg prov_loans  h_stat1 Lagnonintinc_ta Lagequity_ta Lagnim logta Laggrowth_loans rgdpgrowth 
gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 propertyrights_hrt  dv_foreign dv_origin  
dv_2002  dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze 
dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo resid_stage2 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1497 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 37,  1459) =   35.80 
       Model |  4138.63344    37  111.854958           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  4558.75329  1459  3.12457388           R-squared     =  0.4758 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4626 
       Total |  8697.38674  1496  5.81376119           Root MSE      =  1.7676 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  prov_loans |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     h_stat1 |  -.0957351   .0362469    -2.64   0.008    -.1668367   -.0246335 
Lagnoninti~a |    .016104   .0165044     0.98   0.329     -.016271    .0484789 
Lagequity_ta |  -.0105925   .0066568    -1.59   0.112    -.0236504    .0024653 
      Lagnim |  -.0757136   .0202658    -3.74   0.000    -.1154669   -.0359603 
       logta |  -.7197035   .0474266   -15.18   0.000    -.8127352   -.6266719 
Laggr~_loans |    .003557   .0009736     3.65   0.000     .0016472    .0054667 
  rgdpgrowth |  -.2315257   .0194021   -11.93   0.000    -.2695847   -.1934666 
  gdp_percap |  -.0000895   .0000515    -1.74   0.083    -.0001905    .0000116 
    cpi_ebrd |  -.0060324   .0214261    -0.28   0.778    -.0480616    .0359968 
logexch_rate |  -3.864367   .9529216    -4.06   0.000     -5.73361   -1.995125 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.5000553    .449215    -1.11   0.266    -1.381232     .381121 
propertyri~t |  -.0593519   .0139599    -4.25   0.000    -.0867355   -.0319683 
  dv_foreign |   .1873066   .1451511     1.29   0.197    -.0974205    .4720337 
   dv_origin |   .2682505   .1408628     1.90   0.057    -.0080647    .5445657 
     dv_2002 |    1.03645   .4313997     2.40   0.016     .1902197    1.882679 
     dv_2003 |    .934308   .4280355     2.18   0.029     .0946773    1.773939 
     dv_2004 |   .8765538   .4874395     1.80   0.072    -.0796033    1.832711 
     dv_2005 |   1.023502   .5284927     1.94   0.053     -.013185    2.060189 
     dv_2006 |   1.280578   .5570977     2.30   0.022     .1877797    2.373376 
     dv_2007 |     1.8616   .6414654     2.90   0.004     .6033073    3.119893 
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     dv_2008 |   1.692532    .720753     2.35   0.019     .2787096    3.106355 
     dv_2009 |   .9476661   .7209764     1.31   0.189    -.4665949    2.361927 
      dv_bos |  -17.20845   3.892661    -4.42   0.000    -24.84426   -9.572644 
      dv_bul |   -15.9186   3.968528    -4.01   0.000    -23.70323   -8.133972 
      dv_cro |  -10.83444   2.572701    -4.21   0.000    -15.88103   -5.787854 
      dv_cze |  -1.795849   1.592947    -1.13   0.260     -4.92056    1.328863 
      dv_est |  -4.387706   2.200416    -1.99   0.046    -8.704023   -.0713882 
      dv_hun |   6.845226   1.203786     5.69   0.000      4.48389    9.206562 
      dv_lat |  -18.01964   4.957617    -3.63   0.000    -27.74446   -8.294821 
      dv_lit |  -12.22211   3.408776    -3.59   0.000    -18.90873   -5.535482 
      dv_mac |  -2.878854   .8015581    -3.59   0.000    -4.451183   -1.306524 
      dv_pol |  -10.55254   3.277951    -3.22   0.001    -16.98254   -4.122539 
      dv_rom |  -12.50347   3.342882    -3.74   0.000    -19.06084   -5.946106 
      dv_ser |   2.050643   .6848369     2.99   0.003     .7072726    3.394013 
      dv_svk |  -15.59856   4.324928    -3.61   0.000     -24.0823   -7.114819 
      dv_slo |  -15.11279   4.382221    -3.45   0.001    -23.70892   -6.516664 
resid_stage2 |          1    .038621    25.89   0.000     .9242414    1.075759 
       _cons |   32.70687   4.706843     6.95   0.000     23.47397    41.93978 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Test for heteroscedasticity: 
Note: because the below test rejected the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity, the third 
stage of the FEVD regression was run with robust standard errors. 
 
estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity  
         Ho: Constant variance 
         Variables: fitted values of prov_loans 
 
         chi2(1)      =  3770.72 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
 
 
 
 
Test for linearity: 
 
estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of prov_loans 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                F(3, 1456) =     19.43 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
 
 
 
Scatter graphs for the relationship between the dependent variable and each of 
the explanatory variables: 
 
twoway (scatter prov_loans h_stat1) (lfit prov_loans h_stat1) 
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twoway (scatter prov_loans Lagnonintinc_ta) (lfit prov_loans Lagnonintinc_ta) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
twoway (scatter prov_loans Lagequity_ta) (lfit prov_loans Lagequity_ta) 
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twoway (scatter prov_loans Lagnim) (lfit prov_loans Lagnim) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
twoway (scatter prov_loans logta) (lfit prov_loans logta) 
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twoway (scatter prov_loans Laggrowth_loans) (lfit prov_loans Laggrowth_loans) 
 
  
 
 
 
twoway (scatter prov_loans rgdpgrowth) (lfit prov_loans rgdpgrowth) 
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twoway (scatter prov_loans gdp_percap) (lfit prov_loans gdp_percap) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
twoway (scatter prov_loans cpi_ebrd) (lfit prov_loans cpi_ebrd) 
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twoway (scatter prov_loans logexch_rate) (lfit prov_loans logexch_rate) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
twoway (scatter prov_loans ebrd_bankref1) (lfit prov_loans ebrd_bankref1) 
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twoway (scatter prov_loans propertyrights_hrt) (lfit prov_loans propertyrights_hrt) 
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Appendix 3.10 Estimation of the impact of banking competition 
on risk-taking using FEVD: the XTFEVD approach 
 
Note: The xtfevd approach is a STATA ado file provided by Plümper and Troeger (2004) 
which executes all the three stages of the FEVD and adjusts the degrees of freedom. The 
tables below present the STATA outputs for the five model specifications that were presented 
in Table 5.4. 
 
 
 
Specification 1 
Note: uses the h_stat1 (i.e. the H-statistic estimated by using the interest income as dependent variable in the 
Panzar-Rosse model) 
xtfevd prov_loans h_stat1 Lagnonintinc_ta Lagequity_ta Lagnim logta Laggrowth_loans rgdpgrowth 
gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 propertyrights_hrt dv_foreign dv_origin  
dv_2002  dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze 
dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, invariant 
(propertyrights_hrt dv_origin logexch_rate dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo) 
 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =     1169           number of obs       =     1497 
mean squared error         = 3.045259           F( 38, 1169)        = 8.362461 
root mean squared error    = 1.745067           Prob > F            = 5.93e-38 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 4558.753           R-squared           = .4758479 
Total Sum of Squares       = 8697.387           adj. R-squared      = .3292288 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 4138.633 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
  prov_loans |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     h_stat1 |  -.0957351   .0501941    -1.91   0.057    -.1942156    .0027455 
Lagnoninti~a |    .016104   .0259122     0.62   0.534    -.0347357    .0669437 
Lagequity_ta |  -.0105925   .0240948    -0.44   0.660    -.0578663    .0366813 
      Lagnim |  -.0757136   .0689996    -1.10   0.273    -.2110905    .0596634 
       logta |  -.7197035   .2473585    -2.91   0.004     -1.20502   -.2343874 
Laggr~_loans |    .003557   .0015579     2.28   0.023     .0005004    .0066136 
  rgdpgrowth |  -.2315257   .0267588    -8.65   0.000    -.2840263    -.179025 
  gdp_percap |  -.0000895   .0000838    -1.07   0.286    -.0002539     .000075 
    cpi_ebrd |  -.0060324   .0433614    -0.14   0.889    -.0911072    .0790424 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.5000553    .694771    -0.72   0.472    -1.863193    .8630822 
  dv_foreign |   .1873066   .7048409     0.27   0.790    -1.195588    1.570201 
     dv_2002 |    1.03645   1.182017     0.88   0.381    -1.282662    3.355561 
     dv_2003 |    .934308   1.152827     0.81   0.418    -1.327534     3.19615 
     dv_2004 |   .8765538   1.169892     0.75   0.454     -1.41877    3.171877 
     dv_2005 |   1.023502   1.195846     0.86   0.392    -1.322742    3.369746 
     dv_2006 |   1.280578   1.232276     1.04   0.299    -1.137142    3.698298 
     dv_2007 |     1.8616   1.330206     1.40   0.162    -.7482571    4.471457 
     dv_2008 |   1.692532   1.445699     1.17   0.242    -1.143923    4.528988 
     dv_2009 |   .9476661   1.405023     0.67   0.500    -1.808982    3.704315 
propertyri~t |  -.0593519   .0209007    -2.84   0.005    -.1003589   -.0183448 
   dv_origin |   .2682505   .6081573     0.44   0.659    -.9249513    1.461452 
logexch_rate |  -3.864367   1.529711    -2.53   0.012    -6.865654   -.8630808 
      dv_bos |  -17.20845   6.256004    -2.75   0.006     -29.4827   -4.934201 
      dv_bul |   -15.9186   6.366891    -2.50   0.013    -28.41041   -3.426792 
      dv_cro |  -10.83444   4.065071    -2.67   0.008    -18.81009   -2.858791 
      dv_cze |  -1.795849   2.560747    -0.70   0.483    -6.820023    3.228326 
      dv_est |  -4.387706   3.539408    -1.24   0.215    -11.33201    2.556596 
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      dv_hun |   6.845226   2.048251     3.34   0.001     2.826567    10.86388 
      dv_lat |  -18.01964   7.962693    -2.26   0.024     -33.6424   -2.396872 
      dv_lit |  -12.22211    5.45252    -2.24   0.025    -22.91993   -1.524288 
      dv_mac |  -2.878854   1.448984    -1.99   0.047    -5.721752   -.0359546 
      dv_pol |  -10.55254   5.215643    -2.02   0.043    -20.78561   -.3194702 
      dv_rom |  -12.50347     5.3767    -2.33   0.020    -23.05253   -1.954414 
      dv_ser |   2.050643   1.253733     1.64   0.102    -.4091766    4.510462 
      dv_svk |  -15.59856   6.920776    -2.25   0.024    -29.17709   -2.020029 
      dv_slo |  -15.11279   6.985738    -2.16   0.031    -28.81878   -1.406804 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   32.70687    8.78207     3.72   0.000     15.47649    49.93725 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Specification 2 
Note: includes the interaction term between the competition (h_stat1) and the dummy variable for the non-EU  
countries (dv_noneu=1),  i.e. the variable hstat1_dvnoneu, to check if the relationship between banking sector 
competition and risk-taking in the non-EU countries differs from the EU countries. 
 
xtfevd prov_loans h_stat1 hstat1_dvnoneu Lagnonintinc_ta Lagequity_ta Lagnim logta 
Laggrowth_loans rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 propertyrights_hrt  
dv_foreign dv_origin dv_noneu dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk 
dv_slo, invariant (propertyrights_hrt dv_origin logexch_rate dv_noneu dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro 
dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo) 
note: dv_hun dropped because of collinearity 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =     1168           number of obs       =     1497 
mean squared error         = 2.998285           F( 39, 1168)        = 8.525002 
root mean squared error    = 1.731556           Prob > F            = 1.02e-39 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 4488.433           R-squared           = .4839332 
Total Sum of Squares       = 8697.387           adj. R-squared      = .3390103 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 4208.954 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
  prov_loans |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     h_stat1 |  -.1826013   .0570902    -3.20   0.001    -.2946122   -.0705904 
hstat1_dvn~u |   .5010093   .1452572     3.45   0.001     .2160152    .7860035 
Lagnoninti~a |   .0163956   .0259656     0.63   0.528    -.0345489    .0673401 
Lagequity_ta |  -.0118712   .0242353    -0.49   0.624    -.0594209    .0356784 
      Lagnim |   -.078207   .0693873    -1.13   0.260    -.2143446    .0579306 
       logta |  -.7716803   .2472087    -3.12   0.002    -1.256703   -.2866575 
Laggr~_loans |   .0032308    .001565     2.06   0.039     .0001603    .0063013 
  rgdpgrowth |   -.235163   .0268336    -8.76   0.000    -.2878104   -.1825156 
  gdp_percap |  -.0001204    .000085    -1.42   0.157    -.0002872    .0000463 
    cpi_ebrd |  -.0051858   .0435845    -0.12   0.905    -.0906984    .0803269 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.8019777   .7014031    -1.14   0.253    -2.178129    .5741731 
  dv_foreign |   .2565852   .7109609     0.36   0.718    -1.138318    1.651488 
     dv_2002 |   1.459536   1.223549     1.19   0.233    -.9410633    3.860136 
     dv_2003 |   1.451596   1.203442     1.21   0.228    -.9095534    3.812746 
     dv_2004 |   1.429097   1.225116     1.17   0.244    -.9745757    3.832771 
     dv_2005 |   1.823094   1.273977     1.43   0.153    -.6764452    4.322632 
     dv_2006 |   2.152529   1.315621     1.64   0.102    -.4287161    4.733775 
     dv_2007 |   2.914062   1.429882     2.04   0.042      .108638    5.719486 
     dv_2008 |   2.731548   1.542441     1.77   0.077    -.2947176    5.757814 
     dv_2009 |   1.797524   1.475626     1.22   0.223    -1.097651    4.692698 
propertyri~t |   -.050926   .0211452    -2.41   0.016    -.0924127   -.0094392 
   dv_origin |   .2864087   .6128719     0.47   0.640    -.9160443    1.488862 
logexch_rate |  -3.221695   1.566792    -2.06   0.040    -6.295736   -.1476547 
    dv_noneu |  -7.194507   2.055818    -3.50   0.000    -11.22802   -3.160997 
      dv_bos |  -13.61251   6.480971    -2.10   0.036    -26.32815   -.8968615 
      dv_bul |   -19.7281   7.761689    -2.54   0.011    -34.95651   -4.499686 
      dv_cro |  -6.518114   4.407869    -1.48   0.139    -15.16634    2.130112 
      dv_cze |  -7.100724   3.364177    -2.11   0.035    -13.70123   -.5002189 
      dv_est |  -9.991139   4.465254    -2.24   0.025    -18.75196   -1.230323 
      dv_lat |  -21.11098    9.35607    -2.26   0.024    -39.46756   -2.754395 
      dv_lit |   -16.8286   6.742646    -2.50   0.013    -30.05765    -3.59955 
      dv_mac |  -1.673796   1.529889    -1.09   0.274    -4.675433    1.327841 
      dv_pol |  -14.75551   6.500401    -2.27   0.023    -27.50928   -2.001743 
      dv_rom |  -16.70256   6.788608    -2.46   0.014    -30.02179    -3.38333 
      dv_ser |   3.626241   1.372833     2.64   0.008     .9327462    6.319735 
      dv_svk |  -19.13251   8.270573    -2.31   0.021    -35.35935   -2.905669 
      dv_slo |  -18.01262   8.359754    -2.15   0.031    -34.41443   -1.610809 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   36.82434   10.46441     3.52   0.000     16.29321    57.35548 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Joint impact of h_stat1 and hstat1_dvnoneu: 
 
. lincom h_stat1+hstat1_dvnoneu 
 
 ( 1)  h_stat1 + hstat1_dvnoneu = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  prov_loans |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |    .318408    .128345     2.48   0.013     .0665955    .5702205 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Specification 3 
Note: the measure of competition in this regression is the h_stat3 which has been estimated by using the total 
income as dependent variable in the Panzar-Rosse model. 
 
xtfevd prov_loans h_stat3 Lagnonintinc_ta Lagequity_ta Lagnim logta Laggrowth_loans rgdpgrowth 
gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 propertyrights_hrt  dv_foreign dv_origin  
dv_2002  dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze 
dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, invariant 
(propertyrights_hrt dv_origin logexch_rate dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =     1169           number of obs       =     1497 
mean squared error         = 3.047343           F( 38, 1169)        = 8.335003 
root mean squared error    = 1.745664           Prob > F            = 8.40e-38 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 4561.872           R-squared           = .4754893 
Total Sum of Squares       = 8697.387           adj. R-squared      = .3287699 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 4135.514 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
  prov_loans |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     h_stat3 |  -.0893871   .0511033    -1.75   0.081    -.1896515    .0108774 
Lagnoninti~a |   .0159559   .0259377     0.62   0.539    -.0349338    .0668456 
Lagequity_ta |  -.0107366   .0241301    -0.44   0.656    -.0580797    .0366064 
      Lagnim |  -.0763115   .0691001    -1.10   0.270    -.2118856    .0592625 
       logta |  -.7247674    .247597    -2.93   0.003    -1.210552   -.2389832 
Laggr~_loans |   .0035343   .0015593     2.27   0.024     .0004751    .0065936 
  rgdpgrowth |   -.231437   .0268227    -8.63   0.000    -.2840629    -.178811 
  gdp_percap |  -.0000914   .0000838    -1.09   0.276    -.0002558    .0000731 
    cpi_ebrd |  -.0063216   .0436872    -0.14   0.885    -.0920356    .0793924 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.5127645   .6959897    -0.74   0.461    -1.878293     .852764 
  dv_foreign |   .1843375   .7060984     0.26   0.794    -1.201024    1.569699 
     dv_2002 |   1.070764   1.184369     0.90   0.366    -1.252963    3.394491 
     dv_2003 |   .9595762     1.1546     0.83   0.406    -1.305743    3.224895 
     dv_2004 |   .9123577   1.172036     0.78   0.436    -1.387172    3.211888 
     dv_2005 |   1.068914   1.197159     0.89   0.372    -1.279906    3.417735 
     dv_2006 |   1.331149   1.233094     1.08   0.281    -1.088177    3.750474 
     dv_2007 |   1.917971   1.331372     1.44   0.150    -.6941747    4.530116 
     dv_2008 |   1.766651   1.447477     1.22   0.223    -1.073292    4.606593 
     dv_2009 |   .9946709   1.405166     0.71   0.479    -1.762259      3.7516 
propertyri~t |  -.0593437   .0209266    -2.84   0.005    -.1004017   -.0182858 
   dv_origin |   .2748146   .6093757     0.45   0.652    -.9207777    1.470407 
logexch_rate |  -3.839368   1.534723    -2.50   0.012    -6.850487   -.8282478 
      dv_bos |  -17.03555   6.277427    -2.71   0.007    -29.35183   -4.719266 
      dv_bul |   -15.7417   6.390707    -2.46   0.014    -28.28023    -3.20316 
      dv_cro |  -10.65493   4.078121    -2.61   0.009    -18.65619   -2.653681 
      dv_cze |  -1.656316    2.57023    -0.64   0.519    -6.699096    3.386463 
      dv_est |  -4.212003   3.544171    -1.19   0.235    -11.16565    2.741645 
      dv_hun |   6.908633   2.049183     3.37   0.001     2.888145    10.92912 
      dv_lat |  -17.81267   7.993112    -2.23   0.026    -33.49512   -2.130222 
      dv_lit |  -12.02684    5.46567    -2.20   0.028    -22.75046   -1.303221 
      dv_mac |  -2.799732   1.452597    -1.93   0.054     -5.64972    .0502555 
      dv_pol |  -10.40595    5.23389    -1.99   0.047    -20.67481   -.1370764 
      dv_rom |   -12.3363   5.399322    -2.28   0.023    -22.92974   -1.742852 
      dv_ser |   2.127907   1.256049     1.69   0.091    -.3364554    4.592269 
      dv_svk |  -15.38769   6.943419    -2.22   0.027    -29.01064   -1.764731 
      dv_slo |  -14.90976   7.012889    -2.13   0.034    -28.66902   -1.150507 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   32.60204   8.799853     3.70   0.000     15.33677    49.86731 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Specification 4 
Note: includes the Lerner Index (lerner_index) as a measure of market power. 
 
 
xtfevd prov_loans lerner_index Lagnonintinc_ta Lagequity_ta Lagnim logta Laggrowth_loans 
rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 propertyrights_hrt dv_foreign 
dv_origin dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze 
dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, invariant 
(propertyrights_hrt dv_origin logexch_rate dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo) 
note: dv_est dropped because of collinearity 
note: dv_lit dropped because of collinearity 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =     1079           number of obs       =     1385 
mean squared error         = 3.170494           F( 35, 1079)        = 7.612865 
root mean squared error    = 1.780588           Prob > F            = 3.36e-31 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 4391.134           R-squared           = .4681283 
Total Sum of Squares       = 8256.001           adj. R-squared      = .3177846 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 3864.868 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
  prov_loans |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
lerner_index |   .0277551   .0130296     2.13   0.033     .0021889    .0533212 
Lagnoninti~a |   .0090551   .0269782     0.34   0.737    -.0438805    .0619907 
Lagequity_ta |  -.0096796   .0277872    -0.35   0.728    -.0642026    .0448434 
      Lagnim |  -.0721009   .0763156    -0.94   0.345    -.2218448    .0776429 
       logta |  -.8230911   .2889904    -2.85   0.004    -1.390138   -.2560443 
Laggr~_loans |   .0032746   .0016209     2.02   0.044     .0000941     .006455 
  rgdpgrowth |  -.2185741   .0307509    -7.11   0.000    -.2789123   -.1582358 
  gdp_percap |  -.0001179   .0000923    -1.28   0.202     -.000299    .0000632 
    cpi_ebrd |  -.0205083   .0495372    -0.41   0.679    -.1177085    .0766919 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.6778074   .9140705    -0.74   0.459    -2.471365     1.11575 
  dv_foreign |   .4458363   .7605949     0.59   0.558    -1.046576    1.938249 
     dv_2003 |   .0059053   .4431045     0.01   0.989    -.8635389    .8753495 
     dv_2004 |   -.121385   .5668782    -0.21   0.830    -1.233694    .9909236 
     dv_2005 |   .1735542   .6356988     0.27   0.785    -1.073792      1.4209 
     dv_2006 |   .4461193   .7189389     0.62   0.535    -.9645574    1.856796 
     dv_2007 |   1.076851   .9041769     1.19   0.234    -.6972933    2.850995 
     dv_2008 |   1.207179   1.068291     1.13   0.259    -.8889844    3.303343 
     dv_2009 |   .4215663   1.044924     0.40   0.687    -1.628747    2.471879 
propertyri~t |  -.0617858   .0250599    -2.47   0.014    -.1109575   -.0126142 
   dv_origin |   .1778171   .6723433     0.26   0.791    -1.141431    1.497066 
logexch_rate |  -3.244951   1.641553    -1.98   0.048     -6.46595   -.0239531 
      dv_bos |  -14.75547   6.686893    -2.21   0.028    -27.87626   -1.634687 
      dv_bul |  -13.20488   6.755198    -1.95   0.051    -26.45969     .049933 
      dv_cro |  -8.282735   4.338483    -1.91   0.057    -16.79555    .2300845 
      dv_cze |   .0594528    2.94499     0.02   0.984    -5.719103    5.838008 
      dv_hun |   7.712854   2.531679     3.05   0.002     2.745283    12.68042 
      dv_lat |   -14.6204   8.438957    -1.73   0.083    -31.17903    1.938227 
      dv_mac |  -2.849413   1.486325    -1.92   0.055    -5.765828    .0670015 
      dv_pol |  -7.650588   5.588687    -1.37   0.171    -18.61651    3.315338 
      dv_rom |  -10.07485   5.712005    -1.76   0.078    -21.28274    1.133048 
      dv_ser |   2.410278   1.275951     1.89   0.059    -.0933482    4.913903 
      dv_svk |  -11.82272   7.392529    -1.60   0.110    -26.32808     2.68264 
      dv_slo |  -11.57049   7.388566    -1.57   0.118    -26.06808    2.927096 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   31.85578   9.449247     3.37   0.001      13.3148    50.39676 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Specification 5 
Note: replaces the measure of competition with the degree of market concentration (i.e. Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index: HHI_dep). 
 
xtfevd prov_loans hhi_dep Lagnonintinc_ta Lagequity_ta Lagnim logta Laggrowth_loans rgdpgrowth 
gdp_percap cpi_ebrd logexch_rate ebrd_bankref1 propertyrights_hrt dv_foreign dv_origin  
dv_2002  dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze 
dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, invariant 
(propertyrights_hrt dv_origin logexch_rate dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom  dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =     1199           number of obs       =     1527 
mean squared error         = 3.418447           F( 38, 1199)        = 8.693869 
root mean squared error    = 1.848904           Prob > F            = 6.55e-40 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 5219.969           R-squared           = .4623486 
Total Sum of Squares       = 9708.834           adj. R-squared      = .3157163 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 4488.865 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
  prov_loans |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     hhi_dep |  -.0018808   .0005445    -3.45   0.001    -.0029491   -.0008125 
Lagnoninti~a |   .0332252   .0263987     1.26   0.208    -.0185675    .0850179 
Lagequity_ta |  -.0048962   .0240846    -0.20   0.839    -.0521489    .0423565 
      Lagnim |  -.1235685   .0674007    -1.83   0.067     -.255805    .0086679 
       logta |  -.7125681   .2649879    -2.69   0.007     -1.23246   -.1926765 
Laggr~_loans |   .0034403   .0015851     2.17   0.030     .0003304    .0065503 
  rgdpgrowth |  -.2368843   .0271288    -8.73   0.000    -.2901096    -.183659 
  gdp_percap |  -.0001266   .0000834    -1.52   0.129    -.0002901     .000037 
    cpi_ebrd |    .039696   .0429673     0.92   0.356    -.0446034    .1239954 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.7857679   .6939401    -1.13   0.258     -2.14724    .5757041 
  dv_foreign |   .1500757   .7534475     0.20   0.842    -1.328147    1.628298 
     dv_2002 |   1.026548   .9358176     1.10   0.273    -.8094742     2.86257 
     dv_2003 |   1.065025   .9177805     1.16   0.246    -.7356097    2.865659 
     dv_2004 |   .8591638   .9849077     0.87   0.383     -1.07317    2.791498 
     dv_2005 |   .9621644   1.039154     0.93   0.355    -1.076598    3.000927 
     dv_2006 |   1.246353   1.081569     1.15   0.249    -.8756255    3.368331 
     dv_2007 |   1.798043   1.193527     1.51   0.132    -.5435913    4.139677 
     dv_2008 |   1.532471   1.325498     1.16   0.248    -1.068083    4.133025 
     dv_2009 |   1.153587   1.286621     0.90   0.370    -1.370692    3.677867 
propertyri~t |  -.0502838   .0214859    -2.34   0.019    -.0924379   -.0081297 
   dv_origin |   .2559934   .6444022     0.40   0.691    -1.008288    1.520275 
logexch_rate |  -4.878432   1.524019    -3.20   0.001    -7.868472   -1.888392 
      dv_bos |  -23.65363   6.378417    -3.71   0.000    -36.16773   -11.13953 
      dv_bul |  -23.02851   6.571485    -3.50   0.000     -35.9214   -10.13562 
      dv_cro |  -15.62475   4.326088    -3.61   0.000     -24.1123   -7.137211 
      dv_cze |  -4.941496   2.794805    -1.77   0.077    -10.42475    .5417552 
      dv_est |  -7.719805   3.715353    -2.08   0.038    -15.00912   -.4304874 
      dv_hun |   5.238955   2.205176     2.38   0.018      .912521    9.565389 
      dv_lat |  -26.20177   8.128866    -3.22   0.001    -42.15015   -10.25338 
      dv_lit |  -16.18269    5.53428    -2.92   0.004    -27.04064   -5.324737 
      dv_mac |   -4.34445   1.473333    -2.95   0.003    -7.235047   -1.453853 
      dv_pol |  -17.16372    5.48174    -3.13   0.002    -27.91859    -6.40885 
      dv_rom |  -18.88477   5.572726    -3.39   0.001    -29.81815    -7.95139 
      dv_ser |  -2.133941   1.722679    -1.24   0.216    -5.513742     1.24586 
      dv_svk |  -21.95543   7.101419    -3.09   0.002    -35.88802   -8.022846 
      dv_slo |  -21.75577   7.132356    -3.05   0.002    -35.74905    -7.76248 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   43.28637   8.719196     4.96   0.000     26.17979    60.39295 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Chapter 6 
 
Appendix 4.1 Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
 
xtserial nim Lagnim h_stat1 equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans  
lqdassets_custstfunding  nonintexp_ta  earningsassets_ta   bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1  
economic_freedom_hrt  rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000  dv_2001 
dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze  
dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo 
 
 
 
 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,     220) =    102.477 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
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Appendix 4.2 Estimation of equation 6.1 with the Ordinary Least 
Squares and the Fixed Effects methods 
 
Note: These two estimations are conducted in order to compare the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable 
obtained through the OLS and FE methods, with the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable obtained 
through the GMM approach. 
 
Ordinary Least Squares: 
 
regres nim Lagnim h_stat1 equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans  
lqdassets_custstfunding  nonintexp_ta  earningsassets_ta   bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 
economic_freedom_hrt  rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000  dv_2001 
dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze 
dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo 
note: dv_2001 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1498 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 40,  1457) =  212.03 
       Model |  9337.19799    40   233.42995           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1604.02421  1457  1.10090886           R-squared     =  0.8534 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8494 
       Total |  10941.2222  1497  7.30876567           Root MSE      =  1.0492 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         nim |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Lagnim |   .7550561   .0129541    58.29   0.000     .7296454    .7804669 
     h_stat1 |  -.0027163   .0213402    -0.13   0.899     -.044577    .0391445 
   equity_ta |   .0162838   .0044706     3.64   0.000     .0075143    .0250534 
nonintinc_ta |  -.1550738   .0256171    -6.05   0.000    -.2053241   -.1048234 
loggross_l~s |   .0629569   .0238472     2.64   0.008     .0161783    .1097355 
  prov_loans |   .0282782   .0121904     2.32   0.020     .0043656    .0521907 
lqdassets_~g |  -.0018191   .0009619    -1.89   0.059    -.0037059    .0000677 
nonintexp_ta |   .1802453   .0228778     7.88   0.000     .1353683    .2251223 
earningsas~a |  -.0203198   .0039668    -5.12   0.000    -.0281012   -.0125385 
bankdep_cu~4 |   .0009211   .0017549     0.52   0.600    -.0025213    .0043634 
ebrd_bankr~1 |   .1699463   .2684945     0.63   0.527    -.3567306    .6966233 
economic_f~t |    -.01901   .0143947    -1.32   0.187    -.0472465    .0092266 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0542254   .0110595     4.90   0.000     .0325311    .0759197 
  gdp_percap |    .000046   .0000266     1.73   0.084    -6.23e-06    .0000982 
    cpi_ebrd |   .0169218   .0131077     1.29   0.197    -.0087902    .0426338 
  dv_foreign |   -.139552   .0871542    -1.60   0.110    -.3105132    .0314092 
   dv_origin |   .1424467   .0822883     1.73   0.084    -.0189695    .3038629 
     dv_2000 |  -.3262781   .3989633    -0.82   0.414    -1.108882    .4563258 
     dv_2001 |  (omitted) 
     dv_2002 |  -.5781925   .3059019    -1.89   0.059    -1.178248    .0218626 
     dv_2003 |  -.3016634   .3061498    -0.99   0.325    -.9022048     .298878 
     dv_2004 |  -.2759207   .3251452    -0.85   0.396    -.9137234     .361882 
     dv_2005 |  -.5138004   .3453282    -1.49   0.137    -1.191194    .1635931 
     dv_2006 |  -.6183222   .3575624    -1.73   0.084    -1.319714    .0830698 
     dv_2007 |  -.6750052   .3981354    -1.70   0.090    -1.455985    .1059746 
     dv_2008 |   -.685943   .4382488    -1.57   0.118    -1.545609    .1737229 
     dv_2009 |  -.3956046   .4194961    -0.94   0.346    -1.218485    .4272762 
      dv_bos |  -.6342643   .2588317    -2.45   0.014    -1.141987   -.1265417 
      dv_bul |  -.4425738   .3260027    -1.36   0.175    -1.082059    .1969109 
      dv_cro |  -1.204745   .4783771    -2.52   0.012    -2.143127    -.266364 
      dv_cze |   -1.00841    .512801    -1.97   0.049    -2.014317   -.0025027 
      dv_est |  -.9939717   .5682514    -1.75   0.080     -2.10865    .1207065 
      dv_hun |  -.7887871   .4957809    -1.59   0.112    -1.761308    .1837335 
      dv_lat |  -.8179043   .4145161    -1.97   0.049    -1.631016   -.0047923 
      dv_lit |    -.99908   .4052967    -2.47   0.014    -1.794107   -.2040527 
      dv_mac |  -.1708372   .2330504    -0.73   0.464    -.6279873     .286313 
      dv_pol |  -.9704082   .3619456    -2.68   0.007    -1.680398   -.2604181 
      dv_rom |  -1.035815   .2650684    -3.91   0.000    -1.555771   -.5158582 
      dv_ser |  -.9810982   .3234965    -3.03   0.002    -1.615667   -.3465295 
      dv_svk |  -1.070749   .4488933    -2.39   0.017    -1.951295   -.1902032 
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      dv_slo |   -1.41001   .5439832    -2.59   0.010    -2.477084   -.3429363 
       _cons |   2.619193   1.135353     2.31   0.021     .3920927    4.846293 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
Fixed Effects: 
 
xtreg nim Lagnim h_stat1 equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans  
lqdassets_custstfunding  nonintexp_ta  earningsassets_ta   bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 
economic_freedom_hrt  rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000  dv_2001 
dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009, fe 
note: dv_2008 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =      1498 
Group variable: bank                            Number of groups   =       285 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4403                         Obs per group: min =         1 
       between = 0.8087                                        avg =       5.3 
       overall = 0.7554                                        max =        10 
 
                                                F(26,1187)         =     35.92 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.5698                         Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         nim |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Lagnim |   .3647795   .0211656    17.23   0.000     .3232534    .4063056 
     h_stat1 |   -.004604   .0184645    -0.25   0.803    -.0408307    .0316226 
   equity_ta |   .0395962   .0074675     5.30   0.000     .0249451    .0542473 
nonintinc_ta |  -.1066374   .0311859    -3.42   0.001    -.1678231   -.0454517 
loggross_l~s |   .1631828    .074595     2.19   0.029     .0168301    .3095355 
  prov_loans |  -.0174002    .012089    -1.44   0.150    -.0411183    .0063179 
lqdassets_~g |  -.0033645   .0014325    -2.35   0.019     -.006175    -.000554 
nonintexp_ta |   .1869746   .0313838     5.96   0.000     .1254007    .2485486 
earningsas~a |  -.0405721   .0044261    -9.17   0.000    -.0492559   -.0318882 
bankdep_cu~4 |   .0010798   .0026424     0.41   0.683    -.0041045    .0062641 
ebrd_bankr~1 |   .2488992   .2374885     1.05   0.295    -.2170448    .7148433 
economic_f~t |  -.0306165   .0130628    -2.34   0.019    -.0562451   -.0049878 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0467094   .0096448     4.84   0.000     .0277867    .0656322 
  gdp_percap |   .0000367   .0000237     1.55   0.122    -9.83e-06    .0000832 
    cpi_ebrd |   .0469551   .0116388     4.03   0.000     .0241202    .0697899 
  dv_foreign |  -.3826849   .1934263    -1.98   0.048    -.7621805   -.0031893 
   dv_origin |   .3149667   .2002897     1.57   0.116    -.0779946    .7079279 
     dv_2000 |   .8454403   .4480064     1.89   0.059    -.0335323    1.724413 
     dv_2001 |    .995551   .4242941     2.35   0.019     .1631011    1.828001 
     dv_2002 |   .7686482   .2992075     2.57   0.010     .1816137    1.355683 
     dv_2003 |   .8716226   .2644715     3.30   0.001     .3527389    1.390506 
     dv_2004 |    .763551   .2187082     3.49   0.000     .3344532    1.192649 
     dv_2005 |   .5072475   .1893273     2.68   0.007     .1357939     .878701 
     dv_2006 |   .3462478   .1575078     2.20   0.028     .0372231    .6552725 
     dv_2007 |    .152017   .1130063     1.35   0.179    -.0696974    .3737313 
     dv_2008 |  (omitted) 
     dv_2009 |   .4336766   .1480088     2.93   0.003     .1432886    .7240646 
       _cons |   3.177785    1.52762     2.08   0.038     .1806485    6.174922 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  1.4313751 
     sigma_e |   .8672532 
         rho |  .73147515   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(284, 1187) =     3.54           Prob > F = 0.0000 
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Appendix 4.3 Estimation of the impact of banking competition on 
net interest margins using the General Method of Moments 
 
Specification 1  
Note: uses the h_stat1 (i.e. the H-statistic estimated by using the interest income as dependent variable in the 
Panzar-Rosse model)  
 
xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat1 equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans  
lqdassets_custstfunding  nonintexp_ta earningsassets_ta   bankdep_custdep economic_freedom_hrt 
ebrd_bankref1  rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000  dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) 
gmm( equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, laglimits (2 2)) gmm (prov_loans, 
laglimits (2 5)) iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep 
economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 
dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_ori 
> gin ebrd_bankref1) robust twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, per m. 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1498 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       285 
Number of instruments = 164                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(40) =   3254.26                                      avg =      5.26 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
         nim |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Lagnim |   .6284701   .0860109     7.31   0.000     .4598919    .7970483 
     h_stat1 |  -.0288019   .0161301    -1.79   0.074    -.0604163    .0028125 
   equity_ta |   .0358708   .0182631     1.96   0.050     .0000759    .0716657 
nonintinc_ta |  -.1075373   .0993104    -1.08   0.279     -.302182    .0871074 
loggross_l~s |   .1897127   .0979717     1.94   0.053    -.0023083    .3817337 
  prov_loans |   .0755585   .0503155     1.50   0.133    -.0230582    .1741752 
lqdassets_~g |  -.0026532   .0026808    -0.99   0.322    -.0079075    .0026011 
nonintexp_ta |   .1322381    .100609     1.31   0.189    -.0649518    .3294281 
earningsas~a |  -.0345173   .0067369    -5.12   0.000    -.0477213   -.0213133 
bankdep_cu~4 |   .0041043   .0029933     1.37   0.170    -.0017624    .0099711 
economic_f~t |  -.0278754   .0141501    -1.97   0.049    -.0556092   -.0001417 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.0048003   .2298913    -0.02   0.983     -.455379    .4457784 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0483005   .0149176     3.24   0.001     .0190625    .0775384 
  gdp_percap |    .000053   .0000217     2.44   0.015     .0000104    .0000955 
    cpi_ebrd |   .0103705   .0143381     0.72   0.470    -.0177316    .0384726 
  dv_foreign |  -.1333225   .0887993    -1.50   0.133    -.3073659    .0407208 
   dv_origin |  -.0133703   .0994905    -0.13   0.893    -.2083682    .1816275 
     dv_2000 |   .4300774   .3925354     1.10   0.273    -.3392778    1.199433 
     dv_2001 |   .6627161   .3892915     1.70   0.089    -.1002811    1.425713 
     dv_2002 |   .1799218   .2889763     0.62   0.534    -.3864612    .7463048 
     dv_2003 |   .3203835   .3021977     1.06   0.289    -.2719132    .9126802 
     dv_2004 |   .3856536   .2490378     1.55   0.121    -.1024516    .8737587 
     dv_2005 |   .1012682   .2419641     0.42   0.676    -.3729727     .575509 
     dv_2006 |  -.0206907   .2133744    -0.10   0.923    -.4388968    .3975153 
     dv_2007 |  -.1078613   .1951496    -0.55   0.580    -.4903476    .2746249 
     dv_2008 |  -.2234114   .1766712    -1.26   0.206    -.5696806    .1228578 
      dv_bos |  -.9723342   .2189058    -4.44   0.000    -1.401382   -.5432868 
      dv_bul |  -.4008383    .317344    -1.26   0.207    -1.022821    .2211445 
      dv_cro |  -1.340346    .409239    -3.28   0.001     -2.14244   -.5382522 
      dv_cze |  -1.271355   .4520223    -2.81   0.005    -2.157302   -.3854076 
      dv_est |  -1.156278   .5183226    -2.23   0.026    -2.172171    -.140384 
      dv_hun |  -.7119654   .5147509    -1.38   0.167    -1.720859    .2969279 
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      dv_lat |  -.8770008   .3621656    -2.42   0.015    -1.586832   -.1671693 
      dv_lit |  -1.321526   .3359308    -3.93   0.000    -1.979938   -.6631134 
      dv_mac |  -.3267559   .2722123    -1.20   0.230    -.8602822    .2067703 
      dv_pol |  -1.230255   .3805123    -3.23   0.001    -1.976046    -.484465 
      dv_rom |  -1.010666   .3440879    -2.94   0.003    -1.685065   -.3362659 
      dv_ser |  -.8297926   .5359926    -1.55   0.122    -1.880319    .2207337 
      dv_svk |  -1.316694   .3744406    -3.52   0.000    -2.050584   -.5828043 
      dv_slo |  -1.800538   .4531861    -3.97   0.000    -2.688767   -.9123097 
       _cons |   3.320432   2.127407     1.56   0.119    -.8492096    7.490073 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 
    dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos 
    dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom 
    dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin ebrd_bankref1) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/5).prov_loans 
    L2.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans) 
    L.Lagnim 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 
    dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos 
    dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom 
    dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin ebrd_bankref1 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.prov_loans 
    DL.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans) 
    D.Lagnim 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.66  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.83  Pr > z =  0.407 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(123)  = 416.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(123)  = 120.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.555 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(67)   =  78.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.154 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(56)   =  41.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.927 
  gmm(Lagnim, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(109)  = 111.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.420 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =   8.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.840 
  gmm(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(48)   =  51.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.353 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(75)   =  69.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.670 
  gmm(prov_loans, lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(83)   =  82.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.496 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(40)   =  37.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.574 
  iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 economic_freedom_hrt 
rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 
dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom 
dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin ebrd_bankref1) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(89)   =  90.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.423 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(34)   =  29.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.699 
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Bootstrapped standard errors: 
bootstrap _b[h_stat1], reps(500) cluster(bank) idcluster(myclid) group(bank) seed (22):  
xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat1 equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans  lqdassets_ 
custstfunding nonintexp_ta earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep economic_freedom_hrt 
ebrd_bankref1  rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000  dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) 
gmm( equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, laglimits (2 2)) gmm (prov_loans, 
laglimits (2 5)) iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep 
economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 
dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin ebrd_bankref1) robust 
twostep 
(running xtabond2 on estimation sample) 
 
Bootstrap replications (500) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
.............................x....................   100 
..................................................   150 
..................................................   200 
..................................................   250 
..................................................   300 
..................................................   350 
x.................................................   400 
..................................................   450 
..................................................   500 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =      1498 
                                                Replications       =       498 
 
      command:  xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat1 equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans 
                    prov_loans lqdassets_custstfunding nonintexp_ta earningsassets_ta 
                    bankdep_custdep economic_freedom_hrt ebrd_bankref1 rgdpgrowth 
                    gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
                    dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos 
                    dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
                    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) gmm( 
                    equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, laglimits (2  
                    2)) gmm(prov_loans, laglimits (2 5)) iv(h_stat1                  
                    lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep  
                    economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000  
                    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008  
                    dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit  
                    dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin  
                    ebrd_bankref1) robust twostep 
        _bs_1:  _b[h_stat1] 
 
                                  (Replications based on 285 clusters in bank) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.0288019   .0166753    -1.73   0.084     -.061485    .0038812 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: one or more parameters could not be estimated in 2 bootstrap replicates; 
      standard-error estimates include only complete replications. 
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Specification 2  
Note: includes the interaction term between the competition variable (h_stat1) and the dummy variable for the 
non-EU countries (dv_noneu=1), i.e. variable hstat1_dvnoneu, to test if the relationship between banking sector 
competition and net interest margins in the non-EU countries differs from the EU countries. 
 
xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat1 hstat1_dvnoneu equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans  
lqdassets_custstfunding nonintexp_ta earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 
economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_noneu  
hstat1_dvnoneu dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  
dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk 
dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) gmm( equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, 
laglimits (2 2)) gmm(prov_loans, laglimits (4 5)) iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding 
earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1  economic_freedom 
> _hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 
dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin hstat1_dvnoneu dv_noneu) robust twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, per m. 
hstat1_dvnoneu dropped due to collinearity 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
dv_slo dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1498 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       285 
Number of instruments = 146                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(41) =   3372.34                                      avg =      5.26 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
         nim |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Lagnim |   .6379345   .0821733     7.76   0.000     .4768779    .7989911 
     h_stat1 |  -.0157332   .0170646    -0.92   0.357    -.0491791    .0177127 
hstat1_dvn~u |  -.0692178   .0549594    -1.26   0.208    -.1769362    .0385007 
   equity_ta |   .0409421    .020287     2.02   0.044     .0011803     .080704 
nonintinc_ta |  -.1421073     .10563    -1.35   0.179    -.3491384    .0649237 
loggross_l~s |   .1904054   .1007934     1.89   0.059     -.007146    .3879568 
  prov_loans |   .0933314   .0724546     1.29   0.198     -.048677    .2353397 
lqdassets_~g |  -.0026884   .0024324    -1.11   0.269    -.0074559     .002079 
nonintexp_ta |   .1196146   .1191574     1.00   0.315    -.1139297    .3531588 
earningsas~a |  -.0353581   .0077604    -4.56   0.000    -.0505682    -.020148 
bankdep_cu~4 |   .0031736   .0034057     0.93   0.351    -.0035014    .0098486 
ebrd_bankr~1 |   .0926305   .2686951     0.34   0.730    -.4340023    .6192633 
economic_f~t |   -.022625   .0151145    -1.50   0.134    -.0522489    .0069989 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0541776   .0198634     2.73   0.006      .015246    .0931091 
  gdp_percap |   .0000506   .0000239     2.12   0.034     3.81e-06    .0000974 
    cpi_ebrd |   .0142765    .014618     0.98   0.329    -.0143742    .0429272 
  dv_foreign |  -.1583045   .1044092    -1.52   0.129    -.3629427    .0463337 
   dv_origin |   .0103652   .1055119     0.10   0.922    -.1964344    .2171647 
    dv_noneu |   1.855756   .4928864     3.77   0.000     .8897162    2.821796 
     dv_2000 |   .5062109   .4168798     1.21   0.225    -.3108584     1.32328 
     dv_2001 |   .7442915   .4071114     1.83   0.068    -.0536322    1.542215 
     dv_2002 |   .1601319   .3241133     0.49   0.621    -.4751186    .7953824 
     dv_2003 |   .3365268   .2948935     1.14   0.254    -.2414538    .9145074 
     dv_2004 |   .3795534   .2540504     1.49   0.135    -.1183762     .877483 
     dv_2005 |   .1071803   .2530786     0.42   0.672    -.3888446    .6032052 
     dv_2006 |  -.0842323   .2264455    -0.37   0.710    -.5280574    .3595928 
     dv_2007 |  -.1638941   .2101465    -0.78   0.435    -.5757737    .2479856 
     dv_2008 |  -.2751078   .1899644    -1.45   0.148    -.6474312    .0972155 
      dv_bos |  -1.017405   .2852026    -3.57   0.000    -1.576392    -.458418 
      dv_bul |   1.355372   .4257223     3.18   0.001     .5209715    2.189772 
      dv_cro |  -1.596823   .5760398    -2.77   0.006     -2.72584   -.4678056 
      dv_cze |   .4667431   .2233869     2.09   0.037     .0289129    .9045734 
      dv_est |   .5956041   .4493397     1.33   0.185    -.2850855    1.476294 
      dv_hun |   1.040625    .427333     2.44   0.015     .2030677    1.878182 
      dv_lat |   .7988012   .3366498     2.37   0.018     .1389797    1.458623 
      dv_lit |   .4859253    .333224     1.46   0.145    -.1671817    1.139032 
      dv_mac |  -.4161998   .3698755    -1.13   0.260    -1.141142    .3087429 
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      dv_pol |    .599121   .3738142     1.60   0.109    -.1335413    1.331783 
      dv_rom |   .8222092   .4901225     1.68   0.093    -.1384131    1.782832 
      dv_ser |  -.8933469   .6592378    -1.36   0.175    -2.185429    .3987354 
      dv_svk |   .5130697    .239548     2.14   0.032     .0435642    .9825752 
       _cons |   .9542446   2.480998     0.38   0.701    -3.908423    5.816912 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin hstat1_dvnoneu dv_noneu) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(4/5).prov_loans 
    L2.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans) 
    L.Lagnim 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin hstat1_dvnoneu dv_noneu 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL3.prov_loans 
    DL.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans) 
    D.Lagnim 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.66  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.68  Pr > z =  0.494 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(104)  = 357.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(104)  = 109.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.328 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(48)   =  54.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.254 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(56)   =  55.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.482 
  gmm(Lagnim, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(92)   =  97.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.340 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =  12.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.382 
  gmm(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(29)   =  34.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.214 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(75)   =  75.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.474 
  gmm(prov_loans, lag(4 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(81)   =  80.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.494 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  29.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.169 
  iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 ebrd_bankref1 
economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 
dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin hstat1_dvnoneu dv_noneu) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(68)   =  75.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.246 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(36)   =  34.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.552 
 
 
  
Bootstrapped standard errors: 
bootstrap _b[hstat1_dvnoneu], reps(500) cluster(bank) idcluster(myclid) group(bank) seed(22): 
xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat1 hstat1_dvnoneu equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans  
lqdassets_custstfunding  nonintexp_ta  earningsassets_ta   bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 
economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_noneu 
hstat1_dvnoneu  dv_2000  dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 
dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser 
dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) gmm( equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta 
loggross_loans, laglimits (2 2)) gmm(prov_loans, laglimits (4 5)) iv(h_stat1  
lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1  economic_ freedom_hrt 
rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 
dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom 
dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin hstat1_dvnoneu dv_noneu) robust twostep 
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(running xtabond2 on estimation sample) 
 
Bootstrap replications (500) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
...................x..............................    50 
.............x....................................   100 
................................x.....x...........   150 
...x..............................................   200 
..................................................   250 
...........................x......................   300 
..................x...........x...................   350 
x.................................................   400 
.......................................x.........x   450 
...........................................x......   500 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =      1498 
                                                Replications       =       488 
 
      command:  xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat1 hstat1_dvnoneu equity_ta nonintinc_ta 
                    loggross_loans prov_loans lqdassets_custstfunding nonintexp_ta 
                    earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt 
                    rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_noneu 
                    hstat1_dvnoneu dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 
                    dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
                    dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, 
                    gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) gmm( equity_ta nonintexp_ta 
                    nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, laglimits (2 2)) gmm(prov_loans, 
                    laglimits (4 5)) iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding 
                    earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt 
                    rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 
                    dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro 
                    dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser 
                    dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin hstat1_dvnoneu dv_noneu) robust 
                    twostep 
        _bs_1:  _b[hstat1_dvnoneu] 
 
                                  (Replications based on 285 clusters in bank) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.0692178   .0537535    -1.29   0.198    -.1745726    .0361371 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: one or more parameters could not be estimated in 12 bootstrap replicates; 
      standard-error estimates include only complete replications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Joint impact of h_stat1 and hstat1_dvnoneu: 
 
 
. lincom h_stat1 + hstat1_dvnoneu 
 
 ( 1)  h_stat1 + hstat1_dvnoneu = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         nim |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0849509   .0511693    -1.66   0.097     -.185241    .0153391 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
403 
 
Specification 3  
Note: the measure of competition in this regression is the h_stat3 which has been estimated by using the total 
income as dependent variable in the Panzar-Rosse model. 
 
 
xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat3 equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans lqdassets_ 
custstfunding nonintexp_ta earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 economic_ 
freedom_hrt  rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000  dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) 
gmm( equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, laglimits (2 2)) gmm (prov_loans, 
laglimits (2 2)) iv(h_stat3 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep 
ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) robust 
twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, per 
> m. 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimatio 
> n. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1498 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       285 
Number of instruments = 143                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(40) =   3637.83                                      avg =      5.26 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
         nim |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Lagnim |   .6392185   .0876779     7.29   0.000      .467373     .811064 
     h_stat3 |   -.030094    .016312    -1.84   0.065     -.062065     .001877 
   equity_ta |   .0309601   .0181781     1.70   0.089    -.0046683    .0665886 
nonintinc_ta |  -.0783469   .0839993    -0.93   0.351    -.2429826    .0862887 
loggross_l~s |   .1490617   .0997578     1.49   0.135    -.0464601    .3445834 
  prov_loans |   .0715077   .0661161     1.08   0.279    -.0580775     .201093 
lqdassets_~g |  -.0028532   .0021497    -1.33   0.184    -.0070665    .0013601 
nonintexp_ta |   .0982629   .1012741     0.97   0.332    -.1002306    .2967564 
earningsas~a |  -.0301337   .0074702    -4.03   0.000     -.044775   -.0154925 
bankdep_cu~4 |   .0020491   .0034084     0.60   0.548    -.0046313    .0087295 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.0349231   .2415437    -0.14   0.885    -.5083401    .4384938 
economic_f~t |  -.0272822   .0137194    -1.99   0.047    -.0541718   -.0003926 
  rgdpgrowth |    .044644   .0151719     2.94   0.003     .0149077    .0743803 
  gdp_percap |   .0000448   .0000225     1.99   0.046     7.49e-07    .0000889 
    cpi_ebrd |    .012719   .0135246     0.94   0.347    -.0137888    .0392268 
  dv_foreign |  -.0903922   .0942315    -0.96   0.337    -.2750826    .0942983 
   dv_origin |   -.004709   .0990846    -0.05   0.962    -.1989113    .1894934 
     dv_2000 |   .3908999   .3771377     1.04   0.300    -.3482765    1.130076 
     dv_2001 |   .6161103    .360216     1.71   0.087    -.0899001    1.322121 
     dv_2002 |   .0858895   .2975053     0.29   0.773    -.4972101    .6689891 
     dv_2003 |   .2706731   .2798293     0.97   0.333    -.2777822    .8191285 
     dv_2004 |   .3252969   .2394423     1.36   0.174    -.1440014    .7945951 
     dv_2005 |   .0852346   .2111818     0.40   0.687    -.3286741    .4991433 
     dv_2006 |  -.0351202   .1960315    -0.18   0.858     -.419335    .3490945 
     dv_2007 |  -.0677027   .1770273    -0.38   0.702    -.4146699    .2792644 
     dv_2008 |  -.1737066   .1659212    -1.05   0.295    -.4989061    .1514929 
      dv_bos |  -.8233293   .2461281    -3.35   0.001    -1.305731   -.3409271 
      dv_bul |  -.2629539   .3508937    -0.75   0.454     -.950693    .4247852 
      dv_cro |  -1.115393   .4705851    -2.37   0.018    -2.037723   -.1930635 
      dv_cze |  -1.054614   .5572024    -1.89   0.058    -2.146711    .0374823 
      dv_est |  -.9181797   .6124369    -1.50   0.134    -2.118534    .2821745 
      dv_hun |  -.4896366   .5491969    -0.89   0.373    -1.566043    .5867696 
      dv_lat |  -.7061448   .4101323    -1.72   0.085    -1.509989    .0976997 
      dv_lit |  -1.135503   .3792404    -2.99   0.003    -1.878801   -.3922059 
      dv_mac |  -.1462047   .3341719    -0.44   0.662    -.8011695    .5087601 
      dv_pol |  -1.008987   .4651515    -2.17   0.030    -1.920667   -.0973067 
      dv_rom |  -.7663042   .3826314    -2.00   0.045    -1.516248   -.0163605 
      dv_ser |  -.5202061   .5359437    -0.97   0.332    -1.570636    .5302242 
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      dv_svk |  -1.137506   .4423516    -2.57   0.010    -2.004499   -.2705125 
      dv_slo |  -1.554524   .5458076    -2.85   0.004    -2.624287   -.4847612 
       _cons |    3.46343   2.287095     1.51   0.130    -1.019194    7.946054 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(h_stat3 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L2.prov_loans 
    L2.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans) 
    L.Lagnim 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    h_stat3 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.prov_loans 
    DL.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans) 
    D.Lagnim 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.65  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.92  Pr > z =  0.360 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(102)  = 353.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(102)  =  97.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.598 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(46)   =  45.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.490 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(56)   =  52.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.617 
  gmm(Lagnim, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(88)   =  91.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.389 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =   6.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.944 
  gmm(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(27)   =  28.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.394 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(75)   =  69.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.657 
  gmm(prov_loans, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(83)   =  81.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.527 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =  16.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.632 
  iv(h_stat3 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 ebrd_bankref1 
economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 
dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(68)   =  70.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.396 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(34)   =  27.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.781 
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Bootstrapped standard errors: 
bootstrap _b[h_stat3], reps(500) cluster(bank) idcluster(myclid) group(bank) seed (22):  
xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat3 equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans lqdassets_ 
custstfunding nonintexp_ta earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 economic_ 
freedom_hrt  rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000  dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) 
gmm( equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, laglimits (2 2)) gmm (prov_loans, 
laglimits (2 2)) iv(h_stat3 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep 
ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) robust 
twostep 
(running xtabond2 on estimation sample) 
 
Bootstrap replications (500) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
..................................................   100 
..................................................   150 
..................................................   200 
..................................................   250 
....x.............................................   300 
..................................................   350 
x..........x......................................   400 
..................................................   450 
..................................................   500 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =      1498 
                                                Replications       =       497 
 
      command:  xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat3 equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans 
                    prov_loans lqdassets_custstfunding nonintexp_ta earningsassets_ta 
                    bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth 
                    gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
                    dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos 
                    dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
                    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) gmm( 
                    equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, laglimits (2 2)) 
                    gmm(prov_loans, laglimits (2 2)) iv(h_stat3 lqdassets_custstfunding 
                    earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt 
                    rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 
                    dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro 
                    dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser 
                    dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) robust twostep 
        _bs_1:  _b[h_stat3] 
 
                                  (Replications based on 285 clusters in bank) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |   -.030094   .0154149    -1.95   0.051    -.0603067    .0001187 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: one or more parameters could not be estimated in 3 bootstrap replicates; 
      standard-error estimates include only complete replications. 
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Specification 4  
Note: includes the Lerner Index (lerner_index) as a measure of market power. 
 
xtabond2 nim Lagnim lerner_index equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans  
lqdassets_custstfunding  nonintexp_ta  earningsassets_ta   bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 econ 
> omic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) 
gmm(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, laglimits (2 2)) gmm(prov_loans, 
laglimits (2 5)) iv(lerner_index lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep  
ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) robust 
twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, per 
> m. 
dv_2000 dropped due to collinearity 
dv_2001 dropped due to collinearity 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
dv_est dropped due to collinearity 
dv_lit dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimatio 
> n. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1380 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       265 
Number of instruments = 141                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(36) =   2484.03                                      avg =      5.21 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
         nim |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Lagnim |    .612043   .1058305     5.78   0.000      .404619    .8194671 
lerner_index |   .0123626   .0043128     2.87   0.004     .0039097    .0208156 
   equity_ta |   .0375567   .0206554     1.82   0.069    -.0029272    .0780405 
nonintinc_ta |  -.1003639   .1043116    -0.96   0.336    -.3048109    .1040831 
loggross_l~s |   .1700048   .1017186     1.67   0.095      -.02936    .3693697 
  prov_loans |   .0855729   .0603713     1.42   0.156    -.0327528    .2038985 
lqdassets_~g |  -.0038185   .0031999    -1.19   0.233    -.0100902    .0024531 
nonintexp_ta |   .1362424    .112924     1.21   0.228    -.0850846    .3575694 
earningsas~a |  -.0359109   .0072399    -4.96   0.000    -.0501009   -.0217209 
bankdep_cu~4 |   .0044094   .0034028     1.30   0.195      -.00226    .0110788 
ebrd_bankr~1 |   .2390418   .2638784     0.91   0.365    -.2781504     .756234 
economic_f~t |  -.0217024   .0144512    -1.50   0.133    -.0500264    .0066215 
  rgdpgrowth |    .049881   .0163878     3.04   0.002     .0177616    .0820004 
  gdp_percap |    .000031   .0000208     1.49   0.135    -9.66e-06    .0000717 
    cpi_ebrd |    .006733   .0149794     0.45   0.653     -.022626    .0360921 
  dv_foreign |  -.1217163   .1003094    -1.21   0.225    -.3183192    .0748865 
   dv_origin |   .0150561   .1079641     0.14   0.889    -.1965496    .2266617 
     dv_2002 |   .0143711   .2809377     0.05   0.959    -.5362566    .5649989 
     dv_2003 |    .297557   .2855127     1.04   0.297    -.2620377    .8571518 
     dv_2004 |   .2794973   .2391043     1.17   0.242    -.1891385     .748133 
     dv_2005 |   .0388099   .2296473     0.17   0.866    -.4112905    .4889104 
     dv_2006 |  -.1045529   .2057455    -0.51   0.611    -.5078067    .2987008 
     dv_2007 |  -.1631315   .1947168    -0.84   0.402    -.5447694    .2185063 
     dv_2008 |  -.1974446   .1845539    -1.07   0.285    -.5591635    .1642744 
      dv_bos |  -.8389226   .2217989    -3.78   0.000     -1.27364   -.4042048 
      dv_bul |  -.5411433   .3330156    -1.62   0.104    -1.193842    .1115554 
      dv_cro |  -1.180014   .4284289    -2.75   0.006    -2.019719   -.3403085 
      dv_cze |  -1.175681   .4977446    -2.36   0.018    -2.151243     -.20012 
      dv_hun |   -.571285   .5323599    -1.07   0.283    -1.614691    .4721212 
      dv_lat |  -1.052516   .3904654    -2.70   0.007    -1.817815   -.2872183 
      dv_mac |  -.3665997   .2712641    -1.35   0.177    -.8982675    .1650681 
      dv_pol |  -1.069334   .4484316    -2.38   0.017    -1.948244   -.1904245 
      dv_rom |  -.8241714   .3374803    -2.44   0.015    -1.485621   -.1627222 
      dv_ser |  -.7572893   .5309211    -1.43   0.154    -1.797876    .2832969 
      dv_svk |  -1.131893   .4103661    -2.76   0.006    -1.936195   -.3275899 
      dv_slo |  -1.540211   .4645305    -3.32   0.001    -2.450674   -.6297476 
       _cons |   2.457656   2.183527     1.13   0.260    -1.821978    6.737291 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(lerner_index lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta 
    bankdep_custdep_c4 ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth 
    gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 
    dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun 
    dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign 
    dv_origin) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/5).prov_loans 
    L2.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans) 
    L.Lagnim 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    lerner_index lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.prov_loans 
    DL.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans) 
    D.Lagnim 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.09  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.95  Pr > z =  0.340 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(104)  = 369.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(104)  = 109.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.335 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(56)   =  69.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.113 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(48)   =  40.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.770 
  gmm(Lagnim, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(91)   =  99.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.262 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =  10.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.663 
  gmm(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(42)   =  51.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.142 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(62)   =  57.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.630 
  gmm(prov_loans, lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(69)   =  72.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.354 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(35)   =  36.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.388 
  iv(lerner_index lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 ebrd_bankref1 
economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 
dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(73)   =  75.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.385 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(31)   =  33.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.341 
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Bootstrapped standard errors: 
bootstrap _b[lerner_index], reps(500) cluster(bank) idcluster(myclid) group(bank) seed (22): 
xtabond2 nim Lagnim lerner_index equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans  
lqdassets_custstfunding  nonintexp_ta  earningsassets_ta   bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 
economic_freedom_hrt  rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000 dv_2001 
dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze 
dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits 
(1 1)) gmm( equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, laglimits (2 2)) gmm( 
prov_loans, laglimits (2 5)) iv(lerner_index lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta   
bankdep_custdep  ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro 
dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign 
dv_origin) robust twostep 
(running xtabond2 on estimation sample) 
 
Bootstrap replications (500) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
..................................................   100 
..................................................   150 
..................................................   200 
..................................................   250 
..................................................   300 
..................................................   350 
..................................................   400 
..................................................   450 
..................................................   500 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =      1380 
                                                Replications       =       500 
 
      command:  xtabond2 nim Lagnim lerner_index equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans 
                    prov_loans lqdassets_custstfunding nonintexp_ta earningsassets_ta 
                    bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth 
                    gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
                    dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos 
                    dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
                    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) gmm( 
                    equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, laglimits (2 2)) 
                    gmm(prov_loans, laglimits (2 5)) iv(lerner_index 
                    lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep 
                    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd 
                    dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 
                    dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
                    dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign 
                    dv_origin) robust twostep 
        _bs_1:  _b[lerner_index] 
 
                                  (Replications based on 265 clusters in bank) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |   .0123626   .0048756     2.54   0.011     .0028066    .0219187 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Specification 5  
Note: replaces the measure of competition with the degree of market concentration (i.e. Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index: HHI_dep). 
 
xtabond2 nim Lagnim hhi_dep equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans  lqdassets_ 
custstfunding  nonintexp_ta  earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 economic_ 
freedom_hrt  rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin  dv_2000  dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 2)) 
gmm( equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, laglimits (2 2)) gmm(prov_loans, 
laglimits (2 5)) iv(hhi_dep lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep 
ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) robust 
twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, per 
> m. 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimatio 
> n. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1530 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       285 
Number of instruments = 172                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(40) =   2834.88                                      avg =      5.37 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
         nim |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Lagnim |   .6472319   .0827422     7.82   0.000     .4850602    .8094036 
     hhi_dep |    .000313    .000144     2.17   0.030     .0000308    .0005953 
   equity_ta |   .0410104   .0201206     2.04   0.042     .0015747    .0804461 
nonintinc_ta |  -.1122743   .1057285    -1.06   0.288    -.3194984    .0949498 
loggross_l~s |   .2139026   .0836558     2.56   0.011     .0499402     .377865 
  prov_loans |   .0969084   .0493323     1.96   0.049     .0002188     .193598 
lqdassets_~g |  -.0020262   .0023327    -0.87   0.385    -.0065983    .0025458 
nonintexp_ta |   .1713151   .0972837     1.76   0.078    -.0193574    .3619875 
earningsas~a |  -.0311906   .0065015    -4.80   0.000    -.0439333   -.0184479 
bankdep_cu~4 |   .0040645   .0031856     1.28   0.202    -.0021792    .0103082 
ebrd_bankr~1 |    .211067   .2375889     0.89   0.374    -.2545987    .6767328 
economic_f~t |  -.0214992   .0131085    -1.64   0.101    -.0471913     .004193 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0577727   .0141938     4.07   0.000     .0299534     .085592 
  gdp_percap |   .0000379   .0000214     1.77   0.077    -4.04e-06    .0000798 
    cpi_ebrd |   .0010431   .0147022     0.07   0.943    -.0277727    .0298588 
  dv_foreign |  -.1653948   .0974986    -1.70   0.090    -.3564886     .025699 
   dv_origin |   .0048537   .1171384     0.04   0.967    -.2247333    .2344407 
     dv_2000 |    .253144   .4025542     0.63   0.529    -.5358477    1.042136 
     dv_2001 |    .383443   .3990165     0.96   0.337    -.3986149    1.165501 
     dv_2002 |  -.0324125   .2651962    -0.12   0.903    -.5521876    .4873626 
     dv_2003 |   .1774244   .2640554     0.67   0.502    -.3401146    .6949634 
     dv_2004 |   .2441769    .216172     1.13   0.259    -.1795123    .6678661 
     dv_2005 |   .0205987    .210159     0.10   0.922    -.3913054    .4325028 
     dv_2006 |  -.0979109    .188528    -0.52   0.604     -.467419    .2715972 
     dv_2007 |   -.138334   .1829703    -0.76   0.450    -.4969493    .2202813 
     dv_2008 |  -.1775598   .1657339    -1.07   0.284    -.5023922    .1472726 
      dv_bos |   -.386209    .248484    -1.55   0.120    -.8732287    .1008107 
      dv_bul |   .0688352   .3299373     0.21   0.835    -.5778301    .7155005 
      dv_cro |  -.7402066   .4206958    -1.76   0.078    -1.564755     .084342 
      dv_cze |  -.8809404   .4631568    -1.90   0.057    -1.788711    .0268302 
      dv_est |  -.6823797   .5039394    -1.35   0.176    -1.670083    .3053234 
      dv_hun |  -.3694582   .4772309    -0.77   0.439    -1.304814    .5658972 
      dv_lat |  -.3832532    .430006    -0.89   0.373    -1.226049    .4595432 
      dv_lit |  -.9602804   .3062741    -3.14   0.002    -1.560567   -.3599942 
      dv_mac |  -.1373057   .2732893    -0.50   0.615    -.6729428    .3983314 
      dv_pol |   -.649292   .4693267    -1.38   0.167    -1.569155    .2705715 
      dv_rom |    -.44471   .2884214    -1.54   0.123    -1.010006    .1205855 
      dv_ser |  -.5176591   .4552193    -1.14   0.255    -1.409872    .3745543 
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      dv_svk |  -.8276732   .3894139    -2.13   0.034     -1.59091   -.0644359 
      dv_slo |  -1.175224   .4777509    -2.46   0.014    -2.111599   -.2388498 
       _cons |   .5984094   1.987547     0.30   0.763    -3.297112     4.49393 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(hhi_dep lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/5).prov_loans 
    L2.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans) 
    L(1/2).Lagnim 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    hhi_dep lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.prov_loans 
    DL.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans) 
    D.Lagnim 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.52  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.66  Pr > z =  0.508 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(131)  = 403.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(131)  = 134.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.398 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(75)   =  88.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.131 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(56)   =  45.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.836 
  gmm(Lagnim, lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(109)  = 115.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.320 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(22)   =  19.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.634 
  gmm(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(56)   =  71.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.077 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(75)   =  62.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.839 
  gmm(prov_loans, lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(91)   =  92.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.450 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(40)   =  42.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.363 
  iv(hhi_dep lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 ebrd_bankref1 
economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 
dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(97)   =  97.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.459 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(34)   =  36.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.341 
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Specification 6  
Note: excludes the foreign ownership variables. 
 
 
xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat1 equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans lqdassets_ 
custstfunding nonintexp_ta earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 economic_ 
freedom_hrt  rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000  dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 
dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit 
dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 2)) gmm(equity_ta 
nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, laglimits (2 2)) gmm(prov_loans, laglimits (3 5)) 
iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1  
economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 
dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo) robust twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, per 
> m. 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimatio 
> n. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1822 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       347 
Number of instruments = 160                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(38) =   2812.63                                      avg =      5.25 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
         nim |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Lagnim |    .666222   .0696984     9.56   0.000     .5296156    .8028284 
     h_stat1 |   -.032948   .0177142    -1.86   0.063    -.0676673    .0017712 
   equity_ta |    .033818   .0176882     1.91   0.056    -.0008502    .0684861 
nonintinc_ta |  -.1709283   .0894924    -1.91   0.056    -.3463302    .0044736 
loggross_l~s |    .236889   .1013366     2.34   0.019     .0382729    .4355052 
  prov_loans |   .0751385   .0717849     1.05   0.295    -.0655574    .2158343 
lqdassets_~g |  -.0022922     .00282    -0.81   0.416    -.0078192    .0032348 
nonintexp_ta |   .1791825   .0826646     2.17   0.030     .0171629    .3412022 
earningsas~a |  -.0294618    .006739    -4.37   0.000      -.04267   -.0162537 
bankdep_cu~4 |   .0030436   .0032422     0.94   0.348    -.0033109    .0093982 
ebrd_bankr~1 |  -.1556325   .2050613    -0.76   0.448    -.5575453    .2462803 
economic_f~t |  -.0185298   .0155517    -1.19   0.233    -.0490106    .0119509 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0509151   .0170717     2.98   0.003     .0174552     .084375 
  gdp_percap |   .0000206   .0000206     1.00   0.318    -.0000198     .000061 
    cpi_ebrd |    .010576   .0236156     0.45   0.654    -.0357097    .0568617 
     dv_2000 |   .4045686   .3732272     1.08   0.278    -.3269433    1.136081 
     dv_2001 |   .1979183   .3797732     0.52   0.602    -.5464235      .94226 
     dv_2002 |  -.0395011    .244661    -0.16   0.872     -.519028    .4400257 
     dv_2003 |   .2177238   .2587595     0.84   0.400    -.2894355    .7248831 
     dv_2004 |   .3598842   .2320604     1.55   0.121    -.0949459    .8147143 
     dv_2005 |   .1170714   .2094731     0.56   0.576    -.2934883    .5276312 
     dv_2006 |  -.0499989   .1916805    -0.26   0.794    -.4256858     .325688 
     dv_2007 |  -.0532775   .1847447    -0.29   0.773    -.4153705    .3088154 
     dv_2008 |  -.1049062   .2112182    -0.50   0.619    -.5188863     .309074 
      dv_bos |  -.7277752    .312383    -2.33   0.020    -1.340035   -.1155157 
      dv_bul |  -.2171703   .3114715    -0.70   0.486    -.8276433    .3933027 
      dv_cro |  -.6958974   .3657216    -1.90   0.057    -1.412699    .0209037 
      dv_cze |  -.7363076   .4913444    -1.50   0.134    -1.699325    .2267097 
      dv_est |  -.6759697   .6393661    -1.06   0.290    -1.929104    .5771648 
      dv_hun |  -.4452224   .4734621    -0.94   0.347    -1.373191    .4827463 
      dv_lat |  -.4733736   .4099593    -1.15   0.248    -1.276879    .3301318 
      dv_lit |  -1.107461   .3972046    -2.79   0.005    -1.885968   -.3289545 
      dv_mac |  -.1184003   .2872237    -0.41   0.680    -.6813485    .4445479 
      dv_pol |  -.8805344   .3840232    -2.29   0.022    -1.633206   -.1278628 
      dv_rom |  -.9253582   .3883513    -2.38   0.017    -1.686513   -.1642036 
      dv_ser |  -.5557227   .6048226    -0.92   0.358    -1.741153    .6297079 
      dv_svk |  -.8583886   .4040345    -2.12   0.034    -1.650282   -.0664956 
      dv_slo |   -1.01005   .4840212    -2.09   0.037    -1.958714   -.0613862 
       _cons |   1.860295   2.238938     0.83   0.406    -2.527943    6.248532 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
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  Standard 
    D.(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(3/5).prov_loans 
    L2.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans) 
    L(1/2).Lagnim 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL2.prov_loans 
    DL.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans) 
    D.Lagnim 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -5.40  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.42  Pr > z =  0.154 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(121)  = 445.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(121)  = 137.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.149 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(65)   =  90.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.018 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(56)   =  46.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.821 
  gmm(Lagnim, lag(1 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(100)  = 115.65  Prob > chi2 =  0.136 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(21)   =  21.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.425 
  gmm(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(46)   =  54.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.186 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(75)   =  82.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.250 
  gmm(prov_loans, lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(90)   =  98.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.261 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(31)   =  39.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.151 
  iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 ebrd_bankref1 
economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 
dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(88)   = 106.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.092 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(33)   =  31.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.561 
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Specification 7  
Note: includes the interaction term between operating expenses (nonintexp_ta) and the degree of competition 
(h_stat1) in order test if the relationship between operating expenses and net interest margins is affected by the 
degree of competition. 
 
xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat1 equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans  lqdassets_ 
custstfunding nonintexp_ta hstat1_nonintexpta earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep  ebrd_bankref1  
economic_freedom_hrt  rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd  dv_2000  dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 
dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) gmm( equity_ta 
nonintexp_ta hstat1_nonintexpta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, laglimits (3 5)) gmm(prov_loans, 
laglimits (2 5)) iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep 
ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) robust 
twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, per 
> m. 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimatio 
> n. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1498 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       285 
Number of instruments = 237                     Obs per group: min =         0 
Wald chi2(39) =   2464.74                                      avg =      5.26 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
         nim |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Lagnim |   .5920681   .0811304     7.30   0.000     .4330555    .7510806 
     h_stat1 |   .1776263   .0863571     2.06   0.040     .0083695     .346883 
   equity_ta |  -.0066934   .0210389    -0.32   0.750    -.0479288    .0345421 
nonintinc_ta |  -.2387481   .1131023    -2.11   0.035    -.4604245   -.0170717 
loggross_l~s |    .035451   .0633493     0.56   0.576    -.0887114    .1596134 
  prov_loans |    .021783   .0504771     0.43   0.666    -.0771504    .1207164 
lqdassets_~g |  -.0006222   .0034035    -0.18   0.855    -.0072929    .0060486 
nonintexp_ta |   .2705715   .0906344     2.99   0.003     .0929314    .4482116 
hstat1_non~a |  -.0673198   .0343931    -1.96   0.050    -.1347289    .0000894 
earningsas~a |  -.0247175   .0067338    -3.67   0.000    -.0379155   -.0115196 
bankdep_cu~4 |   .0034737   .0035761     0.97   0.331    -.0035354    .0104828 
ebrd_bankr~1 |   .1856335   .2399247     0.77   0.439    -.2846103    .6558773 
economic_f~t |  -.0319694   .0167246    -1.91   0.056     -.064749    .0008102 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0545033   .0115879     4.70   0.000     .0317914    .0772152 
  gdp_percap |   .0000607   .0000245     2.48   0.013     .0000127    .0001086 
    cpi_ebrd |   .0147725   .0151324     0.98   0.329    -.0148865    .0444315 
     dv_2000 |   .1165867   .4813689     0.24   0.809     -.826879    1.060053 
     dv_2001 |   .3549072   .3671046     0.97   0.334    -.3646046    1.074419 
     dv_2002 |   -.097979   .2771589    -0.35   0.724    -.6412004    .4452424 
     dv_2003 |   .0562077   .3020471     0.19   0.852    -.5357937    .6482091 
     dv_2004 |   .0985603   .2526203     0.39   0.696    -.3965665    .5936871 
     dv_2005 |  -.1800122   .2236587    -0.80   0.421    -.6183752    .2583507 
     dv_2006 |  -.1713722   .2076501    -0.83   0.409    -.5783589    .2356145 
     dv_2007 |  -.2750673   .1951268    -1.41   0.159    -.6575089    .1073743 
     dv_2008 |    -.35064   .1810829    -1.94   0.053    -.7055559    .0042759 
      dv_bos |  -.4826847   .2618775    -1.84   0.065    -.9959551    .0305857 
      dv_bul |  -.1609074   .3492055    -0.46   0.645    -.8453377    .5235228 
      dv_cro |  -1.248147    .443096    -2.82   0.005    -2.116599    -.379695 
      dv_cze |  -1.017631   .4627449    -2.20   0.028    -1.924594   -.1106677 
      dv_est |  -.5255971   .5257858    -1.00   0.317    -1.556118    .5049242 
      dv_hun |  -.5738117   .5233759    -1.10   0.273     -1.59961    .4519863 
      dv_lat |  -.6913515     .37033    -1.87   0.062    -1.417185     .034482 
      dv_lit |  -.8701696   .3311021    -2.63   0.009    -1.519118   -.2212213 
      dv_mac |   .3097726   .2655878     1.17   0.243    -.2107699     .830315 
      dv_pol |  -.8616298   .4582479    -1.88   0.060    -1.759779    .0365197 
      dv_rom |  -.5425918   .3205402    -1.69   0.091    -1.170839    .0856555 
      dv_ser |   .0270941   .5435941     0.05   0.960    -1.038331    1.092519 
      dv_svk |  -1.091232   .3605794    -3.03   0.002    -1.797955   -.3845095 
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      dv_slo |  -1.650145   .5006479    -3.30   0.001    -2.631397   -.6688936 
       _cons |   4.161045   1.971967     2.11   0.035     .2960607    8.026029 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.Lagnim 
    L(3/5).(equity_ta nonintexp_ta hstat1_nonintexpta nonintinc_ta 
    loggross_loans) 
    L(2/5).prov_loans 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.Lagnim 
    DL2.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta hstat1_nonintexpta nonintinc_ta 
    loggross_loans) 
    DL.prov_loans 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.55  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.01  Pr > z =  0.315 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(197)  = 623.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(197)  = 209.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.260 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(138)  = 157.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.126 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(59)   =  52.17  Prob > chi2 =  0.723 
  gmm(Lagnim, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(188)  = 197.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.309 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =  12.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.203 
  gmm(equity_ta nonintexp_ta hstat1_nonintexpta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, lag(3 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(44)   =  43.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.485 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(153)  = 165.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.229 
  gmm(prov_loans, lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(157)  = 174.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.158 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(40)   =  34.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.712 
  iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 ebrd_bankref1 
economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 
dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(163)  = 175.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.234 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(34)   =  33.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.488 
 
 
 
Bootstrapped standard errors: 
bootstrap _b[hstat1_nonintexpta], reps(500) cluster(bank) idcluster(myclid) group(bank)seed 
(22): xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat1 equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans 
lqdassets_custstfunding nonintexp_ta hstat1_nonintexpta  earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep  
ebrd_bankref1  economic_freedom_hrt  rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd  dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) 
gmm( equity_ta nonintexp_ta hstat1_nonintexpta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, laglimits (3 5)) 
gmm(prov_loans, laglimits (2 5)) iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta   
bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro 
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dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign 
dv_origin) robust twostep 
(running xtabond2 on estimation sample) 
    D.(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) 
    L.Lagnim 
    L(3/5).(equity_ta nonintexp_ta hstat1_nonintexpta nonintinc_ta 
    loggross_loans) 
    L(2/5).prov_loans 
    _cons 
    h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin 
    D.Lagnim 
    DL2.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta hstat1_nonintexpta nonintinc_ta 
    loggross_loans) 
    DL.prov_loans 
  GMM instruments for levels 
  gmm(Lagnim, lag(1 1)) 
  gmm(equity_ta nonintexp_ta hstat1_nonintexpta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, lag(3 5)) 
  gmm(prov_loans, lag(2 5)) 
  iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 ebrd_bankref1 ec 
> onomic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_200 
> 4 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_l 
> at dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) 
 
Bootstrap replications (500) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
...x................................x.........x...    50 
...............x..................................   100 
................x.................................   150 
..................................................   200 
............................x.....................   250 
..................................................   300 
..................................................   350 
x...................x.....x.......................   400 
.....x............................................   450 
.................x................................   500 
 
Bootstrap results                               Number of obs      =      1498 
                                                Replications       =       489 
 
      command:  xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat1 equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans 
                    prov_loans lqdassets_custstfunding nonintexp_ta hstat1_nonintexpta 
                    earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt 
                    rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 
                    dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro 
                    dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser 
                    dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) gmm( equity_ta 
                    nonintexp_ta hstat1_nonintexpta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, 
                    laglimits (3 5)) gmm(prov_loans, laglimits (2 5)) iv(h_stat1 
                    lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep 
                    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd 
                    dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 
                    dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
                    dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign 
                    dv_origin) robust twostep 
        _bs_1:  _b[hstat1_nonintexpta] 
 
                                  (Replications based on 285 clusters in bank) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _bs_1 |  -.0673198   .0360029    -1.87   0.062    -.1378842    .0032446 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Note: one or more parameters could not be estimated in 11 bootstrap replicates; 
      standard-error estimates include only complete replications. 
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Specification 8  
Note: includes the implicit payments variable among the control variables (implicit_rate1). 
 
xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat1 equity_ta  implicit_rate1 loggross_loans prov_loans  lqdasse 
ts_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt  
rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_foreign dv_origin dv_2000  dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 
dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) gmm( equity_ta  
loggross_loans , laglimits (2 2)) gmm(implicit_rate1, laglimits (3 3)) gmm(prov_loans, 
laglimits (2 5)) iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep  
ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 
dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est 
dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) robust 
twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, per 
> m. 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimatio 
> n. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1499 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       285 
Number of instruments = 144                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(39) =   2921.45                                      avg =      5.26 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =        10 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
         nim |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Lagnim |   .6719472   .0771298     8.71   0.000     .5207755    .8231189 
     h_stat1 |  -.0314095   .0152226    -2.06   0.039    -.0612452   -.0015738 
   equity_ta |    .019952   .0215568     0.93   0.355    -.0222986    .0622027 
implicit_r~1 |   .1771207   .0838161     2.11   0.035     .0128443    .3413972 
loggross_l~s |   .2142418   .0849631     2.52   0.012     .0477171    .3807664 
  prov_loans |   .0555915   .0580649     0.96   0.338    -.0582135    .1693965 
lqdassets_~g |  -.0003707    .002612    -0.14   0.887    -.0054902    .0047488 
earningsas~a |  -.0289886   .0061961    -4.68   0.000    -.0411327   -.0168445 
bankdep_cu~4 |   .0042135   .0028187     1.49   0.135    -.0013111    .0097381 
ebrd_bankr~1 |   -.034588    .214308    -0.16   0.872     -.454624     .385448 
economic_f~t |  -.0252015   .0156036    -1.62   0.106     -.055784    .0053809 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0411411   .0148439     2.77   0.006     .0120476    .0702345 
  gdp_percap |    .000046   .0000206     2.23   0.026     5.62e-06    .0000864 
    cpi_ebrd |   .0112076   .0131511     0.85   0.394    -.0145681    .0369834 
  dv_foreign |  -.1279173   .0915173    -1.40   0.162    -.3072879    .0514532 
   dv_origin |  -.0247742   .0880054    -0.28   0.778    -.1972616    .1477132 
     dv_2000 |   .4282867   .3994238     1.07   0.284    -.3545696    1.211143 
     dv_2001 |   .6597668   .3496206     1.89   0.059    -.0254769     1.34501 
     dv_2002 |   .1403464   .2591481     0.54   0.588    -.3675746    .6482673 
     dv_2003 |   .3104185   .2659684     1.17   0.243    -.2108701     .831707 
     dv_2004 |   .3485655   .2311379     1.51   0.132    -.1044565    .8015876 
     dv_2005 |   .1271492   .2081693     0.61   0.541     -.280855    .5351535 
     dv_2006 |    .006868   .1941928     0.04   0.972    -.3737429    .3874788 
     dv_2007 |  -.0712809   .1793427    -0.40   0.691    -.4227862    .2802244 
     dv_2008 |  -.1867387   .1616407    -1.16   0.248    -.5035487    .1300713 
      dv_bos |  -.8754063    .223421    -3.92   0.000    -1.313303   -.4375092 
      dv_bul |  -.3783128   .2904588    -1.30   0.193    -.9476016     .190976 
      dv_cro |  -1.208663   .4033474    -3.00   0.003    -1.999209   -.4181166 
      dv_cze |  -1.210489   .4560527    -2.65   0.008    -2.104336   -.3166425 
      dv_est |  -1.130078   .5459221    -2.07   0.038    -2.200065   -.0600899 
      dv_hun |  -.6980003   .4884387    -1.43   0.153    -1.655323     .259322 
      dv_lat |  -.7456895    .353317    -2.11   0.035    -1.438178   -.0532009 
      dv_lit |  -1.196823   .3315732    -3.61   0.000    -1.846694    -.546951 
      dv_mac |  -.1328249   .3391877    -0.39   0.695    -.7976206    .5319709 
      dv_pol |  -1.112616   .3176553    -3.50   0.000    -1.735208   -.4900227 
      dv_rom |  -.9549214   .3345333    -2.85   0.004    -1.610595   -.2992482 
      dv_ser |  -.4055439   .5198461    -0.78   0.435    -1.424424    .6133359 
      dv_svk |  -1.182332   .3768079    -3.14   0.002    -1.920862   -.4438019 
      dv_slo |  -1.619861   .4728329    -3.43   0.001    -2.546596   -.6931252 
       _cons |   2.343235   2.072001     1.13   0.258    -1.717811    6.404282 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/5).prov_loans 
    L3.implicit_rate1 
    L2.(equity_ta loggross_loans) 
    L.Lagnim 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.prov_loans 
    DL2.implicit_rate1 
    DL.(equity_ta loggross_loans) 
    D.Lagnim 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -5.02  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.85  Pr > z =  0.395 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(104)  = 345.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(104)  =  99.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.610 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(56)   =  64.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.208 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(48)   =  35.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.918 
  gmm(Lagnim, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(90)   =  86.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.573 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  12.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.569 
  gmm(equity_ta loggross_loans, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(67)   =  71.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.342 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(37)   =  28.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.849 
  gmm(implicit_rate1, lag(3 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(86)   =  89.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.389 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =  10.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.921 
  gmm(prov_loans, lag(2 5)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(64)   =  71.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.248 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(40)   =  28.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.922 
  iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 ebrd_bankref1 
economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 
dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(70)   =  68.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.538 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(34)   =  31.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.608 
418 
 
Specification 9  
Note: includes the volatility of money market interest rates (stdev_interbank) among the control variables. 
xtabond2 nim Lagnim h_stat1 equity_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans prov_loans lqdassets_ 
custstfunding nonintexp_ta earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1  
economic_freedom_hrt  rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd stdev_interbank dv_foreign dv_origin 
dv_2000  dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  dv_bos 
dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo, 
gmm(Lagnim, laglimits (1 1)) gmm( equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, 
laglimits (2 2)) gmm(prov_loans, laglimits (2 3)) iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding 
earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep ebrd_bankref1  economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap 
cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009  
dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk 
dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin stdev_interbank) robust twostep 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor speed, per m. 
dv_2000 dropped due to collinearity 
dv_2001 dropped due to collinearity 
dv_2009 dropped due to collinearity 
dv_bos dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =      1326 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =       260 
Number of instruments = 130                     Obs per group: min =         1 
Wald chi2(38) =   2498.63                                      avg =      5.10 
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
         nim |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Lagnim |   .7520719   .0717721    10.48   0.000     .6114011    .8927427 
     h_stat1 |  -.0326195   .0193024    -1.69   0.091    -.0704515    .0052124 
   equity_ta |   .0449562   .0175698     2.56   0.011     .0105201    .0793923 
nonintinc_ta |  -.2720017    .114066    -2.38   0.017    -.4955669   -.0484364 
loggross_l~s |   .2065882   .1080373     1.91   0.056     -.005161    .4183375 
  prov_loans |  -.0128563   .0606415    -0.21   0.832    -.1317115     .105999 
lqdassets_~g |  -.0007852   .0021062    -0.37   0.709    -.0049133     .003343 
nonintexp_ta |   .2300394    .082592     2.79   0.005      .068162    .3919168 
earningsas~a |  -.0233106   .0062032    -3.76   0.000    -.0354685   -.0111526 
bankdep_cu~4 |   .0005649   .0026278     0.21   0.830    -.0045855    .0057153 
ebrd_bankr~1 |   .4579809    .278792     1.64   0.100    -.0884413    1.004403 
economic_f~t |  -.0139011   .0204435    -0.68   0.497    -.0539696    .0261673 
  rgdpgrowth |   .0375442   .0156329     2.40   0.016     .0069043     .068184 
  gdp_percap |   .0000392   .0000241     1.63   0.104    -8.04e-06    .0000864 
    cpi_ebrd |  -.0005027   .0145042    -0.03   0.972    -.0289304    .0279251 
stdev_inte~k |  -.0372319   .0719479    -0.52   0.605    -.1782472    .1037834 
  dv_foreign |  -.2020926   .1217812    -1.66   0.097    -.4407794    .0365943 
   dv_origin |    .023403    .115209     0.20   0.839    -.2024025    .2492086 
     dv_2002 |    .228104   .3202534     0.71   0.476    -.3995811    .8557891 
     dv_2003 |   .2752902   .2981141     0.92   0.356    -.3090027    .8595831 
     dv_2004 |   .3058311   .2658293     1.15   0.250    -.2151848    .8268471 
     dv_2005 |  -.0327624   .2463803    -0.13   0.894    -.5156589    .4501342 
     dv_2006 |  -.1682161   .2285058    -0.74   0.462    -.6160793     .279647 
     dv_2007 |  -.1791602   .2092385    -0.86   0.392    -.5892602    .2309398 
     dv_2008 |  -.2553675   .1840601    -1.39   0.165    -.6161186    .1053837 
      dv_bul |  -.9628803   .4108931    -2.34   0.019    -1.768216   -.1575446 
      dv_cro |  -1.794978   .5348301    -3.36   0.001    -2.843226   -.7467303 
      dv_cze |  -1.768692   .6520402    -2.71   0.007    -3.046667   -.4907166 
      dv_est |  -1.747654   .6878404    -2.54   0.011    -3.095796   -.3995112 
      dv_hun |  -1.466197   .6310149    -2.32   0.020    -2.702964   -.2294308 
      dv_lat |  -1.180882   .5258258    -2.25   0.025    -2.211481    -.150282 
      dv_lit |    -1.5556   .4727379    -3.29   0.001    -2.482149   -.6290505 
      dv_mac |  -.3254057   .3865554    -0.84   0.400     -1.08304     .432229 
      dv_pol |  -1.465318   .5356567    -2.74   0.006    -2.515186   -.4154501 
      dv_rom |  -1.289718   .4146005    -3.11   0.002     -2.10232   -.4771164 
      dv_ser |  -2.021559   .6155219    -3.28   0.001     -3.22796   -.8151582 
      dv_svk |  -1.608799   .5313391    -3.03   0.002    -2.650205   -.5673937 
      dv_slo |  -1.744795   .6700601    -2.60   0.009    -3.058089   -.4315016 
       _cons |  -.3326899   1.981117    -0.17   0.867    -4.215608    3.550228 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin stdev_interbank) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L.Lagnim 
    L2.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans) 
    L(2/3).prov_loans 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 
    ebrd_bankref1 economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 
    dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 
    dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol 
    dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin stdev_interbank 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.Lagnim 
    DL.(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans) 
    DL.prov_loans 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -5.03  Pr > z =  0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.69  Pr > z =  0.491 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(91)   = 344.70  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(91)   =  97.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.309 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(43)   =  49.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.233 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(48)   =  47.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.481 
  gmm(Lagnim, lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(78)   =  85.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.251 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =  11.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.594 
  gmm(equity_ta nonintexp_ta nonintinc_ta loggross_loans, lag(2 2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(29)   =  33.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.261 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(62)   =  63.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.414 
  gmm(prov_loans, lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(69)   =  80.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.157 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(22)   =  16.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.794 
  iv(h_stat1 lqdassets_custstfunding earningsassets_ta bankdep_custdep_c4 ebrd_bankref1 
economic_freedom_hrt rgdpgrowth gdp_percap cpi_ebrd dv_2000 dv_2001 dv_2002 dv_2003 dv_2004 
dv_2005 dv_2006 dv_2007 dv_2008 dv_2009 dv_bos dv_bul dv_cro dv_cze dv_est dv_hun dv_lat 
dv_lit dv_mac dv_pol dv_rom dv_ser dv_svk dv_slo dv_foreign dv_origin stdev_interbank) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(59)   =  70.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.154 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(32)   =  27.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.711 
